PDA

View Full Version : AAIB Bulletin: Morecambe Bay


Flying Lawyer
30th Jan 2007, 04:44
The AAIB has issued a preliminary report of the investigation into the cause of the SA-365N Dauphin 2 crash in Morecambe Bay on 27 December.


AAIB Bulletin S1/2007 Special (http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/cms_resources/S1-2007%20G-BLUN.pdf)



FL

Hummingfrog
30th Jan 2007, 09:55
Can I ask that amateur crash investigators don't start putting their theories onto this board. Let the AIB finish their deliberations so we get the true picture.

HF

A Dauphin Pilot

Chopper Doc Junior
30th Jan 2007, 11:44
It makes for very scary reading!

StarbucksOne
30th Jan 2007, 12:24
Hummingfrog (http://www.pprune.org/forums/member.php?u=49800): I agreed with your comment, initially, then thought...hang on , if a discussion on this topic becomes "taboo", you might as well go and delete most of all the other threads on pprune. The flyBe GPWS incident is a good example. I've read enough on that thread to make me think twice on travelling with flyBe and am glad I did. I can make my own decision about the credibility of a post - a stupid theory based on little facts can be easily distinguised from an informed debate about an incident. Saying that, the media should not be given fuel to speculate - but they'll likely to find stuff out before anyone hits a key on PPRuNE anyway.

I can't help but be intrigued by this crash, and being a fixed wing pilot, I'm fustrated by lack of knowledge about rotary wing oil rig ops to even begin formulating a "best guess". I would be interested in hearing views on this one to be honest.

Whirlygig
30th Jan 2007, 12:35
One of the reasons why some people here do not appreciate speculation is that a lot of the hypotheses could centre around pilot error.

If it is later found not to be pilot error though, the pilots could still be tarred with that as a reason for the accident. One only has to consider those poor bloody Chinook pilots and the effort that has gone into clearing their names.

That might be an extreme (and not entirely apposite) example but, as the rotary world is so small and many pilots on here know each other, it could be considered insensitive to discuss pilot error without having any hard evidence with which to back it up.

Secondly, when there are so many theories being bandied around, it is hard to distinguish fact from fiction.

I’m with Hummingfrog on this one. It is one matter to discuss something once the final report is out but another altogether when it's just a preliminary.

Cheers

Whirls

StarbucksOne
30th Jan 2007, 12:40
Fair shout.

Didn't realise the rotary world was so small to be honest.

Whirlygig
30th Jan 2007, 12:45
It's small! If you read the original thread about the accident, you'll see how many of the guys here knew and respected the pilot.

Cheers

Whirls

Tranquil
30th Jan 2007, 14:11
Just like to add my wholehearted agreement with Hummingfrog. Conversation about an accident is one thing but as has already been mentioned speculation without all the facts is undisirable and can be upsetting to friends and family.
If the weather was bad,could be a case fo pressonitis.
Airspeed back to nothing, hugging the ground,trying to get over that hill.
lost visual reference,low and slow,intruments no use, tail rotor or main rotor hit the hard stuff, game over!
Pure speculation on my part, but that's all we can come up with from some photos.
Could be the case, amongst others, previously mentioned.

This from a previous accident where those speculating know not what occured.

I would also add that the Captain of the 365 was a very experienced and professional Guy and will be sorely missed by all who knew him.
And "that there but for the grace of God"

Stringfellow Dork
30th Jan 2007, 14:42
Non-rhetorical question: What is the point of releasing this preliminary report? It just seems to provide fuel for conjecture. Can anyone enlighten me, please? I'm a bit puzzled... :confused:

shortfinals
30th Jan 2007, 14:59
Bulletins are routine now. They are preliminary factual reports. They contain facts as established from the FDR/CVR and leave it at that. Lots of "what happened", but no "why it happened", because the latter will not be established for some time yet.

Why post them? It's an insult to the aviation community's - and the public's - intelligence to withhold facts from them once the facts are established. It's the truth, even if it's not the whole truth. Truth, even part of it, tends to limit speculation; but nothing - even silence - will ever stop it.

I'm with StarbucksOne: "If a discussion on this topic becomes "taboo", you might as well go and delete most of all the other threads on pprune. The flyBe GPWS incident is a good example. I've read enough on that thread to make me think twice on travelling with flyBe and am glad I did. I can make my own decision about the credibility of a post."

Stringfellow Dork
30th Jan 2007, 15:05
It's an insult to the aviation community's - and the public's - intelligence to withhold facts from them once the facts are established.

Fair point. I'd not really thought of it like that.

SASless
30th Jan 2007, 17:10
"Facts" they may be but the context and derivation of those "Facts" is subject to debate. That is the crux of the problem in such debates as go on at places like pprune and pub bars in the wake of events such as this.

I would assume a Special Bulletin could/might contain more specific "facts" if something had been found to report and thus would provide better service to those who read the thing.

That was not the case here. The Bulletin merely set forth the status of the investigation to date thus providing an opportunity for conjecture about the cause. It would seem to me, mere conjecture serves no good at this point.

Hippolite
30th Jan 2007, 20:34
I understand the sensitivities. I knew one of them. But certain facts have been established by the AAIB. There is no evidence of mechanical failure. There maybe some additional contributing factors but The liklihood of finding that evidence is probably slim.

There isn't much more to speculate on is there? This accident has the hallmarks of other accidents or near acidents.

Those of us with thousands of hours of offshore flying, especially in the dark UK winter have all been in a similar situation, it just that we had a different outcome.

Sad business.

Kit d'Rection KG
30th Jan 2007, 20:49
SASless,

Respectfully, I suggest you find a quiet moment to sit down and read the report again. What has been found has been reported, without making it gory.

Thomas coupling
30th Jan 2007, 22:36
I remember a time on Pprune when Pprune meant just that....
professional pilots rumour network.
The professionalism in us catered for the standard of the discussion and the moderators moved in when it got 'out of hand' (on those rare occasions).
It now seems (to me) that more and more (recent) members are fighting shy of discussing these rumours, or chewing over what has been / has not been disclosed.
It's as if the nanny state is pervading the very existence of free speech. I feel we are quietly sinking under a morass of political correctness; insidious malaise rather than refreshing discourse. Fear of "the fear of upsetting anything or anyone":mad:
Look back over similar instances like this thread, why don't you?
If you were at work or in the bar, you'd chat about this....why not here also - a dedicated vehicle for such issues.

Provided one delivers a constructive opinion devoid of libel or harrassment, what harm does it do?

Are we all going to end up checking our "six" all the time? This isn't Russia for goodness sake:E

It won't resolve the issue, it won't (if handled correctly) upset friends and relatives - if we debate it healthily, it will simply define us for what we are: inquisitive, curious creatures. Nothing more, nothing less.

Whirlygig
30th Jan 2007, 22:45
A fair point well made TC, but the freedom to swing my arm ends where your nose begins!

We may have a right to discuss such matters but we also have a responsibility to have some regard to others.

In a court of law (don't shoot me FL!!) a similar debate could be held as sub judice, and for good reason. Some of the ramblings that I have previously read regarding accidents and incidents could be tantamount to tabloid speculation and, at worst, scaremongering.

Cheers

Whirls

eagle 86
30th Jan 2007, 23:37
I think I've been in aviation a lot longer than most of you - conjecture re accidents has been around for as long as accidents themselves. I concur with TC. The mouse button will allow you to avoid this thread Whirly but if you venture in your brain will allow you to discount what you don't agree with - threatening TC with violence is most un-PC!!
GAGS
E86

Lord Mount
30th Jan 2007, 23:51
In a court of law (don't shoot me FL!!) a similar debate could be held as sub judice, and for good reason. Some of the ramblings that I have previously read regarding accidents and incidents could be tantamount to tabloid speculation and, at worst, scaremongering.



Whirls,
Whilst I take your point regarding sub judice I would say that the two cannot be compared.

In a court of law the guilt or innocence of the accused is being decided by 'twelve good men and true'. These are selected at random from the populous and therefore no expectation of expertise lies upon them.

The AAIB are experts and therefore, one would hope, not susceptible to influence from conjecture, speculation or hearsay from outside sources such as PPRUNE.

Having said all that I choose to withold any such opinion because I am no expert myself and would not wish to either show my ignorance or inadvertently cause alarm or distress to anyone by doing so.

My thoughts are still with the families of those who perished.

LM

malabo
31st Jan 2007, 02:58
I'll propose that as a community, we pilots take more comfort in "pilot action" errors. That includes the pilots not handling an otherwise controllable mechanical/electrical malfunction. To hope to find an accident is the result of factors beyond a pilot's control is just too pessimistic to contemplate. As long as we can hope for "pilot error" then there's a chance that in the same situation the next pilot could have done something better, and perhaps can prepare for it in the meantime. If the accident was due to something the pilot was not able to control, then all the training and experience in the world counts for naught, and we are all doomed to the shadow of an occupation that could snuf our lives arbitrarily and randomly.
From the preliminary report, we know the aircraft had some dramatic attitude excursions from the normal profile in the final few seconds. I doubt most pilots have ever seen anything like 38 degrees nose down, unless they flew Apaches or Lynx in a past life. It is a preliminay report, with more information to come, so we can be patient. For myself I'm going to give it a try in a simulator where I get a second chance. Staying with the facts, does anybody know what kind of autopilot/flight director system this aircraft had and what modes would likely have been engaged by CHC in their standard offshore procedures. Information for the sim experience only, no speculation on what the crew may have been doing, which no doubt will be in the AAIB final report.
malabo

hostile
31st Jan 2007, 04:44
I am thinking the same. I was a broblem with Pitch-lanes from autopilot in a past. It is funny feeling for take-off or landing when pitch lanes drops off. Other thing is Trim feel. It is very easy to cut it off inadvertentally or maybe jump it over from checklist. This is not a speculation for this accident but it happens to me and our crews in VFR- inland ambulance flights. I can immagine how surprising it might be over the dark sea...

Hostile

31st Jan 2007, 05:34
I think the main purpose of publishing the preliminary report is to reduce speculation and rumourmongering by stating what happened and eliminating certain causes - the main one being major structural or component failure.
This is done partly to keep all the other 365 crews and pax happy that there is not a serious fault with the aircraft so that they can keep flying it without fear. If you were Eurocopter, you would want to show as quickly as possible that your aircraft is safe and I suspect that some pressure is applied from industry onto the CAA in these cases.
There are some other safety equipment issues that could have been included in the preliminary report but I will wait for the full report before discussing them.

Whirlygig
31st Jan 2007, 06:45
I think I've been in aviation a lot longer than most of you - conjecture re accidents has been around for as long as accidents themselves. I concur with TC. The mouse button will allow you to avoid this thread Whirly but if you venture in your brain will allow you to discount what you don't agree with - threatening TC with violence is most un-PC!!
GAGS
E86

:rolleyes: It's an expression luv! :rolleyes: The whole point of the expression is that it means I DON'T have the freedom if it means trampling over someone else's freedoms.

My concern, as I mentioned before, is that if there is any mud-slinging (as sometimes these things can degenerate), then mud sticks and I don't think it's unreasonable to wait for a final report to prevent such rumour-mongering. If a couple of people ask one to refrain from something, then I would respect their wishes. That's not necessarily being PC, it's being polite!

Cheers

Whirls (with an "S")

Whirlybird
31st Jan 2007, 07:48
I'm with TC (an a few others whose names I've forgotten already) on this.

Let's be realistic. You will NOT stop people wondering what happened. And it's normal for them to share those speculations with fellow aviators. So they'll post them. Now, look back at other threads where this has happened. The original speculating would probably have been long forgotten. But what usually happens is that someone says the post shouldn't have been made, someone else argues for free speech, a third person wades in and demands that all speculation stop, the next one flames the previous poster for telling him what to do or not do, etc etc etc.

Suddenly one speculation becomes an all-out argument! And for what? Because the original post might be wrong? Because one person might have suggested a pilot made a mistake when he didn't?

We've had the pilot from a recent accident come on PPRuNe and explain what he thought happened. We've had relatives and friends come on and thank people for their condolences, and for caring enough to post at all. But as I recall, we haven't actually had anyone - except other PPRuNers - complain about people speculating in a perfectly human fashion as to what happened.

Live and let live might not be perfect, but it's better than any of the alternatives. :ok:

Cheers,

Whirly (with a "Y")

AndyJB32
31st Jan 2007, 08:10
It's no doubt inevitable that some people will post speculatve theories, and some people will argue for the benifit of these posts. However, the AAIB report makes it clear that the initial report now published only shows the facts as they have been found so far. It makes clear that not only may these facts be corrected and altered before the final report comes out, it also states that no analysis has been done on the information found so far.
I think if the AAIB are waiting before they come to any conclusions, it may be worthwhile if we consider doing the same.

DOUBLE BOGEY
31st Jan 2007, 08:19
I am an Offshore Pilot currently flying heavy helicopters. The question whether a Pilot is respected or not by his peers has no bearing on my desire to understand what happended on this flight.

I do not like the thought that this accident could be attributable to pilot/crew error but if that is what the AAIB ultimatley determine then we accept it and try to learn from it. My responsibilities as a proffessional aviator to my crew and passengers requires me to keep an open mind and strip away the emotion from the incident.

It would help if we could read a thread without all the "Holier than thou sh*te" complicating the messages!

We have been here before with the Brent Spar accident!!

flyer43
31st Jan 2007, 08:22
Let's be realistic.

I think that is the key issue here. Speculation, provided a good degree of thought is applied before posting, should not be discouraged. Much can be learned by all from "healthy" discussions and debates on all manner of topics.
As has been pointed out on this thread, the helicopter world is a very small one and it is inevitable that crew involved in any accident will likely be well known to many of us on this forum. As long as we all remember that, particularly when responding to threads such as this one (although it has wandered way off the initial post), then others should not take offence. Surely, the real intent of this site, outside of the rumour mongering, is to improve our understanding of the profession or passtime that we are all engaged in and so help prevent further accidents.

helimutt
31st Jan 2007, 08:49
I agree DOUBLE BOGEY. Keep to what we know, make our discussion beneficial to all, especially those of us who may find ourselves in very similar positions sometime. ie night, over ocean, etc etc.
To go out on a limb here, has anyone had very similar experience which could provide 'sensible' insight into this tragic accident. Maybe even to start a new thread with a title such as 'Things that could go wrong in certain ops'. It may help us inexperienced guys with a little knowledge from the old and wrinklies.:E
As posted previously, we hate to think our fellow aviatiors may have gotten things wrong but, if it's a case of pilot error or mechanical / instrument failure etc, then I know what I prefer the outcome to be, even if others disagree.

DOUBLE BOGEY
31st Jan 2007, 08:52
A question for offshore dauphin pilots,

1. How come the AAIB report makes no mention of AVAD calls on the CVR for 100 feet (pre-set) and 50 feet (the later being the standard for a rig landing).

Or is the AVAD suspended during rig approaches?

BASys
31st Jan 2007, 09:28
Hi Folks

Media making further assumptions, headlines reported as if definitive.
NW Evening Mail -
Mechanical failure ruled out in fatal chopper crash
Published on 30/01/2007
http://www.nwemail.co.uk/news/viewarticle.aspx?id=460867

HTH
ATB
Paul

Special 25
31st Jan 2007, 09:39
I too am concerned that we seem to fear above all else the conclusion of Pilot Error. I believe that this is still the final conclusion in many aircraft accidents and incidents, and I assume that none of us can honestly claim to have never made a mistake, and I would consider that I personally have made and observed mistakes that have genuinely frightened me and could have had disasterous consequences. You learn from them, you discuss them openly, just to put that experience to someone else so that they may never get themselves into that situation, or may better get out of it.

I further agree with a point made by Malamo, that I almost hope for that conclusion - The thought that an aircraft suffered a terminal fault that was impossible to recover from, is something that keeps me awake at night !

