BA's 80 Knot Call

[c152pilot]

Hi

Does anybody know why in BA SOPs, the call by the NHP: "80 KNOTS" gets no response from the HP?

Thanks :ok:

[Carnage Matey!]

Why does it need a response?

[c152pilot]

to check if the guy is still alive!!!

why wait until the v1 call to find out

[tom775257]

We use the (100kts) call as a way to check i)Incapacitation of the handling pilot ii)instrument x-check so the response 'checked' is very important in Airbus standard SOP, and the airline I work for.

[Sean Dell]

In an RTO below 80kts NHP selects Reverse Idle, above Full Reverse.

[tropical wave]

We use 80kts call by the nfp, and fp responds 'checked, or 80kts.Works well.

[Carnage Matey!]

If the guy is keeping the aircraft on the centreline at the 80kts then I think it's highly unlikely he's dead. They don't drive themselves you know!

[alexban]

CM , on our SOP states also , that if no answer at 80 kt call ,then PM will say 'my controlls' and abort the take-off.
What are the reasons for the 80 kt call? From what I know those are:
speed check
separation between the 2 phases of RTo: low energy and high energy RTO
incapacitation check
There are different levels of incapacitation,and the fact that the plane is tracking the cl doesn't allways mean that the PF is 100% on the job.Answering a call check,at a specific time, increases the certitude about his awareness..
I knew pilots,very experienced ones,who sometimes flew the plane 'on autopilot' (and I don't mean the airplane A/P) , while their mind was somewhere else. An interrogation check will always reveal such an incapacitation , dangerous due to lack of wareness.

[stanley]

part of the 80 knt call goes back to the 707 when the t/o power had to be set by 80 knts and a cross check of the instruments

[False Capture]

c152pilot,
I guess the main reason is because BA flight operations think there's little chance of someone becoming incapacitated between setting take-off power and the a/c reaching 80kts. As a result, no response to the 80kts call is there to reduce 'unnecessary chatter' during an important part of the flight. Furthermore, no response will prevent unnecessary aborts due to communication cock-ups.

The 80kt call is there as a trigger to remind us that we no longer "stop for any failure". As Sean Dell says, it also reminds NHP to select Reverse Idle or Full Reverse as necessary.

You've probably noticed the lack of incapacitation check at the other end of the flight as there's no response to the "100 above" call on an instrument approach.

I guess in BA we retire early so there should be less chance of us collapsing at work ....:hmm:

[stanley]

tyou are right no reply to the 100 above call but at DECIDE call if the PF does not responed then the PNF will exicute a goround.

[TAC inop.]

On the 777, the PM will say '80 kts' then the PF will say 'Hold' as a responce to the FMA changing its autothrottle mode.

What type do you operate? Maybe you have a similar FMA call ?

[D'vay]

I wonder if the fact that cautions and warnings are automatically inhibited on the take-off run? The Master Caution lights are usually inhibited from about 80kt on takeoff to 400ft and engine fire warning bells are therefore usually inhibited from approximately V1/VR to 400ft.
I see it as a reminder of that fact.
D'vay

[BadBigbusBoy]

Big Bus : same idea, different speed = 100 kts

1> incapacitation check
2> up to a 100 kts we CAN stop for any caution/warning

speed > 100 kts : only allowed to stop for warnings, no cautions !

[A37575]

Surprised that in BA and some other airlines the PNF operates the reverse in a high speed abort while presumably the captain stands on the anchors if not in RTO. Is that a Boeing recommended procedure?

What happens if slippery runway with crosswind where the aircraft can drift sideways and weathercock under reverse thrust sideways vector? I can see an awful lot of talking and hands in all directions from two pilots if that happens. Would it not be more safer and certainly easier and less confusing to have one man handling the full abort (the captain) while the First Mate monitors and initiates necessary radio calls etc?

