PHI lose S76 in GOM

[etienne t boy]

I hear that PHI lost an S76 in the GOM yesterday. Reports are that it had just 2 crew on board and they escaped unharmed. I don't know if the floats didn't work, but the reports I've seen say the aircraft sunk and that it took 3 hours to rescue the crew.

[frankp]

Posted elsewhere on the web.

************************************************************ ********************
** Report created 10/23/2006 Record 1 **
************************************************************ ********************

IDENTIFICATION
Regis#: 22342 Make/Model: S76 Description: S-76, H-76, AUH-76, SPIRIT, EAGLE (HE-24
Date: 10/22/2006 Time: 1230

Event Type: Accident Highest Injury: Minor Mid Air: N Missing: N
Damage: Destroyed

LOCATION
City: EUGENE ISLAND State: LA Country: US

DESCRIPTION
N22342, A SIKORSKY S-76A ROTORCRAFT, WHILE ON A REPOSITIONING FLIGHT TO
OFFSHORE PLATFORM, CRASHED INTO THE WATER AND SANK, THE TWO PERSONS ON
BOARD SUSTAINED MINOR INJURIES, EUGENE ISLAND, LA

INJURY DATA Total Fatal: 0
# Crew: 2 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 2 Unk:
# Pass: 0 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Grnd: Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:


OTHER DATA
Activity: Pleasure Phase: Unknown Operation: OTHER

Departed: AMELIA, LA Dep Date: Dep. Time:
Destination: EUGENE ISLAND, LA Flt Plan: VFR Wx Briefing:
Last Radio Cont:
Last Clearance:

FAA FSDO: BATON ROUGE, LA (SW03) Entry date: 10/23/2006

[gazbert]

From the FAA -

IDENTIFICATION
Regis#: 22342 Make/Model: S76 Description: S-76, H-76, AUH-76, SPIRIT, EAGLE (HE-24
Date: 10/22/2006 Time: 1230

Event Type: Accident Highest Injury: Minor Mid Air: N Missing: N
Damage: Destroyed

LOCATION
City: EUGENE ISLAND State: LA Country: US

DESCRIPTION
N22342, A SIKORSKY S-76A ROTORCRAFT, WHILE ON A REPOSITIONING FLIGHT TO
OFFSHORE PLATFORM, CRASHED INTO THE WATER AND SANK, THE TWO PERSONS ON
BOARD SUSTAINED MINOR INJURIES, EUGENE ISLAND, LA

INJURY DATA Total Fatal: 0
# Crew: 2 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 2 Unk:
# Pass: 0 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Grnd: Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:


OTHER DATA
Activity: Pleasure Phase: Unknown Operation: OTHER

Departed: AMELIA, LA Dep Date: Dep. Time:
Destination: EUGENE ISLAND, LA Flt Plan: VFR Wx Briefing:
Last Radio Cont:
Last Clearance:

FAA FSDO: BATON ROUGE, LA (SW03) Entry date: 10/23/2006

[Gomer Pylot]

The FAA preliminary data is often garbled, confusing, and just plain wrong. I've seen Eurocopter accidents reported as Bells with no correction for weeks, and the reports are often just comical, apparently written by someone who has never seen a helicopter. Do not rely on anything in an FAA preliminary accident report.

[SASless]

From two sources....no mechanical problem prior to the impact. Customer reported the aircraft missing to PHI....well after the crash. Captain is fine, Co-pilot was in the hospital overnight.

Crew was not IFR checked or approved on the S-76A+ aircraft but were VFR rated for Part 135 Flights.

No IFR flight plan had been filed....thus no IFR Clearance...lots of questions are raised by the accident and loss of the aircraft.

The good news is the two pilots survived, and are standing up to their responsibilities. The failed approach was made in heavy rain and very poor visibility....apparantly below company VFR minima.

The Captain recently arrived in the GOM from an EMS job in Indiana....the co-pilot was a new hire and new to the GOM.

Perhaps those closer to PHI than I am, can provide more details....what say you REV, INSIDER, and WRENCH1?

[sox6]

Still nothing on the NTSB site.

Whoose B407 ditched the following day?

[Gomer Pylot]

Still nothing on the NTSB site.
Whoose B407 ditched the following day?
Rotorcraft Leasing.

[wde]

Heard a rumour:

The NTSB will not be investigating the accident; that the accident has been classified as an incident; that there is very little public information available; that the crew lost control due to a microburst on the tail end of an instrument approach below minima and ended up in the water.

As a '76 driver, I sure would like to know if there are any aircraft related issues that caused this accident...

Anyone think that the lack of information is related to the current labor situation...

[thecontroller]

how can this not be classed as an "accident"? can you imagine the CAA doing that?!

Part 830 NTSB says:

an “Accident” is “an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight and all such persons have disembarked, and in which any person suffers death or serious injury, or in which the aircraft receives substantial damage.”

"Substantial damage means damage or failure which adversely affects the structural strength, performance, or flight characteristics of the aircraft, and which would normally require major repair or replacement of the affected component."


i guess the aircaft sinking to the bottom of the sea doesn't affect the structural strength, performance, or flight characteristics of the aircraft!?

[NickLappos]

Although this is a rumor network, beware of rumors!

The word on the street is that the pilot is a stand-up guy, and blames no microburst or alien hovercraft downwash. Poor vis, rain, and a tricky rig approach causing surprise water contact is the rumor I heard.

Also, if any ppruner wants to bet me that the NTSB will not invesitgate this accident, I am on, because the NTSB will have their antennae up for any strike-caused laxity. PM me with the amount you want to bet, I will take on all comers!

[Cyclic Hotline]

Heard a rumour:

The NTSB will not be investigating the accident; that the accident has been classified as an incident; that there is very little public information available; that the crew lost control due to a microburst on the tail end of an instrument approach below minima and ended up in the water.

I'm afraid that really runs at the bottom end of the intelligent, informed, comments that have ever cropped up here. How on earth can the total loss of an aircraft, in flight, meet anyones criteria of an incident? Do you think they just make this stuff up at the NTSB and cover up the accidents that would not be politically correct? :mad:

As Nick points out, want to raise the level of oversight from the Feds, be it FAA, OSHA, etc; just try a strike! And it won't just be your local management doing the oversight either. If any one takes on Nick for a bet, count me in too. I'll offer some startling odds!

