Lions, Donkeys and Dinosaurs by Lewis Page [Archive]

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Norman Nimrod

24th Apr 2006, 01:47

Has anyone else read this book about the wasteful Defence Procurement Process ??

According to Lewis Page (an ex Royal Navy Officer) :

The Nimrod AEW3 came about because we had "several Nimrods in mint condition sitting around doing nothing", werent the airframes selected the newest and lowest houred MR2's at the time?? I remember airframe 84 at Kinloss and the closest to that being 60 which would indicate this was the case. I am sure two prototypes had the serials 85 and 86.

He claims the F3 cant climb above 30,000ft feet and says this is because while on a AAR VC10 jolly in the Gulf the crew told him so !! Apparently the crew had to descend to refuel the F3's as the Tanker Crew told him an F3 would be burning fuel at that height at the same rate as they were receiving it. Surely a crew wind up or a circumstance of Hot and High ?? (Not looking for details .. Opsec and all that)

He mentions Eurofighter and he does have a point there but claims that Israel bought F15's at 3 million pounds a jet !!

He also claims that the UK could have bought J-STARS but are the Americans selling this technology ??

And for someone apparently researching Defence Procurement blunders surely it is a crime to mention the F4 Phantom but not the debacle of the redesign to take the Spey ??

He also claims the RAF employs "swarms of meteorologists" .. WTF ??

Anyone read it and thought the same ??

Not Long Here

24th Apr 2006, 03:55

"The Nimrod AEW3 came about because we had "several Nimrods in mint condition sitting around doing nothing", werent the airframes selected the newest and lowest houred MR2's at the time?? I remember airframe 84 at Kinloss and the closest to that being 60 which would indicate this was the case. I am sure two prototypes had the serials 85 and 86."

Norman,

I am pretty sure that XZ 280-286 came back to the UK when 203 Sqn disbanded. I certainly have hours in 80,81, 82,84 and 85. Need to check my log book for 83 and 86. 60 wasn't the closest to 80 though. 261, 262 and 263 have been at Kinloss in living memory. I also seem to recall that there were over 30 Nimrods produced. I think they are all listed in the Jim Hughes history of Kinloss which should be available to you.

Norman Nimrod

24th Apr 2006, 04:29

Was that Jim Hughes from Eng Co-0rd ??

Worked ops 95 - 98 and remember the engineers board going from 26 to 60 and then 84. Missing Frames from 26 to 60 were 34,38,39,42,47,49,53,56,57, and 59 for various reasons. Remember the Aircrew talking about all the frames lost for AEW3. And I am sure that by the old sports hangar on the south taxiway near 26 threshold there is a AEW3 rear fuselage section.

Just read that in the book and thought it was a criminal lack of research to come out with the obviously wrong fact that the AEW3 frames were spare.

FormerFlake

24th Apr 2006, 06:20

I believe there were 8 unused frames in storage somewhere that made the bulk of the 11.

http://www.spyflight.co.uk/Nim%20aew.htm

I dont think he is to far away with his F3 comments. There will of course be variables.

F15 may be cheap to buy, but are expensive to run and do break a lot.

Jackonicko

24th Apr 2006, 07:13

I bought this risible piece of utter rubbish on Saturday.

A cursory flick through the light blue sections revealed a strong anti-RAF prejudice (I'll bet you a pound to a penny that he was binned off his UAS, or didn't get a third year VR) with the kind of 'in depth' analysis that you'd expect from the usual non-specialist, under-informed, Euro-sceptic 'defence analysts' that too many of the broadsheets turn to.

He repeats all the tired old lies, exaggerations, misinterpretations and misunderstandings - suicidal low level Tornado missions in Granby, the Cold War Typhoon, the high cost of Storm Shadow etc. I was astonished that anyone with a UAS background should have swallowed all that (from Hastings, Keegan et al) quite so uncritically, and to have spewed it all with quite such cheerful and unembarrassed abandon.

I had been looking forward to reading it, but I've put it aside for when my anger is less likely to be roused by such piss-poor ignorant tosh.

It is nicely written, though.

tablet_eraser

24th Apr 2006, 08:39

I read the review on this tawdry little piece of rubbish in The Times last year. What utter, utter bilge. As I understand it, this guy has done very little research beyond the raw figures, and fails to offer any sustained, intelligent and well-balanced arguments in support of his opinions. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I believe he also advocates disbanding the RAF and splitting its assets between the Army (who don't know how to manage it) and the RN (who don't need it).

Do not read this book. It is clearly a piece of unneccessary tripe.

JTIDS

24th Apr 2006, 09:50

I particularly liked the bit where he states that only the worst pilots in the RAF get sent rotary, and that even though rotary pilots know fast jet and multi engine mates are better than them, rotary pilots in the RAF are still professional

:bored: :bored: :bored:

Tombstone

24th Apr 2006, 10:55

I wouldn't like to refuel the Tonka at 30k in any circumstances!

The SAR pilots are up there with the big boys IMHO, top job & certainly not a lower calibre of pilots compared to FJ mates, excluding the Harrier of course!;)

Are all of this Ex RN Officer's comments on the subject of Air Power and if so, how does he qualify his comments?