[alexban]

Boeing recommends the captain to keep hand on throttles after takeoff thrust is set,and perform the rto manouvre if necesary,no matter who is PF.
False Capture: about incapacity check during approach...what if there is no answer at call 'minimums' ..? This is on our sop the incapatitation call,where if no answer from PF the PM will assume controls and state his decision.
I've heard BA has many differences from average SOP,but you have to remember they are on the market for a long time now,and they have established they're own SOP,a good one if you learn it and stick with it.
There is no perfect SOP,but most are ok if you know and follow ,instead of trying to add or modify from older SOP's you've known.

[G-Dawg]

We follow the new boeing proc's in our company and we have to set T/O thrust by 60kts, the 80kts call is for incapacitatin and we will also get a change to throttle hold on our fma, which is annouced....BA do it differently, but i guess your going to get slight changes form company to company, not a massive issue, the only thing is that if you don't get a response at V1 your only option is to go, which does seem a little strange but there you go, oh and also following the standard boeing sop, the capt will do the abort as his hands are on the throttle until V1...

[teamilk&sugar]

A whole bunch of things happen at 80kts...(Boeings anyway)
1. Incapacitation check
2. Instrument x-check
3. Stopping for "any abnormality" has ended, and we now only stop for more serious things...
4. Master caution "attention getters" (lights and aurals) now inhibited
5. The autothrottle system disengages from the throttle servo gears and so cannot move a thrust lever until new selction on Thrust management coputer (earlier versions, or MCP on later models)


...I'm sure there's more, but I cant think at the mo...

[Junkflyer]

We fly the classics and power must be set by 80 knots otherwise g/a thrust is set. Also it separates the low speed/high speed regime for abort decisions and instrument cross checks are done.

[TAC inop.]

MASTER WARNINGS inhibited after 80kts.....really

[wobble2plank]

On the bus half deflection forward stick is taken prior to setting the T/O thrust (full deflection for >20 kt X-wind or and tail wind). This is to keep the N/W firmly on the ground for steering during the time the pitch power couple would try to lift the nose. At 80 knots the NHP calls and checks the HP releases, slowly, the forward pressure. This tells the NHP the HP is 'alive' and gets rid of the nose wheel loading as, above 80kts, the aerodynamic effects of the rudder outweigh the effects of the nose wheel steering.

[TheGorrilla]

TAC INOP,

We do not call FMA changes when they should happen on the B777 sir.

[TAC inop.]

Sir (nice one)...we call FMA every time it changes, as part of crew awhereness

and I still cant believe the bit about warning inhibs at 80 kts...cautions ok, but warnings.....

[MrBernoulli]

TAC inop,

On the BA 777 the PM calls 80 kts and both PM and PF would expect to see the 'HOLD' FMA, they just don't verbalise it, thats all. For your interest, we call them NHP (non-handling pilot) and HP (handling pilot) respectively.

I cant see the post about "the bit about warning inhibs at 80 ts...cautions ok, but warnings" (deleted maybe?) but that is wrong. On the BA 777 the Master Caution lights and beeper are inhibited at 80 kts. The Master Warning Lights and Fire Bell and Siren are inhibited at V1.

[TAC inop.]

teamilkand sugar wrote

'A whole bunch of things happen at 80kts...(Boeings anyway)
1. Incapacitation check
2. Instrument x-check
3. Stopping for "any abnormality" has ended, and we now only stop for more serious things...
4. Master caution and master warning "attention getters" (lights and aurals) now inhibited
5. The autothrottle system disengages from the throttle servo gears and so cannot move a thrust lever until new selction on Thrust management coputer (earlier versions, or MCP on later models)'


ok...now I am talking about item 4...now, that aint right, not at 80 for warnings

further, to reflect on the thread itself, I sugested early that maybe BA had a call of 'hold' to respond to the 80kt call ... but I guess you just dont respond at all...does seem strange, but hey, whatever rings BA's bells

[Human Factor]

you are right no reply to the 100 above call but at DECIDE call if the PF does not responed then the PNF will exicute a goround.