Nobody is doubting the experience and professionalism of this crew and I've heard nothing but positive comments about both pilots. Whilst I didn't know them, its clear they were a good crew. I, like most of us, have no firm idea what caused this crash so I won't try to speculate, but if it ultimately turns out to be pilot error, few of us would be criticising the crew - I will maybe be able to read the report having learned something, but certainly I'll be thinking 'There but for the grace of God go I .....'

shortfinals
31st Jan 2007, 09:43
DB: I wondered the same as you did. It would have been helpful to know from this bulletin whether the AVAD call occurred or not. I'm not a chopper pilot, but I thought the AVAD 100ft call was "hard wired" and not cancellable. Does anyone know if that rule is suspended on final approach and if so how?

212man
31st Jan 2007, 10:17
DB, "50 ft for rig landings": whose SOP is that????

AndyJB32
31st Jan 2007, 10:20
the 100 foot to go call cannot be cancelled.
Offshore sop bug setting is 200 foot set before landing for visual approaches.

Wizzard
31st Jan 2007, 12:02
IIRC the AVAD "100 feet" warning does not operate if the ROD is over a certain figure - I think it might be 1500fpm. This is to avoid distracting the crew when crossing an elevated deck edge for instance. The last recorded ROD was 1400fpm.

HeliComparator
31st Jan 2007, 12:38
Wiz

IIRC its supressed when rod (calculated by rate of change of radalt) is over 5000'/min. If it was 1500'/min it wouldn't be much use!

HC

keepin it in trim
31st Jan 2007, 13:10
I am wondering if it was not mechanical failure could it have been a gyro related issue, I should say now I have never flown the 365, but I have experienced and am familiar with gryo related problems in the SK, which can be quite insidious initially and then deteriorate quickly.

Such a problem can affect both the attitude information supplied to the crew and obviously the stabilisation system. A problem of that nature relatively close to the surface at night with poor to nil visual cues/horizon would be a nightmare to deal with.:(

Colonal Mustard
31st Jan 2007, 17:03
I would suggest that following tragic accidents the time between the loss of a friend(s) and the report of the cause(s) being released is best used remembering the good times had with that person(s) no longer with us ......Speculation...rumours..guesses or whatever you want to call them serve no purpose in written form other than to revive moments of sadness for those that knew them...

Yes Prune is a rumour network...rumour about things that dont affect others emotionally..

I may be wrong but just my view on dignity and human respect for others:ok:

check
31st Jan 2007, 17:29
Bug setting for night is 300', 200' for day and on short finals the AVAD can be cancelled but not the light. For us at least!

I once flew for an operator whose AVAD could not be cancelled, after carrying out 30+ landings during the day you start to filter out the call so it becomes no longer an alert but just another annoying noise.

When you can cancel it it is so unusual to hear it, that on activation you react immediately. However if it is cancelled on finals and a go around is made the gear is not retracted or a landing is made (activation of the weight on wheels switch) I don't think the AVAD will activate and give an alert if you go below the bug set height. This might account for the absence of comment in the report.

Perhaps the more technical minded will confirm this or put me right.

Geoffersincornwall
31st Jan 2007, 20:37
I was quite upset after reading the report. Could it possibly be that depite all the training and the many years practice the gremlins that haunt those dark nights can conspire to snatch your life away as punishment for just a moment's lack of concentration. I know that once or twice they have scared the **** out of me and I know that others have had their own scary moments where disorientation or loss of concentration have resulted in a 'near-miss' or, in one case, a nasty, pointless CFIT.


Unlike Melabo I do hope that there was a mechanical failure of some kind for
otherwise it means that I have to be sure to be 110% on top of the entire flight even if that last shuttle comes at the end of a maxed-out Duty Period when I'm feeling like ****e. I knew I worked in an unforgiving world but having to perform to the highest levels without respite is something I wish I could do but I know that I can't.


I still hope that the 10% of the aircraft yet unrecovered may yield important data. If not then I have to come to terms with what may be unrealistic expectations of our ability to perform at the required levels without ever making any mistakes. Maybe routine night flying needs to be reviewed and maybe technologies such as NVGs need to be revisited for use in cruise flight.

G

:( :confused: :\

ShyTorque
31st Jan 2007, 21:17
I generally refrain from posting my opinion or theories in matters like these. However, in view of the press's reaction to the initial report I would like members of the discussion panel to reflect on two fairly recent previous accidents.

Firstly, the S-76 lost in unusual circumstances where it spiralled out of control into the Bering sea, causing a loss of 14 lives. That could have easily been seen as pilot error and the argument still goes on.

Secondly, the original UK A109 crash landing that was put down to pilot error until a second one went down some time afterwards in almost identical circumstances and was found to be caused by an incorrectly fitted control item, a non rotating star scissor link. The first accident evidence (wreckage) was re-examined and the same evidence was there. Verdict changed.

MBJ
31st Jan 2007, 22:01
Do the CHC aircrew suits have a full neckseal? Many years ago I suffered subtle incapacitation from a new and overtight neck seal and nearly blacked out on finals to a ship at night - fortunately had a co-pilot to hand over to.

SASless
31st Jan 2007, 23:07
Gyro failures that can bite you.....what kind of gyro failure affects all three attitude indicators?

The standby should have an independent power source so that it remains operable even under a complete electrical failure (loss of both/all generators/inverters) should it not?


I always thought step one in an unusual attitude indication or upset....is to poll the jury and go with the two AI's that agree and ignore the odd man out. Or am I getting senile here.

DOUBLE BOGEY
1st Feb 2007, 07:24
The way the report reads both pilots appear to have had a go in correcting what started as a pretty outrageous UP (38 degrees nose down & 38 degrees AOB) which would infer that each was flying by reference to his own independat flight instruments.

In addition the lack of any CVR evidence to suggest any other factors in play and the final report statement that the aicraft from FDR/CVR data appeared to behave in response to control inputs paints a fairy strong argument for disorientation and failure to recover fully from the UP. The question remians - WHY?

I do this thing every day and I cannot imagine how the AC was able to achieve such an extreme UP during a go-around when both pilots should be concentrating or at least alert enough for the NHP to intervene as the UP developed. I am also concerned that the initial report from AAIB does not explain how quickly the original UP developed and therefore how much time the NHP had to react.

Also I cannot imagine what took place that would lead the co-pilot to effectively "give-up" and ask for help. In my experience when the suituation is thus (ie in the simulator) the HP is so overaroused there is no brain power left to ask and the NHP intervenes naturally.

Finnally the Commanders failure to correct the UP fully in the time frame the report suggests does not feel right either.

The report does a really good job at inferring that these two experienced well trained flight crew loss control and flew into the sea. I am really struggling to accept that to be the case.

In the offshore industry, airspeed is probably the number one referenced instrument during approaches offshore due to the performance issues we operate under. During a go-around it is also watched carefully by both HP and NHP. The report provides FDR evidence of very high airspeeds throughout the UP and very high RODs. Both of these parameters whould lead to a powerful desire by both pilots to pull up the nose and yet the opposite happened in both cases.

In addition the initial approach was poorly handled by the co-pilot despite the fact that these crews are in engaged in a very high number of approaches and landings in the shuttle sector.

If I were a betting man I would look closely at the pitot-static system!!!!

Farmer 1
1st Feb 2007, 09:52
One of my constant concerns when approaching a platform was that for quite some time in the final stages, the PNF (Pilot Not Flying) has no visual contact with the helideck, because it is obscured by the instrument panel. The aircraft heading is offset by the PF so that he can have a better view of the deck. Depending on the size and layout of the platform, that might also be out of the PNF's view.

On a dark and stormy night he might have no external visual clues whatever in those latter stages of the approach - no moon, no horizon, an empty sea.

If the PF is late in realising he ought to go around or hand over control, or suffer subtle incapacitation, then it might be extremely difficult for the PNF to appreciate the gravity of the situation until it is too late.


Question: if there was a gyro fault such that, for example, there was a cockpit indication of a 38 degree AOB while the wings were level, what would the FDR indicate - level flight or 38 degrees AOB? The pitot-static system indications would surely be the same in the cockpit and the FDR? In the bulletin, there is nothing that suggests to me there was a fault there.


We obviously have to wait for the CVR data to be published. I know regular passengers were most concerned about the possibility of mechanical failure. Personally, I do not know what to wish for.

steve mc
1st Feb 2007, 10:56
To my knowledge, the info on pitch and roll comes from the copilots ADI, then fed in parallel to the IHUMS and FDR. There are 3 ADI's on the Dauphin.


Someone mentioned pitot static input. Remember that a trimble GPS is fitted, where groundspeed can be monitored and there are two independent pitot systems.

I can't see how a pitch and bank of 38 degrees can be put to a problem with air data instruments.

The data which is fed to the FDR is calibrated every 12 months.

Brilliant Stuff
1st Feb 2007, 17:06
Do the CHC aircrew suits have a full neckseal? Many years ago I suffered subtle incapacitation from a new and overtight neck seal and nearly blacked out on finals to a ship at night - fortunately had a co-pilot to hand over to.

Yes they do have a neck and wrist seal which you can cut down in order to make them more comfortable and stop the danger of cutting off circulation.
They still remained water tight. I used my suit for the dunker training which kept me dry.

1st Feb 2007, 18:23
They are also black which makes you very difficult to find in the water at night!

Divergent Phugoid
1st Feb 2007, 19:42
The immersion suits used are Blue with reflective tapes on the legs.
If you have survived a ditching and inflated the lifejacket, the firefly strobe and sea light will aid any rescuer as well as the tapes on the Day-Glo orange jacket.

Thomas coupling
1st Feb 2007, 21:24
No-one could survive a 100Kt+ impact with the sea!

2nd Feb 2007, 05:25
Divergent - blue looks like black in the water in anything other than bright sunlight and if you don't inflate your lifejacket (incapacitated) you are therefore invisible (unless you can float with your legs in the air). People in orange/red suits are easy to see.

running in
2nd Feb 2007, 08:30
Crab,
Orange/red suits are easier to see, but they tend to cause a lot of internal cockpit reflections at night.
RI

rotorspeed
2nd Feb 2007, 10:10
Good to see from Double Bogey's last post some real effort to try and understand what was going on in the last moments of the flight and consider why. It is important to appreciate that this process is not about seeking to blame anyone but enable those of us that care, to focus on what could have gone wrong and where we might make even greater efforts to avoid errors - and that could refer to pilots, engineers and aircraft manufacturers. Doing so could well prevent more accidents during the time it takes for a full detailed report to be published.

I agree with Double Bogey, this does seem odd. Although not an offshore pilot, I too am baffled at just how such a big unusual attitude - especially 38 deg nose down - could occur with two experienced IR pilots.

The comment that "the crew became unhappy with the approach" etc is significant. It would be interesting to know exactly what was said on the CVR to know this. Presumably the PF Co-pilot was unhappy about something, but what exactly? How unusual is it for a missed approach and go-around to a rig to occur from a VFR approach? And when they do - let's say here because of poor visual reference in poor vis, what is the procedure? Clearly at this stage the flight is VFR, but is the policy to immediately fly by reference to instruments, or is to try and regain visual reference? If it was the former, it is harder to understand how such a big attitude change could occur - let's face it, 38 deg down looks pretty obvious and dramatic on the AI, and the starting point from a controlled approach and early go-around attitude would be a fairly normal AI picture. But if eyes were out of the cockpit believing adequate visual reference existed - maybe wrongly - I guess 38 deg down could well arise.

Whatever the level of concentration of the PNF on the approach - and clearly it should be high - one would assume it would be even higher as soon as the PF says he's unhappy and going around, with full orientation on all references - outside and instruments.

Next, after the go-around is commenced, the PF is concerned enough to ask for assistance. Is that unusual? I would have thought so, assuming he's not feeling unwell. Anyway now our hopefully orientated formerly PNF commander takes over - and within a second the aircraft is 38 deg nose down and 38 deg banked right. Another 3 seconds later it's level but still 13 deg nose down, and over the next 5 seconds presumably little more control input happens until it hits the sea. Doesn't sound like someone grappling to establish a sensible attitude on the AI.

Seems all a bit odd to me, I must say. I look forward to reading the full report especially info relating to the instruments, but there again it had a full dual panel and two pilots couldn't sort it out.

DOUBLE BOGEY
2nd Feb 2007, 13:32
When approaching a rig in night VMC the final approach provides plenty of visual cues to a reasonably experienced offshore pilot. Normally this terminates in a safe landing and for some pilots this will be the case for majority of their careers (when vmc). However, a go-around from a platform in VMC, where the immediate go-around area has no other lit objects to provide visual clues, or worse, an array of confusing objects at distance, it is very very easy to become disorientated and things happen quickly thereafter.
To my knowledge there have been at least 2 AC touchdowns into the water that have survived by rapidly apply pitch both attributable to disorientation in reasonable VMC but possibly confusing visual cues out of the windows.

Most offshore pilots who are regularly engaged in IFR operations, rig radar approaches etc, would normally immediatley convert to instruments should a go-around occur, vmc or otherwise as the dangers of not doing so are ussually experienced in the safety of a flight simulator. This critical conversion is not easy and requires the pilot to be skilled and practised and fully comfortable with what the instruments are telling him. At such a satge in flight the seat of the pants is as much use as a chocolate fireguard!

If it is proven beyond reasonable doubt that this was a disorientation followed by a failure to recover to controlled climbing flight then my deep conviction is that such events become less likely if both crews have experienced the event in the simulator beforehand and recieve regular recurrent training in the sim to re-inforce these critical periods of flight.

Without simulator training some offshore pilots may NEVER EVER experience a go-around in night VMC where they are required to establish quickly on the panel.

It has happended to me twice and both events left me feeling less secure in my own abilities to complete this manouvre with the ease that I would normally expect from myself. It is a VERY demanding manouvre and I have been a regular sim visitor for the past 10 years.

A go-around form a rig radar is very different from a VMC event as the HP remains handling and is on instruments throughout the procedure.

This unfortunate event and it resulting tragedy may finally be what it will take for the Authorities to mandate sim training for all offshore flight crews and give us all a reasonable chance of practising these critical flight conditions so that safety is assurred when the unexpected happens.

You can bet you bottom $ that the Authorities read these pages so lets hear from anyone else who has struggled with a Night VMC approach and go-around!! I strongly suspect there are a lot of us out there!!

cyclic
2nd Feb 2007, 16:09
Not that I'm suggesting we rely completely on autopilots, but the newer generation aircraft have a go-around facility at the press of a button. With heading engaged and go-around pressed it makes the change from visual to instrument a lot more comfortable. Those that have flown glass with 4 axis, generally never want to go back.

rotorspeed
2nd Feb 2007, 18:07
Very interesting response Double Bogey from someone who obviously knows this environment. It is clear night rig approaches in VMC can transform from being relatively straightforward with good visual reference with the platform on approach to being really tricky on a go-around when the lights are gone and it's just inky blackness - and at low level. Hard to think how this should not automatically require an instant transition to instruments.

I too have had my most anxious moments in the potentially fluctuating transition phase from IMC to VMC flight when flying SPIFR on an approach. Letting down on instruments on a wet misty night can be reasonably straightforward until you become visual. At that point you are really reliant on continued vision of ground lighting and if that disappears - either because you've passed over what you were looking at or denser rain or mist is hindering visibility, it can get very difficult and all you can do is pull back up, get back on the instruments and rapidly climb to safe altitude and plan again. There is the added danger that if speed reduces with a flare on initially becoming visual, if that visual reference is lost the airspeed may be dropping below minimum IMC speed, especially with a rapid cyclic pull back to maintain obstacle clearance on reverting to instruments.

