Report: '50% of RN helo assets unfit for purpose'

[Ian Corrigible]

...according to Scottish rag The Herald (http://www.theherald.co.uk/news/61099.html). In this case, 'unfit for purpose' is interpreted as not being "available, reliable, airworthy, and capable of carrying out their missions on given dates" rather than "40 years old," "underpowered," "lacking AShM capability," or "oh God, why do they keep throwing money at Westlands when all we really want is a batch of [insert dream platform of choice here]"

(Only kidding Wizzard mates) :E


Half of navy’s helicopters grounded by cash shortage

Half the Royal Navy's helicopters are out of action because of lack of money for spares and maintenance, according to figures obtained by The Herald.

In addition, ground attack jet squadrons' Harriers and Jaguars were cannibalised for spare parts to keep others flying on 930 occasions in 2005.

Of 122 Sea King, Merlin, and Lynx helicopters in the RN's order of battle, 61 were "unfit for purpose" last week.

The MoD said aircraft were judged to be "in service" only when they were "available, reliable, airworthy, and capable of carrying out their missions on given dates".

A spokesman said that the numbers "fit for service" could vary widely, depending on operational requirements. In an emergency, more would be made operational.

On the Harrier GR7 and Jaguar jets, he added: "The removal of spare parts from one aircraft for use on another is a short-term, temporary measure to ensure that the maximum number of aircraft are available to the front line."

The figures, revealed in written parliamentary answers, come a year after the Commons public accounts committee warned that the gap between the number of helicopters needed and those available was 20% to 38%.

The MPs said the shortages, though "alarming" had not affected front line capability, but were having an impact on training pilots and crews.

The helicopter shortfall has been worsened by the £259m purchase of eight Chinook Mark 3 heavy-lift aircraft which cannot be sent to Iraq or Afghanistan because of computer problems.

The total helicopter fleet operated by the three armed services amounts to 357 battlefield aircraft. One hundred or more are out of commission at any time, with 79 declared irreparable last year.

An RAF source said more frequent use of helicopters to avoid the risk of roadside booby-traps was exacerbating maintenance problems.

I/C

[FJJP]

Good old 'just in time logistics'. When forced upon us by the engineers who, of course, know better than us mere aircrew mortals, they were told you can't run a fighting service the same way that you can run a civilian production line, where everything is calendar planned to the day.

The engineers declared that they were the trained experts and held sway with the hierarchy at MOD, who, driven by the accountants who proved conclusively that massive savings were to be had by not storing spares and maintaining maintenance units like Carlisle and Stafford, sold off vast quantities of stored materiel and closed both units. Tea and medals all round.

Guess what? It doesn't work. 'Quad erat demonstrandum' as the Herald article indicates [along with dozens of others over the years].

Eg, calling up a 32 Sqn HS125 to fly from Northolt to a North Scottish base to collect and deliver to an East Anglia base a 50 amp fuse that would enable an aircraft to get airborne on an op sortie. Good use of assets and the system - must rate as the most expensive fuse in the history of engineering... [We don't hold it in stock because you don't use them at the rate set to allow stock to be held on the shelf!].

Doh!

[engineer(retard)]

FJJP

From my time in DLO, 20% finance cuts were enforced year on year by the beancounters. Not having enough money to meet the need was irrelevant. Also on many programmes, if money was short the spares budget was cut not the platform procurement, this was usually a DEC decision.

regards

retard

[tucumseh]

FJJP

Agree with Eng(R).


"Just in Time" was a bean counter (financier and RAF supply manager) initiative. Engineers / Requirement Managers / ILS Managers / Aircrew told them it was a crock of s*** and predicted exactly what would happen, and when. It happened, just on the predicted time.

After implementation, we managed to get a look at the "justification". Just like "lean" and other lunatic ideas, it was almost entirely based on an industry model, where they knew exactly what they would need, and when, for years in advance. So much for facilitating flexible operations.

Also, if you studied the model, it reduced spares holdings from 18 months to 6 months max. The implementation plan completely ignored the fact that this would give procurers (not the same as supply managers) a few months to compete (mandatory in most cases), agree, let and deliver a contract. Most of this time is taken up by mandated commercial activities, like (x) days notice in the contracts bulletin, (x) days for the PQQ, (x) days for the ITT response. By which time you have AOGs. Also, if you think about it, this meant a full years spares funding could not be spent, so it was lost ("saved").

You should also realise that the baseline / benchmark here was an extant policy (in DLO, inherited from RAF Harrogate, who had moved to Wyton) that only permitted a requisition to be raised (to initiate procurement or repair) when an outstanding demand was received. So, you were ALREADY without spares for the production / repair lead time. That is, a policy which already prevented spares from being available on time, was made worse by "Just in Time".

And, to cap it all, the very same people at RAF Harrogate had decreed some years earlier that RN "War Reserves" should be held unserviceable. Which meant, among other things, you couldn't store a ship on time. I've lost count. A quadruple whammy??