Sounds like a T***er who didn't make the grade...

StuartP

24th Apr 2006, 11:08

It's a bit like the Da Vinci Code. Utter cobblers (so I'm told) but an entertaining read. Mind you, if his comments about BAe are even half true....

Stuart.

(Edited for Rafloo to reflect that my Presbyterian (sp?) upbringing may have left me with a less than objective view on that, and to hopefully stay on topic)

rafloo

24th Apr 2006, 11:35

The Da Vinci code isn't cobblers. Its true

South Bound

24th Apr 2006, 12:35

Certainly more considered and researched than Lions....

Norman Nimrod

24th Apr 2006, 17:40

I continued reading for a while but his whole attitude towards the Air Force seems to be negative, finally gave up this morning. Whoever researched the Air Power segment of this book should be fired. I find his facts and figures highly specualtive and found that although the book is well written what I know to be false about the Air Force side coloured what he had to say about the other services.

And I did note that his comments on the UAS system comclude that it is an organisation where "they teach you to fly for nothing in return", maybe someone should tell him where a lot our fast jet guys started flying !!

4/10 .. must try harder.

c130jbloke

24th Apr 2006, 18:15

Lions, Donkeys and Dinosaurs by Lewis Page.

Had a read, utter crap.

Went well in the fire though.

:eek:

Archimedes

24th Apr 2006, 19:30

Whoever researched the Air Power segment of this book should be fired.

You mean the Air Power section was researched?:eek:

UberPilot

24th Apr 2006, 20:26

Good Times article on said publication...

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-1965526,00.html

...especially good is the story on the SA80 procurement!

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-1965526_2,00.html

Norman Nimrod

24th Apr 2006, 20:31

You mean the Air Power section was researched?:eek:

Well I assumed it was but then assume can have a different meaning cant it ??

Tourist

24th Apr 2006, 21:01

Thought the book was very thought provoking actually, though I admit I disagreed on some points.
It isn't in any way anti RAF incidentally, he spreads his ire equally across the services.

LCRAYMYX

24th Apr 2006, 22:53

"He also claims the RAF employs "swarms of meteorologists" .. WTF ??"

delurking after a long time reading this forum.
if lewis page is having a dig at the RAF surely this quote back fires on him
The navy employes their own meteorologists, even though they do other jobs on board, such as oceanography. The air force rent them.:=

brickhistory

24th Apr 2006, 23:49

He also claims that the UK could have bought J-STARS but are the Americans selling this technology ??

Haven't read the book and the subjects are not for me to comment on, but I do know a bit about this. The ISTARs program you are getting is a distinct step up from our system. The cumbersome E-8 is NOT the way to go. The radar and avionics are the cat's a** (as will ISTARs), but one does NOT need the large crew that we put on the jet which is also a piece of sh1t (used airliners with anemic JT8D engines). A couple of techs for the systems on a new biz jet and data link the rest.

Sorry for any thread creep.

FormerFlake

25th Apr 2006, 06:23

Michael Edic

25th Apr 2006, 09:00

Tourist

25th Apr 2006, 09:06

Just to re-cap.

Norman Nimrod read the book and was surprised by/disagreed with some of its assertions.

Not long now does not appear to have read the book, but helped out with some Nimrod facts.

Former flake again does not appear to have read the book, but doesn't disagree with at least one of the assertions.

Jacko bought "this risible piece of utter rubbish" and has cursorily flicked through one section. Fortunately his journalistic impartiallity has made sure he has in no way prejudged the book. This thoroughness twinned with his vast experience of all branches of the military (well he once got to touch the controls of a Bulldog) means that his professional opinion is a very valid input.

Tablet eraser knuckled down and read a whole review about "this tawdry piece of rubbish" before deciding it was "utter, utter bilge"
He also sagely points out that "As I understand it, this guy has done very little research beyond the raw figures, and fails to offer any sustained, intelligent and well-balanced arguments in support of his opinions" It is fortunate for us that Tablet eraser has carried out so much research and offers so many inteligent and well balanced arguments in support of the Times reviewers opinions which he has thoughtfully parroted for us. Just because he has not read the book does not, of course, invalidate his opinion that no others should read it either.

JTIDS disagreed with the comments about RAF helo people, and appears to have read the book.

Tombstone agrees about the Tornado, hasn't read the book, but suspects that the bloke is a To$$er on principle since he is RN (we love you too)

StuartP thinks its cobblers but finds the anti BAE arguments strangely believable.

I could go on, but I think I have made my point.
Those who have actually read the book, including myself, do not necessarily agree with everything in it, but that does not mean there is not some truth in there also. Read it and decide.
For gods sake don't just believe other people's second/third hand opinions. The Times reviewer may be like Jacko and not have had the basic professionalism to actually read it before spouting an ill judged opinion from a position of no military background!
This reminds me of the satanic verses. None of the muslim world actually read it before demanding it's author be Fatwa'd.