Is there a policy on night rig approaches even in VMC of the PNF following through solely on instruments, so that if the PF calls go-around the PNF can smoothly and calmly take over, already fully orientated on the instruments? Assuming Radalt monitoring in the scan, this would have the added benefit of safeguarding against disorientation on the approach.

332mistress
2nd Feb 2007, 18:54
There seems to be a trend in this thread to conclude that this accident was caused by dis-orientation. This may, after a full enquiry, be the case but there are still many unanswered questions.

The weather was fit for night shuttling with a useful 20+kts of wind to lean into. The crew had completed at least one night landing before the accident so were in the groove of night approaches. The crews at Blackpool regularly do several approaches each night so are well practised in low-level ops over the sea. The a/c was light with only 5 pax (10 can be carried) so performance wasn't an issue.

So what caused the experienced current co-pilot to roll away from the rig, accelerate and increase power, then increase the roll while pitching nose down then ask for assistance? This doesn't sound like classic disorientation, as he would have had the deck in site for most of the initial manoeuvre. Something else must have distracted the crew or caused the initial roll/pitchdown. Let us wait and see what the AIB final report says.

As a matter of accuracy for previous posts:-

Cyclic - the Dauphine has a go round button, which sets 75kts so long as the coupler is engaged - not likely during an approach.

Doublebogey - you are looking at this accident from, I believe, a Puma viewpoint. We spend most of our time with the height and heading hold engaged and it is unusual for us to do more that 20 night rig approaches a yr. A Blackpool Dauphin crew will do that in 2 days during the winter and go rounds are not unusual as during a shuttle it is not unrealistic to have to do at least one overshoot due to a deck crew not being ready. The transition from visual with a rig to the big black hole is an every night occurrence.

SteveMc - The Dauphin autopilot has 2 lanes one fed from the captain's and the other from the co-pilot's AI and compass. A discrepancy in info causes that channel to drop out with an A/P red alarm. The Trimble GPS ground speed function would be a hindrance in this sort of scenario as it is difficult to see and well away from the normal instrument scan.

Rotorspeed - yes the PNF has a responsibility to monitor the approach, call 55kts and acknowledge the commited (to land) call. This accident was not at the end of a rig radar approach so your comments about becoming visual do not apply

Let us wait for the full report before trying to come to a firm conclusion.

332M

Tranquil
3rd Feb 2007, 13:06
Hear hear,
Well said 332mistress.

cyclic
4th Feb 2007, 16:48
332, I wasn't suggesting anything. The co-pilot was a friend of mine. As you know, a decent go-around function doesn't require previous coupling engagement to operate.

cpt
4th Feb 2007, 20:23
I have the feeling that this go-around function can be a little bit sluggish to recover an unusual postion at such a low height, with relatively high pitch and bank angle. It brings your "wings" level and looks for Vy but in a rather smooth manner....
There are so many thinks or combinations of factors that could have happened, once again, only the full investigation will tell.

malabo
4th Feb 2007, 20:48
I'll have to plead complete ignorance about a 365N autopilot system, but I find this tangent on "Go Around" as muddled and uncertain as that other red herring - the AVAD.

So let me put it out to all of you on the "Go Around" function and offshore approaches. Honestly, I didn't think anyone used it anymore for anything except perhaps an ILS. There are far more useful modes to couple to and stay coupled with. "Go Around" is for when you've gone brain-dead and can't think of anything else except not going any closer to the ground.

malabo

SASless
4th Feb 2007, 21:44
Lets think back to the ERA 76 that crashed in the Gulf of Mexico a year or two ago.

Nice night, in cruise flight, very experienced crew, fully kitted out aircraft. Radar traces showed a very shallow descent until about 1500 feet before the radar contact was lost. No radio call...nothing unusual found (that I have heard).

Things happen in our business....some are very complex although seemingly straight forward at first examination.

A second example of why it is best left to the accident investigators rather than hash it out here....the 76 Crash in the Baltic where the hydraulic actuators bound up due to corrosion or whatever it was. That one too was thought to be simple and straight forward.

Bristow/Pan African lost a Bell 412 in Nigeria and no investigation has really been done on that one.

I would suggest holding a discussion of how varied systems function is valid and even discussing causes for spatial disorientation or similar things is also good.

That being said....those discussions have nothing to do with what really happened in this tragedy. As we hear more from the experts doing the investigation then more topics will be subject to discussion.

One man's opinon here.

DeltaFree
4th Feb 2007, 21:58
It seems unlikely to me that experienced pilots would put a fully serviceable aircraft in a 38 degree pitch and roll attitude. The first two things that spring to my mind are AIs and autopilot.
An error in the AIs could lead to the initial confusion, and the standby is not great, which possibly leaves the handling pilot believing he was straight and level when in fact he was nose down. Having recovered from such a dramatic UP at low level it would take any pilot several seconds to gather his thoughts and scan thoroughly away from the standby AI to assess rate of descent.
As with many helicopters the 365 is very lively with the autopilot out. If a pilot takes control with poor visual references expecting the autopilot to be on his side and suddenly realises it is not, then a significant UP will almost certainly occur.
These guys would be used to poor conditions, but with normally minor problems occurring at the wrong time, things were not on their side.
Only a couple of thoughts, there is a long way to go before we know the answers, if we ever do.

Farmer 1
5th Feb 2007, 07:27
On the 365N, the go-around function sets the airspeed hold to 75 kts.

That is all.

Power has to be adjusted manually, and heading controlled either manually or with the heading bug. The heading bug is on the P1 side.

For the go-around function to have any effect, the Coupler has to be selected ON, which would not be the case for an offshore approach unless it was a coupled ARA approach. Such an approach is normally only done if the weather conditions demand it, which I don't think was the case on this occasion.

I don't recall ever seeing anyone use the go-around function offshore.

I'm never one for making rash statements, but if the accident had anything to do with the go-around function, I'll eat my hat.

cpt
5th Feb 2007, 09:11
Farmer 1, I haven't flown the 365N for a while now, but I remember you didn't have to couple the autopilot to engage the "go around"
All you have to do, is to depress the switch on collective (or on coupler control pannel) only then it engages A/S mode at a preset value of 75Kts and also brings your bank angle back to 0°. Heading changes can then be done with a coupled lateral mode engagement or manually.

Farmer 1
5th Feb 2007, 09:54
Cpt,

We have different memories, and there may be variations in the types we have flown, but on all the 365 models I have flown, including that particular aircraft, without the FD or Coupler engaged, pressing the go-around button is completely ineffective.

If the FD is selected ON, pressing the button selects the A/S hold to 75 kts, and the horizontal beam bar appears, but only on the P1's side.

If the coupler is selected ON, the autopilot will input controls to the pitch channel to adopt the attitude for 75 kts IAS for the particular power setting.

The pilot must control the power, and would normally apply go-around setting (100% torque up to 75 kts).

Heading control, bank angle, etc. have nothing to do with the go-around function, it deals only with airspeed.

The only difference I can remember is some aircraft have the FD beam bars on both sides of the panel, but the go-around function has always been as I have described, including in the aircraft which crashed.

cpt
5th Feb 2007, 10:32
farmer 1,
OK, I agree with you in regard with the power setting and F/D bars but not on the rest. I'll try to find a technical doc on the "sfim 155" but I'm fairly sure of my memory.
I have seen some 365C equipped with the "sperry 7000" autopilot but I don't think it can be fitted on the "N", anyway,I also have flown on this particular helicopter and AP was a "sfim" in this time.

Farmer 1
5th Feb 2007, 10:54
OK, Cpt, I await with interest.

As regards the automated "wings level" bit, that is not what you want when you go around from an ARA. In that situation, an immediate 45 degree turn, one way or the other depending on circumstances is required, if memory serves correctly.

I can't remember the autopilot manufacturer, I'm afraid.

tomotomp
5th Feb 2007, 11:21
The AAIB says the helicopter (G-BLUN) had taken off from Blackpool, north-western England, to serve offshore gas platforms in Morecambe Bay. When the accident happened at 18:30 the aircraft was flying from the Millom West rig to the North Morecambe platform at 500ft (150m) above sea level on its third sector of the evening. The first officer was the pilot flying, and the visibility, at a reported 3-5km in rain, was marginal according to UK Civil Aviation Authority regulations for operations of this type at night, says the bulletin
This taken from Flight International, didn't see that in the report(jurno licence i presume):ugh:

212man
5th Feb 2007, 12:55
I guess the statement stems from the reported fact that the vis passed to the crew was 4km, and the minimum required (as stated) was 5 km. That could be construed as marginal by some, I suppose.

hostile
5th Feb 2007, 13:36
If you look at the AS365 FM SUP1 "Cat A" section para 2.1, we have to think if this is a common use? I dont think so. I've been involved very many times a conversation for this. Are you even able to make training for the copilot's in this kind of procedures?

"...The take off and landing procedures must be performed by the pilot in the RH seat."

Hostile.

Droopystop
5th Feb 2007, 21:13
It will be interesting to see what the AAIB have to say on this one as I think most of us here are thinking "there but for the grace of God go the rest of us".

But as an aside, what are the thoughts on the use of autopilots in this environment.

On the one side autopilots reduce work load and is very good at doing what it is told to do. But at some point the aircraft has to be uncoupled to do the landing bit. How easy is that transition at say 300', 45kts at night with poor visual references? So is it better to have more stick time to get your "hand in" for the landing, or is it better to let George fly until the last minute?

At least one manufacturer of modern machines is insistant that their aircraft are flown coupled at all times (quite how this can be achieved offshore remains a mystery to me). So do we disobey the manufacturers recommendations to keep our hand in or do we go by the book?

verticalhold
6th Feb 2007, 10:25
From memory the conditions these guys had were second only to a rig radar at night to minima in a flat calm in my list of hated airborne conditions. Accurate speed control is absolutely essential, and is the easiest to get wrong, or have go wrong.

Its a long time since I last flew offshore, but the weather and workload appears not to have been reduced, An approach into the black pit with few external references is extremely hard. Add other potential problems and the situation can rapidly turn into a crisis. P2 was an experienced pilot with not much offshore time, it appears he knew when to ask for help, P1 a vastly experienced offshore operator had probably gone through many a night go-round. I don't know the fit on this aircraft, but I doubt any holds would have been used on such a short sector other than alt.

The AAIB will still keep pulling the aircraft to bits to find the truth. If the aircraft had a fault and the particular part was not utterly trashed in the impact I'm sure they will find it.

AuxHyd
6th Feb 2007, 12:09
The 365 is normally flown with the coupler on standby (green CPL annunciator on the A/P control panel). Any mode including G/A can then be engaged. But with the standby light out no coupling is available.

A failing attitude indicator can kill, see the NTSB report below:

http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20001212X19083&key=1

Question is: can we adequately simulate and/or train to recognize and react to such a failure?

Farmer 1
6th Feb 2007, 12:46
The 365 is normally flown with the coupler on standbyNot with this operator, AuxHyd. Not unless they have changed the SOP fairly recently.

SASless
6th Feb 2007, 13:41
What would be interesting to know about this flight would be the layout of the field, location of the heli-decks and the existing wind data. Having that information.....think through what the crew might have been seeing as they made their rounds in the field.

I can remember many a night shuttling in the Ninian Field in the lovely weather that exists there and having to make the takeoffs on instruments, get turned around towards the next stop and having to use radar to find the next rig/platform....even if just a mile or two apart from each other. That was back in the good ol' days of Decca which was not much help shuttling (or in cruise either). Depending upon the wind....it could be an easy trip over to the next deck upwind of your takeoff point and the other deck was in sight the whole time. With the wind from a different direction one would have to depart into the black void and get turned around to travel down wind to the other rig then get turned back into the wind for the landing which was more more work.

AuxHyd
6th Feb 2007, 19:16
Farmer 1: So why would anyone not want the coupler on standby? Time to change the SOP, perhaps?

soggyboxers
6th Feb 2007, 20:50
Sorry, nothing to do with the AAIB report, but there's just too much misinformation about Dauphin autopilots appearing here to let go without comment. All the Dauphin models from the SA365N to the N3 have a standard fit SFIM 155 automatic pilot and a CDV 85 flight coupler, unless specified with something different from the factory. This can be found in Section 10.6 of the 365N RFM (different reference for 365N1 - N3 models). The coupler control unit enables either coupler or flight director (or both) modes to be coupled to the AP. If only FD is armed and selected, the appropriate mode will be connected to the flight director bars on the ADI and the pilot will have to manually fly the bars to centre them. Of only CPL is armed and selected, the autopilot will provide control inputs when an appropriate coupler mode (e.g. HDG, ALT, AS) is selected, without any FD command bar input (and on many 365 models the FD command bars are displayed only on the Captain's ADI). Normally both CPL and FD modes are armed and selected as required. IN GA mode (selected either on the coupler control unit or the collective button), the wings are rolled level and a pitch attitude for Vy are selected, the pilot manually pulling appropriate GA power (whether toruqe, Ng or delta Ng depending on model and temperature).
When instructing on the Dauphin simulator, I found that most pilots wanted to fly the aircraft on an ARA using ALT and HDG modes, but then when they had to carry out a GA, suddenly found themselves acclerating level as they pulled power. I find that for an ARA it's normally easier to couple HDG and AS, then if a GA is necessary, use the heading control to turn away from the rig and allow the airspeed to be held by the AS coupler mode, whilst just pulling appropriate power on the collective. Using the GA mode for most ARAs at the go around point is pointless as it rolls the wings level at a time when you want to be turning away from the rig.
None of the above implies that any autopilot mishandling occurred in this accident. I have no idea and await the outcome of the AAIB investigation. It's just that there seem to be a number of slightly confused posts on the coupler and flight director modes on the Dauphin. I'm told that Scotia in UK don't send their pilots to Helisim for annual recurrent training. Is this true? If so, it's an unforgiveable error on their part, when a fully certified Cat D simulator is available at Helisim to practice many failures which it is not possible to do on the aircraft. Even in the much-maligned Nigeria, pilots from all companies are required to carry out annual recurrent simulator training if there is a certified simulator available for the type.

Blind
7th Feb 2007, 08:38
I've been very reluctant to post here as speculation is not always healthy and we must wait for the full AAIB report but.........

I'm told that Scotia in UK don't send their pilots to Helisim for annual recurrent training. Is this true? If so, it's an unforgiveable error on their part, when a fully certified Cat D simulator is available at Helisim to practice many failures which it is not possible to do on the aircraft.

Unfortunatly this is correct and I really hope this changes. In Aberdeen alll the L pilots go to the Sim in Norway every 6 months yet only a small handful of the L2 pilots go to the sim annually. The UK S76 and Dauphin crews do not go to the sim. The S92 crews do use the sim at the moment. A number of command courses have been run over the last 18 months and the L crews had the benefit of a week in the sim yet the L2 crews did not. I do not know how this can be justified.

I think this is dreadful and hopefully changes soon.

madherb
7th Feb 2007, 12:09
A question, slightly off topic, relating to Blind's post - do clients, in this case major oil companies, not require annual sim recurrent as part of their operator audit and approval process? The OGP Aircraft Management Guide section 10.5.1.7 encourages the use of full-motion simulators if available.

M

Teefor Gage
7th Feb 2007, 12:30
do clients, in this case major oil companies, not require annual sim recurrent as part of their operator audit and approval process?

In some cases they more than 'encourage' it, but some companies seem to need more encouragement than others......!!

hostile
7th Feb 2007, 12:38
I thought that it is the operator who operates their helicopters and keep the flight crew in best shape. Not the client :oh:. Simulator is the place where you are able to go thru all bad situations.

Hostile.

Teefor Gage
7th Feb 2007, 12:51
I thought that it is the operator who operates their helicopters and keep the flight crew in best shape. Not the client :oh:. Simulator is the place where you are able to go thru all bad situations.