Further to the above (BA use "50 above"), if no reply is received to "Decide" on a Cat 3 approach, in BA the co-pilot will land as it is considered safer than a solo go-around.

The calls within BA (from the Non-Handling Pilot) are "Power Set", "80 knots", "V1" (if applicable), "Rotate", "Positive Climb" ... and of course "Stop".

The "Stop" call is perhaps the most contentious. Obviously, it can be called by the Captain for any reason, although above 80 knots it would most likely be for "multiple failures". However, unlike in some companies, it can be called by the co-pilot for any of the following:

i) Any fire
ii) Engine failure (two parameters, one on the panel)
iii) Configuration warning
iv) Blocked runway *
v) Control difficulties *
vi) "Monitor Radar Display" auto-callout **
vii) "Windshear Ahead" auto-callout **

* If handling
** Where fitted

[TheGorrilla]

Also, on a CAT3 No DH approach there will be no "50 above" call/autocall (or 100 above for that matter). So by the time the F/O notices the Capt is incapacitated the aircraft has landed itself! Just select reverse, disconnect the A/P, override autobrake as appropriate and ask ATC for assistance and medical as required. A G/A would really screw up the Captains chance of survival and increase the F/Os workload tenfold.

[Lemper]

All these are indeed quite correct, but to answer the initial question: Why 80 KTS, as it might have been chosen 70, or 90, 100, 85....
If I remember well my early aviation days, on a 707, there was no link between the rudder pedals and the nosewheel, as on later aircraft, and no tiller on the right side; during initial take off roll, and especially with cross wind, the captain had to keep his right hand on the thrust levers and his left hand on the tiller to keep the plane on the centerline using the tiller, while the FO would hold a forward pressure on the column, and this until the rudder became aerodynamically effective to be used for directioanal control on the runway. That speed was 80 Kts, which the FO would call so the captain could move his left hand from the tiller to the column. From there on "80Kts" became a "traditional" speed to call and to use for all the other purposes you all guys have mentioned.
Et voila, madame, pourquoi votre fille est muette.

[wobble2plank]

refer to my post above :rolleyes:

[Elroy Jettson]

Also for most types RTO or autobrakes max is armed prior to this speed, also for certification, takeoff power must be set by that speed.

Also in low vis, takeoff should be continued after this speed if vis reduces below takeoff minima, because it is safer than the RTO in this case.

[A37575]

) Any fire
ii) Engine failure (two parameters, one on the panel)
iii) Configuration warning
iv) Blocked runway *
v) Control difficulties *
vi) "Monitor Radar Display" auto-callout **
vii) "Windshear Ahead" auto-callout **



I would have thought the captain, under the conditions above, would make his own decision to reject the take off without having a startled squawk of "Stop" from the copilot to tell him what to do - or should not do - as may be the case at the time..

[Human Factor]

Rather depends who notices first.;)

Also, if the captain isn't handling and is looking in at the engine instruments I would have thought the FO calling stop for a blocked runway or control difficulties makes a lot of sense.

[wiggy]

Here we go again, just because "our" (i.e.BA's) SOP is different to your's then it is "out of this world". Why the emotive language? The instances an F/O can call stop are well defined and seem to work fine.

[MD11Man]

RTO, I'll give you that BA SOP's might not seem sensible for someone who doesn't work with em on a daily basis, but they are bloody good once you get the hang of em.

[Human Factor]

"I fly and you play with the thrust levers" thing?

I think that went with the Flight Engineers (and probably the VC10 - ask the RAF).

[TAC inop.]

just back to the core for a moment.... FCTM 3.5 states '...PM should anounce passing 80 kts, and the PF should verify....etc'
So, that is what Mr Boeing has to say about it
ibid

[False Capture]

TAC inop,
...PM should anounce passing 80 kts, and the PF should verify....Why should he/she announce something that which you both normally expect to see?