Jackonicko

25th Apr 2006, 11:32

Tourist,

You make a superficially good point, in criticising some of us for not having “the basic professionalism to actually read (this book) before spouting an ill judged opinion from a position of no military background!”

I would say, however, that when one finds so many stark and glaring inaccuracies, flawed arguments, and familiar lies and misunderstandings even on cursory examination of two sections of the book, one is entitled to make a preliminary judgement.

Since you choose to personalise this by commenting on my 'vast experience of all branches of the military (well he once got to touch the controls of a Bulldog)' I'd point out that I make no claims of credibility based on my admittedly limited Bulldog time, but on the basis of having been professionally observing and reporting on defence and aerospace since 1984. While everyone on these boards will have much greater knowledge about their own aircraft type, role and community than I will ever have, few will have been exposed to so many types, roles and communities, nor will they have been lucky enough to have had the access I've had, nor over such an extended period.

I do feel qualified to judge Page's assertions about Tornado, for example, having a number of good friends who've flown the jet in action, and having interviewed a dozen more Tornado aircrew who weren't already friends who flew the type during Granby (including all the Det Commanders), and more who flew it in Desert Fox and yet more who flew it in Telic, and having spoken to numerous people within the IPT, BAE, MBDA, etc. One wouldn't need to do anything like that much preparation to demolish Page's claims, however, as a simple examination of the loss rate, and of the causes of each of the losses, would immediately lead any impartial observer to question his conclusions.

I note with interest that while condemning others who have the decency to state the limitations of their own credentials, you skulk behind the anonymity of the phrase 'Wafu loafer'. How are we to assess the scope and extent of your own “vast experience of all branches of the military”, Admiral?

I would absolutely stand by my judgement that Page reveals a strong anti-RAF prejudice (I'll still bet you a pound to a penny that he was binned off his UAS, or didn't get a third year VR) and that he is parroting exactly the kind of ill-informed, highly partial analysis that you'd expect from the a non-specialist, Euro-sceptic 'defence analyst.' While stressing his experience of all three services, I'd say that Page writes like a complete outsider, just like Max Hastings, Piers Morgan or Andrew Gilligan

I was amused that you seemed to be criticising some people for forming a view based on the Sunday Times piece, which you yourself obviously didn't read, as it's pretty gushing and enthusiastic about this ridiculous book!

I say again, when even a cursory examination of a book reveals a succession of flawed and superficial analyses, clichéd and inaccurate accusations, and a fundamental lack of understanding and knowledge, it's entirely fair to make a preliminary judgement. And when it comes to things 'light blue', Page's book is entirely risible.

Bluntend

25th Apr 2006, 12:31

The book, amongst other things, criticises Senior Officers and Civil Servants within the DLO and DPA for not paying any concern to the views or opinions of their immediate subordinates and Junior Officers. When this point was raised with the DCDL (in open forum) his response was:
I was aware of the book but, not having read it, not of the colourful quotes about the DLO…I am also confident that the dismissive views of the then Junior Naval Officer who wrote the book are not shared by those officers in the armed forces who are responsible for delivering operations around the world. And for evidence of that, consult the articles written by the former Vice Chief in the June 05 DLO News and former Commander in Chief Fleet in the November 05 DLO News.
The DCDL effectively points out that he regards the VC’s and C-in-C Fleet’s views and opinions to be more accurate and far more valid and those of a Junior Officer. By saying this though, is he not proving at least one of Mr Page’s criticisms to be accurate? Although I am not defending the claims made in the book, I do feel that the DCDL's dismissive 'well, what would he know, he's just a Junior Officer' opinion does little counter Mr Page’s arguments.

StuartP

25th Apr 2006, 12:42

StuartP thinks its cobblers but finds the anti BAE arguments strangely believable..

Those who have actually read the book, including myself, do not necessarily agree with everything in it, but that does not mean there is not some truth in there also. Read it and decide...

I've read it. Ok, I'll concede it's only mostly cobblers.

Stuart.

Tourist

25th Apr 2006, 13:00

Stuartp.
Fair enough, at least you read it before criticising it. I don't agree with all of it myself by any means.

Jacko, touche on reading the Times article.:O
I am not an admiral but anonymity unfortunately is fairly important on this forum as you are no doubt well aware, and my credentials would be a bit of a give away.

FormerFlake

25th Apr 2006, 15:38

Not if they didn't get attracted towards the RAF in the first place because they didn't realise the opportunities that existed or what a good career the RAF offered before their time with the "flying club"
The fact that you have called it a "flying club" shows what derisable outdated diatribe you are spouting. Under the new system more emphasis is placed on personal development and leadership training than anything else.

Touched a raw nerve did he?

Having friends who are ex UAS as well as having worked with a fair number of ex UAS my views are not outdated. On average former UAS students are no better than direct entrants. If the RAF does not get any noticeable gains from the money spent on the UAS it is just a 'flying club'.

Far more ex air cadets join the RAF than UAS, so there are other ways to attract people. What is more the ATC/CCF pay to be members of their organistation, not get paid.

Toursit,

I wont claim to have read the book. I would image that any book like this will be a mixture of getting it spot on, and missing by a mile. The misses and hit will no doubt be the opposite to what most people think.