Not quite! Simulators are the only place where you can practice abnormal situations without increasing the risk to crew. As such, Sims are invaluable in the drive to "keep flight crew in best shape".
However, we are digressing from the original thread and implying that the use of the simulator in this particular case could have prevented the accident.
As previously stated by many others, lets not prejudge the investigation.

roundwego
7th Feb 2007, 12:55
CHC Safety statement from CEO;-

“For absolutely every decision we make, safety must always be the first consideration.”
- Sylvain Allard, CEO & President

CHC Europe management has added the unwritten proviso;-

"As long as it doesn't affect the bottom line"

CHC Europe (UK) has been very slow in adopting simulator training for pilots other than those who were undergoing sim training in Brintel & Bond. The majority of UK pilots do not get regular sim training. One of the reasons for this problem is their appallingly slow record of recruiting and training. It takes twice as long for CHC to make recruitment decisions and get people on line than their UK competitors. This has helped create an ongoing shortage of pilots hence the inability (even if they would include it in their budget) to roster all pilots for quality sim training.

Blind
7th Feb 2007, 13:57
It is client driven in some cases. I can only really comment on Aberdeen, but the L crews have used the sim for a long time and there wasn't an L2 sim. When the L2 sim was approved CHC chose not to use it but Mobil insisted on it which is why they are in the crazy situation where only some crews are checked on the sim, and they are the only crews mobil use.

I think this is crazy and have never understood how it can be justified. A number of L pilots have refused to go on to the L2 because of this. Even the Mobil "approved" crews go annually compared to biannually on the L.

Sorry this has gone off thread, but it was in answer to soggyboxers' question.

check
7th Feb 2007, 14:01
It is obvious that CHC UK do not have a contract for Shell, they insist on all pilots using a sim if one is available. CHC in Holland use simulators. For years first with KLM, KLE, Schreiner and CHC I went to WPB for the S76 and then 6 months later Stavanger for the S61.

One size does not fit all, some areas of CHC are up to speed in using simulators and enhancing pilot skills, awaress and knowledge of emergency procedures. Others like the UK, well what can you say!

Geoffersincornwall
7th Feb 2007, 15:03
One thing is for sure. Whatever the outcome we are likely to see the whole question of training, and particularly sim training revisited by CHC and probably others. Nobody can afford to be in a situation where your ops management and training is put under the microscope in the way that an investigation into a fatal accident does. There will always be holes and people will always be wiser after the event.

Check
You are right the Dutch authorities (pre JAA) introduced a rule that said that all operators WILL use a simulator if one is available. The reaction of the UK CAA will be interesting to observe for unlike many NAAs they can be sued for 'negligent regulation' and so they can be expected to change the rules on sim training if they are able to find enough 'just cause' and the industry does not fight such a move.

It is such a pity that we always seem to react AFTER the event despite the evidence from operations in other parts of the world or other parts of the aviation industry.

G

:confused:

coalface
7th Feb 2007, 15:52
Geoffers, you make a good point but it is a shame that it might take a regulatory authority to enforce sim training. I don't think it will happen in the short term as the UK CAA seems completely toothless. For the past 6 years the CAA has allowed CHC to operate without any senior management with any aviation background. I am told that the AOC senior postholder was the equivilent of a commercial clerk not many years ago. The resources director to who the flight ops managers report to has no aviation background and by all accounts is completely out of her depth. Due to the attempt to create CHC "Europe" as a single company most of CHCs management's time seems to be taken up with trying to sort out politics and industrial problems among the different national entities which are all trying to protect their own local jobs and client base.

There seems to have been a deliberate senior management decision to ensure there is no-one in flight ops with any financial or budget authority because they know that pilots, pilot training and everything else which goes towards providing a safe operating system costs money.

Roundwego is right - they might talk the talk but they don't walk the walk.

PS. Please don't think that anything I have said implies any particular view on the cause of the thread subject accident. That is up to the AAIB. I just hope they look very carefully at the management structure of CHC in the UK

Geoffersincornwall
7th Feb 2007, 18:00
Just to give you a flavour of what it means to land on a platform at night here is a short video clip of a landing on one of the better platforms in the North Sea. believe me they come a lot worse than this. The movie was shot from the LH DV window of a 365 using a Fuji Finepix 4.0. The lurch mid sequence is when I had to arm the floats for my long-suffering skipper. Just look how black the world is on a dark moonless night. Now how do you fancy a bit of night vfr?
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_ZLmjLHGQFY
G
:ok:

tistisnot
7th Feb 2007, 22:22
I … remember ….. when ….. ‘Check’ was a young lad ….

KLM’s induction training included 40 hours of sim training! (Being a foreigner they concluded we obviously did not know how to fly on the correct side of the sky). How many companies have an induction course of note nowadays – even though it’s a requirement in the OMA/D?

Thereafter it was the sim, for both aircraft types, every 6 months!

The foray into Norwich, with KLM Era UK, upset the Brit operator who lost the contract – but their influence in the UK CAA meant that even with a S76B (which is capable of everything a new S76C+ can do) CAA Examiners were not interested in seeing the management of failures on AP’s, FD’s nor Radalt Hold functions but rather hands-on flying throughout – that’s how real men fly aircraft! Give credit where credit’s due though – they have certainly improved of late.

Yes KLM had a monopoly, yes they were influenced by mainline KLM (thank heavens) but they installed most of the equipment – and the procedures to go with it – 15 years ago.

What staggers me most is that non-Europeans sort of look at UK and the like as revered centres of JAA excellence demanding lengthy training and high standards; and yet here we are saying that a UK operator skimps on sending pilots to the simulator ….. nigh on scandalous.

helimutt
7th Feb 2007, 23:02
So now, using a thread about an accident, the cause of which is still unknown, people are having a go saying that a certain operator isn't doing enough sim training? Come on guys. Anyone have any facts and figures to back this up comparing to other operators, or is it all just one sided bullsh*t??
:ugh:

SASless
7th Feb 2007, 23:12
What staggers me most is that non-Europeans sort of look at UK and the like as revered centres of JAA excellence demanding lengthy training and high standards; and yet here we are saying that a UK operator skimps on sending pilots to the simulator ….. nigh on scandalous.

What rock did you crawl out from under pard? Most non-Europeans (which includes those of us on the west end of the Salt Water Divide) see the UK routine as anything but centers of high standards to be revered by anyone but the terminally thick amongst us.

Too right the UK demands lengthy training but for what reason beyond lining someone's pocket at great expense to those trying to enter the profession.

Surely anyone with a modicum of common sense can appreciate the unwieldy nature of the bureaucratic system you suffer under.

The UK system does some things right but as an entity it is simply an obstacle to getting anything done in a timely and efficient manner.

The existence and popularity of US and other foreign registered aircraft is evidence of that. One does not see UK registered aircraft in North America....wonder why that is.

Geoffersincornwall
8th Feb 2007, 06:30
Tistisnot

Lest we forget - good as they were, our Dutch colleagues thought that AVAD was for amateurs and pussycats .......... and paid the price. (20th Dec 1997)

SAS

Here we go again........let's not mistake 'cheap' for 'good'.

I've been around a wee bit and there are as many ways to 'skin the cat' as you care to find. However as Nick L constantly points out to me, the end results, in terms of accident stats at least is pretty much the same when you compare the JAA world with the FAA world.


In the world of Safety Management we talk about 'designing to succeed - v - designing to fail'. I have seen many an organisation that was designed to fail but did not, simply because the guys (and gals) that worked there constantly made up for the lack of management skills and resources. There are even organisations that despite putting lots of $$$ and a lot of effort into safety (designed to succeed) still manage to have accidents because good corporate oversight cannot make up for individuals who, despite everything, screw up.

It's been my experience that a lot depends on the quality of NAA oversight and this depends on the background of the personnel working as Flight Operations Inspectors. Around the globe you will find all sorts of people tasked with this important role.

In ascending order, this is how I rate them:

1. Military fixed wing
2. Military helo
3. Ex-military with no commercial experience
4. Any one who has been out there in the commercial helo world for a minimum of 10 years and earnt the respect of his colleagues (commercial or military background).

Yes, for those out there that don't realise it there are helicopter operations around the world policed by folk that wouldn't know a collective lever from a hole in the ground.

Helimutt

The facts speak for themselves. The amount of sim training received within the CHC 365 fleet has been zero. In the S76 fleet it was zero until last November and is now very limited. You can make of that what you will but as I have said previously the speculation about the need for sim training will only be reinforced by the accident regardless of the outcome simply because it has some validity, however uncomfortable that may be.


G

:uhoh:

tistisnot
8th Feb 2007, 06:40
SaSless,

Don't jump to conclusions - that's my prerogative! I don't fly in UK; I fly with Argentinians, Chileans, Indians, Africans, North Americans and Asians ..... and it is a perception that many of these have about the 'JAA' Licence and system to which I was referring. I do not say it is right or wrong.

With the boom in revenue oil companies are now demanding newer equipments with all the kit. Perhaps if we had been stronger as an industry a few years ago, operators would have provided a lot of this as standard fits for them in the past - and that would have led consequently to more simulator work earlier. The figures are already available from OGP safety studies as to why this should be occurring. it doesn't take the brains of an archbishop to work out where we need to concentrate - sims provide excellent testing and proving of procedures, emergencies and CRM.

You have thousands of posts and I do not rant against those... allow me one now and again, thank you.

helimutt
8th Feb 2007, 06:40
So how many sim hours did Bond or Bristow do on all of the a/c they utilise? Not including new types, only those for recurrency/safety training. Again, how do the accident statistics stack up, and is it really glaringly obvious that CHC's possible lack of sim training has led to more accidents than other companies?
Remember, you can't include this particular incident as we don't know the cause yet.

tistisnot
8th Feb 2007, 06:52
Geoffers,

Our posts crossed! Now be careful - you quite rightly identified the cause of the S76 accident in previous posts as CRM failure.

Yes - I did state they bought 'most' of the equipments! I am an AVAD fan, not EGPWS (at present), although it did contribute in this instance - they acknowledged 100' ASL as a crew but it was ignored in the desire to find the platform visually - the age old two sets of eyes outside ignoring the turn below 500', subsequent loss of speed and increasing ROD ..... 'blowaway' did not help at that stage.

Geoffersincornwall
8th Feb 2007, 07:43
The point I am making is that when you put an incident or accident under the microscope you can turn over a few rocks in the process and find underneath some 'embarassing' shortcomings. They need not be related to the direct cause of the accident but the fact that they appear in the analysis makes them very difficult to ignore and calls into question the wisdom an earlier decision to do, or not to do something. If you are familiar with the Zotov Error Map then you know what I mean. If not PM me and I'll send you more info.
G
:ok:

Hummingfrog
8th Feb 2007, 08:19
This thread is now suffering from content creep and is now developing into a discussion on simulator training, which I feel has no bearing on this accident whatsoever. The CHC Dauphin TRE/IREs do a good job in keeping us current and always ask if there is anything we wish to practise.

These were 2 experienced pilots who died in this accident and the captain probably had more night landings on the 365N than I have (5000+). They realised something was amiss so went around but for some reason crashed.

Let us wait for the AIB to publish their full findings and hopefully learn from them. In the meantime a new thread on the benefits of simulator training could be started.
HF

Geoffers - it was never that dark going onto the U:eek:

Brilliant Stuff
8th Feb 2007, 09:54
Hummingfrog,
We did the maths a while back I believe Steve would have had something like 40.000 landings and take offs purely on the North Sea. I myself did 10.000 in 6 years. I counted them after every flight.


Whenever the sim question came up within the company we were always told they cost to much because we would have to go to France for them.
The Training captains were always under pressure to stay within their budget, as you can imagine this did not impress them one bit. We also were made to adopt a more company standardised checklist and sops even though this did not account for us making 5 landings an hour on average.

DOUBLE BOGEY
15th Feb 2007, 09:21
I hear what you sat about the amount of landings carried out by the P1 in this case but was it not the P2 that was HP during the approach?

The significant issue in this incident is the go-around - Night VMC (which we all know becomes effectively a go-Around IMC once the lights have slid by the window)!!

This is an event which is unusual, especially for a pilot who is v. experienced in night deck landings, as most of his approaches will generally result in a successful landing.

I think the any speculation on the impact simulator training may or may not have made to this incident is just that, but I feel it is important to consider that simulator training provides the opportunity to "reflect" the problems of the real world retrospectively to hopefully prepare crews more fully for infrequent occurrences that are just to risky to do in the helicopter itself.

My understanding is that CHC have a new dynamic MD who for the past year has been working on the introduction of Simulator training for all Offshore pilots and crews and this is very commendable. It is hard to point the finger at management and categorically state that sim training should have been carried out in the past as without a mandate from the NAA the costs of conducting such training may make the Company un-competetive in the market place and predjudice its continued survival.

I hope that this incident will certainly highlight the benefits of sim training and bring to the forefront of the CAAs minds that this type of training is essential for certain types of helicopter operations. It should, in my opinion, be mandatory for offshore ops!

Just a footnote: As a "newbie" to PPRUNE am am bemused by the moral contingent who keep urging us not to stray from the original thread. Surely PPRUNE offers all a chance to state their minds and sometimes straying just a little bit can produce some amazing results - rather like "thinking outside the box"!! (WHATEVER THAT MEANS)

Hummingfrog
15th Feb 2007, 16:48
Double Bogey

Your comment about a go round is inaccurate

"This is an event which is unusual, especially for a pilot who is v. experienced in night deck landings, as most of his approaches will generally result in a successful landing."

A go round, as 332Mistress explained to you, is not an unusual occurrence for a shuttle pilot. Due to the nature of shuttling the next rig is not always ready to give deck available as you approach so we usually set up the approach expecting deck clearance sometime during the approach. If we don't get it we go around - this happens on a regular basis!

The comments about thread creep are usually mentioned to encourage people to start new threads if they have an idea they think needs exploring and not let a thread, which concerns 7 people dieing wander off into irrelevant discussions.

Although the P2 was the HP with 300+ hrs shuttling he may have over 300 night deck landings - nearly as many as a Puma pilot would get in 10 yrs!!

Shuttle pilots hand fly the a/c most of the time so while disorientation may be a factor in this accident I do find it hard to believe it was the initial trigger.

HF

Brilliant Stuff
15th Feb 2007, 18:21
Just to add some accuracy to the picture.

In my 6 years I did 5 go-arounds and I believe this is the same for all the Blackpool pilots.

Hummingfrog
15th Feb 2007, 20:03
Interesting Brilliant Stuff

I haven't done many detachments to Blackpool but in my time there it was not uncommon to have a deck crew not quite ready and have to go around to wait for them. It was certainly more common when Liverpool crews first started operating to the Douglas field. In the 40s in was very common - especially with the Delta and Alpha - don't know why??

My point is that operating in the pitch black with no visual references is not uncommon for shuttle pilots. The worst being the shuttle we used to do from the Tharos to Claymore to Tharos, single pilot - off the brightly lit Claymore into pitch black -climb on instruments to 500ft - level turn on instruments - quick glance out to make sure you weren't being blown towards the Claymore, back onto instruments - corner of your eye see the Claymore passing abeam then descending turn onto finals for the Tharos X 10 per night.

HF

212man
15th Feb 2007, 21:34
I agree: I remember one of my first nights in the SNS coming home after 4:30 hours night flying with 26 T/o and landings, and discovering after looking at my log bock that represented 2 years worth of 332 landings in ABN. You definitely become very familiar with the environment.

Droopy
16th Feb 2007, 08:51
This is of interest...http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/lancashire/6366603.stm

bondu
16th Feb 2007, 19:09
Things have obviously changed in the Northern North Sea since Hummingfrog and 212man operated there last. In the five weeks between 5 Dec 06 to 12 Jan 07, I flew 57 hours night (out of a total of 98) with a total of 55 deck landings/take offs, admittedly shared with various co-pilots, but still around 25to 30 myself. The days of only 26 night decks in two years are long gone!