British Airways don't invent their own SOPs. BA consults with the manufacturer (Boeing or Airbus) and then decides on the SOP providing this is in agreement with the manufacturer.

At the end of the day, how many times has a B777 aborted take-off because the FMA didn't annunciate 'HOLD' at 80kts eventhough take-off power was correctly set?

[alexban]

On 737 the call should be made at 80 kts ,and the other pilot should check his speed and answer 'checked' . If the speed is not right,he should abort the take off.We had a safety presentation done by a Boeing safety pilot,and it was obvious that it's much safer to abort instead of continuing with unreliable speed (observed by high speed difference at 80 kt call)
The 'hold ' call is not required by Boeing , it must be monitored. The absence of 'hold' is not a reason for RTO , but the pilots must closely monitor the a/t operation during take-off (so it doesn't reduce power due to any fault )
I had some fo's who were doing the 80 kt call :" 80..thrust hold "...so I asked them what if you don't see 'hold' ? you reject? And I've surprised some of them, cause they were doing the check without really thinking of it.
Elroy,on the 737 the autobrake arms at 90 kt.

[TheGorrilla]

More importantly, autobrake RTO functions above 85 kts on B777.

The BA SOP is to apply full reverse above 80 Kts in an RTO, and reverse idle below 80. Therefore the 80 kts call by PNF serves as a good "reminder to self" as to how much to apply if stop is called.

[teamilk&sugar]

TAC Inop

Sorry for the delay...been on a trip.

You are indeed correct. Too much ale pre-post!
Cautions inhibited from 80kts, WARNINGS from rotation (B757-767) or V1 depending on systems fit.

Thanks for the spot & clarification - I'll edit my post.

[wiggy]

Just a nitpick but if some here are going to quote "BA SOPs" for the world to see then at least get it right. It is not BA SOP to use Full Reverse above 80 knots. On at least one BA Fleet I know of the SOP is "if IAS is below 100 knots when takeoff rejected, reverse idle need only be selected".

Right, back in my box:ugh: .

[Shaka Zulu]

@ Wiggy, I dont know what type you fly in BA but on the 'Cripple' 7 its def SOP to use full reverse above 80kts and ilde below it

[arem]

<<part of the 80 knt call goes back to the 707 when the t/o power had to be set by 80 knts and a cross check of the instruments>>

Not quite but lemper was partially right - in BOAC we did have nosewheel steering on both sides and the 80 kt call was essentially a reminder to the PF to take his hand off the nosewheel tiller and take the control wheel - which, up to then,was held with the requested xwind input by the PNF. No rudder fine steering on our 707's.

[wiggy]

Sorry to regenerate the thread but it may be worth it for of the "younger" readers because there is danger when people start to assume their type or Fleet SOPs apply Company wide:bored:. Frankly I suspect anyone who thinks they can claim that anything is "BA SOP" ( except perhaps the FL 100/ FL 200 calls) has only flown one type in the Company....perhaps the one where the use of manual thrust levers when hand flying isn't allowed....:=.

Now to answer your question, I fly the 744 ( you know, the one where the P2 now loads the FMC :rolleyes:) . The BA 747-436 SOP, verbatim from the Flying Manual, is "up to 80 kts the takeoff may be rejected for any apparent malfunction; Above 80 knots the takeoff should only be rejected for major malfunctions".

Then the QRH states:
"IF IAS is below 100 kts when takeoff rejected, reverse idle need only be selected". So Full Reverse below 80 kts - BA SOP?...obviously not.

In conclusion, just 'cos you do it on your Fleet, don't assume it's a Company SOP - but unlike some I think you probably knew that.

Happy Landings

[Sean Dell]

well obviously Wiggy, it's about time the Jumbo came under the umbrella of BA SOP of full reverse above 80kts!:ok:

You know it makes sense

[ltn and beyond]

Sure the 80kts call would be good for a incap' check asothers have said, but it also works well for the PF to know his speed checks with the PNF as PF will rotate at Vr, regardless of a "rotate" call from PNF, this is when you suspect a pilot incap' if PF does not rotate or indeed PNF does not call "rotate".