NTSB definition of an accident.

Federal regulations require operators to notify the NTSB immediately of aviation accidents and certain incidents. An accident is defined as an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft that takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight and all such persons have disembarked, and in which any person suffers death or serious injury, or in which the aircraft receives substantial damage. An incident is an occurrence other than an accident that affects or could affect the safety of operations. (See 49 CFR 830.)

[Darren999]

With reference to the PHI accident, I was told that the accident occured whislt the Helicopter was circling the platform, in awful weather, and there was a conversation between the pilots about turning the wipers on. There was some confusion, and both pilots had there heads inside, then impacted with the water. Just what is being sad...:hmm:

[Geoffersincornwall]

The perception this side of the water is that the official accident statistics do NOT contain those occurrences that, even though they may be investigated by the NTSB, are subsequently classified as 'incidents'.

If what the regs apparently say is true then this cannot be the case.
If somebody in the 'know' reviews the stats can we see ALL those incidents that involved no serious injury/fatality reflected in the 'accident stats'.

The reason I ask is because I was told by a source that I hitherto trusted that they were NOT included. A case in point was a Bo105 that ditched after losing one engine and all on board stepped into liferaft after power-on ditching. The aircraft subsequently rolled over and was damaged severely. I was told that this was not included in the accident stats for that year.
Your help in clarifying appreciated.
Geoffers

[Gomer Pylot]

The NTSB does not fully investigate every accident. They apparently have said that since they already know what happened, no further investigation is needed. At least that's the rumor in the Gulf. :ugh:

[Devil 49]

Gomer Pylot,
Is there anything in the rumor that this wasn't an IFR crew?
Why not? other than "meat in the seat"? When I left the GoM in '97 (Never flew with the PIC) PHI had long since gotten out of VFR mediums...

[wrench1]

Devil,
Nick L. got it pretty good above. Also, crew met all the requirements - and I commend and respect their professionalism during this matter.

As for the NTSB, GP and Geoff are right - the NTSB has a matrix that assists in dictating the level of investigation.

In reference to "substantial structural damage" - it depends how, when, where, etc. the damage was sustained - keep in mind the main trigger for the NTSB is the people side - serious injury & death.

Most of the "substantial damage" was done during recovery. You will get differing definitions on "substantial" but from what I have experienced it is the difference between whether the operator or the manufacturer can fix it - providing the human factor trigger was not hit.

W1

[Devil 49]

"Met all the requiements" ? As in, they were a 135 IFR crew?
If not, next question- Was PHI back to VFR mediums before the strike?

[GLSNightPilot]

I don't know this for a fact, but the rumor is that the PIC was not IFR current. From conversations with PICs who have flown with the SIC, he has about 500 total hours, and the consensus is that he was basically ballast. He does have a MySpace site using the screen name 'Crash'.

Before the strike nobody would ever be sent out as a PIC without a current IFR checkride, but with the current shortages I suppose concessions must be made.

The PIC has emailed friends that there was no malfunction, and he just 'screwed up', and is uncertain whether he will continue to fly. I predict that he will.

[wrench1]

From my info - crew was IFR qualified and current - and a flight plan filed. I believe the SIC "500 hr" item is a reference his multi-time and he had recently upgraded to left seat so I do not know hours in type.

The only possible VFR mediums that come to mind, maybe the EMS 412's on the east coast - but I believe there were other issues why they weren't IFR (?)

W1

[aclark79]

From the myspace blog of "Crash" who claims to be the 2IC of the S76 that went down
*disclaimer, I make no statement regarding the veracity of the following:

On Sunday October 22nd I woke up at 0400 just like any other workday. I got dressed, ate a bananna with peanut butter and was on the rode by 0430 to the Morgan City base to preflight my helicopter. I met with my PIC (pilot in command) and he informed me we would be launching at daybreak to pick up one guy 60 miles offshore at Eugene Island 259C (EI259C). We watched the weather and waited for daylight. The day before I was the pilot flying and we attempted this flight twice, both times we decided to cancel the flight and turn around. Ok back to Sunday, after daybreak we got our last weather briefing the weather was good enough to make the flight. When we got to the beach the weather was marginal but once we got over the water our visibility cleared to 20 miles to the east and 10 miles to the west. There were thunderstorms all around but clear in our line of flight. The cloud ceiling was roughly 500-700 feet and solid overcast. As we made our way inbound to EI259C I made a 20 minute out call to let them know that we were inbound. The platform informed us they were experiencing low clouds and rain. I told them we would make a 5 minute call and let them know if we had to turn around. As we got closer the weather radar in the cockpit showed the platform and the rainshower they were experiencing. When we were approimately 5 minutes out I made the final call, the platform gave me a green deck that means we were cleared to land. As we made our way inbound rain started obscuring our vision on the windshield but still plenty of visibility. The pilot in command turned to the west so I could search for the platform out of the left window, soon the platform came into sight. We made our prelanding checks and started setting ourself up for the approach. The rain became moderate and the visibility was around 3 miles. The platform was in plain view, I stated to the PIC that he could turn to the left and set himself up perfectly for landing into the wind. The last call I made we were roughly 400 feet on the radar altimeter, the PIC called for windsheild wipers. I stated "windshield wipers" and reached for the switch. From that point it all seems like a bad dream. As I reached the switch we impacted the water at roughly 100mph. The windshield blew out and the cockpit immediately filled with water and flipped upside down. I was shocked and went into rescue mode, a calm came over me and I waited for the cockpit to fill to equalize the pressure. Once we were inverted and the cockpit was summerged, I pulled the emergency lever to jettison the door and then released my seatbelt and exited the aircraft. On the surface I could smell jet fuel and the only thing you could see was the belly of the helicopter with the wheels out. I pulled the inflate handles on my switlik survival vest. The vest inflated and I pulled out my EPIRB ( personal GPS emergency tracking device ) and activated it along with my strobe light. I didnt see my PIC and made my way around to the other side of the helicopter. He seemed to be ok and he was hanging on to the side of the helicopter. As the helicopter started to go under I stated that we should back away so it wouldnt grab an article of clothing and pull us under with it. We backed away and watched the helicopter dissappear into the dark gulf water. The sea state was about 4-6 foot waves and the temp was approx. 68-72 degrees. The storm moved over the top of us and was rain was pelting us. 4-6 foot seas are not huge but I found myself under water half of the time. I had on steel toe shoes that weighted me down but was uneasy about kicking them off so I could retain body heat. As I lay there in the water I thought to myself someone will be here soon to get us. I looked around and could see rigs in the distance with boats and choppers coming and going but too far away to see us. Now that the helicopter was at the bottom of the ocean it will definitely be harder to see us. After failed attempts and dreams that someone would see us, I asked the PIC for his EPIRB. I set it off as well and thought well maybe my unit is broken and this one will work for sure. After 30 or 40 minutes I thought to myself how in the hell can we still be here and noone looking for us?? My P:IC said he couldnt feel his arms and legs like a hypothermic state was overtaking him. I was thinking to myself I felt fine but I can't let this guy go down. I made the suggestion to swim to a nearby platform about 2 miles away. We argued if we would be exhausted or not but I won by saying lets attempt to swim that way because the current seems to be pulling us toward it anyway. It gave us a goal to achieve so we would sit there and think about our impending doom. One hour into the swim me and the PIC started drifting further apart, didnt matter we were going the same direction but I kept an eye out just to see that he was still ok. Then I received a powerful strike to my right leg, everyones worst fears were happening to me.....I knew a shark had found me and this was the end. Then another swift blow to the stomach area. OMG I thought I am going to die. I didnt feel pain, just a sharp blow with about 20 pounds of pressure behind it. The strikes became more intense and more frequent. then one swam under me. It was a shark OMG!!! I was getting hit about 5 times a second but no damage no blood. I knew I must have received a cut or wound from the crash because the fish were way to persistant. I thought to myself "how can I live through an impact to the water, turn upside down under water, escape, and get eaten by a shark?" We all have our time to go and I thought this was it. I made my peace with God and knew I would never hold my child Kaiden in my arms again and he would grow up always wondering what his father was like" I began to cry out to god for help as the fish were trying to feed off of my body. I swam harder and faster to make my way to the rig. The weight of the steel toe shoes I was wearing was tiring me even more but I knew if I kicked them off I would have problems climbing the barnacle encrusted ladder on the rig. The rain stopped but the wind had picked up to 40kts or so. only a mile or less to the rig now and I wasn't giving up, I could see my PIC swimming in the same direction about 50 yards from me. I swam for about another hour and made it within 75 feet of the platform. I was then swimming against the current, I didnt know if I would have the strength to make it the last 50 feet. Every time I would make it 10 feet or so the waves would push me back. I rolled over to my back and used my arms and legs to propel me through the water. 2 hours and 30 minutes I had been swimming when my hand got a grip on the the rung of the ladder. The barnacles sliced into my hand and I smiled, that is the best pain I had ever felt. I climbed up the ladder to the mezzanine and got on my all fours to praise god for helping me have strength to make it to this platform. My PIC also made it and we started searching the rig for food, water anything that would help us be rescued. We found a bunkhouse that had two beds, blankets, pillows, 2 cases of coke, a case of water, peanut butter, spam, and tuna fish. We could last for a few days out here if need be. I took off my clothes to dry them and saw why the fish were after me. My right leg had a puncture wound 1 and 1/2 inches wide and about 2 inches deep. It was bleeding down my leg to my foot. I found a first aid kit and sterilized the wound, put betadine on it and wrapped it with a compress. My PIC was shaking almost in a state of shock, I made him drink some water and gatorade. He wrapped up in blankets and laid down on the bunk. I made my way up to the helipad to see what was around. I tried to wave my survival vest at them and turned the strobe light on but I was too far away they couldnt see me. I went back down to the first deck to check on my PIC and find some paint to make an SOS sign on the helideck. My PIC was ok and I continued to search for paint. I found no paint and decided to go back up top and spend the rest of my day trying to get help. I attached my survival vest and pants to the helicopter tie downs on the deck so if anyone flew over the deck could see we were there. I waited on top for roughly an hour and no one even attempted to find us. This is crazy I thought, we have two GPS tracking devices and a communication center with 20 controllers that should be in contact with us. I began to lose hope that we were going to be rescued that day. Ohh I forgot to tell you that this one platform was damaged by hurricane Katrina so there was no power or people on it. Finally in the distance I saw a helicopter heading directly toward us. I got up and unbuckled the safety vest and waved it side to side so the helicopter would see me. Of course how do you miss a fat kid in his underwear jumping up and with a bloody bandage on his leg? The helicopter made a circle back around to see what I was doing. They saw I needed help and pulled into a hover. I gave them hand signs to call for help they gave me a thumbs up and then took off. Within minutes there was an S-76 and a 407 there to pick us up. The 407 landed and loaded us up and took us to the hospital. The 407 landed on the hospital helipad and the nurses met us up top. In the hospital many people were there to question us and nurses are starting I.V.'s , blood work was being drawn and heart moniters were being hooked up, I was happy to be there. The doctor examined me and came back to tell me they were keeping my overnight. My CK level was 1200 and that was a little high. Your CK level shows your muscles are starting to breakdown. The two and one half hour swim took a toll on my body. He said that they wanted it to come down before I was released because if it stays high or increases it can send you into kidney failure. They set me up in a bed in the ER because the hospital was full. One benefit to this is I got to take a shower in the nurses lounge WOOHOO!
I am at home now waiting on the investigation, they recovered the helicopter and I have a few meetings that I will have to go to. I will go back to the company I work for and I will fly the 76 again.
Thanks for all your love and support

[Darren999]

Very well done! Here's to speedy recovery! hope to see you back in the gulf soon.
Darren

[Project Pilot FH1100]

The kid's account is interesting, but if it is accurate it raises one big question for me.

PHI's flight-following procedures dictate that flight plans be closed *after* landing. (Many pilots call "landing" prematurely, while they are still in the air in direct contravention of the letter and spirit of PHI's rules.) When an aircraft is overdue, PHI "goes crazy" trying to find it; by that I mean, they do not take these things lightly. If it is true that "no one" was looking for the S-76, then either two things had to happen:

1. PHI's computerized flight-following system failed to alert that a ship was overdue (which happens immediately at the ETA - the aircraft's call-sign turns red or flashes or something);

2. The flight-plan had already been closed while the aircraft was still in the air, meaning that the "two-hour check" rule was in effect and the company would not look for the aircraft until that time period had elapsed.

Either way, there was a serious breakdown in the system somewhere and explanations are due. I don't even want to think about what would have happened if the helicopter was full of pax instead of empty seats.

[js0987]

Reading that statement makes us all thankful that it turned out OK. Had they not made that platform, sounds like we would be reading obituaries instead.
I wonder what the people on the platform were doing? They got a 20 minute call, then a 5 minute landing call and then nothing. Did it occure to anyone on the platform that the aircraft they were expecting any minute never made it?
His statement says they were at 400 feet with the platform in sight. Simple math infers that they entered a high rate of descent that they were unaware off. CRM classes these days, hammer home the term "situational awareness." I wonder if the two pilots had CRM classes, considering the rush to get pilots on the line.
The PIC in his email, mentioned he's considering his future options and the SIC looks forward to returning to flying. I sincerely wish them the best, but have the feeling their futures won't be with PHI. In a case of ironies, they will have no organization to go to bat for them in the investigation (probably wouldn't matter much in this case anyway as companies almost always are deffered to in matters of safety).
I fear Al will opt for termination rather than having to worry about another accident involving either pilot

[flyby_heli]

Another question that comes to mind is why they were doing 100mph if the visibility was that bad? Wouldn't it be better to slow it down a little bit??
I know that's what i do when i fly in marginal vfr conditions.

[Woolf]

This "incident" could have easily been avoided by a simple AVAD system and appropriate bug/CRM procedures. Are helicopters in the GOM not required to have those?:confused:

[slgrossman]

I've got to jump on the bandwagon with Nick here. We have a lot of technology readily available at a cost which is justified by the reduction in risk it provides. Yes, we can and have gotten by without it, but how close to the edge do we routinely walk without ever realizing it?

I've been in nearly identical situations a couple of times. In my case we had a bit of a scare, but, no blood - no foul. However, it wouldn't have taken much to put us over the edge. Then you'd have been reading about me and my copilot instead.

You establish limits and procedures, you check the weather, you pay diligent attention to what you're doing, and still it happens. It happens because at some point you exceed the limit of what you can manage with the available resources. And until you get the task load back to a managable level you're relying on luck for a happy outcome.

There's a bunch of stuff out there that will tremendously improve the margin of safety. Of course, the appropriate technology differs with the application. For marginal weather in the GoM it may be four-axis autopilots. For EMS in the mountains at night maybe it's NVGs. Whatever. But any operator that doesn't take advantage of the appropriate technology, and any customer that doesn't require it of their contractors, is opening themselves up to serious liability. I think you know what's coming next, "If you think the equipment is expensive, just think about the cost of an accident."

-Stan-

[Flashover999]

Wow!
Wow
Wow!
Well done good luck!

[Hippolite]

Woolf

Of course, you are right. It could have been prevented by a simple AVAD system and some Standard Operating Procedures attached to Rad Alt use. After all, they have been in use on the NS for how long....20 years....no more like 23 I think.

The Gomers have always been a bit slow to catch onto some of this "technology" and at last, its only the oil companies who have started to drive new aircraft acquisitions with improved equipment.

Unfortunately, PHI has had to be dragged kicking and screaming into the 21st century. The Chief Pilot and Director of Operations in PHI have had little operational exposure outside of Louisiana.

For example, until 3 years ago, the concept of looking at a graph and calculating a take off weight to give any kind of Cat A en route performance was totally alien. In fact, the attitude was "why do it, why not just load up to max gross and take off like a helicopter?" Obviously, this makes a S76 like a Bell 206.

It was only a large oil company client who insisted that aircraft were operated to the equivalent of PC2 which started to drive some alternative thinking in PHI.

It used to be said that if the throttles weren't on the collective, it couldn't be operated in the GOM!!

[Rocker]

Quote: "The last call I made we were roughly 400 feet on the radar altimeter, the PIC called for windsheild wipers. I stated "windshield wipers" and reached for the switch. From that point it all seems like a bad dream. As I reached the switch we impacted the water at roughly 100mph."

I'm confused about this part of the story. Granted, I don't fly offshore in an S76, but how can you impact the water from 400 feet while you are reaching for the windshield wiper switch? There seems to be a gap in the story. Would the SIC specifically leave out the info in this gap or could it have happened so fast he wouldn't know? I'm just curious if he may have left out that particular part because there is an ongoing investigation. If so, why would he publish anything at all?

My heart goes out to the guys. The story is very similar to one I heard a few years ago from a friend of a friend who worked at Air Log (I think) - ditched off a platform and fought off sharks for a couple of hours, hoping a large one would finally end it for him. :eek:

[GLSNightPilot]

AVAD? Bug? What are those?

And the 'large oil company client' did not, and still has not, required compliance with PC2 procedures. It does require calculating whether a PC2 takeoff can be made, but will not download to comply with it. If you can't make a PC2 takeoff, you get off the best way you can, at your present weight. Do not even consider telling the dispatcher that you have to reduce the load in order to do a PC2 takeoff.

[Hippolite]

GLS Night Pilot

I am amused by your feigned ignorance!!

I think you are getting mixed up between customers. You maybe speaking of Shell but there are other PHI customers who do require PC2 performance on their S76C++ and S92s contracted from PHI. They even observe take offs at some heliports to ensure compliance.

It remains undeniable that it is only the customers who are starting to demand improved operational standards in the GOM. Most older aircraft are poorly equipped and continue to be operated like a big 206. If the customers weren't driving improvements, the operations management would still be telling people that the 214ST production line should be restarted......like they did 3 years ago when asked about long range deepwater support!

HH

[thecontroller]

AVAD? can someone tell me what that is?

forgive my off-shore ignorance, but wouldnt there be some procedure for the SIC to countdown the rad-alt readings when descending in poor wx?

and.. is it wise for this guy to post all this on his blog? i personally would be keeping quiet and only talking to the authoritories

[Woolf]

thecontroller:

I believe AVAD stands for "Automatic Voice Alert Device". One of the functions on this device will give you an aural warning when you reach a certain "bugged" height above the ground (measured straight down by rad-alt). Some will also give you other warnings like 100ft, gear up, fire engine 1, etc ...

For offshore approaches most companies in the North Sea would have a bug setting from 50 to 150ft depending on the rig. This will then give you a bit of a "heads up" if things don't go according to plan.

As all of the offshore flying here is done by IFR twins, an approach in low visibility conditions would most likely be a rig radar approach, which uses the weather radar to fly an instrument approach offshore.

Cheers,

Woolf

[Geoffersincornwall]

Woolfie

Be careful - your radar should be placarded "NOT TO BE USED FOR NAVIGATIONAL PURPOSES'.

Just because the UK CAA (and some others) chooses to allow such IFR techniques does not mean that they are acceptable in other countries.

And I believe it's "Altitude Voice Alert Device" but who knows, acronyms have a habit of growing their own decode.

Geoffers

:ok:

[Woolf]

Geoffers,

I did a google before posting my last reply and most sources do refer to it as "automatic" although I did find one site with your suggestion (altitude). I did decide to go with "automatic" as other functions of AVAD (enhanced AVAD) are not altitude related. Maybe someone in the know can give us a definite answer?

Be careful - your radar should be placarded "NOT TO BE USED FOR NAVIGATIONAL PURPOSES'. Just because the UK CAA (and some others) chooses to allow such IFR techniques does not mean that they are acceptable in other countries.

Geoffers, are you suggesting that for once the CAA does allow something that others do not??? Whatever next ..... :}

Even the JAA/EASA allow this procedure for CAT under JAR-OPS 3. In any case I would suggest, if done properly, it is a far safer approach in low visibility (see above).

Cheers,

Woolf

[havoc]

NTSB Identification: DFW07LA011
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Sunday, October 22, 2006 in Eugene Island, GM
Aircraft: Sikorsky S-76A++, registration: N22342
Injuries: 1 Minor, 1 Uninjured.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

On October 22, 2006, approximately 0730 central daylight time, a Sikorsky S-76A++ twin-engine helicopter, N22342, registered to and operated by Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. (PHI), of Lafayette, Louisiana, was destroyed when it impacted the water while landing near offshore platform Eugene Island (EI) Block 259, located in the Gulf of Mexico. The airline transport rated pilot was not injured, but the commercial rated first officer sustained minor injuries. There were no passengers aboard the helicopter at the time of the mishap. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and a company flight plan was filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulation Part 91 on-demand air taxi flight. The local flight departed PHI's base in Amelia, Louisiana, at 0658, and was destined for EI 259 to pickup a passenger.

A representative of the operator stated in the Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report (NTSB Form 6120.1) that after takeoff from PHI's base at Amelia, the pilot-in-command (PIC) encountered a cloud deck at 500 feet and leveled the helicopter at approximately at 450 feet, with the visibility at approximately 10 miles. A call was received by the crew that EI 259 had encountered moderate rain, poor visibility and a low ceiling. The PIC responded that he was aware of the weather line of rain showers, and expected them to move through the area prior to their arrival. The crew called EI 259 about 20 minutes out giving their estimate time of arrival, and were told that it was still raining.

At 2 nautical miles (NM) from EI 259, the crew could not see the platform due to the rain, so the PIC turned the helicopter to the West to circle the rain shower and called for the pre-landing check. At just under 2 NM west of the platform, the first officer saw the platform, and the PIC called for the floats to be armed and the windshield wipers to be turned on. At this time the, wind was from 340 degrees. As the PIC turned to final, he remembers his altimeter indicating 250 feet and airspeed 55-60 knots, and seeing the platform, but not seeing a visible horizon. The PIC estimated moderate rain, while noticing that the floats were not armed and that the rain on the wind shield was obscuring his vision. He asked the first officer again to arm the floats and turn on the wipers. The first officer appeared to be fumbling with the switches as the PIC looked down to see what was happening. At that time, the helicopter made contact with the water, rolled over, and began filling with water. The first officer escaped by jettisoning his entry door and the PIC escaped through the a missing windshield.
Index for Oct2006 | Index of months

[rick1128]

Woolfie

Be careful - your radar should be placarded "NOT TO BE USED FOR NAVIGATIONAL PURPOSES'.

Just because the UK CAA (and some others) chooses to allow such IFR techniques does not mean that they are acceptable in other countries.

And I believe it's "Altitude Voice Alert Device" but who knows, acronyms have a habit of growing their own decode.

Geoffers

:ok:

In the US radar approaches are approved on an operator by operator basis. The operator is issued OpSpecs (Operations Specifications) for this type approach. The issuance of these Oppecs require approved training programs and procedures. However, these days they are not used to the degree they used to be. GPS approaches are easily made to each platform. Many of the GOM pilots I have talked with still use the radar as a additional tool and backup.

[helopat]

...Visual meteorological conditions prevailed...encountered a cloud deck at 500 feet and leveled the helicopter at approximately at 450 feet, with the visibility at approximately 10 miles... not seeing a visible horizon...the rain on the wind shield was obscuring his vision

Gentlemen,

At the risk of opening myself up to ridicule and harassment (nah, never happens in the land of PPRUNE) what are the VMC rules in the USA? Not trying to affix blame (never having flown for the oil companies in the Gulf) but something just didn't seem to add up for me with the above.

Bottom line, glad they walked (swam?) away.

HP

[jab]

Just for info, Era does OSAP's (Offshore approaches etc.) using GPS and radar down to 200 feet on the radio alt. This is based on the radar agreeing with the GPS, if its not calibrated correctly then the limits are 700 feet (I think). I am sure PHI has a similar arrangement as rick1128 mentions.

[rick1128]

Gentlemen,
At the risk of opening myself up to ridicule and harassment (nah, never happens in the land of PPRUNE) what are the VMC rules in the USA? Not trying to affix blame (never having flown for the oil companies in the Gulf) but something just didn't seem to add up for me with the above.
Bottom line, glad they walked (swam?) away.
HP

For helicopters in the US the VFR minimums are the same as fixed wing aircraft except when in uncontrolled airspace (Class G). There it is enough visibility to avoid obstacles. Also in other airspace helicopters operate under different requirements for special VFR than fixed wings do and may operate under special VFR in airport areas that deny special VFR for fixed wings.

Most GOM operators have or have had radar approach Opspecs issued to them.

[Mars]

Rick,

Are you certain that the VFR minima is the same for fixed wing and rotary?

You are quoting the (helicopter) Part 91.155(b)(1) Class G minima when, by your reference to 'operators', we might assume that the (helicopter) Part 135.205(b)(1) or (2) might apply - i.e. 1/2 mile by day or 1 mile by night.

It's unfortunate that whilst the alleged 'blog' from the P2 implicitly exudes an air of competence:The last call I made we were roughly 400 feet on the radar altimeter, the PIC called for windsheild wipers. I stated "windshield wipers" and reached for the switch. From that point it all seems like a bad dream. As I reached the switch we impacted the water at roughly 100mph. the P1's story says something quite different:The PIC estimated moderate rain, while noticing that the floats were not armed and that the rain on the wind shield was obscuring his vision. He asked the first officer again to arm the floats and turn on the wipers. The first officer appeared to be fumbling with the switches as the PIC looked down to see what was happening.It is not clear to me that any device would have saved the day when it appears that distraction was one of the principal factors.

[Gomer Pylot]

Helicopter VFR minima are not the same as fixed-wing. There are several differences. In the case of offshore, it depends on the company's ops specs. Most use 300'/2 SM for VFR, but some are lower. The FAA requirements are 'clear of clouds'.

Offshore OSAP approaches require use of radar in addition to GPS. The position of the approach target must agree between the GPS and the radar, and the radar must be operational to insure that there are no other targets in the approach area, or which cannot be missed by at least 1/2 mile. I know of no authorization for an offshore approach using only GPS.

The NTSB report and Crash's blog are certainly different. The term 'ballast' does seem more appropriate when reading the NTSB version. One can now better understand the post on the blog - very self-serving, ISTM, and perhaps not completely accurate.

If this flight had been done IFR from the beginning, it might have finished more happily. But a new crew, perhaps not IFR current, is often reluctant to fly IFR, and the lack of facilities makes it even more difficult. There is no radio or radar contact with ATC past the beach, in essence, and there is no weather reporting in most areas, so OSAP approaches are difficult if not impossible. The alternative is to file to a HEDA (Helicopter Enroute Descent Area), a location previously surveyed for having no obstacles, and descending to VMC there. The minimum descent altitude in a HEDA is 400', and the flight can continue VMC with weather as low as 300' and 2 miles visibility. That wouldn't have helped in this case, but having weather reporting and ATC communications, allowing an IFR approach to the platform, might have. All it takes to allow this is money - money which the government and the oil companies refuse to spend.

[Devil 49]

I think referring to the SIC in this case as "ballast" is uncharitable and undeserved. This individual didn't preform as an SIC, and his lack of offshore experience is telling. But, the post attributed to him may not be his. Even if it was, it was intended for a non-technical audience- a war story.

My impression after reading it is that there was a lot left out. I wondered if the author understood the issues in his story. My second impression was that not only was this guy not a functioning member of the crew. He wasn't even a good switch-flipper, although that took a good bit of empathy in the reading to infer. My eyes would have been out, out, out was I in that seat, lest the water come up and smite me, which it did.

I remember my first offshore days too well. While the GoM isn't the vicious environment I hear attributed to the North Sea, it has all the offshore traps. For instance, I remember well the first time I saw "flying platforms" in a poor horizon situation.

I also remember how tough it was as a new SIC to challenge an experienced PIC, and I inferred that in the SIC's story too. It's the biggest part of the job and the greatest benefit of real CRM.

Ballast? No. Inexperienced, poorly trained, and perhaps not suitable for multi-crew operations- I can't say, I never trained or evaluated pilots for that. He was in over his head in a situation that was largely the company's creation. PHI failed this crew, before and after the event. I'm very unimpressed with the "new PHI".

[GLSNightPilot]

My use of the term ballast was a quote from more than one PIC who has flown with him in the past. I have not, so I can't say one way or the other, but those PICs do have that opinion of him, right or wrong.

I do agree that PHI failed the crew, by sending them out together with the experience level they had. If an SIC can't even arm the floats, he shouldn't be an SIC. The checkpilot who passed him was apparently negligent, although likely pressured to do it by the company. I hope there aren't more like him out there, but I wouldn't bet my life on it.

[rick1128]

Rick,
Are you certain that the VFR minima is the same for fixed wing and rotary?
You are quoting the (helicopter) Part 91.155(b)(1) Class G minima when, by your reference to 'operators', we might assume that the (helicopter) Part 135.205(b)(1) or (2) might apply - i.e. 1/2 mile by day or 1 mile by night.

Mars, I was quoting Part 91 due to the fact that the flight they were conducting during the incident was legally a Part 91 flight. They were not carrying either passenger or cargo at the time. FAA Legal uses FAR 119.1 to determine if a flight is either 91 or 135. In all other airspace the visibility requirements are the same as FW's. The fact that the company was getting paid or the pilots were getting paid for the flight is immaterial in this determination. While many operators do consider the empty legs as 135 flights, it not a requirement.

[i4iq]

I was speaking to a pilot a few days ago who said that PHI gave assurances that in the event of such a "landing", an aircraft would be over the position within 15 minutes, circling the area and ensuring a rescue team were on it's way. Apparently, PHI have a hi-tech tracking system that can pin-point aircraft positions to a high degree of accuracy.

I've not been down to the GOM and I'm not familiar with that kind of system, so I wonder what went wrong? Even if a flight plan had been closed, wouldn't triggering 2 ELT's alert the PHI base that something was wrong?

Is this kind of setup typical for the operators down there?

[sox6]

Mars

In that case AFDS....

[GLSNightPilot]

The 'high tech tracking system' is Outerlink. Sometimes it works, sometimes it doesn't. It's often down, either at the Outerlink site, on the phone links between there and PHI, or at PHI's end. Plus the comm specs in LFT have to be paying attention. They don't always do that.

Activating the ELTs would not notify PHI at all, only the underfunded government rescue center. It can take hours for an ELT signal received there to be responded to, partly because there are so many false activations.