However, night shuttles are a different kettle of fish altogether and deserve total respect!

bondu

DOUBLE BOGEY
17th Feb 2007, 08:56
I know I keep coming back to the go-around thing, bit I have been doing Offshore Ops for 18 years, plenty of night time experience and enough shuttling with the bigger types (yes we do it too). This week I have done a total of 12 night decks, 6 of them during shuttling type ops.

I have to say every one of these approaches and landings demands a very high degree of attention, including the rig departures into the inky blackness. There is simply no margin for error and I am constantly left with the impression that a moments distratraction leading to a breakdown in scan can have dramatic results during a low speed type manouvre such as a go-around or indeed rig departure.

It may be that after all these years I am still cr*p, but for me I can very easily see how this incident panned out.

I have been NHP at the bottom of an ILS in the sim when the HP has inadvertantly pressed the trim release at the point of go-around and the result was spectacular to say the least. OK, the sim is a little bit unrealistic in the control response sense but the attemted recovery by me was heartstopping resulting in us completing a 150 degree turn and almost backracking the flipping localiser.

This kind of training, done in the safety of the sim has proven to me that it does not take much to "TILT" the crews gyros as we tend to spend the vast majority of our time in balance, S&L in a controlled fashion.

It is interesting to hear the accounts of the smaller ****tle pilots, ie lots of landings, lots of experience, but the question remains. How much experience do you guys get of trying to recover a seriously compromised flight envelope at low speed, low to the sea? The 3000 feet "UP" recovery on OPC done in the AC simply does not provide a realistic enough scenario and it always comes when you are expecting it.

Sim training also helps to break down barriers between "experienced crews" that exist as a result of mutual respect. The fear of intervening early cos he is usually so solid. Trust through complacency.

When you see a well respected collegue reach his limit, sat next to you in the sim, it changes forever the way you view your job. How many AC have had near misses, touched the sea, lost all airspeed on these types of ops, and the common thread - all v. experienced crews.

Some adages remain valid for ever - you'll never live long enough to make all the mistakes possible, so take some time to learn from the mistakes of others.
My point is - I like to do my learning in the comfort of the sim if at all possible.

DOUBLE BOGEY
19th Feb 2007, 22:18
Great Name by the way - are you French??

I am intrigued - what do you believe could have happened during the approach that the CVR/FDR has not recorded and therefore is omitted fro the interim AAIB report?

Is there anybody out there who is not paying a lot more attention during night operations when the sea gets close!!!!

Hummingfrog
20th Feb 2007, 22:18
Mais non, je suis Anglais:ok:

If you had read my profile you would see that being Ex RAF I don't have a pocket in my flying suit for that essential French item - a large white hanky:E

It is just a feeling that something else was amiss. The a/c was being flown from the LHS yet the roll was away from the rig. I would have expected a fixation on the deck lights to produce a roll to the left as the HP kept the deck in view.

I await the full report.

HF

VeeAny
16th Oct 2008, 22:17
Has the G-BLUN report been published ?

I ask because I've just returned form Helitech and not had great internet access while out there.

I got back to a barrage of emails and one contained a link to Human Error Caused Fatal Helicopter Crash (from The Herald ) (http://www.theherald.co.uk/news/other/display.var.2461091.0.Human_error_caused_fatal_helicopter_cr ash.php)

The Air Accidents Investigation Branch report found that the co-pilot lost control, there was a delay in the commander taking over, and the CHC Scotia helicopter plunged into the sea with the loss of all on board.

As the helicopter approached the platform Mr Potton asked Mr Foddering: "You all right?" as the helicopter started to pitch.

He replied: "No, I'm not happy mate."

I can't find any mention of this in what currently seems to be publshed, and I cant find the finished report on the AAIB web site (just the preliminary S1-2007).

Have the media been given access to the report before its published ?

Strange thing is the article is dated tomorrow 17 Oct 2008 (which could just be confused computer clocks I know).

I am tired so I may have missed it, but I have been all over the AAIB site tonight and can't find it.

GS

VeeAny
16th Oct 2008, 23:25
Was still up after midnight and it duly appeared when the date changed

Air Accidents Investigation: 7/2008 G-BLUN (http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/publications/formal_reports/7_2008_g_blun.cfm)

I guess the media got to see it first then and knew the publication date (and no thats not a dig at the AAIB).

puntosaurus
17th Oct 2008, 02:46
That is truly heartbreaking. The speed with which this went wrong - 30 secs from normal conversation to disaster, and barely 15 secs from the sense of something wrong to the crash. It seems inconceivable that these approaches can be flown without electronic aids. The fixed wing folk must look at this and shake their heads.

helimutt
17th Oct 2008, 08:01
It doesn't make for pleasant reading. It's a long time coming and also, I can't believe media sources get a copy before general release on the AAIB website! What's that all about?

HeliComparator
17th Oct 2008, 08:37
Overall is a good report and should be mandatory reading for all offshore pilots, especially with night flying season fast approaching. Its annoying that lives were lost whilst the bean counters who decided not to spend the money on Sim training get away with it.

I have to disagree on one point- as I understand it the trials into GPS approaches that the report refers to are as a substitute for an ARA. At the end of an ARA you are still at around 0.75nm from destination (maybe 0.5nm with the new approach) and the final (and hardest and most critical) bit of the approach will always have to be visual. With the varying approach directions (wind) and obstacle environment I can forsee no other way. So this accident scenario would in no way be helped by the EASA research which the report is pushing.

punto - unfortunately that is the way of many helicopter accidents - "fat dumb and happy" to accident in only a few seconds. There is no light in the cockpit that says "crashing in 5 minutes".

HC

mustpost
17th Oct 2008, 09:27
I can't believe media sources get a copy before general release

Routinely the media are given advance access to official reports with an embargo on it until the publication date (to ensure that they publish simultaneously with the report's authors)..Electronic editions of UK papers start to appear around 2300-0000 the night before so some stories do get out a hour or so before the due date. It's just the way it is..

shortfinals
17th Oct 2008, 11:02
HeliComparator - there are research programmes going on out there. The techniques would need tweaking for rigs, but it could be done. Check this link: Helicopters prepare for precision GPS approaches (http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2008/09/23/316327/helicopters-prepare-for-precision-gps-approaches.html)

SF

Shawn Coyle
17th Oct 2008, 13:41
Gosh, it was only 10 years ago that I flew DGPS approaches to a 50' hover (with 10 knots of tailwind, no less) in an S-76.
Where are they and why aren't we getting them?

HeliComparator
17th Oct 2008, 17:05
shortfinals, Shawn

The type of approach in the link shortfinals posted is fine for an airfield type approach, even then its only to CAT 1 limits (prob 200' above the airfield). This in no way translates to an offshore approach that takes you right to the helideck. The obstacle environment just doesn't make it possible, and whilst gps with SBAS is super-accurate, its not very accurate in the vicinity of a large metal structure due to multi-path reception of the satellite signals. Then there is the point that the helideck is not in a fixed place (floating rig/ship), there may be other installations in the immediate vicinity etc.

The type of approach shown in the link is along the same lines as the type of approach mentioned in the report. It wouldn't have helped in this case - in fact maybe made it worse - its harder to transition from an instrument approach that leaves you at 50' above deck height at 0.75 or even 0.5 nm (very flat), to a visual rig landing, than it is to fly the whole approach visually.

HC

Buitenzorg
17th Oct 2008, 18:16
So this accident scenario would in no way be helped by the EASA research which the report is pushing.

I respectfully disagree. The way I read this report, this accident was set up by a sloppily-set-up approach – with contributory factors of course. If this approach had been flown as an IAP (whether ARA, GPS or DGPS) with proper (radar-) altitude and airspeed control, the visual segment would have been started from a configuration that would have given a much better chance of a successful conclusion: low speed, correct height and therefore, angle, and close enough to see the deck lights well enough for them to help in judging the approach angle etc. Instead the crew started a visual descent from a low height (400 AGL), at cruise speed (125 KIAS), quite far out (shortly after spotting the rig at a calculated 6.8 km). In airline parlance, this approach was never stabilized.

As for simulator training, apart from some generic FTDs without visuals I only have experience of the Level D B412 sims. They’re great for practicing procedures, especially for those emergencies we can’t practice in the aircraft, or under conditions we’d never practice in, but its visuals for the last part of the approach including hover are pretty poor, especially if you fly a steep approach. Certainly not good enough to practice technique rather than procedure. Where abundant sim training may have helped would have been during the unusual attitude recovery on the go-around.

Look, this was a routine operation, not an emergency, performed by two pilots who were both experienced and recently current in this particular operation. The proper procedures (appropriate calls, active monitoring of PF by PNF) could and should have been practiced on every approach, even during daytime. Lack of a simulator is a red herring on this issue.

Lastly, am I the only one who sees parallels between this accident and the ongoing carnage in the US EMS industry? Night, poor weather, crew pushes low to remain visual, gets disoriented and crashes. The difference is that this was an instrument-rated two-man crew in an IFR aircraft flying between surveyed and approved facilities over absolutely flat terrain. Why was every leg on this flight not flown IFR? Because IFR alternate fuel requirements would have precluded an eight-sector flight? That sounds like a really good reason to me – but to the next of kin?

helimutt
17th Oct 2008, 19:35
buitenzorg, I spent nearly half an hour typing up a reply to this thread then decided against it for fear of being ridiculed over my views on the simulator use due to my low time experience of offshore flying (1000hrs). I have to say I agree with you completely though. Having just returned from sim training and practising night decks( badly) The final approach phase and landing are just not realistic in a sim due to the visual cues or lack thereof, and the totally simulated feel to it all when using it for offshore night practice. (otherwise the sim is a fantastic tool for practising emergencies etc)
When I do eventually come to be signed off to fly night decks in the North Sea I feel it will be a great challenge on every one. Am I looking forward to the challenge? Completely. Do I realise the serious nature of probably every night deck landing? I certainly do. I might fly them slowly, set it up slowly and go-around at any time I feel unhappy with what I see. Does that make me a poor pilot?

puntosaurus
17th Oct 2008, 19:43
Me too Buitenzorg.

On ILS and NDB approaches in the fixed wing I am concentrating on setting up a stable approach. I know if it's not stable because I break the parameters that I set for myself, eg, half scale deflection. No matter how roughly I fly an IAP (and I can do some real doozys), If I've not broken my limits then I'm always in a good position at the end of it to do a visual approach, because the speed, angle of approach and azimuth are all going to be well controlled.

I'm not sitting there worried about depth perception, I'm setting up the AI so that the needles follow. And it doesn't matter whether the technology is ILS, MLS, NDB/BaroAlt, or GPS/RADALT, I'm just playing a video game until DH/MDH. Or better still I'm watching the best pilot in the cockpit play the game for me, with my own private hyperspace button (TOGA !).

chcoffshore
17th Oct 2008, 21:07
Buitenzorg (http://www.pprune.org/members/47849-buitenzorg)

Where you there? Have a little respect for the crew!:mad:

pumaboy
17th Oct 2008, 21:29
Here is a formal copy of the report :

Air Accidents Investigation: G-BLUN Report Sections (http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/publications/formal_reports/7_2008_g_blun/g_blun_report_sections.cfm)

RVDT
17th Oct 2008, 22:00
Just because it's legal doesn't necessarily mean it is safe of course.

If you have flown a helicopter for a while you instinctively know a certain cyclic displacement will give you a certain pitch rate to achieve a certain change in pitch angle.

I notice that there is no mention of the possibility of refraction due to rain on the windscreen which is well known phenomena. How experienced either pilot was of it is a possible factor that will probably never be known.

Something obviously caught out 2 experienced pilots who had done this type of thing on many occasions before.


An error in vision can occur when flying in rain. The presence of rain on the windscreen, in addition to causing poor visibility, introduces a refraction error. This error is because of two things: firstly, the reduced transparency of the rain-covered windscreen causes the eye to see a horizon below the true one (because of the eye response to the relative brightness of the upper bright part and the lower dark part); and secondly, the shape and pattern of the ripples formed on the windscreen, particularly on sloping ones, which cause objects to appear lower. The error may be present as a result of one or other of the two causes, or of both, in which case it is cumulative and is of the order of about 5∞ in angle. Therefore, a hilltop or peak 1/2 NM ahead of an aircraft could appear to be approximately 260 ft lower, (230 ft lower at 1/2 SM) than it actually is.

Pilots should remember this additional hazard when flying in conditions of low visibility in rain and should maintain sufficient altitude and take other precautions, as necessary, to allow for the presence of this error. Also, pilots should ensure proper terrain clearance during enroute flight and on final approach to landing. (Courtesy Transport Canada)

FAR AIM
8-1-5. Illusions in Flight

(e) Atmospheric illusions. Rain on the windscreen can create the illusion of greater height, and atmospheric haze the illusion of being at a greater distance from the runway. The pilot who does not recognize these illusions will fly a lower approach. Penetration of fog can create the illusion of pitching up. The pilot who does not recognize this illusion will steepen the approach, often quite abruptly. (Courtesy FAA)

It would appear that the LHS pilot was confused or uncertain about something.

If both pilots were tricked by this phenomena, it is a possibility that the commander in the RHS assumed from the last visual cues he had that they were a lot higher or nose high which could explain the excessive nose down pitch angle.

My personal opinion is that the reason for this accident is more simple than the "findings and contributory factors" that are in the conclusions in the report.

End my 2p.

HeliComparator
17th Oct 2008, 23:02
Wowzer - where do I start? Its late, so I will start with the easiest out of RVDT punto and mutt and the funny german-sounding one - that's RVDT

If both pilots were tricked by this phenomena, it is a possibility that the commander in the RHS assumed from the last visual cues he had that they were a lot higher or nose high which could explain the excessive nose down pitch angle.


Clearly you are not a night offshore pilot - if you were you would realise that as soon as you are into go-around mode, there is no point in looking out of the window - there is nothing to see. Its straight onto instruments. Hopefully not too much rain on the instruments... Yes you might have a point in the bit where the co-pilot was finding difficulty with visual reference, but that is not what caused the crash. The crash was (best guess) caused by the captain's failure to believe what the instruments were telling him.

This is where I move my disagreement onto Buitenzorg - yes the sim is not a great help in training to judge a night offshore approach, but it is a great help in training the other pilot in how and when to take control, and how to execute a go-around on instruments following loss of visual reference, pref. by using the go-around function that would set a sensible pitch attitude to climb away. You are also clearly not an night offshore pilot (in Europe at least) because if you were you would know that from each installation you must have an onshore alternate, therefore they would have had onshore IFR fuel regardless of whether they were flying IFR approaches or night VFR ones. Your comments about the benefits of starting from an instrument approach are based on ignorance of the procedures and environment. You should stick to pontificating about the third interest in your public profile.

Finally punto - you clearly don't know what you are talking about since you seem to be a fixed wing pilot (probably with a type rating on MS flight sim).

None of the above-mentioned gets the point that its not like an airfield approach where you fly the ILS and just keep going below 200' / DH / MDH til you get to the runway.

Lets make no mistake, these guys were very experienced, not stupid and doing their best. Those that haven't flown offshore at night will not realise that there are nights and there are nights. Many nights there is a moon / stars, lights from other installations etc. Those nights where there is absolutely no visual reference once past the installation are in a different league. Only pilots disciplined in instrument flight will survive, and a great training aid in this area is the simulator, despite any limitations it might have for night visual approaches to a rig.

HC

Buitenzorg
17th Oct 2008, 23:03
chcoffshore,

No, I wasn't there. The CVR and FDR however, were. And they don't lie.

HeliComparator
17th Oct 2008, 23:21
The CVR and FDR however, were. And they don't lie.

However the interpreter thereof may well do, or at least be talking out of his :mad:

Buitenzorg
17th Oct 2008, 23:46
Only just saw HeliComparator's reply.

