Melchett01
4th Apr 2006, 22:37
Realise that this article (believe to be the Times) covers old ground, however, it has just gone onto ARRSE, where it seems to have done a reasonably good job of raising the collective blood pressure; thought it was worth a posting here so I could ask a question:
Has it really come to this? Not only are we now beholden to the diktats of the bean counters, we now appear to be displaying what Sir Humphrey would no doubt describe as "intellectual suppleness and moral manoeuvreability".
As much as I am proud to serve, this sort of thing really makes my blood boil :*
"It Should Never Have Come To This
The inquest into the deaths of six Royal Military Policemen at Majar al-Kabir in June 2003 has failed to satisfy the families - just as the latest Deepcut Inquiry also failed to bring closure to the bereaved parents. It has been another sad day for the army with yet more evidence that the management of troops and operations fell significantly below the expected standards. Yet again the families are spitting blood at the way in which their children were treated, in this case demanding that the police investigate officers for alleged manslaughter. Regardless of the rights and wrongs of that case, most sensible people would agree that – as with Deepcut - it should never have come to this.
But what can we expect when the appalling examples of poor leadership come so thick and fast. I spent yesterday at No 1 Parachute Training School RAF Brize Norton watching Chandler Biddiss collect his Para wings. Not a lot of paratroopers have managed to do that in recent weeks, largely due to a shortage of C130 Hercules aircraft – most of them being deployed full-time ferrying troops and equipment out to Iraq and Afghanistan. Chandler didn’t need to jump out of an aircraft. He was making a sponsored decent from the 60-ft high Exit Decent trainer used to test the nerve of paratroopers before they actually jump out of an aircraft. There is of course a twist, as regular readers of this blog will know, in that Chandler is six years old, has cerebral palsy, cannot walk, is unable to talk properly and has difficulty seeing.
Yes of course to a certain extent it was a stunt, a sponsored descent to raise money for a charity that helps former paratroopers, and Chandler was caught by his father Corporal Paul Biddiss. He didn't have to land. But it was worth seeing the smile on Chandler’s face afterwards when the audience in the hanger which houses the training school erupted in applause. Hats off to the RAF and the Paras for allowing the sponsored jump to go ahead. This was a good example of decent man-management in action. The RAF freefall team, the Falcons, were also there to see Chandler awarded the coveted British Military Parachute Wings and Certificate, as were all the young para recruits on the current course, none of whom has so far managed to earn their own wings because of high winds and the lack of aircraft.
When I last wrote about Chandler I contrasted the way in which the Army has looked after Cpl Biddiss recently with the treatment that led to Chandler’s disabilities. Some asked how the army could be blamed for his sad situation so perhaps it is time to tell as much of the story as can yet be told. The Biddiss family’s problems began in November 1999 when Corporal Biddiss’s wife Debbie was six months pregnant. He had just returned from Kosovo and his battalion was preparing for a six-month tour in Northern Ireland.
The Army – under pressure to save costs – was at the time engaged in a full-scale effort to reduce the costs of its pension scheme, which provides soldiers leaving after 22 years with a pension. Under a now discredited system known as “manning control”, the Army Personnel Centre at Glasgow was sending out lists of soldiers who were either to be discharged, so they did not reach the 22-year point and a pension, or put on a different contract that would allow the army to get rid of them before they became entitled to their pension.
Since they were changing the soldier’s contract, and to his or her obvious disadvantage, they needed to persuade the soldier to sign a piece of paper agreeing to this change. They ought also to have explained all the implications. It was part of their duty of care. It was almost certainly illegal not to do so. But in a number of cases the implications were never explained and where they were, unsurprisingly, most soldiers were reluctant to make the change so had to be forced in some way to agree.
On 2 November 1999, Corporal Biddiss’s immediate commander told him he had to change his contract. Too savvy to be mugged into giving up his pension rights, he refused. He was also just a tad pee-ed off that he should be seen as someone expendable. He was an experienced junior NCO widely regarded as a good team leader who had just been recommended for the SAS selection course. He saw no reason why he should be under threat. He was precisely the sort of soldier the army didn’t want to lose.