[Safeware]

Eng,

I remember one engineer who made his name on cutting back spares. Went on to be Chief Engineer! Back in the mid 90s, he decreed that the reserves of RB199 should be reduced (to 6 weeks I think). All and sundry that knew, said that any significant technical problem would result in AOGs. Never mind, on we go. Then came the crisis, and we ended up robbing engines if a jet was going to be u/s for more than 8 hours. I felt for the Sooties, they became so slick at changing engines, often doing 2 a shift (for a few nights on the trot).

Still, a good way to make your name :(

sw

[Talk Wrench]

Good old 'just in time logistics'. When forced upon us by the engineers who, of course, know better than us mere aircrew mortals,

FJJP,
Fully understand your gripe, but please assure everyone that you mean the "engineers" who "plan", as in the desky types who work alongside the bean counters and not the real engineers on the ground who suffer from the same frustrations as yours. :ugh:
Many regards
Talk Wrench

[tucumseh]

FJJP & Safeware

I apologise. On reflection, I fully accept you may have known engineers who made, or were party to, decisions to cut back on spares. I can offer an explanation for this.

Not only were maximum stock levels reduced (see above) but when this new parameter was entered into the supply computer there would appear a notional “surplus” – typically 12 months. In many cases, Beancounters issued instructions to SCRAP these perfectly serviceable, long shelf life spares. In some cases, a project manager in PE would be faced with issuing disposal instructions for tens of millions of pounds worth of spares on his projects in a single day. (There were 36 of us in my section alone, and we were inundated with such instructions).

However, due lack of co-ordination in the supply world, having issued disposal instructions their system immediately raised automatic demands to REPLACE these spares. That is, it committed funds to procure duplicates of spares that were about to be scrapped. (Imagine what industry thought. On the same day, a letter from PE telling them to scrap a given list of spares; and another from suppliers, enclosing the same list, asking for a quote to replace them. They thought we were quite mad). Those who know the system will realise that this funding for duplicates was not for these spares, but for other equipment. A double whammy. This happened to me on a daily basis at the time. I refused to scrap the spares or buy the duplicates.

The immediate beancounter response was to quarantine the spares we refused to scrap, which meant they were not available to the 4th line repairers. I remember Hercs in particular suffered, forcing Lyneham to attempt equipment repairs which they had no means of verifying – a serious safety issue.

Given these refusals, the RAF beancounters sent in the big guns (an AVM) to chastise PE engineers who complained about this and other wasteful policies. I cannot speak for anyone else, but I was threatened with the sack if I complained again. (At a formal hearing, in front of 7 witnesses, including all of my line management up to the AVM. 5 civvies supported me. 2 Air Commodores stood with the AVM). I was instructed to waste aforesaid money. I refused and took my chances. Others, who saw what was happening to a few of us, had a decision to make. Waste the money, or have their career blighted. They chose the former. They are now today’s policy makers.

The policies I mention are common knowledge, but I’ve filled in a little personal detail. The reason I survived was, to protect me, my boss recommended an internal audit, which supported my position. This went direct to SofS as it highlighted gross waste of money and made a number of recommendations which would prevent it happening again. (They largely reiterated mandated policy anyway). Significantly, PE refused to implement these recommendations and, to this day, DPA will always rule against anyone who fights the white. Later, under FOI, I obtained confirmation that I was wrong all along – to instruct staff to knowingly waste money is not an offence, but to refuse is. Forgive me if I don’t agree. I don’t apologise for that.

[WhiteOvies]

Going back to the original thread: Anyone know of an aircraft fleet, past or present, that didn't rob (cannibalise:hmm:) to keep aircraft flying? Never the first option but one that occurs daily in my experience.

Some of us are still struggling to dig ourselves out of a hole caused by a crass (but career enhancing) decision taken a few years back to 'save' money through reducing spares and engine numbers. Even a well known company in Bristol are aware of and talk about this effect. :mad:

[Occasional Aviator]

Tucumseh,

having worked for 4 years in a job where I dealt daily with the DPA and DLO on aircraft support, I kn ow you speak the truth about the effects of recent and not-so-recent policies.

I am a little concerned though, that you are projecting a rather undeserved anti-RAF image. When you say "RAF Harrogate decided..", are you referring to MOD Harrogate, which was, IIRC, staffed mainly by civil servants, as DLO Yeovilton and Wyton are today? Also, when you say "the RAF beancounters sent in their big guns", are you referring to MOD RP(Air), which was similarly an MOD-level establishment run by MOD civil servants? I can't see the RAF being able to tell off MOD(PE)!

Actually, having worked in an MOD post, my opinion of the MOD civil servants is that they are generally well-meaning people trying to do a difficult job under often unreasonable direction from the Treasury and without enough input from the forces.

If I could change things, I would go for more autonomy for the MOD with more influence from the forces themselves. IMHO, inter-nicene fighting does us no good and has played a large part in the loss of uniformed posts and service influence in the MOD. Let's stick together on this stuff.

[Safeware]

Tuc,

I wasn't trying to make excuses, just trying to highlight that there are engineers (let's just call them policy makers) who have made bad judgements about such issues and JIT in the case I talked about (and Whiteovies it would seem) was one where someone made his name, in more than one way.

sw