[ron-powell]

GLS-NP is absolutely correct when he says the dispatchers have to be paying attention. When it worked for us, it went like this:

PHI had an Astar crash in New Mexico and the dispatchers actually watched it happen - the map display was tracking the aircraft as it returned to Taos NM and about 5 minutes from base, the track stopped. The dispatchers, who were still based in Albuquerque at the time, then tried to contact the aircraft. Then called the state police, giving them the position next to a nearby highway.

The pilot was picked up and in the Taos NM hospital in about 45 minutes, after walking less than 10 minutes off the mountain. Not too bad - when everyone is paying attention.

Apparently, the S-76 crew was unable to get off the emergency notification on Outerlink. This would probably have helped alert the dispatch center something was wrong.

I have personally tested the emergency function and had PHI dispatchers call within 5 minutes, they also were called from the Outerlink company notifiying them of an emergency signal.

Again, when it works, it seemed to work well.

[GLSNightPilot]

Activating the mayday function on the Outerlink is not the same thing as activating the ELT in the survival vest. I have had to activate the mayday on the Outerlink just to get the comm center's attention to file an inbound flight plan, after trying for about 10 minutes to call on all available frequencies.

[Aser]

It can take hours for an ELT signal received there to be responded to, partly because there are so many false activations.

That's one of the reasons to quit using of 121.5 ELTs by 2009
http://www.sarsat.noaa.gov/phaseout.html

[Mars]

Aser,

Whilst you are correct in stating that there is a proposal to phase out 121.5 by 2009 in the US, you might have noted that the use of 406 MHz has been the ICAO Standard since 2005

ICAO Annex 10 Volume II

5.1.4 From 1 January 2005, emergency locator transmitters shall operate on 406 MHz and 121.5 MHz simultaneously.

It is more than likely that the EPIRB was transmitting on this frequency - as are all the ELTs of the newer helicopter types that have recently been introduced to the GOM. It is not clear why the EPIRB transmissions were not picked up by the satellite (or picked up and noted). It could be that the absence of compliance with this ICAO Standard in the US means that there is less than wholesale commitment to the system.

One of the important elements of 406 MHz was the introduction of verification; each individual ELT has to be registered with a contact number - the firing of the beacon should have resulted in an immediate call to the registered owner which should have triggered the emergency response. The location of the beacon would have been recorded which should have shortened the search phase.

There is another disturbing element of the accident which has not been discussed so far: having given the deck clear call, why didn't the HLO raise the alarm when the helicopter wasn't with him within a couple of minutes.

Perhaps the the recommendations from this accident should be focused on the safety management systems of operator and oil company. The resulting lessons might impact more on the organisational aspect of both.

JAR-OPS 3.940 Composition of Flight Crew
...

(4) Procedures are established, acceptable to the Authority, to prevent the crewing together of inexperienced flight crew members; (See AMC OPS 3.940(a)(4))

AMC OPS 3.940(a)(4)
Crewing of inexperienced flight crew members
See JAR-OPS 3.940(a)(4)

1 An operator should consider that when two flight crew members are required, a flight crew member, following completion of a Type Rating or command course, and the associated line flying under supervision, is inexperienced until either:

a. He has achieved 50 flight hours on the type and/or in the role within a period of 60 days; or

b. He has achieved 100 flight hours on the type and/or in the role (no time limit).

2 A lesser number of flight hours, on the type and/or in the role, may be acceptable to the Authority when:

a. A new operator is commencing operations; or

b. An operator introduces a new helicopter type; or

c. Flight crew members have previously completed a type conversion course with the same operator (re-conversion); and

d. Subject to any other conditions which the Authority may impose.

[sox6]

Another good reason to move to 406 is the constant risk of other nearby helicopters being jammed on 121.5 by false passenger beacon activations.



There is another disturbing element of the accident which has not been discussed so far: having given the deck clear call, why didn't the HLO raise the alarm when the helicopter wasn't with him within a couple of minutes.

Perhaps the the recommendations from this accident should be focused on the safety management systems of operator and oil company. The resulting lessons might impact more on the organisational aspect of both.



Good point. This has been a farily common failing in past offshore accidents.

Who operates that platform? is it manned or a NUI?

[GLSNightPilot]

Few of the individual survival vests in PHI have the newer beacons. PHI has apparently been reluctant to spend the money on them. When my vest reached its expiration date in August, only the bladder was replaced, with another used one. The beacon was not replaced. Most of these, and AFAIK all the aircraft beacons, are of the older type which operate on 121.5.

At one time search aircraft would have been launched very quickly. It seems that perhaps SAR aircraft are not available now, and PHI aircraft which might go down might not be able to count on timely rescue.

[oryxs]

GLSNightPilot
A SAR a/c is available in that area. Last time I was there, Cougar Helicopters had a SAR equiped S-61 sitting in Galliano on contract with BP/Shell.
The greater issue here is why it took so long for PHI to react to the fact that a machine was down or not reporting. I know a customers who use Blue sky tracking and in their case an alarm will sound after 5 min if the a/c is not reporting.
The next question would be why the rad alt was not set by the crew to eg. 150 ft. About 2 years ago another s-76 flew into the water at night down there. The a/c started a gentle descent that was never caught by the crew till they hit the water. In their case i think the rad alt was u/s. February 2005 a crew flew a Bell 222 ? into the water on approach to a ship at night off Galveston.
All 3 these cases was 2 pilot operations, so what is lacking? Not enough training, lack of SOP's or just a failure to follow SOP's.:=
Reading about incidents like these maybe stresses the point that SOP's are there for a reason. It's a reminder, to me in any case, that short cuts might not always be the best way to get there.
Fly safe and keep the right side up.:O

[GLSNightPilot]

oryxs:

1. PHI's Outerlink is supposed to alarm at the aircraft's ETA. Why it apparently did not in this case I don't know, but I do know that it is often out of service.

2. I don't believe PHI will call on another company for SAR until it absolutely has to. It also will not willingly help other companies. The Dir of Ops refused to allow me to launch to search for the Era S76 until Era agreed to pay for the flight. :ugh: I was still the first aircraft on the scene, beating the USCG by some time, after an hour delay.

3. I don't know whether the radalt was set or not, or to what altitude. In any case, all that happens when the altitude is reached is that a small light on the radalt illuminates. It's easy to miss that light in the daytime. There is no aural warning in that aircraft, nor in most of the A++ aircraft. A couple have a very faint 'ding', easy to miss. If the pilot isn't looking at the radalt, he will receive no warning. At night, the light is much more noticeable. I also don't have any knowledge about the Central Helicopters 222, other than the NTSB report, nor about their SOPs. Technology can help with this, I think. A simple aural warning when radalt minimums are reached would be easy, but it simply hasn't happened.

[Cyclic Hotline]

I don't believe PHI will call on another company for SAR until it absolutely has to. It also will not willingly help other companies. The Dir of Ops refused to allow me to launch to search for the Era S76 until Era agreed to pay for the flight. I was still the first aircraft on the scene, beating the USCG by some time, after an hour delay.

Pitiful behaviour. No wonder things are so screwed up in the Gulf.

I have always instructed my crews to use their own initiative and discretion to use any company assets in order to provide assistance for any life in danger. Not that it be done in a dangerous or reckless manner, but maintaining the safety of themselves, the crew, the aircraft and the victim, in an organised approach. Certainly offering aircraft and any available assistance if their is an organized rescue effort underway, is the very least a neighbour could do.

I was taught this response by my first ever employer, and have continued it throughout my career. We have directly saved many lives as a result of this policy. One crewmember recieved an international award as a result of his actions. Another saved the life of a contractors employee, by providing CPR all the way to hospital, and certainly saving the life of the victim - only to die himself two days later as the result of a tragic accident. More typical were the opportunities to save lives simply by providing expedient transportation to people who in many cases would not have survived without it.

We never wondered about who would pay, and you know what, I never had anyone who didn't quietly and without fuss arrange to reimburse us for our costs - all at cost! Hey, and if they didn't pay, so what. It is simply not an issue.

What goes around comes around. God forbid someone dies while you figure out who will pay the :mad: bill! It might be you that dies as a result of that indecision!

[Mikila1A]

I don't believe PHI will call on another company for SAR until it absolutely has to. It also will not willingly help other companies. The Dir of Ops refused to allow me to launch to search for the Era S76 until Era agreed to pay for the flight.

DISGUSTING.....to say the least, shows one the level if intelligen...let me rephrase that, STUPIDY in the whole GOM philosphy.
TWITS!!!!!:yuk: :yuk:

[wrench1]

Industry Insider beat me to it...PHI, ERA, Air Log, Taylor, Chevron... whoever, have ALWAYS responded to another aircraft in trouble - with not the slightest hesitation. Based on GLS's past posts, he tends to "drift" every now and then. The day someone leaves another in the water without a thought or action is the day I get out of the business.

A quick note on SAR - the Cougar aircraft was brought in by BP after the 92 started flying. In the US (GOM) most SAR is provided by the tried and true Coast Guard - with great results. As explained to ME during "ditching school" given the average water temp of the GOM and the network of the CG stations, plus the operator based flight following - the system worked and was approved by the oil companies. Problem came when the CG aircraft could not "rescue" an entire 92 flight - thus the Cougar 61. Put all the spin you want - the GOM is not the North Sea or the EU. Everything is different - but I do not imply that one area is better than the other - only that it is two different environments.

All the new ELT installs, to include the pilot's vest's are equipped with 406 ELT's and registered under PHI. Don't know why GLS doen't have the 406 ELT.

Just my take....

[js0987]

Reading GLSNightPilot's post, its obvious he was on duty that night. Its obvious that there was a delay in launching the PHI night ship of approximately one hour. I'm sure that's all quite well documented.
I assume there were no mechanical problems delaying the launch, so that leaves some kind of dispatch delay.
It would be interesting to see if PHI actually billed ERA for the night flight.
Substantiating a dispatch delay will neccessitate recollections of phone conversations. I seriously doubt that PHI's management will admit to it - same with ERA. It makes both companies look bad.
So it comes back to the question of why did GLSNightPilot wait an hour before launching when he was ready to go.

[GLSNightPilot]

II, are you threatening me? I shouldn't have to substantiate anything, Carlin should stand up and justify his decisions. I would be surprised if that happened, though.

There were many angry people that night, and I assume would testify. I also documented everything in writing, just in case. That will likely disappear in the company, but I made copies. Just in case I was ever threatened. I've learned to do that. I stand by my previous statements.

[tistisnot]

Now girls let's be sensible here - yes it is everyone's right and duty to assist someone in difficulty whilst you are AIRBORNE but you cannot have every Tom Dick or Harry on the ground appropriating an aircraft just because he deems it fit to intervene. It has to be co-ordinated, and therefore any pilot would have to consult his company / other agencies before doing so.

[GLSNightPilot]

II:
Oh, of course you're just trying to protect me. :rolleyes:

I have never said anything on this, or any other, forum, that I did not know, or have good reason to believe, to be the truth. If someone wants to sue me for making true statements on an anonymous forum, well, you can sue anyone for anything in the US, but this forum is based in the UK, AFAIK, and it's difficult to successfully prosecute a defamation suit there. Even in the US, the plaintiff would have to prove that the statement is false, and that it was made with malice. Neither can be shown. I'm not worried, so keep spinning away.

[SASless]

The person you mention by name does not have the best reputation in the industry, in fact, that person is seen as a bit of a liability by many on the client's side. Some find it hard to understand why Gonsoulin keeps him there.


Sounds like corroboration to me GLS!

[aclark79]

If I take anything from this its thus:

Don't rely on anyone other than yourself for rescue. Bring the required emergency equipment and be ready to do what has to be done to save yourself.

I don't know what happened in the air, but it sounds like the 2IC did the right thing once they were in the water.

Is dunking training provided by the GOM operators or is it a voluntary pay for yourself kind of thing?

[Land of LA]

aclark79
I am about to start with ERA and will be provided HUET training by the company. I believe PHI does from what I have read on other areas of this forum. I cannot imagine NOT receiving HUET training if one fly’s over water more than gliding distance from terra firma especially after reading "Crash's harrowing account".
LoL

[Devil 49]

You can never count on anybody else in a survival situation. One should take that very literally and to the logical extreme- you can rely on the equipment on your person, only. If you can get anything out of the aircraft, it's your lucky day...