Michael Edic

25th Apr 2006, 15:59

JTIDS

25th Apr 2006, 16:15

The UAS system now no longer teaches EFT to its studes. (Which it did do between 1997 and 2005, and even if no one else did, I found it hard to mix doing the flying training and degree at the same time :) )The studes now get ten hours flying experience a year on the Tutor, and each UAS has on average one QFI who does all the flying. The rest of the training is now leadership based etc.
As a matter of interest I believe its only the RAF who see their university corp as a recruiting agency. The OTC (army) and URNU (navy) are there to give people an experience of life in the military, and recruiting is only a pleasant co-incidence.

FormerFlake

25th Apr 2006, 16:16

Unless your friends are ex UAS who left no more than 3 months ago then I'm afraid your views are outdated as that was when the emphasis changed from predominantly flying to predominantly leadership based activities. Incidentally before that the emphasis was on completing EFT, do you therefore regard the new EFTS as flying clubs too?
I wouldn't say you touched a raw nerve it just galls me to see people spouting on subjects where their knowledge is pretty limited.

3 months? So it too early to see if your view is correct either. I hope it works (seriously) as the RAF needs some quality for the future.

We are talking about the past not the future anyway. The books talks about the then, you are talking about the tomorrow.

Roland Pulfrew

25th Apr 2006, 16:25

Having friends who are ex UAS as well as having worked with a fair number of ex UAS my views are not outdated. On average former UAS students are no better than direct entrants. If the RAF does not get any noticeable gains from the money spent on the UAS it is just a 'flying club'.

Far more ex air cadets join the RAF than UAS, so there are other ways to attract people. What is more the ATC/CCF pay to be members of their organistation, not get paid.

FF

Your knowledge is outdated, and from your earlier post very outdated. The UASs have had ground branch members for many years. They had ground branch members when I was a QFI back in the early to mid 90s! UASs do not have ground branch members any more (with the exception of sponsored ground branch personnel and even they can now learn to fly). All members joining a UAS as of Sep last year are deemed to be "Any Branch", there is no differentiation between flying and ground. All members can get 10 hours instructional flying per year and the emphasis has moved away from EFT (which they no longer conduct) towards IPDLT.

Where do you get your, somewhat narrow, viewpoint that if the RAF do not get any noticeable gains? The UASs have not been "flying clubs" for sometime, certainly not since the early 90s when there was more of an argument that they were flying clubs.

But back to the thread. I have read extracts from the book and from what I have read a lot of the coverage is the typically jaded view from someone who IMHO hasn't/didn't quite make it to any jobs where he could see the bigger picture. A large amount seems to be the headline stuff without knowing the facts behind the headlines. But then that is just MHO.

(PS I am not an ex UAS student, but I know quite a few currently serving RAF officers who might not have been if they hadn't tried the UAS at Uni.)

FJJP

25th Apr 2006, 17:48

Roland,

what I have read a lot of the coverage is the typically jaded view from someone who IMHO hasn't/didn't quite make it to any jobs where he could see the bigger picture. A large amount seems to be the headline stuff without knowing the facts behind the headlines. But then that is just MHO.

I haven't read the book, but from the extracts, I reckon you've hit the nail on the head...

Tombstone

25th Apr 2006, 18:45

Just to re-cap.
Tombstone agrees about the Tornado, hasn't read the book, but suspects that the bloke is a To$$er on principle since he is RN (we love you too)

A little harsh Tourist!

I suspect that the author is a t***er due to the fact that he is quite happy to publish utter tosh, apparent even from the small amount that I have read.

You seem a tad defensive old chap, perhaps the author in question is infact...

...you!;)

Jackonicko

25th Apr 2006, 19:40

Jungly,

It is precisely because this book is aimed at the "uninformed civvy" that it is important that this half-arsed half wit doesn't spout ill-informed bollocks himself. People trust what they read in books, giving his nonsensical diatribes against Tornado's suicide tactics and ineffective weapons, against the Cold War Eurofighter, and in support of the all-singing, all-dancing Tomahawk a credibility that they do not deserve.

And if this is supposed to be a serious study of procurement, why no serious examination of the strategy followed for the Jag upgrade, and the reasons for its failure to be considered for the so-called Tornado IDS 2000?

Lazy, flawed, clichéd, and one-sided analysis has no place in what purports to be a serious book, whoever it's intended for.

And like Tourist, unless and until you're prepared to be a bit more up front about your own qualifications, you should perhaps refrain from under-stating, mocking and belittling mine.

SirPercyWare-Armitag

25th Apr 2006, 20:07

I have read the book and it is utter bilge. There is a blatant anti-RAF bias which, to be honest, I would forgive if he had shown any sort of consistency throughout. Anyone with half a brain knows to show both sides of the argument before coming down on one side of the argument. One has only to read the navy chapters to see that he automatically decides aircraft carriers are a "good thing" whichout any attempt to consider whether the British military can achieve the required level of effect using different resources. Even if he subsequently then concluded that carriers were "good" at least he would have seen to be balanced.
Personally, I am still undecided about carriers but that is fine because MOD procurements only rarely consult me before making decisions but a decent author would have considered whether British carriers have made a decisive contribution since 1982; if the answer is "no" (plausible), then consideration has to be given whether carriers can be sacrificed in favour of something else.
I dont mind reading controverisal, thought provoking stuff even if I disagree with the conclusions so long as the author has a decent stab at being balanced but this book has all the hallmarks of being written by a failed naval officer who probably failed to rise beyond the rank of Leading Parrot.

