TSR2 - dont click if you dont like links to pictures

[Nantucket Sleighride]

Seasons greetings

I know the posting of links to pictures on here is frowned upon by some, but this is simply stunning and real food for thought for what might have been…

TSR2 (http://www.airliners.net/open.file/979918/L/)

[seand]

Nice pic

Typical BAC aircraft lots of stright lines, its a shame that Hawker didn't get their hands on it to add a few curves and a bit of a better shape (in looks that is).

Shame our friends up north didn't have the use of french curves when designing the airframe outline. Putting aside what the aircraft does, as a designer I've alway's liked the look of Hawker aircraft (hence why I wanted to work for them), as pilots and the end user what has been the best looking British airframe built and seen operational service in your opinion.

Sea Fury
Sea Hawk
Harrier
Buc
Hunter
etc

Happy Christmas to all

[Beagle-eye]

At the risk of being labeled spotter ..... this site has some excellent information on TSR2 history and systems as well as a few good photo's.

http://www.targetlock.org.uk/tsr2/



:ok:

[Skeleton]

Should have gone into production and would no doubt still be providing sterling service today.

Yes there were production issues, cock ups etc...

But it was criminal to kill her.

Shame on those who did! :(

[BEagle]

Sir Sidney Camm's design for the GOR339 requirement, the P1129, was, if anything, even more good-looking than TSR2.

[GeeRam]

These are good ones a well.

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v726/Stewart1a/TSRII.jpg

http://www.thunder-and-lightnings.co.uk/public2/tsr2ro5.jpg

[MightyGem]

even more good-looking than TSR2
Is it only me who doesn't see the connection between "good looking" and "TSR2"?

[BEagle]

Probably. But you are a helicopter pilot, after all....

[Onan the Clumsy]

shouldn't that be "even better looking"?

:8

[BEagle]

If I hadn't hyphenated the two words, quite probably. Thus instead of 'better looking' for the comparative and 'best looking' for the superlative, my phraseology suggests 'more good-looking' for the comparative and 'most good-looking' for the superlative.

But I never did the 'C' exam, OCC, ISS or any other reeding and riteing course during my time in the RAF .

Anyway, the TSR2 looks superb!

[Onan the Clumsy]

I think I just got out-:8ed


:ok:




I was born in 1960, so I vaguely remember hearing adults talk about it being scrapped. Yes she was beautiful alright. Very powerful looking.

[Skipness One Echo]

Once Typhoon is delivered that's it for the British aircraft industry. How different it once may have been if we'd been more like the French.....(and that's something I don't say every day.)

[Zoom]

MightyGem
That's pretty damned close to blasphemy - wash your mouth out at once!

Skipness
Agreed, so why doesn't our aviation industry get a head start in the next technology and spend some real dosh on RPVs, UPVs, UMVs, uPVCs or whatever they're called before it's totally washed up. It is the only way (left) to go.

[John Farley]

My apologies to TSR2 fans but allow me to put a different point of view.

Critics are seldom popular, but as a one time professional critic of potential military aircraft I have to say that an aerodynamic design optimised around a specification that gives priority to payload, range and a high cruise speed at low level will always have a tiny wing in order to minimise drag and improve cruise fuel consumption.

A tiny wing unavoidably leads to real problems with respect to takeoff and landing distances as well as providing an inferior medium speed manoeuvring capability. So personally I was relieved that the TSR2 was among the batch of cancelled projects that included the P1154, Fairey Rotodyne and AW681 because I felt all four were fatally flawed technically.

The P1154 design (a supersonic vertical lander which was pre Harrier) had silly efflux temperatures and velocities around and under the aeroplane during takeoff and landing and all wingborne flight with the PCB lit.

The Fairy Rotodyne was a design intended for city centre operation that thanks to a rotor driven by tip jets was so noisy it presented a real danger to the hearing of anybody in its vicinity who was not wearing ear defenders.

The AW681 (a VSTOL jet transport aircraft to support the P1154 concept of tactical ops.) was designed to do a job that clearly could have been done for a fraction of the cost by a helicopter.

Mind you I do accept that the reasons for cancelling this batch of programmes were most likely based on political expediency rather than technical merit.

[pr00ne]

Skipness one echo,

You might as well say that once Rafale is delivered that's it for the French aircraft industry.

How different it once may have been if we'd been more like the British....(then we too may be able to say that we have the 2nd largest aerospace industry in the world, like the British have)


Stop spreading ridiculous urban myths.

