Aussie Defence Procurement Shines Again

[victor two]

News in the Australian papers today that the ADF contract for the Aussie Tiger Helicopter is in a shambles. Despite the initial contract to purchase an "off the shelf" product, the reports say the project is in disarray and that the tiger helicopter does not meet it's contracted weapons or load carrying capability and is restricted to over-land operations due to engine reliablilty concerns. So far $825 million dollars has been spent on the project and the supplier, Australian Aerospace, is asking for an extra $625 million dollars to correct the faults. This request was rejected as "unjustified" and beyond the terms of the original contract. The first 2 machines were delivered in 2004 but have been plagued with a variety of capability and reliablilty issues. It is predicted that long delivery delays are likely while a new contract is negotiated and that the Army will be waiting an extra couple years to take full delivery of their machines.

At least the ADF is reliable in it's ability be shafted by it's contractors, roll on Joint Strike Fighter.....

[L J R]

A unique Aussie Defence procurement problem?, or are all Defence Forces this bad. I think the latter. Where do they breed the Defence procurement people, they need neutering!

[VH-GRUMPY]

I remember years ago the Australian Army got a real bollocking from the Commonwealth Auditor when they bought a whole lot of new trucks and separately a whole lot of trailers only to discover that the tow-bars would not fit the trailers.

The truck buyers had not exxchanged information with the traile buyers.

It cost hundreds of $,000 to rectify the problem.

:p

[GengisKhant]

Below are the overall conclusions of the ANAO’s audit of the Australian Army’s Tiger attack helicopter program 15. Defence had intended that the ARH aircraft was to have been an ‘off-the-shelf’ delivery of proven, operational technology, lowering the risk of schedule, cost and performance shortfalls. The ARH acquisition transitioned to become a more developmental program for the ADF, which has resulted in heightened exposure to schedule, cost and capability risks, both for acquisition of the capability, and delivery of through-life support services. The lack of operational experience in maintaining this capability in other Defence Forces has meant that original cost estimates associated with the through-life support were immature, and exposed Defence to significant future budgetary risks. 16. As at October 2005, the DMO had expended $855.45 million on the Project, representing: payment for four aircraft out of the 22 aircraft to be delivered; design work; and a proportion of: external stores; facilities; training deliverables; and the required support equipment. Of this expenditure, $731 million has been expended on the Acquisition Contract in accordance with the Acquisition Contract’s Milestone Payment and Earned Value Management System, representing expenditure in the order of 60 per cent of the total value of the Acquisition Contract. 17. The ADF has not had an effective Tiger ARH capability and has had a limited ability to train aircrews, 12 months after accepting the first two production aircraft (ARH 1 and 2) in December 2004. At the time of acceptance of ARH 5 in June 2005, the aircraft was not fit for purpose against all the Contracted requirements (as was also the case with ARH 1 and 2). In June 2005, the DMO made milestone payments of $9.1 million for ARH 5, and $20.7 million in Earned Value payments. The ANAO was advised that the full milestone payments totalling $11.45 million were made for delivery of ARH 4 in September 2005. The DMO accepted the first three aircraft in a state that did not meet contractual specifications. However, the DMO did not withhold part payment from the corresponding milestone payments for production acceptance, even though the Acquisition Contract allows for this arrangement. The DMO did withhold 50 per cent of payments associated with the award of the Type Certification at the time delivery of ARH 1 was achieved for overall system deficiencies, but did not withhold milestone payment for the aspects associated with contractual deficiencies with the performance of the aircraft itself. The DMO advised that the design process is considered to be the area of highest risk. The Contractor is unable to claim for earned value packages associated with delivery of the aircraft that have not been completed. This included ferry tanks, and roof mounted sights. The DMO withheld 5 per cent ($2.3 million) of the Earned Value payments associated with delivery of ARH 1 and 2. The withheld amount associated with the Type Certification was paid in full on award of the Australian Military Type Certificate (with limitations) in October 2005, even though some of the design issues remain unresolved. 18. The DMO advised the ANAO that, at the time of Contract signature on 21 December 2001, it was accepted that the ARH delivered at In-Service Date (15 December 2004), and a number of subsequent ARH, would not meet the fully contracted specification. In February 2006, the DMO also advised the ANAO that negotiations commenced with the Contractor in 2002, which resulted in the DMO agreeing to a lesser capability at the In-Service and acceptance dates of the first three aircraft than that specified in the December 2001 Contract. The Acquisition Contract (Attachment C, Part 1) provided for the Project Authority to determine the configuration of the ARH required to meet the In-Service Date milestone. The DMO advise that all helicopters delivered in such a configuration are to be retrofitted at the Contractor’s expense to meet the final configuration required by the Acquisition Contract. The ANAO observed that the negotiation for a fundamental change to the Acquisition Contract to cater for the resulting remediation plan that impacted on available operational capability, was not formalised through agreed Contract Change Proposals. 19. The first three aircraft accepted by the DMO carried configuration deficiencies that did not meet contractual specifications. These included capabilities associated with: maximum all-up weight; weapons operability; navigation system operability for instrument rated flight conditions; software integration; an emergency locator beacon; a compliant voice flight data recorder operable in high ‘G’ environments; proven crash resistance; an ability to undertake protracted flight over water (for the first two aircraft); an operable ground management system to task and communicate with the aircraft; and the required spares and support and test equipment. 20. The DMO agreed that specific contractual capabilities were not required at the respective In-Service and acceptance dates of December 2004, and June 2005. The DMO advised that deeper level maintenance and the retrofit activity to ameliorate deficiencies with ARH 1, started in February 2006, and is to be completed in November 2006. 21. The ANAO noted that, at the time the Project Director accepted ARH 5 one month ahead of schedule, the subordinate Operational Airworthiness Authority delegation had expired five months earlier, in December 2004. There was no valid Operational Airworthiness Authority delegation that allowed the DMO’s Project Director to accept ARH 5. Defence advised the ANAO in February 2006 that the intention had always been to ensure that this authority was valid throughout the period for which it had lapsed, to allow the Project Authority to undertake acceptance activities.

GengisK :ok:

[SASless]

Christ on a Crutch fellas!

A mere drop in the bucket compared to the on-going silliness with the USMC and the Osprey deal. They had to special buy Jeeps to pull Mortar trailers....seems no ( as in none, nada, zip, zero ) current in service vehicles fit in the ass end of the Osprey (commerical bought ATV's excluded).

Your lot are just amateurs when it comes to wasting Taxpayers money.....we have true Professionals!


http://www.sftt.org/main.cfm?actionId=globalShowStaticContent&screenKey=cmpDefense&htmlCategoryId=30&htmlId=4933

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[Maple 01]

I remember a simular tractor unit/trailer unit interface cock-up with the 'mobile' radars back in the mid 1980s - the cabs spent years sitting in MT, so nothing new under the sun

[MarkD]

Which is worse - the UK/Canada where the politicians won't let anything be bought or the Aussies who buy everything in sight (C17s, 330Ks) but have the odd spec hiccup :}

[gonesurfin]

Not really true....the Canadians have a multitude of different uniforms bought for them. ;)

[GengisKhant]

Canadians appear very short on defence spending if the following item below is anything to go on......!!!

The Department of National Defence has announced that repairs to Her Majestys Canadian Ship (HMCS) Chicoutimi, damaged by fire in 2004, will be deferred until 2010 when a two-year refit on the submarine is conducted. This decision means that repairs caused by the 2004 fire incident will be conducted at the same time as the two-year refit process known as the Extended Dock Work Period, which is scheduled for 2010. If the repair process had begun immediately, HMCS Chicoutimi would have been back in service for less than two years before going back for the scheduled refit in 2010. The decision has the potential to save the department millions of dollars through a more effective allocation of resources. The Victoria-class fleets operational capability will not be negatively impacted because of the deferral. Deferring these repairs will allow the Navy to focus its resources on other vessels and the surface fleet. This decision is the most cost effective method to address other competing priorities on current naval resources. "This will improve our ability to get Victoria and Corner Brook back into service and better position the Navy to have two boats fully operational in 2009," said Vice-Admiral Drew Robertson, Chief of the Maritime Staff. HMCS Chicoutimi is currently located at Halifax Shipyards Ltd. and will be placed in an extended limited maintenance period until the Extended Dock Work Period begins in 2010. With the application of skills, knowledge, and efficiencies gained from work on other Victoria-class submarines HMCS Chicoutimi is expected to rejoin the fleet in 2012.

GengisK :ok:

[SirToppamHat]

GK

damaged by fire in 2004, will be deferred until 2010 when a two-year refit on the submarine is conducted ... operational capability will not be negatively impacted because of the deferral..
I am pretty sure our bean counters would interpret this as a demonstration that there was no requirement for the Chicoutimi!

STH

[MarkD]

ah yes, the Upholders the RN generously sold the Canadian Forces. Quite the used sub salesmen you have there.

[Captain Sand Dune]

I'll see your ARH and raise you a Seasprite!!:ugh:

[reacher]

The super dooper $1 Billion VFR only Sea Sprite

[victor two]

Whats the bet that the ADF will end up finding some far flung excuse to buy a bunch of those little mortar tugging jeeps in a few years................

We will, of course, insist they are "new" and specify a suite of high-tech modifications to suit "australian conditions" the current owner, will tow them out of the desert, spray some brown paint on the doors to break up the all green colour sheme, hook 'em up to a battery cart and pour some fuel straight into the carby to fire them up, pump up the tyres and sell them off for $1.25 million dollars each. The defence minister will take delivery of the first one in a massive media conference by donning a fire proof suit and driving one through a wall of carboard boxes to prove their ruggedness.....

[Like This - Do That]

We will, of course, insist they are "new" and specify a suite of high-tech modifications to suit "australian conditions" the current owner, will tow them out of the desert, spray some brown paint on the doors to break up the all green colour sheme, hook 'em up to a battery cart and pour some fuel straight into the carby to fire them up, pump up the tyres and sell them off for $1.25 million dollars each. The defence minister will take delivery of the first one in a massive media conference by donning a fire proof suit and driving one through a wall of carboard boxes to prove their ruggedness.....

Some Repco bull bars and a tray for an AN/PRC-77 set ..... HARDENED AND NETWORKED!!!!!

[American Tiger]

This is just the icing on the cake. dare to dig??:hmm:

[VH-GRUMPY]

We have now been advised that an Australian National Audit Office report indicates that $1 billion worth of munitions are 'not serviceable'. I take it means that the bombs won't go bang and the bullets will mis-fire.

Will someone please help the ADF to get its purchasing right - see the other thread for the failure of the Seasprite procurement program - another $1 billion - that's $2 billion in one week.

When do people get sacked?
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