He was repeatedly called into the commander’s office and told he had to sign. When he continued to refuse, the commander began what Debbie Biddiss described as “a campaign of harassment and victimisation against him”. Since his wife was pregnant and she had a history of difficulties in pregnancy – she had lost a baby a year earlier - Corporal Biddiss had been told that he could remain behind with the rear party to ensure he was there to support her. Now that offer was withdrawn. He would have to go to Northern Ireland.
The pressure told on his wife who went into premature labour. A week after Chandler was born, a cranial ultrasound scan showed bleeding on his brain. Despite the problems, and protests from his platoon commander that he should be allowed to stay with his wife, Corporal Biddiss was told he was still going to Northern Ireland. A month or so later, Chandler was rushed to hospital with pneumococcal meningitis and scepticaemia. Corporal Biddis was told he could not go home to help his wife unless he signed a new contract. She had four other small boys and was struggling to take them to school while trying to protect Chandler from the cold.
Eventually, Corporal Biddiss stormed into the battalion operations room in Northern Ireland and told his commander that: "If anything happens to my son, I will f*** you and this regiment." Only then did his commanders talk to the hospital, who lambasted them for not sending Corporal Biddiss home. He was on his way back to England within 15 minutes. “For the first seven days, we waited for Chandler to die,” Debbie later said. “He was saved by a blood transfusion and his fighting spirit.” Although he didn’t die, Chandler had suffered irreparable damage to his brain.
There are more details to this story, which cannot yet be told because Debbie Biddiss is writing a book on the affair. It is set to reveal an astonishing level of bullying, cover-up and incompetent behaviour by officers involved in the case. In the end, Corporal Biddiss was not forced to change his contract and yesterday was a happy day for him and his young son. It would of course be easy to write this off as an accident, to say that the whole manning control issue was a mistake, it was never meant to be run that way.
There were plenty of commanding officers who fought against the orders to “manning control” some of their best men and knew it was wrong. But there were plenty of others who just followed orders and forced good young soldiers to change their contracts or leave to save the MoD the cost of their pension. I wrote the first story on “manning control” on 29 April 2002. It was swiftly followed up by other newspapers and the MoD protested repeatedly that there was nothing wrong with the system. But when the Government was asked in October when the last incident of “manning control” took place, it said in April 2002. They knew they were acting immorally and arguably illegally and the minute they were found out they stopped it.
It was just another example of the poor management I was talking about yesterday, as of course was the situation that led to the deaths of the six military policemen. The idea that their deaths were “unavoidable” is so ludicrous that one scarcely needs to comment on it, other than to ask why it took so long for the coroner to deal with the case. One would like to believe that it wasn’t to ensure that the controversy wasn’t aired in the run-up to last year’s election when Tony Blair was being challenged in his Sedgefield constituency by Reg Keys, whose son Tom was one of those killed.
It was John Hyde, whose son Benjamin was also among those killed, who put his finger on the real cause of their deaths. Mr Hyde, who has not been so vocal as the other parents but says he is just as committed to getting to the truth, said: "With proper command and control that day and effective communication, our lads would still be here today." Mike Aston, who lost his son Russell, said that the officers involved should be held to account. "They got my son killed along with five other brave men and they deserve to answer for it,” he said. I’m bound to say that I’m not entirely sure that calling in the Metropolitan Police is the answer at this stage. But what certainly needs to be done, as I said in my Deepcut blog, is to ensure that across the board the people who lead our troops into battle are capable of doing the job properly. There are far too many now who are clearly not."
No doubt the high paid help would say that it hasn't come to this and that everything is tickety-boo. If that is the case, I'd love to see them stand up to the bean counters and Yes-men that are undoubtedly the root cause of so many problems amongst all the Services.
I wouldn't be suprised if in the next budget review we didn't get a report from some very expensive consultants telling us that we need to tighten our belts, before finding out we can't afford the fees for such magnificent advice, so we'll sell a couple of bases or a Regiment here or there. Inter-Service banter aside (long may it continue :ok: ), it's about time we all stood up as one and told the bean counters where to stuff it. Or am I just being naive here?