A rejected take off in BA sops does call for different actions above 80KTS, and BA sops only call for a few items to reject with all are items which endanger the safety of the aircraft in the take off run. A high speed RTO as more likely to endanger the aircraft and pax than, matey boy next to you that has already become incaped !!!!!

[JW411]

Why is it that people in aviation will insist in reinventing the wheel?

If BA SOPs work for BA pilots then leave them alone. The same goes for everyone else!

[Tee Emm]

QANTAS has an one particular SOP markedly in contradiction to Boeing. In the B737 series aborted take off procedure, Boeing go for manual speed brake whereas QANTAS, in it's infinite wisdom, use the reverse thrust lever operation as as the primary means of getting the autospeed brake to up. The Boeing philosophy is that manual speed brake actuation for abort is primary with reverse thrust lever actuation as back-up. The problem with the QANTAS policy is that if the automatic function of the speed brake is inoperative there is no way of telling before the abort and precious max braking time is lost while the captain puzzles why the actuation of the reverse levers did not operate the speed brake.

In addition it may be quite dangerous to select reverse thrust during an abort if the engine selected is on fire. The British Air Tours B737 fatal at Manchester many years ago proved that conclusively. Leaking fuel was atomised by the reverse thrust plume and thus caused a major conflagration which ultimately killed many passengers. This point was made in the Accident Report.

While Boeing may issue a No Technical Objection (NTO) statement when an operator wishes to change a stated Boeing procedure, I wonder if that exposes an operator to litigation from Boeing in event of an incident in which the company procedure was a causal factor in damage or injury?

[gimmesumviagra]

Sir (did you like that?),
QANTAS management pilots have always attempted to position themselves at the top of the pyramid (regardless of the logics of their propositions - refer B747 at BKK). This accounts for their divergence from the Boeing procedure (in my humble opinion, unjustified)

On the other hand, maybe they have a large number of pilots who do not have the aptitude/skills to select reverse thrust correctly at the appropriate time!! and have to write their procedures accordingly!!

Basically, I cannot understand why egos must interfere with the basic manufacturers' procedures unless dictated by significant local conditions.

[THICKO]

Quote: 'I stopped wondering why BA do the things they do long ago. Their SOP is just out of this world for some reason.'

What the hell do you mean by this trite comment?

It seems to me that everybody else (non-BA) would have a very busy and critical but short time on the runway filled with unnecessary talk between the crew.

Calling a speed and getting the other guy to call 'checked' dates back to the days of old fashioned steam driven ASI's. These days with high-tech Air Data modules and electronic displays there is surely little (no) chance of a difference in readings.

As previously posted, the 80kts call in BA is just an awareness for changes in reverse thrust handling and the reasons for stopping.

:8

[alf5071h]

A cautionary tale for those who use a 80kt call SOP:– what does the SOP mean?

As PF of an experienced two-captain crew on a positioning detail, flying alternate sectors with seat change, my response to a 80kt call was ‘No’ (my ASI was only 75).
Human nature engaged automatic enquiry mode – both pilots; there was a quick cross check of the other instrument panel in a vain hope of determining which ASI was in error and why – an impossible task with a dual system. Then there was realization that there was a standby ASI, which confirmed a mismatch, but this required significant mental effort as the airspeed was no longer 80 kts, thus all three ASIs had to be re-inspected.
At which time the dutiful PNF called V1 (his ASI), which was followed immediately by rotate; it was a light weight aircraft with a low V1/Vr. The flight was completed, but not without further event as the main ASI was linked to several functions and inhibits – flap/gear interlock for one.

The company SOP stated “call 80kts … , only reject the takeoff above 80kts for engine failure, fire … etc, etc”, nothing about what if the ASIs did not agree. The aircraft type had low-level alert inhibit at 80kts, thus it could be argued that much of the pre takeoff briefing re alerts was superfluous, as only important alerts would be given anyway. The important action for ASI mismatch (or failure) was overlooked; perhaps the SOP (those who wrote it) assumed that crews would stop. Interestingly, subsequent variants of the aircraft had EFIS airspeed which included an amber comparator, which if annunciated above 80kts, was ignored as there was a selectable alternate airspeed source from the ADC. The modern systems are not as fault free as some would expect, don’t assume anything – they just have other ways in which to fail.

Lessons learnt; check your SOPs to ensure that they are workable and cover foreseeable circumstances – what if. Ensure that SOPs consider human factors – the effect of surprise and shock of the event and the natural desire to find out why something has occurred.
The SOP must be practical; exactly how will crews determine that there is an error, what are the allowable limits bearing in mind that each crew may not view their ASIs simultaneously. Does it matter which ASI is in error – just that they don’t agree?
Specify the action required, ensure that this is trained for at the appropriate level – in this instance, if an RTO is required, this should be as a skilled, automatic response to stop i.e. if ASIs disagree at 80kt any call / comment is equivalent to stop? Or should we be ‘go’ minded as per the RTO training aid?
As this stage of the tale / considering SOPs, the process is getting very messy – ‘what ifs’, ‘buts’; so back to the risks, what exactly are the risks of stopping or continuing the takeoff.
In many modern aircraft, an ASI mismatch could be a relatively low risk event, but to be sure, we have to understand all of the ramifications. Then of course, we encounter situations involving masking tape over static ports and covers left on pitot tubes – but these failings require SOPs other than an 80kt call. Then if the 80kt check is not for the ASI, then exactly how do you check for incapacitation, or do you assume the non response (mic selected off) is instant death ??!!

An air safety report? No, far too embarrassed at the time, although later there was an unproductive discussion on SOP wording with the chief pilot on the theme of what if.

[Spooky 2]

It may be worth noting that Boeing is evaluating the rejected takeoff flow and may as a consequence may eliminate the manual deployment of the speedbrake as oposed to the auto deplyoment with reverse thrust. In the past a carrier could go to Boeing and ask for an NTO regarding this facet of the rejected takeoff. For the last six+ years Boeing would not issue an NTO for this alternative procedure due to some previous accident investigation. Not sure how Qantas gets around this with the B737 but perhaps this is jut a FAA mandate and the Australian authorities look at it a different way. I must confess, I have fumbled with this procedure in the simulator on many occasions.

Also, IMHO, a Master Cautiion light is no reason to reject a takeoff when you are above 80Kts, unless you have specifically briefed it as such.

[sudden Winds]

all of you got it right...
we call out 80 kts for all those reasons, instrument x-check, possible incapacitation (or wake up call for those taking off on autopilot) and beggining of the high speed regime of take off run. We also call out, throttle hold.
Once we´ve said that the pf says "cross checked" meaning he took a look at his a/s indicator, fma, and stby a/s indicator. I believe the response is very important...wouldn´t be comfortable with an SOP calling for a response not necessary.

[Spooky 2]

We happen to use Boeing for all of our initial and recurrent training so this little ditty was a result of one of those rec. training events. I did my "dearture briefing" as follows; I'll reject this take off for any reason prior to 80kts, between 80kts and V1, I'll reject for engine failure, fire, loss of directional control, and a windshear warning. etc. Well during that subsequent take off we had a generator drop off line at around 120kts. I rejected. During the post flight debrief the instructor reminded me that was not how I briefed the takeoff and in fact it was not a reason to reject the take off. Point well made.

We do call out 80kts and throttle hold on all departures, btw.

[john_tullamarine]

These days with high-tech Air Data modules and electronic displays there is surely little (no) chance of a difference in readings

With the fairly electronic Type for which I am responsible at present, we have had several aircraft snagged for just this over the past year or so ...