The IFR fuel requirements are the reason we don't file IFR on our off-shore flights (you are correct, not in Europe). Since none of our off-shore platforms have fuel we have to file to return to base (which would be our on-shore alternate for any of the off-shore sectors) plus for an on-shore alternate to our base. Plus of course holding etc. Our usual loads have us going out at close to max weight on VFR flight plans so carrying IFR fuel would make a serious dent in our ability to carry payload and/or make long (multi-sector) flights. The weather tends to be good, allowing us to fly VFR so much of the time that delaying/cancelling the flight program due to IFR conditions is not a problem.

Also, if every approach had been flown as an IAP rather than visual on the mishap flight, that would have added substantially to the flight time, probably 4 mins. per sector on average (if the IAP were to have been flown into the prevailing wind, our company SOP for ARAs). On an 8-sector flight with 7 off-shore approaches that's about 30 mins extra. Extra fuel, less payload. Same fuel, fewer sectors.

With my limited night off-shore experience I have concluded that never was a truer word written than Only pilots disciplined in instrument flight will survive and indeed that's how we do our night flights, with the PNF remaining on instruments, constantly monitoring and giving verbal cues to the PF, and ready to take the controls for a go-around on instruments. I also agree that a great training aid in this area is the simulator, despite any limitations it might have for night visual approaches to a rig I maintain however, that the aim of this training and discipline should be to position the aircraft at a point, height and airspeed, that will allow a controlled visual descent to the deck (or go-around) and that this point, height and airspeed should be the same every time.

HeliComparator
18th Oct 2008, 00:26
Buitzenorg, we are getting a bit closer!

However looking at the traces (bearing in mind they start not long before the go-around) I would not say that the approach was unstable. The speed is fairly steady around 50kts or so and the pitch attitude is not eg excessively nose up. Its clear that there is some over-controlling and that presumably is due to disorientation.

The procedure we follow for a night visual approach is to stabilise at a briefed speed and height (min 50kts IAS and deck height + 200'), run in steady and level at that, then lower the collective to make the final approach once the site picture (= helideck ovality) is right. By briefing a tight speed and height, PNF is empowered to prompt/take control if the parameters are deviated from. Its not clear from the report whether CHC have the same policy and whether or not it was adhered to.

In any event, I maintain that we all have off days, we have all become disorientated at night for no obvious reason. That should be a survivable provided we go-around in good time, as was done here. The go-around should have been survivable, that it was not is hard to understand but I can only think it was a failure to fully transfer to instruments and use the AFCS upper modes to their best advantage. That does not mean that Capt was an idiot, but perhaps his company or base culture was not optimised. I have no doubt that appropriate Sim training would have helped.

I also strongly maintain that had the approach started from an instrument approach (terminating at 0.75nm and deck height + 50' or 300') it would have been harder since the heli would have been unnecessarily low and far out (= flat with poor site picture references).

HC

RVDT
18th Oct 2008, 00:42
HC,

Clearly, you have no idea what I do. And I can confirm with you that I am not an offshore night pilot because I choose not to be.

I do operate offshore but my employer listens to me when I tell him we shouldn't do it at night! Yes we do have all the bells and whistles.

Now this is the bit of your statement that I have trouble with - The crash was (best guess) caused by the captain's failure to believe what the instruments were telling him.An experienced offshore captain? Why?

If he didn't believe his instruments, what made him disbelieve them all of a sudden after all these years? What was tying the CP in knots? Why didn't the captain (PNF) call to go around earlier?

My guess is a sucker punch got the pair of them. Sensory illusions in one of it's numerous flavours. They thought they were "visual", but obviously the "visual" was flawed, i.e. due to some phenomena, and the report does state that it would be "challenging".

Remember the ANZ DC-10 that hit Mt Erebus. Visibilty was over 300 miles at the time, it was daylight. The aircraft was "visual" when it hit the mountain. They were not IMC, they just couldn't see it.

In this situation my claim is the cues are not sufficient to be operating VFR (although granted they may be MOST of the time) and you are too slow to be IFR for all the other reasons already stated. What is Vmin IFR on a 365?

What are the criteria and where do they come from that determines that it is "visual" apart from the jockeys in the front seat?

Let me see now -

Dark - check.
No horizon - check.
No approach slope guidance - check.
(Possible) Rain on windscreen causing sensory illusion to both pilots - check.
(Possible) Aircraft below Vmin IFR - check.
Self assessment by crew of "visual" conditions - check.

Of note is that ALL the sensors, electronic or human, are in the aircraft. Nothing independent from the surface! Nothing to tell you in real time that it is possibly not going as well as expected or perceived.

This is possibly responsible for a large majority of preventable offshore accidents to date. Read the Night Flying post. Somewhere the ducks don't line up!

How much is at stake here? What would it take to install either electronic or visual slope guidance on the deck if you want to be responsible about doing this stuff? It would appear so far that it is beyond human intelligence.

It is already accepted that it is not really visual flight as you have somebody backing you up on instruments, although possibly at a speed at which you technically cannot fly IFR.

Let the hellfire and brimstone begin, justify as you see fit, but the numbers won't go away.

HC - can't you feel that bean in your ear? In your own words no less! In any event, I maintain that we all have off days, we have all become disorientated at night for no obvious reason.Excuse me? What did you say?

HeliComparator
18th Oct 2008, 01:23
RVDT

In some ways you are right, if we followed your lead and refused to fly at night it would be safer. It would also be safer if we refused to fly when it was a bit cloudy/foggy/windy. It would be even safer if we just locked the hangar door and went home.

You may be able to get your job done by day VFR, but if your job was to fly oil workers out to N Sea installations from Aberdeen in winter where it doesn't get light until 09:30 and its dark again by 15:30 - and when it is daylight you sometimes don't get to see much ground/sea - you would have a serious problem getting your work done. You could argue that the oil companies should pay for enough aircraft and crews to get the job done in daylight, but an alternative strategy is to accept the increased hazard of night flying and have extra training and equipment to level the risk back to another operation's daytime flying. The latter is the chosen strategy whether its right or wrong.

Once again I discount your point about poor visual references because once the go-around was initiated and the rig passed, its unlikely that there were any visual references with which to get confused. More likely a dose of the leans (very powerful disorientator - has to be experienced to be appreciated) possibly as a result of the unusual attitude moments earlier, caused his brain to believe that everything was fine attitude-wise and no need to stare at the instruments too much when there is a co-pilot to be comforted for his loss of confidence.

In any event, I maintain that we all have off days, we have all become disorientated at night for no obvious reason.

Yes, this is why we have 2 pilots, why we have aircraft with fancy autopilots, AVAD and why we should practice having to take control in the sim.

HC

puntosaurus
18th Oct 2008, 04:30
HC.

Leaving aside the personal abuse, the central issue here that we all need to wrestle with is how two thoroughly experienced pilots in a perfectly well equipped machine managed to kill themselves and their passengers. This is precisely the sort of accident where we have to learn something, because there are no other factors to discount.

Some very experienced people, including Nick & Shawn are leaning to the conclusion that attempting to fly this sort of an approach visually IS the problem, no matter how experienced you are.

Now you obviously believe differently

None of the above-mentioned gets the point that its not like an airfield approach where you fly the ILS and just keep going below 200' / DH / MDH til you get to the runway.

The type of approach shown in the link is along the same lines as the type of approach mentioned in the report. It wouldn't have helped in this case - in fact maybe made it worse - its harder to transition from an instrument approach that leaves you at 50' above deck height at 0.75 or even 0.5 nm (very flat), to a visual rig landing, than it is to fly the whole approach visually.


Now with a single button press I was able to ascertain your qualifications (a courtesy you might choose to afford me), and clearly your view deserves respect. But I would (again respectfully) suggest that after this accident, the burden of proof lies with your side of the argument. And the proof won't emerge from a slanging match on PPRUNE, it will come from thorough research into approach aids and design for offshore platforms.

As you yourself have observed:

In any event, I maintain that we all have off days, we have all become disorientated at night for no obvious reason. So once in a blue moon BOTH pilots can have off days, or much more worrying, they can have on days and still be fooled by what they see. Only two guys know what they saw and felt that night, and the tragedy is that they are not here to tell us about it. However those who are here and do have relevant experience (RVDT, Double Bogey) all testify as to how close to the edge this sort of an approach is.

Until a sim is invented that can generate all the illusions that could ever exist, there is a risk. And all the sim work in the world will not help if you are simming an approach which is fundamentally unsafe.

he1iaviator
18th Oct 2008, 05:43
No matter what both pilots see through the windscreen it is the duty of the pilot not flying to monitor the instruments and take action should a deviation from a safe profile occur. Action could be a gentle verbal prompt up to taking control and carrying out a go around. As has been said, this lesson is best learned in the simulator not from the death of colleagues. Any bean counter who has turned down simulator training for pilots expected to operate in conditions such as those described in this accident report needs to be prosecuted.

AndyJB32
18th Oct 2008, 06:31
Out of all the flight enviroments we deal with in the North Sea, i find the night time offshore approach and landing the most challenging. I think i find it challenging for two main reasons.

1. It is the only type of flying that i have ever done, where the crew is neither flying fully on instruments nor fully visually. Even on an onshore IFR approach to minimums, there is one defined moment where the flight stops being instrument and becomes visual (if not you go around). The HP has a well defined role of staying on instruments, while the NHP has a well defined role of looking out the window to become visual, and then take controls for the final visual segment resulting in the safe landing. The challenge with offshore night time, especailly when cloud is added and no help is to be gained from moonlight, is that there is no such clear boundary between visual reference and instrument reference. The HP is regularly switching between the two to acheive the approach. The NHP is spending more time monitoring the instruments, but will also be glancing out side as the rig becomes more visual to monitor the approach path. If at the very end of the approach the HP is unhappy and decides to go around, he maintians control, and rapidly goes from looking outside at the rig, to going fully IFR and setting his pitch power etc for the go round.

2. The second reason is amount and frequency of training and practice. I get 2 base checks a year - very comprehensive checks of emergency procedures and instrument procedures. I feel very comfortable with these. With the instrument procedures we can easily and regularly practice them flying the line. With offshore night flying we (and by we i mean all offshore pilots in line with the aviation authority regulations) get to demonstrate one night flight, which may have only one night rig landing, per year.

I honestly don't know how to train better for this constant switching between instrument and visual flying, as we have no training devices that enable this to occur. I feel however that if this issue could be dealt with, and we trained as regularly in this grey area of partial visual and partial instrument flying, as we did in the fully instrument enviroment of base checks then that would be of great benefit.

Andy

Special 25
18th Oct 2008, 07:48
Having read through the report, I too am a bit disappointed with the conclusions, none of which are really going to stop this sort of accident happening again. Very little questioning of the requirement to fly at night, nor of the proceedures used to try to ensure safe flight.

I find HC's responses accurate but slightly aggressive in tone. We all have our opinions here, and all are valid - As mentioned above, we had two pilots here who weren't cutting corners, were clearly aware of the visual problems they were about to encounter and were experienced in the type of flying. I was surprised by how many night decks they both had. I imagine that on the North Sea, I probably don't personally fly more than 30 night decks in a year, so if they can get it wrong, I'm quite sure I, and most other North Sea pilots can as well.

I know some pilots fly an ILS with the 'Intention' of going around. I'm sure we all should be doing that, and if cloud base is quoted as below 400ft, I do. In that way we are mentally prepared, ready and are expecting to initiate the go-around actions at DH. If as usual, you get visual, then you have to convert your approach and landing to VFR, a process made much easier by the new generation of aircraft that will fly you to a safe position and allow you to get your bearings.

Perhaps we should fly night approaches in the same way. The Non-Handling pilot should be ready and expecting to Go-Around unless all the pieces come together and he hears that call 'Landing' or 'Committed'. I know this is how we theoretically all fly, but I think from experience we tend to 'brief to a landing' being the expected ultimate conclusion. I don't think enough pilots brief and are mentally prepared for that go-around.

I also think there seems to be too much personal pride involved. As I think we mentioned in the Night Flying post, I don't know of many Go-Arounds at night even though I'm sure I've been in many situations where we really weren't best placed to make the approach. It seems the Co-Pilot here was feeling a professional pride in making the approach and maybe even worse, was focused on that failure, having had to hand the controls over. I always stress the point during all night approaches including me as the handling pilot, "Anything you don't like, be prepared to take control and we'll fly away and we'll try again" but I'll be making sure in future briefs, we talk about what to be looking for in terms of the (fairly obvious) rates of climb and attitude. - Sadly we don't all have a Go-Around button !!

HeliComparator
18th Oct 2008, 08:58
punto
Leaving aside the personal abuse

It was not my intention to issue personal abuse, however it was my intention to discredit your view by pointing out that you have absolutely no experience of the environment we are discussing. I know this is Pprune but remember we are discussing the death of 2 of our fellow pilots here, and whilst I didn't know them personally many readers did. Now that I have checked your button, my belief that your view in support of Buitzenorg's rather nasty post was based only on ignorance, seems to have been correct.

Reading more courteously what you say this time, night offshore approaches are not going to be stopped nor is there going to be a magic final approach button, and nor is the design of rigs going to significantly change for the better (certainly not the existing ones).

If you look at the history of the N Sea I think the last time there was this type of accident was over 20 years ago. Bearing in mind how much flying is done, that is not a horrendous accident rate (though still too high). If you bear in mind that, despite what you say Simulator training is very good for an unexpected tranfer to instrument flight from low height and speed, and no simulator training was being carried out, this is surely a basic step that can be taken to reduce the liklihood of this recurring (and should have been taken before the horse bolted).

Andy - I totally agree that there is too much training time spent with onshore stuff with engine failures etc, and not enough with offshore stuff. This is in part because its not feasible to safety train for this sort of thing offshore in the aircraft. The Authority has some blame here - now that simulators are available (except for my fleet!) their use should be mandated. At the moment they are sort of mandated for the LPC but there is no requirement to go offshore in them. The CAA are starting to push this a bit but they should push harder! Bean counters only respond to must-haves, not to nice-to-haves.


Special
I find HC's responses ... slightly aggressive in tone.

Guilty, but I found it offensive when people like Buitzenorg were using words like "this accident was set up by a sloppily-set-up approach". The pilots can't stand up for themselves, someone else has to.

Totally agree about practicing go-arounds and the pride factor, though in this case the co-pilot did admit that he was having problems and gave control to Capt. I remember an offshore night approach I flew in light winds many years ago, totally cocked it up and was going much too fast, but pride made me just go for 20 deg nose up to slow down (and it was a night line check!). Afterwards I decreed never to do that again but go-around!

HC

AndyJB32
18th Oct 2008, 09:16
HC, i realise sims have great benefit, but still they can't replicate the constant switch and monitoring between visual and instrument conditions - i think this is the real challenge of the offshore night approach, and the one that is very limited in the available training aids we have.

andy

rotorspeed
18th Oct 2008, 09:44
Ultimately what caused this aircraft to crash was the commander's inability to establish a climb in the go-around. So why? Clearly the HP co-pilot got disorientated and within a few seconds the acft was 38 deg nose down and banking 38 deg right. The NHP commander then took over and acted quickly - within a second - to now establish a modest 7 deg left bank, which was not wings level, but not a problem, and hugely reduce the nose down pitch from 38 deg to 13 deg pitch down. This though was a big problem. The acft was still descending fast and just continued to do so until it hit the water.

Interestingly, after this initial attempted attitude correction by the commander, he did not input much more. He even asked his co-pilot if he was ok. Doesn't sound like someone wrestling to get an acft attitude he was happy with.