[Onan the Clumsy]

A tiny wing unavoidably leads to real problems with respect to takeoff and landing distances as well as providing an inferior medium speed manoeuvring capability. Yeah, but fifty thousand feet a minute at sea-level :ok:

It'd make one hell of a jump plane.




a job that clearly could have been done for a fraction of the cost by a helicopter. It's not often you hear that :confused:

[Skipness One Echo]

Proone

Airbus, albeit civil at Toulouse, building hundreds of airframes per year is a fact not a myth. Airbus is in France because the French invested heavily after Concorde. They are even assembled in Germany because the Germans wanted it badly.
In the UK we have Typhoon, the Hawk(still) and some rebuilt Nimrods. Name me a new aircraft design that will be UK built? No?
BAe even sold the 125 sold to the US as BAe wouldn't develop it - the US did and still build it. All BAE do is manfacture bits for other more ambitious people.
Wake up and smell the coffee

[pr00ne]

Skipness One Echo,

More urban myth!

A few facts;

Airbus at Toulouse is building forward fuselages for hundreds of Airbus airliners, they are also “assembling” the wide bodies. The actual aircraft is “built” all around Europe, with all of the wings, fuel systems, undercarriage systems for the entire range and every centre fuselage for the A321s all built, designed and engineered in the UK.

There is very little value add in the actual final assembly process, especially the way that Airbus builds aircraft. BAE were offered the A320 final assembly and turned it down as it was not high tech and nowhere near as beneficial to their technology as the wing design and build. Add to that the 300 UK companies who are suppliers to the Airbus programme.

Airbus by the way is not French, it is a consortium owned 80% by EADS, itself a multi-national consortium consisting of the French, germans, Italians and Spanish, and 20% by BAES.

BAE may have sold the 125 design to the US but the entire airframe is still built at Hawarden.

The future of Aerospace manufacturing is in systems, integration and design, all areas where the UK is world class. Take the US where even Boeing put up their aerostructures business for sale, GKN of the UK bought the military side at St.Louis but turned down the civil side at Seattle as there was not enough margin in it.

UK still has a larger Aerospace industry than any other country after the US in terms of turn over and numbers of people employed. With major investments in huge multi-national projects such as F-35, Typhoon, A380, A400M and as revealed this week R and D into future UCAV systems. Hang RR engines on the new Boeing 787 and with all the other UK content they are over 38% British, the same figures for the A380 is over 60%.

UK Aerospace is NOT all about BAES, don’t forget huge international players such as Smiths, Rolls-Royce, GKN and Meggit, without even mentioning world class players such as Martin Baker.

Industry is about far far more than mere assembly, genuine high margin high tech systems are the future, shareholder value demands a concentration there rather than assembly plants that look good but add nothing to your core competences, technology or future.

Fully awake and enjoying a latte…………………..

[green granite]

The Fairy Rotodyne was a design intended for city centre operation that thanks to a rotor driven by tip jets was so noisy it presented a real danger to the hearing of anybody in its vicinity who was not wearing ear defenders.

O he who does it vertically

Before your time there but I was in the maintainance hangar @ Bedford when the rotodyne landed on the threashold of 09.
conversation was imposible and the vibration was amazing
:ooh:

[Fg Off Bloggs]

Sorry to take you all way back to the 2nd post on this thread but, seand, are you seriously suggesting within your seemingly Hawker list of beautifully designed aircraft that the 'Buc' was a Hawker design?

Not according to the late (& great) Roy Boot of the Blackburn Aircraft Company!

[Skipness One Echo]

Still "Made in France" sadly.
Where are the new British designs?

[pr00ne]

Skipness One Echo.

“Still "Made in France" sadly.”

No,

Assembled in France from very high tech fully equipped airframe component sections designed, engineered, manufactured and tested in the UK, Germany and Spain.

Where are the new British designs?

A350, A380, A400M, A330, A340, Typhoon etc etc etc.

All as British as they are French (or German, or Spanish, or Italian).

Fully involved in the F-35, loads of system, component and airframe work on the F/A-22, Boeing MMA, Global Express, Learjet 35, Gripen, EH101 etc etc etc.

The aerospace world is a truly global one, even the US no longer designs purely on it’s own, just look at the F-35. Japan and Italy provide more of the airframe for the 777 and 787 than Boeing.

[wg13_dummy]

John Farley, I'm sitting with fingers in ears, singing 'la la la la la la, I can't hear you, la la la la'. As I did in the late seventies when Kate Bush wafted onto us and the masses suggested she was odder than the number seven. The analogy is similar I feel. Barking mad, gorgeous but some how 'different'. I like to keep that thought locked into my tiny head.