Has it really come to this? Not only are we now beholden to the diktats of the bean counters, we now appear to be displaying what Sir Humphrey would no doubt describe as "intellectual suppleness and moral manoeuvreability".
As much as I am proud to serve, this sort of thing really makes my blood boil :*
"It Should Never Have Come To This
The inquest into the deaths of six Royal Military Policemen at Majar al-Kabir in June 2003 has failed to satisfy the families - just as the latest Deepcut Inquiry also failed to bring closure to the bereaved parents. It has been another sad day for the army with yet more evidence that the management of troops and operations fell significantly below the expected standards. Yet again the families are spitting blood at the way in which their children were treated, in this case demanding that the police investigate officers for alleged manslaughter. Regardless of the rights and wrongs of that case, most sensible people would agree that – as with Deepcut - it should never have come to this.
But what can we expect when the appalling examples of poor leadership come so thick and fast. I spent yesterday at No 1 Parachute Training School RAF Brize Norton watching Chandler Biddiss collect his Para wings. Not a lot of paratroopers have managed to do that in recent weeks, largely due to a shortage of C130 Hercules aircraft – most of them being deployed full-time ferrying troops and equipment out to Iraq and Afghanistan. Chandler didn’t need to jump out of an aircraft. He was making a sponsored decent from the 60-ft high Exit Decent trainer used to test the nerve of paratroopers before they actually jump out of an aircraft. There is of course a twist, as regular readers of this blog will know, in that Chandler is six years old, has cerebral palsy, cannot walk, is unable to talk properly and has difficulty seeing.
Yes of course to a certain extent it was a stunt, a sponsored descent to raise money for a charity that helps former paratroopers, and Chandler was caught by his father Corporal Paul Biddiss. He didn't have to land. But it was worth seeing the smile on Chandler’s face afterwards when the audience in the hanger which houses the training school erupted in applause. Hats off to the RAF and the Paras for allowing the sponsored jump to go ahead. This was a good example of decent man-management in action. The RAF freefall team, the Falcons, were also there to see Chandler awarded the coveted British Military Parachute Wings and Certificate, as were all the young para recruits on the current course, none of whom has so far managed to earn their own wings because of high winds and the lack of aircraft.
When I last wrote about Chandler I contrasted the way in which the Army has looked after Cpl Biddiss recently with the treatment that led to Chandler’s disabilities. Some asked how the army could be blamed for his sad situation so perhaps it is time to tell as much of the story as can yet be told. The Biddiss family’s problems began in November 1999 when Corporal Biddiss’s wife Debbie was six months pregnant. He had just returned from Kosovo and his battalion was preparing for a six-month tour in Northern Ireland.
The Army – under pressure to save costs – was at the time engaged in a full-scale effort to reduce the costs of its pension scheme, which provides soldiers leaving after 22 years with a pension. Under a now discredited system known as “manning control”, the Army Personnel Centre at Glasgow was sending out lists of soldiers who were either to be discharged, so they did not reach the 22-year point and a pension, or put on a different contract that would allow the army to get rid of them before they became entitled to their pension.
Since they were changing the soldier’s contract, and to his or her obvious disadvantage, they needed to persuade the soldier to sign a piece of paper agreeing to this change. They ought also to have explained all the implications. It was part of their duty of care. It was almost certainly illegal not to do so. But in a number of cases the implications were never explained and where they were, unsurprisingly, most soldiers were reluctant to make the change so had to be forced in some way to agree.
On 2 November 1999, Corporal Biddiss’s immediate commander told him he had to change his contract. Too savvy to be mugged into giving up his pension rights, he refused. He was also just a tad pee-ed off that he should be seen as someone expendable. He was an experienced junior NCO widely regarded as a good team leader who had just been recommended for the SAS selection course. He saw no reason why he should be under threat. He was precisely the sort of soldier the army didn’t want to lose.
He was repeatedly called into the commander’s office and told he had to sign. When he continued to refuse, the commander began what Debbie Biddiss described as “a campaign of harassment and victimisation against him”. Since his wife was pregnant and she had a history of difficulties in pregnancy – she had lost a baby a year earlier - Corporal Biddiss had been told that he could remain behind with the rear party to ensure he was there to support her. Now that offer was withdrawn. He would have to go to Northern Ireland.
The pressure told on his wife who went into premature labour. A week after Chandler was born, a cranial ultrasound scan showed bleeding on his brain. Despite the problems, and protests from his platoon commander that he should be allowed to stay with his wife, Corporal Biddiss was told he was still going to Northern Ireland. A month or so later, Chandler was rushed to hospital with pneumococcal meningitis and scepticaemia. Corporal Biddis was told he could not go home to help his wife unless he signed a new contract. She had four other small boys and was struggling to take them to school while trying to protect Chandler from the cold.
Eventually, Corporal Biddiss stormed into the battalion operations room in Northern Ireland and told his commander that: "If anything happens to my son, I will f*** you and this regiment." Only then did his commanders talk to the hospital, who lambasted them for not sending Corporal Biddiss home. He was on his way back to England within 15 minutes. “For the first seven days, we waited for Chandler to die,” Debbie later said. “He was saved by a blood transfusion and his fighting spirit.” Although he didn’t die, Chandler had suffered irreparable damage to his brain.
There are more details to this story, which cannot yet be told because Debbie Biddiss is writing a book on the affair. It is set to reveal an astonishing level of bullying, cover-up and incompetent behaviour by officers involved in the case. In the end, Corporal Biddiss was not forced to change his contract and yesterday was a happy day for him and his young son. It would of course be easy to write this off as an accident, to say that the whole manning control issue was a mistake, it was never meant to be run that way.
There were plenty of commanding officers who fought against the orders to “manning control” some of their best men and knew it was wrong. But there were plenty of others who just followed orders and forced good young soldiers to change their contracts or leave to save the MoD the cost of their pension. I wrote the first story on “manning control” on 29 April 2002. It was swiftly followed up by other newspapers and the MoD protested repeatedly that there was nothing wrong with the system. But when the Government was asked in October when the last incident of “manning control” took place, it said in April 2002. They knew they were acting immorally and arguably illegally and the minute they were found out they stopped it.
It was just another example of the poor management I was talking about yesterday, as of course was the situation that led to the deaths of the six military policemen. The idea that their deaths were “unavoidable” is so ludicrous that one scarcely needs to comment on it, other than to ask why it took so long for the coroner to deal with the case. One would like to believe that it wasn’t to ensure that the controversy wasn’t aired in the run-up to last year’s election when Tony Blair was being challenged in his Sedgefield constituency by Reg Keys, whose son Tom was one of those killed.
It was John Hyde, whose son Benjamin was also among those killed, who put his finger on the real cause of their deaths. Mr Hyde, who has not been so vocal as the other parents but says he is just as committed to getting to the truth, said: "With proper command and control that day and effective communication, our lads would still be here today." Mike Aston, who lost his son Russell, said that the officers involved should be held to account. "They got my son killed along with five other brave men and they deserve to answer for it,” he said. I’m bound to say that I’m not entirely sure that calling in the Metropolitan Police is the answer at this stage. But what certainly needs to be done, as I said in my Deepcut blog, is to ensure that across the board the people who lead our troops into battle are capable of doing the job properly. There are far too many now who are clearly not."
No doubt the high paid help would say that it hasn't come to this and that everything is tickety-boo. If that is the case, I'd love to see them stand up to the bean counters and Yes-men that are undoubtedly the root cause of so many problems amongst all the Services.
I wouldn't be suprised if in the next budget review we didn't get a report from some very expensive consultants telling us that we need to tighten our belts, before finding out we can't afford the fees for such magnificent advice, so we'll sell a couple of bases or a Regiment here or there. Inter-Service banter aside (long may it continue :ok: ), it's about time we all stood up as one and told the bean counters where to stuff it. Or am I just being naive here?