Could it have been because he actually thought he'd done the right thing? I see the OM states that any night go-around should be undertaken on instruments (obviously) and that Tq should go to 100%, wings level and pitch 5 - 10 deg nose down. Well, Tq was circa 100%, wings were not far off level, and the pitch set was only 3 degrees outside the prescribed range, at 13 compared with 5 - 10 deg. Pre-attitude correction the VSI was at 2000ft/min descent; following it the commander might have noticed it swinging back in right direction towards 1300ft/min. We all know there is lag - could he have thought in the second or so that he scanned the VSI it was indicating appropriately?

Of course there were other indications that a good scan should have picked up, like the critically decreasing height, increasing air speed and later, increasing V/S to 1700ft/min down. Big mistake, sure, and one that a commander should not have made. But did he think he'd done, pretty much, the right thing to establish a go-around?

Would seem the OM IMC go-around procedure might need reviewing. I'm sure it's based on sound principles but it would appear it doesn't accommodate correction from such a big (38 deg down) unusual attitude at low level.

Moving on to how the disorientation happened in the first place, from the fact that the height was varying from 500 to 270 ft several miles out I was surprised that the A/P did not continue to be coupled, with say a planned HDG and VS profile, until a decision point close to the rig. This would have reduced HP workload, and enabled an expected image of the platform to be seen on the approach when visibility allowed. The pilots would have known that the visual picture they met over the duration of the VMC approach was with the acft stable and helped their orientation when uncoupling to flare and land. The OM does not apparently make any reference to use of coupling on approaches.

Now I've never flown rigs or the AS365, so I may have got this wrong or missed something. But I have down plenty of SPIFR let downs at night in poor weather. And know it's not easy when you revert to instruments to go-around at low level.

HeliComparator
18th Oct 2008, 10:11
Andy - I agree, the part visual part instrument flight is difficult to replicate in a Sim but in my opinion this accident was not caused by the loss of control of the co-pilot whilst trying to fly visually - these things happen and should not be terminal. It was after the capt took control and flew the go-around and, it seems, did not interpret his instruments correctly. That can be well-replicated in a Sim.

rotorspeed - I agree that the company procedure (assuming they were following it) in terms of use of the autopilot upper modes does not seem to be optimal. One problem here is that the manufacturer gives no guidance on the best way to use the autopilot. Bottom line is that if the capt had pressed the go-around button under his left thumb then let go, we would almost certainly not be having this discussion. I have to be careful here because I have never flown a 365 and it could be that the autopilot doesn't work very well, but certainly on the newer types it should be SOP to maximise use of the automation in these circumstances (and it is on my fleet!)

HC

leading edge
18th Oct 2008, 10:52
The procedure we follow for a night visual approach is to stabilise at a briefed speed and height (min 50kts IAS and deck height + 200'), run in steady and level at that, then lower the collective to make the final approach once the site picture (= helideck ovality) is right. By briefing a tight speed and height, PNF is empowered to prompt/take control if the parameters are deviated from. Its not clear from the report whether CHC have the same policy and whether or not it was adhered to.

HC,

I agree with you. In a nutshell, that has been the procedure for many years. It was alomst the night offshore version of the old monitored ILS low viz approach into ABZ.

The element that appears to be missing from this particular approach is the briefing of tight speed and height / ROD. In fact, it seems that there was inadequate monitoring of the approach by the PNF. Had it have been better monitored, the PNF may have called a GA sooner and have been more easily able to assimilate what was happening to take control while still on instruments.

Paperwork perhaps?

verticalhold
18th Oct 2008, 11:56
Leading Edge;

There was a CHC/Scotia/BIH FSI a number of years ago that ordered no paperwork to be done while at low level, on approach, or shuttling. Paperwork was to be done in the cruise or on deck.

VH

Aser
18th Oct 2008, 12:50
HC
now that simulators are available (except for my fleet!)

Happy news for you:
HeliSim inaugurates World's first Eurocopter EC225 Full Flight Simulator
Friday, October 10, 2008 / Eurocopter
Vertical Daily News: HeliSim inaugurates World's first Eurocopter EC225 Full Flight Simulator (http://www.verticalmag.com/control/news/templates/?a=8917&z=6)

Regards
Aser

HeliComparator
18th Oct 2008, 13:01
Aser - Inaugurated, yes. Approved, no. Once it has an approval from the DGAC/CAA we will start to use it, that may be as soon as the end of this month.

HC

RVDT
18th Oct 2008, 16:36
HC,

Wade on in here - http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/344394-flying-night.html. (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/344394-flying-night.html)

puntosaurus
18th Oct 2008, 21:09
What on earth is the matter with you HC ? We're all hurting because these people died, you don't have a monopoly on empathy.

Bottom line is that if the capt had pressed the go-around button under his left thumb then let go, we would almost certainly not be having this discussion. I have to be careful here because I have never flown a 365 and it could be that the autopilot doesn't work very well, but certainly on the newer types it should be SOP to maximise use of the automation in these circumstances (and it is on my fleet!)]

That's essentially the point. Why are people flying visual approaches manually to the most challenging of landing sites in marginal weather when there are tools to help ?

smudge07
18th Oct 2008, 21:43
Having read some of the responses on this thread I felt compelled to write.

I find some of the comments difficult to read having known one of the crew, however, it is vital that we learn from accidents such as this and it is important people discuss what the report said and share their own thoughts.

The thread from Rotorspeed, however, is totally unacceptable and insulting to the crew, I just couldn't believe the last paragraph 'Now I've never flown rigs or the AS365, so I may have got this wrong or missed something. But I have done plenty of SPIFR let downs at night in poor weather. And know it's not easy when you revert to instruments to go-around at low level'.

With your experience you are in a position to have an opinion, however you are in absolutely NO position to make statements such as: 'Big mistake, sure, and one that a commander should not have made'. You have absolutely no experience in this environment.

In comparison I have years of experience flying offshore and thousands of hours in 365 series. I would not comment on 'SPIFR let downs' as I have little experience there.

I totally agree with HC comments, especially your response to Buitenzorg: 'However the interpreter thereof may well do, or at least be talking out of his http://static.pprune.org/images/smilies/censored.gif' Couldn't have said it better myself.

More respect everyone please.

Smudge07.

Chopper Doc Junior
19th Oct 2008, 08:53
From reading the report the thing that strikes me is that none of the recommendations seems likely to improve safety. If as the pilots were discussing you have no depth perception due to poor conditions why are they trying to do a visual approach? Or have I missed something here? I cannot see how in similar circumstances this type of accident will not happen again.

rotorspeed
19th Oct 2008, 13:03
Smudge07

Well then, with the benefit of all your 365 offshore experience and this very extensive report, if it wasn't a mistake by the commander that ultimately caused this acft to hit the sea, what was it? In fact much of my post actually concerned me trying to understand why the commander acted as he did.

Or were my comments "totally unacceptable" because part of what I said dared to criticise a pilot who had tragically died? I am very sorry indeed that the pilot and the other passengers died. But although some posts on this forum seem to indicate that we pilots should never be criticised in the event of a fatal accident, I consider that only an objective debate about causes, once the accident report is out, is going to help save lives in the future by helping us all avoid mistakes.

There was no evidence of any mechanical failure with this acft. The weather was poor, but not beyond limits or really bad. There seemed to be no technical emergency the crew were pre-occupied with. Yet this acft crashed. You and no doubt many others are I suspect continuing to perform similar operations, some without much simulator training. Are some offshore passengers at major risk of being victim of a similar accident? If so such operations should surely be suspended immediately.

I put the caveat in about my lack of experience in this environment to allow those like you with all your experience the invitation to use that to tell me why any of my views are invalid. Perhaps now you'd like to be specific about that.

212man
19th Oct 2008, 14:43
A sobering report which should be mandatory reading for al offshore pilots. I would suggest that the parameters recorded in the go-around should be used as the basis for a pre-briefed (to an individual - not the crew) pilot incapacitation 'event' in simulator training.

A couple of things I thought might have had more scrutiny or reference to:



The visual appearance of the ADI at the point of control handover: It is my belief that at the pitch attitude reached, the ADIs would have been completely black and would not have been easy to interpret (especially in the dark) The use of 'fly up' chevrons as seen on modern EFIS displays might help greatly in these situations


The pitch change that was effected (around 25 degess pull up) must have felt quite significant, especially in the dark, and with the likely g forces that would have resulted at the prevailing airspeed (looks close to 2g in the FDR trace). There must be some consideration to the idea that RHS pilot felt he had initiated a significant recovery manouevre, and that the actual degree of pitch change and rate required was likely to be totally unnatural to him. It is likely to have been of the order of 55-60 degrees of pitch change which is practically an aerobatic manouevre! (-38 to +15-20)


No discussion was made by the AAIB or CAA as to whether the aircraft could actually have been recovered from this upset. What pitch change and rate of change would have been required, if at all recoverable, given the height and rate of descent that resulted?


A brief reference is made to the G/A button (and HC mentions it above.) More information on the envelope within which it can be used might have completed it's reference, with the likely conclusion that it would not have responded quickly enough at the higher speeds, and would not be engageable at the lower speeds


I'm surprised the letter from the CAA was published with the name and address of a nominated post holder for another operator. A disidentified letter would have served the intent, without any ability to construe a connection or inference


The pathology report states injuries consistent with a high vertical speed and some forward motion. Surely it would be the other way round - I know 2000 ft/min is a high vertical speed, but I'm sure the 126 kts did more harm



Terribly sad, regardless, and we should heed the lessons carefully

rotorspeed
19th Oct 2008, 15:17
212man

Good to see some interesting, specific points raised.

Following on from your point about the possible blackness of the ADI picture, given that the commander had reduced pitch quickly to the 13 deg nose down, any thoughts on why, with a more familiar picture now on the ADI, he did not pull back further on the cyclic over those final 6 seconds? Do you think he could have thought he was around that 5 -10 pitch down attitude that was in the OM for an IMC GA?

Or was the real issue that this was not fundamentally a GA, but a recovery from a (very) unusual attitude at a very low height and that the prescribed GA attitude was not relevant?

AndyJB32
20th Oct 2008, 10:37
Just a general post to find out what people feel about using the go around function when offshore.

I realise in certain circumstances it will be benificial, but i'd argue that in the latter part of an approach, if things start to go wrong, that it would have to be used with extreme caution. I've only got a couple of 100 hours in the 365 from about 4 years ago, so i could be wrong here, but.......

when you press the go around function, doesn't the 365 roll wings level and try to attain 75 KIAS through pitch?

In which case, if you're already below 75 KIAS it will demand a pitch down attitude when you are within a couple of hundred feet of the sea. As far as i'm aware, it doesn't adjust power, so you may now be nose down, at a lowish power setting.

Also, if you are already quite close into the rig, and getting disoriented, then rolling wings level may cause you to turn toward the rig, or at least not turn away from the rig, at the same time as you try to sort out a pitch down command.

If the go around button is used, isn't it best to use it from a reasonably stable platform unless you have a lot of height to play with? Maybe start a go around manually, and make sure the aircraft is above 75KIAS and positivley flying away from the structure before thinking of engaging the go round mode.

I'd be interested to know what other people feel.

andy

902Jon
20th Oct 2008, 11:26
I believe the go-around button is designed for use on a coupled instrument approach when your approach speed is probably in the 90 - 120 kts band. It will only change the attitude to obtain 75kts. There is no collective input on the SFIM auto-pilot to add power to make the climb.
IMHO, I dont believe that given the low altitude/extreme unusual attitude, that the go-around button would have made any difference.
Most of us that have flown off-shore at night on inter-platform shuttles will recognise these conditions and will know how quickly you can get into the s***. RIP

Bravo73
20th Oct 2008, 17:05
Flight has an article in this week's edition about the accident and report:

AAIB calls for compulsory helicopter simulator recurrent training in its Morecambe Bay crash report (http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2008/10/17/317600/aaib-calls-for-compulsory-helicopter-simulator-recurrent-training-in-its-morecambe-bay-crash.html)


It is also mentioned in the front page editorial. Unfortunately I can't find a link to that article but 'Learmont's Blog' has a similar theme:

Helicopters need help - Learmount (http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/learmount/2008/10/helicopters-need-help.html)

21st Oct 2008, 14:38
Could a simple angle of approach indicator (as fitted to most grey-funnel liners) help with rig approaches?

It would need to be modified to give the 3 -colour spread of light around 360 degrees to account for different approach paths with different winds but that is not rocket science to achieve.

It could be made small enough to fit in the middle of the HLS so it is underneath the aircraft for landing and therefore out of the way.

That would at least give the HP an idea that his angle of approach was right as all he needs is to stay in the green sector to achieve the desired glidepath. It would also show when the aircraft was coming in too low to start with as only a red light would be visible.

In might not have prevented this terrible accident but it might have alerted both pilots to the fact that the actual flightpath was diverging from the desired one much earlier.

Shawn Coyle
21st Oct 2008, 16:14
Such an approach lighting system existed nearly 20 years ago - called Firefly. Had flashing green for high, green on glidepath, red for low, flashing red for really low. Glidepath azimuth and elevation remotely adjustable from helicopter. Small, battery operable. worked well. Nobody wanted it... Still able to be resurrected. Did AAIB even mention it's possibility?
Anybody wanting more details, PM me.

rufus.t.firefly
21st Oct 2008, 16:59
A similar device was on show at Helitech at Duxford last year :ok:- you can guarantee the majority of the energy company managers " if " on site during the show will have just walked straight past it .... it always costs to put your hand in your pocket - mustn't offend the bean counters by investing to make things easier and enhancing safety in the long run :*

It would be a relatively inexpensive aid to install in the big scheme of things:ugh:

22nd Oct 2008, 08:36
Therefore it behoves the CAA to mandate such equipment for rig ops if they are going to continue to allow them to continue safely at night. Then the bean counters don't get a say - No AAI, no heli ops to rigs at night!

It is a shame there wasn't a recommendation for something simple like this in the report.

Hummingfrog
22nd Oct 2008, 11:47
An AAI is not the answer to the problem of night approaches to rig helidecks. The ability to make approaches from any direction within the 210 arc makes it impractical to have a calibrated instrument with enough power and directional coverage that doesn't blind the air or deck crew once on the deck.

The approach to a RN ship's deck is from a set direction so the beam can be aligned and also show green until on the deck as it is mounted above deck level. A centre deck level mounted device would not allow a narrow green beam to show as the helicopter approached the deck - it would show amber.

The answer lies in what is actually happening. Green deck edge lights which greatly improve the acquisition of the deck from amongst the cultural rig lighting. Along with illuminating circle and H with LEDs which is being trialled on the Thames platform. This allows the pilot to fly a sight picture approach from a good range.

HF

RedWhite&Blue
22nd Oct 2008, 12:47
Along with illuminating circle and H with LEDs which is being trialled on the Thames platform.

This really does help, but I landed there last night and the deck is back to just green perimeter lights.

It seems that the LED parts of the deck lighting just aren't up to the job. Great shame.

Back to the drawing board then...

Just a thought, imagine a cone of an omni-directional approach path, emanating from the centre of the H, being plotted via a multitude of GPS waypoints and a display in the cockpit to indicate whether you are above, on or below the approach cone. With clever computers and RAIM etc, could it be done? If its only a question of money then please just ask...;)

22nd Oct 2008, 15:39
Hummingfrog - it is the initial part of the approach that needs the AAI - the area where there are no rate of closure cues and only the aspect of the helideck to work from. Once you are close in you would have all the visual references you need so it wouldn't matter that the AAI was in the middle of the deck.

The fact that it would be in the centre of the deck would mean it wouldn't dazzle the aircrew when they were hovering over it and it could be turned off when neccessary to protect the helideck crew.

A 210 degree arc would be very straight forward to achieve with prisms and mirrrors or modern stuff like LEDs. It needs to be simple so it is cheap and straighforward to use and robust enough for the job.