Jackonicko

26th Apr 2006, 01:12

Just over sensitive about Bulldog remarks, Jungly, as the 'dog marked the zenith of my light blue life.....

A very, very long time ago.

Tourist

26th Apr 2006, 08:19

I do find it amusing that people are saying that the book has an anti RAF slant.
He advocates the Army losing all its Main battle tanks and its Apache, and he advocates the Navy losing all its Frigates and Destroyers and just keep ing the new carriers.

All he wants for the RAF is a few less Typhoon, a vastly larger AT fleet and a change in role emphasis from deep strike to CAS.

Jackonicko

26th Apr 2006, 08:49

Whether or not he's pro- or anti-RAF is just one point, and it wouldn't make the book good or bad either way.

One could make an argument to bin Tranche 3 of Typhoon, for example, but not by making facile, misleading, irrelevant and wrong-headed assumptions about its 'Cold War origins', while if you want to criticise it on cost grounds, it would be a good idea to get one's facts right about what the cost actually is, and how and how much money could be saved.

One could make an argument against the effectiveness of Tornado, but not by making entirely false statements about what it did and do during Granby.

This isn't a bad book because of Page's overall conclusisons (Though I think most of them are wrong), but because he reaches those conclusions without making a convincing case, but instead lazily parrots tired, hackneyed cliches and makes basic, schoolboy mistakes.

WhiteOvies

26th Apr 2006, 09:15

Sir PWA,
Without dragging this into the realms of other threads: how plausible is it really that carriers haven't made a difference since 1982? Didn't see much HNS during Sierra Leone, and Italy was a bit foggy at times for the RAF to fly missions over Bosnia, to mention a couple of egs. Anyway, I digress.

I agree with Jacko on the fact that this sort of book needs to be accurate. The public get presented with so much b:mad: :mad: s on military matters by ill-informed journos (NOT a dig at anyone) it annoys me intensely when someone with a service background, who should know better, does the same. However, does the author claim to have worked within either the DLO or DPA on any of the projects he is critical on? Seems to me that alot of it is based on his personal opinions or overheard stories. It was an interesting read and I agree that some projects have been managed worse than the NHS, but little is made of some of the improvements made in recent times.
Just for the record I also agree with Tourist in the fact he seems pretty much against all the big legacy projects across all three services.

Tourist

26th Apr 2006, 09:18

Jacko.
Leaving banter aside (just for a moment), with all due respect, all of your opinions are necessarily second hand. Whilst I accept that you have many contacts in the RAF, all of them are going to be protective of their role for obvious reasons. The fact that they are convinced of their correctness means very little.

Pre 1st world war every single member of the Cavalry was convinced that nothing would ever withstand the mounted charge. If someone had pointed out they were wrong they would have been ridiculed.
But they were wrong, and they were the experts.

Same goes for the belief in the invincability of the Battleship pre Taranto/Pearl Harbour, Blitzing a country into submission pre WW2/Iraq/Afghanistan/Serbia(maybe we keep failing to learn that one), Lines of Battle pre Nelson etc etc

The fact that your RAF mates disagree does not make him wrong, and remember, his experience across all the services may be scanty at best, ie UAS and All Arms, but it is more breadth than 99% of the military have done.

I hear a lot of statments that his arguments are b@llocks, but not a lot of considered argument against them.

Jackonicko

26th Apr 2006, 12:59

Two considered arguments

1) In a book purporting to be a serious critique of procurement, he makes no mention of the most obvious example of a more successful alternative procurement strategy (the Jaguar upgrade) nor even of the best Dark Blue example - the Sea King ASAC 7.

2) He dismisses the Tornado IDS as a great British fiasco, misconceived from the start, still poor after much upgrading. Ignoring the relative capabilities, he judges the Harrier 'excellent'. This is over-simplistic, opinionated, unsupported, sub-Carlo Kopp nonsense. He says that the RAF lost five of its 45 Tornados during the first seven days of Desert Storm - all to ground anti aircraft fire in the vicinity of their targets, and clearly implied that all were lost on JP233 missions. He regarded the loss rate as unsustainable and suicidal. In fact, the RAF lost six RAF Tornados during the entire war, two of them at medium level. The four losses during the first week included one while running in for a loft attack, one 'during' a loft delivery, and one after a low level loft attack.

In 100 JP233 sorties, only one aircraft was lost - and that while egressing from the target. It seems clear that leaving the sanctuary of low level (even briefly) was what caused losses…..

And he got the number of Tornados on strength wrong, too.

3) In dealing with Typhoon he stresses the type's Cold War origins, conveniently ignoring the fact that "the Eurofighter Typhoon's genesis has left it uniquely well suited to the post Cold War environment. Far from being a narrowly focused and over-specialised Cold War bomber-destroyer (like the Tornado ADV) the Typhoon was always intended to be a versatile, affordable, swing-role fighter and fighter-bomber, while UK out-of-area and regional reinforcement commitments meant that great emphasis was placed on deployability, maintainability and supportability. For the UK, what would become the Eurofighter was always seen as a Jaguar replacement, and expanded air-to-air capabilities were added as an afterthought. The influence of the Jaguar was such that Eurofighter was designed to have the same California Bearing Ratio, meaning that it could taxi on the same soft surfaces, while the STOL requirement required that the aircraft could operate from a 500 metre strip with a meaningful warload."

He gives a much higher programme unit cost than the NAO does.

He suggests that seven squadrons would require just 140 aircraft over the type's lifetime, apparently unaware of the fact that: "232 aircraft are required to sustain an active RAF fleet of 137 aircraft, covering the seven front-line squadrons, the Operational Conversion Unit (OCU), and the Operational Evaluation Unit. Each squadron will have one in-use reserve aircraft, and the OCU will have two in-use reserves, giving a total of nine. The remaining aircraft allow for assumptions of attrition and overall use of the aircraft over the planned 25 year life of the aircraft, with the last aircraft being scheduled for delivery in 2014."

He is apparently blissfully unaware of the work now being done on providing the aircraft with an interim 'austere' air to ground capability.

4) In dealing with Apache costs he ignores the proportion of the cost that will flow straight back into the exchequer as tax, when comparing a sterling purchase of a UK assembled airframe with a dollar purchase of an import. It's still expensive, but this sort of thing smacks of carelessness, ignorance, or not letting inconvenient fact stand in the way of a good argument.

5) His analysis of helicopter lift (and especially of Merlin HC3) is equally simplistic, and equally awry.

I cannot believe that I'm wasting time talking about such a ridiculous, stupid, book.

John Blakeley

26th Apr 2006, 13:16

As someone who writes under his own name I hesitate to be seen as contributing to some of the wilder comments on this thread, but I do think that some of the contributors have lost sight of the main message - I have to accept probably because there are too many inaccuracies in Page's book, particularly with regard to his opinions on operational issues. These have also been ably pointed out by other contributors. However the central message he is trying to get across, namely that the procurement system has far too often let down the front line in terms of cost, timescales and performance remains a good one, and some of his examples such as the SA80 saga and the very public domain Nimrod AEW and MR4 fiascos are pretty accurate. Apart from the obvious and sometimes quite major inaccuracies. my main disappointment with the book was that he ignored the costs of “servicing” the demands of procurement linked organisations such as dstl, QinetiQ, DOSG etc with the vast amounts of data and reports they need even for procurement of a so called off the shelf system. Add in QA and ILS data and reports needed for the audit trails, much of which my friends tell me is only destined to tick a box and then gather dust in a filing cabinet and you can see how it is that a “hangar - coat” soon approaches the cost of a “hangar – aircraft” – don’t write back it is a joke!

Unfortunately even if you accept that he was trying to write for a more general audience based only on headline issues, the great British public is more interested in the salacious aspects of "reality" TV than in the real world of news of this type - even today's top story of further government incompetence in letting 1000 foreign prisoners out without deporting them will soon be forgotten by most people. Unless things have changed even within the military establishment there will be some senior officers and civil servants who have little interest in getting procurement right even though intellectually they well understand how important it is.

If you would like a more accurate understanding of defence procurement issues than is provided by Page’s book read Brigadier Bill Kincaid's excellent series of books: A Dinosaur in Whitehall, Dancing With the Dinosaur and Dinosaur in Permafrost. Bill was Director of Operational Requirements (Land) until 1995 and is Editor of RUSI Defence News, and I suggest that his "pedigree" is not in doubt.

Dinosaur in Permafrost is a critique of Smart Procurement based on interviews through all sides of the procurement community and you can find a summary at

www.ukdf.org.uk/bookextracts/BA03.doc

As a consultant working a lot with overseas companies and Israeli ones in particular, I found the first two and last quotes (below) taken from the critique particularly true as I have often heard their project managers make similar comments - the Israelis, whose kit, for obvious reasons, generally works, cannot understand why the UK constantly has to re-invent the wheel - always impacting on cost and schedule even if not on performance (but we did have the only rifled tank gun in the Western World as well!). However, it would also be wrong to condemn the whole of the organisation - too often the good people in the DPA, I still think the majority, are as frustrated as the front line by the number of hoops that they have to jump through to get anywhere and to get a decision - but they still have to follow the rules to get the job done at all. In fact it could be argued that they actually achieve a lot of successes despite the rules!

“Process is deemed more important than the project.”
“It’s all process – have we lost sight of what we are trying to do?”
“XDs [Executive Directors in the DPA] are trying to find a role, but will it be one that adds value?”
“When things go wrong, the old adversarial mentality returns.”
“Many small companies may lose interest in MOD business altogether.”
“DPA sees innovation as a threat.”

Another area that you procurement buffs might like to look at is the DPA Annual Report and Accounts 2004/2005 – available on the MOD web site under DPA. Section 28 “Losses and Special payments” makes fascinating reading – OK it was only £173M in a budget of around £12B, but is even this acceptable, and whose heads rolled? Amongst the lost projects is the £14M+ hole in the ground at RAF Henlow where the new aircrew centrifuge ought to be – a procurement disaster that was both predictable and predicted by both the competition (and I declare my interest here) and by the fact that the chosen company was being sued by the USN, had to re-structure its finances to take the contract - to reduce the commercial risks to MOD (not that this appears to have worked) and was the subject of complaints from within the RAF itself against their performance on other equipment previously delivered. Still MOD did follow the rules by writing to my client to ask if he had any objection to the DPA project manager, who was ultimately responsible for the procurement decision, working as a consultant for the chosen vendor!

Other areas of interest in the DPA report include that old favourite Nimrod 4, the now infamous BOWMAN project and even cancellation of a classified project on the C130J costing a whole £1.7M as a cost savings measure – wonder if they are now having to re-instate it for Afghanistan.

Sideshow Bob

26th Apr 2006, 15:57

I know I'll probably get some stick for this, but since I'm sat at home skiving off work, board stupid, I'll clear up the nimrod serial number debate for you.
The two prototypes and the only ones that were converted Comet 4C's were XV147 and XV 148.
The ones built as MR1's and later converted to MR2's were XV226 to XV263. The three original R1's were XW664 to XW666. The aircraft new built as MR2's (and slightly heavier due to American bauxite being used to produce the aluminum) were XZ280 to XZ287. The aircraft used for the AEW program (lowest hours in the fleet) were XV261 to XV263 and all the XZ's except 84 which is now at Warton with the MRA4 project along with some of the original MR1's and the airframe that used to sit behind the motor club by the sports hanger (XV253). XV 249 was converted into a R1 to replace XW666.

By the way XV147 was the only one to have Avon engines, it's fuselage was also used as the MRA4 mockup at Warton.

Flatus Veteranus

26th Apr 2006, 19:34

[QUOTE]Having friends who are ex UAS as well as having worked with a fair number of ex UAS my views are not outdated. On average former UAS students are no better than direct entrants. If the RAF does not get any noticeable gains from the money spent on the UAS it is just a 'flying club'.[QUOTE]

You can blame that on the demise of the Chipmunks at the UASs. In 1965-67 I was desk officer at MOD for Cranwell, the FTSs and the UASs (TF1b). "All-through jet training" was the buzz-word and all direct entrants and Cranwell cadets cut their teeth on the JP before going on to Gnats at Valley or Varsities at Oakington (as I remember it). Trouble was, the JP was so ridiculously easy to fly that almost everyone passed the course and nearly all the scrubbing was done at the most expensive stage - ie AFS or OCU. The UAS cadets, on the other hand, had done their 100 hrs or so on Chippies which demanded real handling skills and coordination (not as much as the Tiger Moth, but still a challenge to those with two left feet). Consequently the scrub rate for ex-UAS students was dramatically lower at AFS/OCU than for the other streams. In defending the UASs against the 1965 Treasury attack, I had this factor costed and offset against the cost of running the UASs. We won and , I believe , Chipmunk "grading" was introduced soon after.

South Bound

26th Apr 2006, 19:50

The glorified flying club argument is just the same for air cadets and in the modern world both provide the same benefit to the Service by exposing people to the Service who otherwise might not develop an interest. Whatever happens with retention, there will always be a need to recruit high calibre graduates and since cadetships dried up there is precious little else to catch the attention of potential candidates. The UAS' provide that exposure. Just wonder what is in it for the non-flying specializations now...

MountainMet

27th Apr 2006, 01:13

delurking after a long time reading this forum.
if lewis page is having a dig at the RAF surely this quote back fires on him
The navy employes their own meteorologists, even though they do other jobs on board, such as oceanography. The air force rent them.:=

Haven't had a chance to read to book yet so I'll refrain from comment about the meat of the thread, just here really to add a comment to LCRAYMYX's post.
Yeah, the RAF pays for it's Met services, the same as any other customer, and we are civilians. I say this as a metman sat in the dark all alone on a station (hear the violins) trying to figure out how cloudy it'll be tomorrow (not much I think) and also as one of the group that get sent out with the RAF to *other* places. Even then the RAF doesn't actually pay us directly as we are all sponsored reservists that are paid by our employer (Met Office, trading firm of MOD) to go out and do our job. We get officer training, but not as much as the regulars, obviously, and when in uniform we're expected to bahave as any other uniformed specialist.
Just wanted to fly the flag, which in our case is a chicken on a stick.:)

rudekid

27th Apr 2006, 04:06

Off thread response warning:

Mobile Met Unit: Outstanding bunch of blokes, excellent service. Wish they were everywhere...:p

Sorry, off now!

SirPercyWare-Armitag

27th Apr 2006, 08:23

WhiteOvies
"how plausible is it really that carriers haven't made a difference since 1982? Didn't see much HNS during Sierra Leone, and Italy was a bit foggy at times for the RAF to fly missions over Bosnia, to mention a couple of egs. "

WhiteOvies,
I dont want to digress either. I certainly do not want to get involved in a slanging match but please note I did say "decisive" contribution. I stand by for corrections but I dont believe that our carriers have made a "decisive" contribution since 1982. I understand that another land based aircraft force was on stand by for Sierra Leone and there were plenty of other NATO types over the Balkans meaning that our carrier contribution wasnt critical. Indeed, if the truth be known, there was serious high level opposition in the CAOC against the UK deploying a carrier at that time because it wasnt needed.
All I am saying is that a case can be made and should have been made by the author of "Lions" for AND against buying 2 enormous big F-off aircraft carriers. He didnt do that and by omitting a balanced argument revealed his tome as biased and pants

FormerFlake

27th Apr 2006, 15:47

Not quite sure how a Sea Harriers, as capable as they are, can stop people killing, maiming, raping, beating (and so on) each other? I'm sure there are other navy vesels can provide helo support for such ops?

Not Long Here

28th Apr 2006, 09:28

Sideshow Bob,

There were no new build MR 2s. All were MR 1 conversions. Some of the MR1s did not get converted to MR2s but went to the AEW 3 programme

WhiteOvies

28th Apr 2006, 10:41

Sir PWA,
Ok we'll agree to disagree on that one, all the arguments are on the CVF thread and I doubt any of our opinions on the matter will make a blind bit of difference to the Treasury anyway:suspect: I quite agree that any argument needs to show both sides and it's not the most balanced book on the subject matter (see John Blakeley's post for details).
FF
The same could be said for any FJ, although a 1000lb-er on the bad guys seems to work. I quite agree helos full of troops do the job much better, otherwise I suspect NI might have been different. Buccs and bombs on Belfast? (not a serious suggestion but a possible 'what if' sideline.)

PTR 175

28th Apr 2006, 11:06

More on the Nimrod Front: XV 262 was an MR1 and was stripped out at St Mawgan about 80/81 ish for its ferry, presumably to Woodford for conversion to AEW. It was never a MR2. XZ 284 escaped conversion because it was being used at Boscombe Down at the time and had some non standard kit fitted to it which made maintenance on it when it went to St Mawgan interesting. It had all sorts of additional and undocumented cabling. Oh and a 1/8 drill stuck in the intercom cable. So it was the only XZ serial in the MR fleet.

Sideshow Bob

29th Apr 2006, 09:41

Not Long Here

If there was no new build MR2's please explain why their reg was XZ not XV and why they were, on average, 2000lbs heavier than the rest of the fleet due to a different spec of aluminum being used. Ever flown one because I have!!

TEEEJ

29th Apr 2006, 10:18

No new build MR.2s. All conversions of MR.1s.

"Nimrod MR.Mk 1 Last 8 production aircraft (second batch) delivered with updated communications system - as later used on MR.Mk 2. Strengthened structure for gross weights of 192,000 lb (87090 kg). "

http://aeroflt.users.netlink.co.uk/types/uk/bae_systems/nimrod/nimrod.htm

Not Long Here

29th Apr 2006, 21:03

Sideshow Bob,

I think Teeej has given you the detail on the XZ build. Of my 8500 Nimrod hours, 1500 were Mark 1, of which some time was spent in XZ 280, 281, 282, 283 and 285.

There is a discrepancy in the article in that the above 5 airframes came back from Luqa and flew with the sqns before being converted to AEW, 84 went to Boscombe before becoming the only XZ MR2, and, as far as I recall 86 and 87 never actually made sqn service but went to the AEW 3 programme directly.

Hope that clarifies things for you :}

MR TROTTER sr

30th Apr 2006, 19:03

Not Long Here

Since 284 escaped your l203 log book I think that adds weight to my recollection that it was the only newbuild MR2...

any ex-woodford bods want to share the facts with all the nimrod spotters on this thread??

Pontius Navigator

30th Apr 2006, 20:08

Jackinoko pm please.

Archimedes

30th Apr 2006, 20:39

Nimrod Spotting (http://forum.keypublishing.co.uk/showthread.php?t=14789), post No.12, suggests that:

The last batch of eight Nimrods (c/ns 8042-8049) is slightly more complicated: apparently only XZ280, 281, 282, 283 and 285 were completed as MR.1s, XZ284 was finished as an MR.2 and XZ286 and 287 were actually completed as AEW.3 variants.

Which, if accurate, suggests that XZ284 started as an MR1 but metamorphosed into an MR2. Whether that means that it was a new-build MR2, or an MR1 I'll let others decide

Jackonicko

30th Apr 2006, 21:23

Ponceness Nerdigator.

Answered by PM

JN

FormerFlake

1st May 2006, 12:59

green granite

1st May 2006, 13:21

Things don't change much do they, think about this:

Had Frank Whittle had the backing he deserved, from the airstaff, the FEW whould have flown Vampires and Meteors, and the Mosquitos would have been Canberras (if you see what I mean) :}