How dare you bring rational, scientific and down right common sense into our boyhood w*n%ing sessions!! The TSR 2 looks like what a boy would draw on the back of his maths book as the definative well 'ard war plane. I care not for the fact that it may well have been less effective than a Labour Minister on a morale boosting mission to Iraq but you have shattered the illusion in the same way that my father told me Santa was nothing more than a drunken Scandanavian only after a free plate of mince pies and a quick knee trembler with me mum! Shame on you and may your New Year be infested with emails from the 'TSR 2 Lovers society, Birmingham Branch'.

As for mighty gem......The Scout was nothing more than a bag of scaffolding poles and Reliant Robin parts chucked together after a bad night on the pish at Westlands!! Curse you, you bloke of no taste and wearer of RAF mess kit!!

[MightyGem]

wearer of RAF mess kit
Pardon!!!!! Wash your mouth out with soap and water, boy. How many wearers of RAF mess dress have 2300hrs in a wg13(apart from maybe Dave Griffiths!)?

[BEagle]

Turning to JF's criticism, yes, you're right about much of what you say, in my humble opinion....

P1154 was fatally flawed mainly because the RAF and RN couldn't agree on a common specification. Plenum Chamber Burning would also have made it almost impossible to operate in vertical flight, due to the hot air re-ingestion and the effect on the landing platform. The more modest P1150 would have been a much better P1127 development.

HS681 also suffered from specification indecision. But when the nonsense of VTOL for a transport aeroplane was dreamed up, there was no way that such a gas-guzzler could provide the requisite payload/range figures. Had it remained as the simple Beverley replacement it was originally supposed to be, it would perhaps have been successful?

Fairey Rotodyne - another story of a design whose specification requirements kept changing. The prototypes were indeed very noisy in helicopter mode when the unsilenced tip jets were running; however, progress was being made with silencers when the programme was cancelled. If the specification had been frozen earlier in the programme, it is possible that the Rotodyne might have succeeded. But the city centre to city centre air travel concept never really caught on, so the civil market for the aircraft was somewhat speculative. In the military role, a medium lift helicopter or a short take-off conventional aeroplane (or both) would have been able to achieve anything the Rotodyne offered.

TSR2. Indeed optimised for high speed, particularly at low level. I understand it was a pig to fly at approach speeds, but then again, so was the Buccaneer, particularly when blown. But it met or exceeded all the targets of the initial flight test programme. Would it have needed better medium speed manoeuvrability? I doubt it - was it any worse than the F-104 in that respect? In any case, it was really a high speed supersonic nuclear bomber rather than the 'tactical strike' aircraft it had originally been intended to be. But even M0.9 down in the weedisphere would have been enough.

Of the 4, TSR2 was the one which should have gone ahead - and perhaps also the civil Rotodyne. TSR2 was killed by political bungling, design overcomplication and the blinkered pro-carrier stance of Mountbottom.

[Gainesy]

Apart from my garage door*, I thought that the last truly Westland design was the Wyvern, all t'other stuff being licence built and/or collaborative. Wasp and Scout design coming from Saro (Saunders-Rowe).

* Said door works about 75% of the time.

[mystic_meg]

(Saunders-Rowe).

or, more correctly Saunders ROE

(t'other one is some dubious moustached dinosaur at a secret Wilts airbase..)

[The Right Stuff]

Before I start, just be aware I love the TSR2; gorgeous thing that it is. First time I saw one was at Duxford, I wandered into the hanger and my jaw hit the floor. Dad was like, oh yeah, that’s the TSR2.…

Heard the tale that on the one flight they did with afterburner, one burner was lit and it left the Lightning chase plane for dead, despite the Lightning using both Avons in re-heat. Awesome.

I had the fortune recently to meet a guy from the design team on the TSR2 and asked him about the aeroplane. He enlightened me with concerns about the materials and construction methods, and doubted it would have made a good service aircraft.

New alloys were invented and developed for the TSR2, and not enough was known about their fatigue life for a service life. That’s how cutting edge it was. Also things like hydraulic lines were welded in place; a new idea apparently, but I shudder to think of the complications that arises.

Still wish it has flown in my lifetime though. At least they didn’t force cutting up of the aeroplanes as well as the tooling.

[Navaleye]

Before I start, just be aware I love the TSR2; gorgeous thing that it is. First time I saw one was at Duxford, I wandered into the hanger and my jaw hit the floor. Dad was like, oh yeah, that’s the TSR2.…

Can't agree more. Lovely looking bird. Can't help thinking it looked a bit delicate though. I read that the design was far from mature and the risks/costs involved in moving it from a prototype to an operational a/c was very significant.

Never mind at least we still have Concorde.... oh bu&&er.

[Gainesy]

MMeg,
Phingers Phaff Typow.

[seand]

Sorry to take you all way back to the 2nd post on this thread but, seand, are you seriously suggesting within your seemingly Hawker list of beautifully designed aircraft that the 'Buc' was a Hawker design?

The Buc wasn't a Hawer design but is in my list for it's looks!

[northernmonkey]

The TSR2 wasn't a million miles away in Looks to the septics Vigilante. (through my failing eyes)

http://www.wam.umd.edu/~pbushmil/atomized_jr/images/2005/01/15/RVAH7_AZ.jpg

Although it would have been a wheeze to watch someone try and land one on the Nimitz

[BossEyed]

Oh, the TSR2 was much better looking. :ok: For one thing, it didn't squit its payload out the back like some sort of incontinent duck. :O (.See "Linear Bomb Bay" here (http://www.vectorsite.net/ava5.html))


This site (see "[2]") (http://www.vectorsite.net/avtsr2.html) does claim an A-5 influence in the TSR2 design, but provides no justification for the statement, which reeks of NIH.

[Brian Abraham]

A-5, now theres another lovely aircraft. If it looks right it must fly ----------- the guys who flew it would post their own epithet from what I under stand, particularly coming aboard ship. Story, true or not? Bomb out the back had an unfortunate habit of flying trail on the aircraft, hence relegation to recon role.

[LowObservable]

I remember reading (Aircraft Annual 1963?) that the TSR.2 was designed to use 600-yard runways. All one can say looking back is that it would have been an interesting sight with that eedy-beedy 37-foot wing, full-span blown flaps notwithstanding.
I think there's an earlier discussion that refers to a symposium on TSR.2 a few years ago, in which a mixed picture of the project emerged - that in many respects it was not running well and that the avionics and systems development promised to be entertaining to say the least. Without sinking into WCSYC (we couldn't so you can't) thinking, it's worth pointing out that after spending a whole load of money, TAC ended up with 400-some F-111s in four distinctly different variants - A, D, E & F - and that the D, which was supposed to be the ultimate Mk2 avionics system, was never deployed overseas.
And whatever you may think of Mountbottom, he had accidentally stumbled across an important point - that when you start with a low-level attack aircraft and then specify M=1.2 on the deck and M=2.0 at altitude it costs you a lot of money, and when do you really need it? OK, there were Gulf War cases of Varks scoring kills on fearless but dumb pilots chasing them at low level and runnning into cumulogranite, but really?
Can't help thinking that if someone back then had designed a sort of SuperBuc with an honest 0.9 on the deck and space for good avionics, it would be there today with Litening III and towed decoys. and about 97 small diameter bombs. I believe that there are people in the USN who rue the day that the A-6F was cancelled. (F404s and a new radar and cockpit - late 1980s.)
A-5s - I believe that the TSR.2 used a version of the Autonetics computer from the Viggie, and the designs were pretty similar in some respects (if very different in others). I was on a forum a few years ago with a USN fighter/test pilot whose hatred of Viggies was cataclysmic... they were dangerous and they were maintenance hogs, but it seems that the worst was that they were so freakin fast over the target that they outran their fighter escorts, and that anything that the NVA fired at the Viggie usually went short and ended up in the proximity of the escorts.

[MMEMatty]

As far as TSR-2 Take off / Land performance, one story i heard was that NATO decided that if WWIII ever kicked off, then some airfields on the west coast of france would survive the initial nuclear attack, and it was from these that the TSR-2 would operate as the second strike capability that the RAF lacked (we've all heard the stories about how the Vulcan didnt have enough low level range to get to its targets and back again).

Avionics, well they were all done before the transistor became available. Lots of room, lots of space used up that wouldnt need to be a few years later.

Still, lovely looking aircraft, and its always nicer to think "What might have been" than "What were we thinking?"

Matt

[critical winge]

Hey guys a beautiful aircraft indeed, as its a pilots forum, anyone got any decent cockpit pics and performance specs.

Cheers, Ciao bellas

ok found it, gotta send in multi posts, sorry

Origins
The tale of the TSR.2 began in March 1957, when the Air Staff announced its operational requirement GOR.339. The GOR.339 document (which later became OR.339, and after review OR.343) called for a tactical strike and reconnaissance aircraft, to enter service in 1964. The GOR.339 aircraft was to be able to operate in all weather conditions, without relying on external systems (such as navigation beacons) to complete its mission. The mission pattern assumed was an attack at very low level, at high subsonic speed on most of the way to the target, with a supersonic dash over the target. At high altitude, the aircraft should be able to fly at Mach 2 and to \"supercruise\", although this term had not been invented yet. Despite being a tactical strike aircraft, it had to be able to reach targets up to 1000nm (1850km) away. The load would be a tactical nuclear free-fall bomb, or conventional bombs. A crew of two, pilot and navigator, was to fly the aircraft. A good take-off and landing performance was required.

From the start, some fog surrounded GOR.339. The introduction to this document stated that the requirement contained the \"broad outlines\" of the project. It also stated that the aircraft would be able to fly missions to the USSR, with in-flight refuelling, and thus added an unofficial strategic dimension to the GOR.339 requirement. This suggests strongly that, although the GOR.339 was officially intended to replace only the Canberra, it was also being regarded by the Air Staff as a possible replacement and enhancement for the V-bomber force. After the cancellation of the Skybolt air-launched ballistic missile, it had been decided to transfer the nuclear deterrent to the Royal Navy and its Polaris submarines. But the RAF wanted to retain a nuclear capability. The GOR.339 was considered to be suitable for a condition of \"limited\" nuclear war.

Proposals were submitted by Avro, Blackburn, Bristol, Fairey, English Electric, Handley Page, de Havilland, Short Brothers, and Vickers. The proposal from Blackburn was a modified version of the NA.39 Buccaneer naval attack aircraft, which it was going to build for the Royal Navy. Although the NA.39 did not meet the requirements of GOR.339, the Secretary of State for Air suggested that the Buccaneer could be required as an interim replacement for the Canberra. The GOR.339, he suggested, would not enter service before 1968. But this idea was dismissed by the RAF: The Blackburn NA.39 was unsuitable because it was subsonic, had a too short range, required a too long runway, and had an insufficiently advanced bombing system. The RAF would rather prefer the keep the Canberra (subsonic, and with a primitive bombing system) in service a few years longer! Obviously, there was a fear that adoption of the NA.39 as a palliative would lead to abandonment of the GOR.339. Nobody can have expected that in the end, it would be the other way around. The RN of course liked the idea of the RAF accepting a derivative of its NA.39, because this would reduce the costs. The First Sea Lord advocated the NA.39 as much superior to the Canberra, and available in 1961. He even offered to share the ordered pre-production aircraft with the RAF. His suggestion was again rejected by the Air Ministry. As the Air Ministry would state later, for the purposes of the RAF the NA.39 would be obsolescent by the time it could enter service!

On 17 June 1958, the Deputy Chief of Air Staff defended the OR.339 in the Defence Research Policy Committee (DRPC). AM G. Tuddle argued that the OR.339 was also vital to the aircraft industry, the position of the UK in the NATO, the Army, and (surprise!) the Navy. He added that it would probably be \"the last military fighting aircraft developed in the UK.\" This statement was probably based on the 1957 \"Defence White Paper\", that boldly had declared all manned aircraft obsolescent in favour of missiles. The GOR.339 was making an exception on this rule.

According to Tuddle, the development of OR.339 would cost 35 million, and it would be ready in 1965. The representative of the Navy correctly dismissed these predictions as overly optimistic, and advocated NA.39 again to fill the gap between the Canberra and OR.339 --- it was even possible, he suggested, to delay OR.339 by two years. However, when it was later suggested that the RN could adopt the aircraft developed for the RAF, the Admiralty was quick to answer that NA.39 and OR.339 were not in competition and designed for different roles.

On 10 September, the Minister of Defence authorized a production order for the NA.39, and indicated that he would not yet set a limit on production. The suggestion that in the future some surplus NA.39 might be available upset the RAF, and it began putting pressure on the Minister, H. Watkinson, to decide on OR.339. In November the Ministry of Defence gave authorization to ask the Treasury for the money for the development. But then the estimated development costs were already up to 70 million, twice the amount mentioned in June. When the Air Ministry asked the Treasury to allocate 62 million to them, with an option on an additional 15 to 25 million, this provoked a sharp reaction. The response from the Treasury amounted to a thinly veiled accusation that the RAF had deliberately underestimated the costs to safeguard the programme, and suggested to look at the NA.39 option again. The Treasury also complained that the MoD asked for large amounts of money, while it was not yet itself convinced of the need for the OR.339!