Whatever the solution, is seems clear to an interested observer that some additional approach aid is required to make night rig approaches easier to fly and therefore safer and it needs to be driven by pressure from the operators/crews onto the CAA who must then mandate it for future ops.

HeliComparator
22nd Oct 2008, 17:04
Although visual approach path indicators sound like a good idea, because of the requirement for 360 deg visibility in an environment where there is a lot of structure above helideck level, and because we approach not to the helideck but to the comittal point which is out to the side, I don't think its feasible. I say 360 deg (not 210 deg) because we approach into wind, we do not only approach in the 210 deg clear sector. Typically with the wind in an unfortunate direction, we would approach to the comittal point (around 40' above the deck and out to the side, with rotor disc just missing helideck edge, before comitting and moving sideways. Therefore I think the visual approach path indicators would be unseen (when far away) and give false indications (when near - but I would have to check the trigonometry!).

A better solution is first to make the visual approach more specifically briefed and flown (as I mentioned, running in at deck height + 200' and a nominated speed, typically and IAS to give 50kts groundspeed, preferably with ALT and IAS modes engaged). From 200' at a normal approach angle, you are quite close and visual references are reasonable. Visual references are massively improved by the new type of helideck lighting that Humming and RWB mention.

But such is the interest in the oil industry in actually improving safety (rather than talking about it) that I understand it will be many years if ever before all offshore installations are modified with the new lighting. In reality it will probably mostly be only new installations that get it. Yup, its pathetic, we can't even get decent lighting!

HC

JimL
22nd Oct 2008, 18:06
I agree with HeliComparator; it is not quite a simple as it sounds.

In the early 1990s, we, in my base servicing the Shell platforms on the Leman, trialed the Omnidirectional Approach Path Indicator (ODAPI); on first sight (no pun intended) this type of device looks extremely useful; you can access and make an approach from any direction - even do circular approaches. However, the range was limited (look at the problems we have had trying to source a wave-off light); it was difficult to pick out from the cultural lighting; and siting was a problem because, even though deck level siting can provide the correct approach angle, it will not deliver the helicopter to the correct position for the landing phase (as HC has indicated).

It could be that its time will have come again because, as with motorway signs, LEDs can now provide high intensity directional lights, and modern electronics can provide the phased arrays that will eliminate the previously required moving parts. However, the previously mentioned problems of cultural lighting and siting will still have to be overcome. It will also have to be intrinsically safe, be easy to install and be virually maintenance free.

Jim

AndyJB32
22nd Oct 2008, 18:33
HC, if by new lighting you're referring to the green deck lighting, then the oil companies have no choice.

From Jan 1st 2009 it's mandatory - no green lighting after that date and the only flights to those decks are to be day time 600feet and 4000m or better conditions.

Aser
22nd Oct 2008, 18:44
Andy,
From Jan 1st 2009 it's mandatory - no green lighting after that date and the only flights to those decks are to be day time 600feet and 4000m or better conditions.
Today 18:06

Could you post a link to the source please?

Regards
Aser

HeliComparator
22nd Oct 2008, 19:14
Andy

I think you are referring just to the perimeter lighting. The "complete package" includes the green perimeter lighting, the electroluminescent (or is it LEDs) deck circle markings, and the glowing H. I don't think this has made it into CAP 437 yet, but I think that is what is installed on the Thames as a trial?

HC

HeliComparator
23rd Oct 2008, 08:52
TtT

I don't see why you need heading or VS beeping capabilities to run in level engaged in ALT and IAS. I presume the autopilot has inherent heading hold with "wings" roughly level? It would just mean that as you hit the desired altitude (say deck ht + 200') you press the ALT button, and when you get the speed to your target, you hit the IAS button. Or why not get PNF to press the buttons, after all its being flown in a multi pilot role? One consideration might be how easy it is do drop out the upper modes when you want to descend the final bit - is there a button on cyclic or collective to do that? What is the min coupled IAS on the 365?

HC

Greeny9
23rd Oct 2008, 10:25
40 kts a/s and there is a button on the cyclic to disengage coupler

902Jon
23rd Oct 2008, 10:53
HeliComparator
It would just mean that as you hit the desired altitude (say deck ht + 200') you press the ALT button, and when you get the speed to your target, you hit the IAS button.

You can't do both. As said before, there is no collective input, so you can hold either a/s or altitude.
Also as the 365N is designed as a single pilot aircraft, the FD inputs are mainly from the right-hand seat, so not easily accessible from the co-pilot.

EESDL
23rd Oct 2008, 13:24
i suppose one of the outcomes of this tragic event is that Helisim is fully booked untill April 09!

SASless
23rd Oct 2008, 15:26
Seems a shame we can look back and see so many factors that contributed to this tragedy but for years were blind to them.

The report, when digested slowly and with consideration of past flights similar to the one in discussion, reminds us of the need to be ever vigilant and proactive in trying to improve the way we do business.

Simple things as having adequate instrumentation positioned for easy and effective use by the pilots, procedures that fit the needs for critical situations vice merely accomodating the normal, training that supports both the normal but also the abnormal situations we encounter, and a safety culture that seeks to proactively rid our environment of genuine hazards, would have gone a long ways towards preventing these fatalities.

Offshore flying is approaching a half century of operations and we still seem stuck in the old ways of doing business when we really get down to examining our environment.

This latest AAIB report is the latest to remind us of this.

I would suggest the lesson to be learned out of all this is we should each strive to be less accomodating to those that continue to deprive us of the basic equipment, training, and techology to bring our industry into the 21st century.

After all, our very lives depend upon it.

Those guys were one of us.....and it could be our turn next.

griffothefog
23rd Oct 2008, 16:27
Night offshore deck ops bring to mind a whole different ball game....
Back in the 80's we used to fly night shuttles single pilot with up to 30 landings per night. We were tuned in and switched on and never had any problems..... 2 crew ops can be a distraction :{

But 2 crew and CRM is progress right?

AndyJB32
23rd Oct 2008, 16:50
HC: yes i was only referring to the green deck edge lighting as being mandatory by Jan 1st 2009.

Aser: i think it is a note out from BHAB (the UK offshore helideck regulatory body, although they may have changed their name now). I'm on a few days off at the moment so will double check when i get back to work. If i don't post within the next few days, then remind me, as i will have forgotten!

Andy

HeliComparator
23rd Oct 2008, 16:56
902

Good point. I am too used to my 4-axis machine.

HC

HeliComparator
23rd Oct 2008, 21:04
TtT

You certainly wouldn't want to couple ALT to the cyclic below Vy - back of the drag curve etc and a recipe for disaster. You could couple IAS to the cyclic and fly altitude on the collective, but I suppose it depends on how good the IAS hold is.

HC

RVDT
23rd Oct 2008, 21:50
Shawn Coyle said - Such an approach lighting system existed nearly 20 years ago - called Firefly. Had flashing green for high, green on glidepath, red for low, flashing red for really low. Glidepath azimuth and elevation remotely adjustable from helicopter. Small, battery operable. worked well. Nobody wanted it... Still able to be resurrected. Did AAIB even mention it's possibility?It seems the name at least may have been resurrected - TLS Commercial Products (http://www.anpc.com/prod_commercial.cfm)

More info - Transponder Landing System - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transponder_Landing_System)

Takes into account "legacy" aircraft and can be offset as well.

BedakSrewet
24th Oct 2008, 02:18
Or the PLASI, which has been in use all over the world since 1985.

Details on : www.devoreaviation.com:ok:

rotorspeed
24th Oct 2008, 07:48
Griffothefog has surely got a good point here. This accident may well not have happened with a single pilot operation when acute awareness of 100% responsibility may have, for example, caused the HP to abort the approach sooner.

Now before many of you start jumping up and down, I'm not suggesting that these ops should be SP, just that with 2 crew disciplined CRM is clearly so important and in this case a degree of complacency undermined the safety net 2 crew is supposed to provide.

Mars
26th Oct 2008, 11:02
Rotorspeed;

Not an obvious conclusion to come to! This was not a normal go-around but a lack of the correct reaction to an unusual attitude - by both pilots.

I was surprised by one paragraph in Section 1.1.3 of the report (page 6 of Section 1) - and the comment from the AAIB that followed it:
The next sector, to the Millom West platform, was flown without any passengers, baggage or freight and with 360 kg of fuel. The helicopter took off at 1814 hrs, climbed to 500 ft on a north-westerly heading and accelerated to an initial IAS of 145 kt. The rig became visible 25 seconds after the 5 nm GPS call; this equates to a visual range of approximately 7,100 m. At 1820 hrs the helicopter initiated its descent whilst reducing speed and turned left onto a heading of 105ºM before landing on the Millom West at 1822 hrs. During the final approach and landing the AVAD “ONE HUNDRED FEET” automatic annunciation was recorded, but no “CHECK HEIGHT” call was recorded.

The audio recordings suggest a relaxed atmosphere in the cockpit throughout the first two sectors and indicate that the normal checklists were being followed. The crew discussed the visual conditions and their experiences with similar conditions during their previous military flying.
When offshore, any annunciation from the AVAD of "ONE HUNDRED FEET" should be regarded as one which demands a response. That there was no response in the cockpit to this call, and the comment from the AAIB "The audio recordings suggested a relaxed atmosphere in the cockpit", came as a complete surprise.

The 100ft call is supposed to trigger a response as it is the equivalent to a "PULL UP, PULL UP" call of the GPWS. It would be indicating that the helicopter had descended dangerously (and probably below the level of the deck, if that deck was at or below 100ft). In most companies (with FDM), it would be regarded as a serious event (especially at night) and would lead to further enquiries by the HOMP Manager.

An assumption that could be made is that the AAIB actually transposed the calls and there was a "CHECK HEIGHT" call but no "ONE HUNDRED FEET". If that is the case then the report needs to be reviewed and corrected.

If it was correct, the AAIB need to brush up on their understanding of offshore operations.

Mars

fkelly
26th Oct 2008, 11:24
If they'd suspended the AVAD on finals there would have been no "check height"; this is normal. The "one hundred feet" would most likely have been spurious, it's not uncommon for it to go off in the hover over the deck at 10 or 20 feet. Yes you're right that one should elicit a response but that response is usually, and appropriately, "no we're not" or similar.

Shawn Coyle
26th Oct 2008, 11:32
The PLASI system can't change azimuth and elevation like Firefly could, as far as I know.
And the Transponder Landing System is only able to handle one aircraft at a time, and as far as I know not in very wide service.
Differential GPS, or even WAAS can do just about the same thing as the TLI.

Hummingfrog
26th Oct 2008, 11:40
Mars

I am not sure if you fly a helicopter with a similar AVAD system to the 365N but it is quite common to get the 100ft call as you cross the deck edge. You can suspend the check height call for approx 2-3 mins by pressing a button on the cyclic but not the 100ft call. It is supposed to be self muted if the rate of change of altitude is in excess of, I believe, 5000ft/min to take account of going from say 200ft to 20ft in an instant as you cross the deck edge but it doesn't always do that.

The AAIB do understand offshore ops:ok:

As someone who has done a few night deck landings I use the old gate approach method as taught when I was in the RAF. I aim to be into wind at approx 55kts + wind at 1 mile and 300ft for small decks, this is especially crucial on light wind goldfish bowl nights, and then fly a normal sight picture approach. The introduction of green edge lights has greatly improved the ability to judge approach angle.

HF

tistisnot
26th Oct 2008, 15:57
Mars,

I think the AAIB, not knowing where the lower bug was set because of damage to it post accident (though thought to be 200' as the PIC called, but not acknowledged by the co-pilot with his set at 500') correctly stated that one could have cancelled the other as they had the same priority - "CHECK HEIGHT (pause) CHECK HEIGHT" takes a lot longer to say than "dubublub 100 feet". If the 100 feet had not sounded then there was something very wrong with the AVAD.

But I think you miss the point - the finger is pointing toward the lack of organizational material addressing how the crew should have reacted to such events. The description 'relaxed atmosphere' can also be construed in several ways. You say what you think should have happened according to your OM - AAIB says there was nothing clear in the procedures provided to this crew. Hence the call for re-writes of the OM. I don't think it is the AAIB that needs to brush up on its offshore knowledge!!

nicknorman
26th Oct 2008, 21:10
Mars, sorry I must disagree with you. '100 ft' call occurs on almost every landing, except those where you cross the deck above 100' and the system detects more than 5000 ft /min measured ROD. It certainly occurs on every onshore landing. Therefore its no good treating it like a GPWS Pullup or even getting excited about it at all. I think you are confusing with 'Check Height' which should not normally be heard - when you intend to descend below bugged height you use the suspend button to prevent the nuisance -or cry wolf - warning. If you do get a check height, you most certainly should be doing something about it.

Since the 100' call is not suspendable but the check height is, its highly likely that the report is correct in this respect.

HOMP/FDM does not generate an event from any AVAD warnings since that information is not available on the data stream. HOMP does have minimum altitudes for en-route flying which could trigger an event, but there can't be a simple "too low" event during the landing phase because you are intending to end up at zero feet before you land! Our system does have a "too low more than x distance from offshore touchdown at night" event but what constitutes too low, and what x is, are secret and nothing to do with radalt settings or AVAD!

he1iaviator
27th Oct 2008, 05:24
On the subject of the AVAD warning, it must be worthy of note that the cockpit switch was set to the "single pilot" position thus causing the "check height" warning only to be heard when the aircraft descends below the bug height set by the RHS pilot, if the suspend button is not used. The bug on the co-pilot's radalt was set to 500ft (Is this standard CHC policy?), but this was disconnected from the AVAD. We do not know where the commander's bug, which was the one connected to the AVAD, was set.

FairWeatherFlyer
28th Oct 2008, 22:23
As a non-IFR pilot (dons nomex underwear), I had a flick through the report and pondered the differences in aids between an approach at EGLL to the one in question here. Isn't a GPWS system one that might have helped here because of its appreciation of both height and more importantly RoD of radalt? If you have a high workload and believe you have just recovered from a stressful situation and get a 100ft warning then you have no immediate concern because you 'know' you are flying straight and level. If you have a differential system and recognise the alert as one that indicates a few seconds until the ground appears (based on Rod+radalt) then you're more likely to focus your attention on dealing with that until it shuts up? In the same way that your eyes would pass on this impetus if the outside world was visible and the ground was approaching rapidly?

Are there any videos of a bad weather night approach? If a picture is worth a thousand words, i think a video is worth even more to convey to those inexperienced with such matters what goes on. I've only found good weather ones on Internet so far and that only really showed the 'at a shallow angle, lots of yellow lights look the same' phenomena.

Bladecrack
28th Oct 2008, 22:55
FWF,

I agree, EGPWS can be configured to offer multiple warnings and alerts depending on the type of operation, and I think in a case like this it might have helped the crew's situational awareness and aided quicker recognition of the PF's loss of control. I have witnessed EGPWS in use over land but i'm not quite sure of the set up and effectiveness of it over the sea, perhaps some offshore pilots familiar with the system can comment on that? Like most things in aviation it usually comes down to money...

BC

Geoffersincornwall
29th Oct 2008, 06:45
Video - YouTube - helicopter landing on platform at night (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_ZLmjLHGQFY)

The otherwise excellent EGPWS in the context of offshore ops has some serious holes in it. The system can use terrain or obstructions as the datum for a series of proximity warnings that can include excessive RoD and ILS glideslope. Unfortunately it doesn't know where all the obstructions (platforms, rigs, ships etc) are so when you make an approach it can't figure that you actually want to land on the 'obstruction'.

I have yet to play with EGPWS for real but I'm sure there are folk out there who can contribute their first-hand experience but I do remember that when I asked Sikorsky some years ago about this problem I was met with a blank stare and a crooked smile that conveyed a huge gap in their appreciation of the problem.

Then we have the debate about whether EGPWS is a substitute for AVAD. I don't think they got that right either.

G

:ok: