S61 crash Canary Islands

[Heliharm]

Yesterday a S61 crashed near the Canary Islands. It departed from Gran Canaria Airport for a fire fighting mission on La Palma. It crashed 2 1/2 miles out of the coast. According to a maritim officer the S61 did not hit anything before it went down. Time of the accident was 9:30 in the morning. 4 died and 2 are missing.
At this moment there is no more information.

http://www.elpais.es/articulo/espana/muertos/desaparecidos/estrellarse/Canarias/helicoptero/antiincendios/elpporesp/20060708elpepunac_3/Tes/

[Aser]

I know one of them...
It's so sad this job sometimes...

My condolences to the families

R.I.P.
:(

Aser.

[VEMD]

Somebody told me about a problem with one MR blade (Gas Leak), but the crew keeps flying with the bad blade, maybe the crew was afraid to lose their jobs, usual in Spain.:ugh:
RIP

[SASless]

VEMD,

Blade Indicator (BIM) leaked down?

Did they pull the blade, refill the blade to a good BIM indication, stress the blade and leave it over night and recheck the blade?

If the company ignored the indication of a leak and continued to fly.....that was a very, very, bad move.

They are simple enough to check.:(

[Heliharm]

Rumors here in Spain also tell that there were problems with a MR blade. It seemed to be overdue but persmission for longer use was granted by the DGAC, the Spanish CAA. But as usual in Spain they really want to keep these things quiet.

[AuxHyd]

The company has posted some information related to this accident:
http://www.helicsa.com/
They say the aircraft is operated in several countries in Europe and elsewhere. What they do not say is that it does not meet the stringent requirements spelled out in JAR 29. But the authorities keep signing off its exempt status.
Why should we as pilots have to put up with customer/operator/authority negligence and fly this obsolete machinery?
I feel sad for the families who are now without their loved ones.

[JimL]

AuxHyd,

I am sure someone in Sikorsky will come back and reply to you fully but, just in case they don't, the S61 (in common with all aircraft) met the Standard of certification at the time it received its initial Type Certificate back in the 1960s (and has had some improvements since then - the rotor blades with extended spars were one such improvement; the tail rotor with its changed build form was another).

Referring just to JAR 29 (or FAR 29 or CS 29) is too simplistic a statement; each helicopter has to meet the regulation at the time of its submission to an Authority for the Type Certificate.

A good example of this would be the recent announcements that the the S92 meets the latest FAR 29 (I think at revision 47 but might have that number slightly wrong).

No helicopter can expect continued modification to meet the latest standards - particularly as most of the recent revisions to FAR/JAR/CS 29 have been concerned with fault tolerance and crash-worthiness.

Meeting the latest design and built standards is one of the main reasons that the oil companies are changing out their equipment at the present time. They consider that the additional safety of a helicopter that has been built to a standard beyond FAR/JAR/CS 29 at revision 47 more than meets the cost of the new equipment.

Jim

[widgeon]

I can understand giving approval to go beyond TBO on a gearbox or engine where there are no other indications of failure . The BIM on the other hand signals a fault with the main spar of the blade . I was told that the one reason they went to the radioactive BIM indication was so they could be monitored in flight , from initial indication to catstrophic failure can be as little as 4 hours . What does the RFM say about an inflight indication of BIM ? .


babel fish translation of cominique


Data of the Crew the crew of rough Sikorsky S-61 today in Tenerife was composed by companions of a great human and professional quality: J.O.P, commander of the helicopter, (1952). It took tie to Helicsa from 1972. It accumulated a experience of 9,221 flight hours, and from 1991 it was operating of continuous form model S-61 N. Teni'a license of Commercial Pilot of Transport and ratings for models S-61 N, Bell 212, Bell 412 and AS 365? The copilot, A.R.L, (1967). He worked in the company from 2005. He accumulated a experience of 890 flight hours and recently he had surpassed the course of rating of S-61 N in Norway. He also had license of Commercial Pilot of Transport and the ratings to the models S-61, Bell the 212 and Bells 412.? The technician of maintenance of airship J.R.V (1953). He worked in Helicsa from 1994. He had License of Technician of Aeronautical Maintenance and ratings for the models S-61 and Bell 212. From his entrance in the Company, he had developed his professional activity in the S-61. Helicopter Sikorsky S-61 Sikorsky S-61 is a twin-engine helicopter (2 motors of 1400 shp each one) of North American manufacture, specially designed for transport missions. This helicopter is used mainly in missions of marine rescue, attendance to petroliferous platforms, fights against forest fires and public transport of passengers. This apparatus is in good condition anywhere in the world, operated by the more important helicopter companies at international level. In particular, they are in good condition at the moment more of a hundred of civil helicopters, made between years 60 and 80, in countries like the United States, United Kingdom, Norway, Spain, South Africa, Canada, etc... Additionally, it is a helicopter commonly used in the main armies in its military version, between which is the fleet of the White House and that the president of the United States in official displacements uses. He is one of the helicopters with greater cargo capacity of the world, up to 28 passengers more 2 pilots, with a length of 18 meters and a volume of cabin of 37 cubic meters. The rough helicopter was being in transport service of the specialistic brigades against fires between the islands of canary archipelago. The helicopter renewed its Certificate of Airworthiness with complete inspection on the part of the Main directorate of Civil Aviation in April of 2006, and counts on the certificate for public transport of passengers and merchandise. To also indicate that in January of 2005 it passed his last general inspectorate in a company specialized in maintenance of Sikorsky in Norway. Helicsa the Helicsa company Helicopters emphasizes from its beginnings by its pioneering character at the time of initiating and developing all type of air services. During its trajectory, Helicsa has consolidated like one of the main European companies in services of helicopters of high accuracy and quality. For it, the company counts with more than 39 operational bases in Spain La company was the first company of the sector in obtaining certifications ISO 9002 and ISO 14001. Also, the organization of Maintenance of Helicsa has certifications JAR -145 and PECAL -120 that also credit it in the maintenance of airships of public transport of passengers and of the Ministry of defense.

[Aser]

It would be nice to hear an engineer rated on S61 speaking about the BIM in CLEAR terms, what says the M.Manual.
Remeber this is just a rumour network, but just in case.... :
Looks like to this Aircrane crash:
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3901/is_199811/ai_n8815604
On 18 July at 1625 Pacific daylight time, Sikorsky CH-54A N64KL en route to Apple Valley, California, crashed after experiencing a main rotor blade separation, and a subsequent In-flight explosion and fire. The aircraft was destroyed and the three crew members sustained fatal injures. The aircraft was being operated as a repositioning flight by Heavy Lift Helicopters Inc. when the accident occurred.
The witness/pilot also reported that the accident aircraft's green blade had failed a blade indicator monitor (BIM) test check during the daily inspection that had been conducted the evening before in Brownwood, Texas. The aircraft's crew chief subsequently recharged the blade with nitrogen and the aircraft was allowed to remain parked overnight on the ramp.
The next morning the BIM was checked during the preflight and it was noted that the green blade had retained the charge. The decision was then made to continue to fly the aircraft to its destination.
During the next 7.6 hours of flight, the aircraft made four subsequent fuel stops. The crew reportedly checked the BIM on each stop and did not note any further discrepancies. According to FAA airworthiness inspectors, the failure of a BIM check renders the aircraft non-- airworthy until the cause of the BIM check failure is positively identified and the problem has been corrected. If the problem cannot be identified, the aircraft shall not be flown until the blade is replaced. The identification and mode of separation of the blade are pending. Information courtesy William T. Larkins.

Regards
Aser

[Cyclic Hotline]

Until you have some information from a verifiable source, it is hard to really react to the possibility of a Main Rotor Blade failure. The following in no way concludes that there is any evidence of this being the reason for this accident, just some pertinent information on the system itself.

The Sikorsky Blade Indication Method (BIM) sytem is an excellent method for providing a self contained indicating system for the structural integrity of the blade. It exists in a variety of configurations, all of which rely on a visual indicator, and in some instances a remote real time in-flight indicating system. The basic idea is to monitor the pressure within the sealed spar, with a relatively large volume, low pressure nitrogen charge, of around 10 psi.

The visual indicator will change colour if the blade pressure drops below a prescribed level. The visual indicator can be tested by purging the pressure, to verify correct operation, as required on a preflight and at defined, mandatory, (AD) flight times. The problem with the visual indicators, is they only can be checked with the rotor system stationary.

On a number of Sikorsky products, an additional remote system can be utilised, which allows real time monitoring and indicating. A radioactive system is used on the military models (and some S-64's), while the commercial S61 utilises an system with an electrical pressure switch on the blades and a cockpit indication (CBIM).

The system is very good. It has been prone to some occassional unreliability from pressure leaks in blades, and water in electrical systems, but it's success rate in detecting potential impending failure, versus the occurence of actual blade failure, this system provides a massive safety benefit.

Over the years it has been demonstrated that the system only has any value if you regularly inspect, test and observe the limitations that are in place for a verified positive BIM indication. The actions and inspection requirements for the system are detailed in the Maintnenance Manual, Flight Manual and are mandated by FAA Airworthiness Directives, specific to the model of blade in use, and the specific type of operation being conducted. Follow the explicit instructions, and the BIM system will provide a superb, and perhaps unequalled method of automatically determining real time blade integrity.

In the instance of the CH-54A accident referenced above, the Operator completely failed to follow the instructions in the Maintenance Manual, Flight Manual OR the AD which mandates the actions required in the event of a BIM indication. During the course of the CH-54A investigation, the crack was determined to have been initiated by someone stop-drilling a crack in a pocket, without observing the dimensional warnings in the manual, and drilling into the spar itself. This exact same thing had occurred on commercial S61 blades in the past, but if they had removed it from service when they had detected the crack they wouldn't have flown the additional 7.6+ hours, which allowed the blade to fail, killing all the crew members and destroying the aircraft!

The S61 metal main rotor blades were granted an FAA approved life limit increase a number of years ago, from 9,400 to 11,600 hours. I don't know if this is the life limit increase referenced in one of the posts. There are additionally a number of FAA STC'd life limit increases to metal blades, including one to 23,200 hours, although I would thinlk it extremely unlikely that they were applied to this aircraft/operator.

Sikorsky has experienced tremendous, continuing problems with metal blade production for the S61. Sikorsky are about to announce the adoption of the Carson blades for the commercial operators, at which time it is unlikely many metal blade operators will remain, as production will cease at that time.

I do hope the cause of this accident is determined, and my condolences to the families and colleagues of those lost in this tragic accident.

[Cyclic Hotline]

For an S61 to break in half at the strongest part of the structure, is extremely unusual. Hopefully by retrieving these parts, some indication of the chain of events will become apparent.

Six killed in Canaries helicopter crash
By m.p.
Sun, 09 Jul 2006, 20:57

http://www.typicallyspanish.com/news/uploads/canaries_helicopter_crash.jpg
Part of the fuselage of the helicopter which crashed off the Canary Islands on Saturday. Photo - EFE.

A helicopter has crashed into the sea off the Canary Islands, killing all six of the crew on board.

Five of the victims have been recovered, but the sixth, the co-pilot, is still missing. It is believed his body may be in the frontal section of the aircraft, which has been located two and a half miles off shore, some 700 metres below the surface.

The crash was reported by a fisherman on Saturday morning, who saw the helicopter in the sea, four kilometres off the northeastern coast of Anaga.

The aircraft had been contracted by the Environment Ministry for the transport of fire fighting personnel.

It had left La Palma for Gran Canaria at 8.10 that morning, where it was due to undergo a technical inspection.

Contact was lost when it was flying over the Anaga mountain range in Tenerife.

© typicallyspanish.com

[212man]

Very sad, I've been through Gran Canaria several times and it was always a welcome sight, at the end of a long day, to see those cheery Helicsa guys come over and talk the usual pilot s**t about what we were doing etc. :)

That's the second a/c in 5 years isn't it? (B412 a couple of years ago?):(

[talvin]

Before S61 crash was a Helicsa HEMS AS365N in Canary Island too.
5 fatalities. Wire strike during takeoff.

Bell 412 was a Helisureste aircraft in Seville.

[Clavileño]

The other one was a AS365N (EC-GJE)
It crashed after a wire impact.
Condolences to the families and deep respect for our companions
I wish you good flies wherever you are.

[Ned-Air2Air]

Aser - Sorry to hear about the 61. Was talking to Emilio at Helicsa this morning and was sad to get the news. :( :(

Helisureste/Helicsa - Its all one big family and the loss will be felt by them all.

Ned