On 1 January 1959, a press statement was issued, using for the first time the name TSR.2. The acronym TSR indicated the aircraft\'s function of Tactical Strike / Reconnaissance, although the first documents described it as Tactical Support / Reconnaissance. TSR.1 was supposed to be the Canberra. It is also possible that someone had remembered the original TSR.II --- the prototype of the Fairey Swordfish! The air staff requirement was revised and now became OR.343. It was required that one squadron would be fully equipped at the end of 1965. Thus began the long fight of the RAF against delays of the TSR.2 program. The 1965 goal could only be met, it was agreed, if no changes were made to the specifications during development and by a very concentrated effort.

There was still anxiety about the very high costs, and on 7 March the Chiefs of Staffs were asked to review the need for the TSR.2 again. They submitted a paper in May. In a later meeting, Minister of Defence mentioned that there were two cures to the cost problem. The first was selling the TSR.2 to the USAF, which he intended to try during his next visit to the USA. This was a reasonable hope, because the USAF did already have a licence-built version of the Canberra in service, the Martin B-57. The other option was giving the TSR.2 an extended strategic role by fitting it with a missile. The latter option would of course not reduce the cost, but it would make the TSR.2 more useful, and thus help justifying the expenditure. But the Minister\'s suggestion that this could be a weapon \"like Bulpup\" revealed his lack of technical knowledge: The US Bullpup had a range of about 10km. The development of a new cruise missile for the TSR.2 was under consideration. Blue Steel, the missile carried by the V-bombers, was much too large.

Contracts, Management, and Cancellation
The first TSR.2 contract was placed on 3 June 1959, but this was only a development contract, running until 30 July 1960. It was not until the autumn of 1960 that all branches of the government finally agreed with the development of the TSR.2, and the contract was signed on 6 October. The Treasury agreed with an expenditure of 61.7 million pound. A Progress Review Committee, a Development Progress Committee, a Management Board and a Steering Committee would supervise the TSR.2 development. In the long run, these committee would show themselves complete incapable of controlling the TSR.2 project.

After the 1959 elections, Duncan Sandys had begun to reorganize what was left of the British aviation industry. There was a feeling that there were too many and too small companies --- the financial weakness of some of them was due to Sandys\' own 1957 Defence White Paper. Not only were these thought to be uncompetitive, it was also an expensive situation for the taxpayer. The creation of the V-bomber force had resulted in contract for two interim types (the Sperrin and the Valiant) and two definitive types (the Victor and the Vulcan) at great expense. In the future there would certainly be fewer, but more expensive development contracts, and the creation of larger conglomerates was logical. To achieve this reorganisation, the government made it a condition in the contracts for GOR.339 and other projects, and even cancelled orders for a batch of Victor bombers because Handley Page refused to cooperate.

Hence the contract for GOR.339 was placed with a conglomerate of Vickers-Armstrong, English Electric, and Bristol Aeroplane. BAC was created speedily, and a final agreement was signed in in June 1960. The three merging companies had 40:40:20 shares. At the engine side a similar merger occurred: The Olympus 22R Mk.320 engines would be developed by Bristol-Siddeley Engines, also recently created by a merger of Bristol Engines and Armstrong Siddeley. This choice of engine had not been the one of BAC, which had preferred Rolls-Royce engines. It was easier to sign a formal merger than to achieve integration between design team and work forces that were used to compete sharply with each other. Not everyone was enthusiast about the enforced merger, and the cooperation within BAC often lacked effectiveness.

The allocation of the contract was by no means the end of the political discussions. On 27 March 1962 the MoD called for a new review of the TSR.2 project, because estimates of the development cost had risen to 137 million. The DRPC decided that the TSR.2 development could continue, but only on condition that the project would be reviewed again when new cost estimates became available. In July 1962 the Management Board for the TSR.2 project heard more bad news: The first flight date was being shifted back to August 1963. The reason was highly embarrassing: BAC had failed to produce a number of drawings, and certain parts of the prototypes had therefore not been manufactured!

In December 1962 the cost estimates were up to 175--200 million, with a rather large margin of error. The estimated unit cost had risen to 2.1 million, and the predicted service entry of the TSR.2 had slipped back to late 1967. The Management Board was highly dissatisfied, and suggested that BAC could improve its own management of the programme. The director of BAC, George Edwards, agreed and made some suggestions. BAC was also willing to accept \"incentive clauses\" in their contract. Officials began to take a cynical view at the cost of the TSR.2 program, but in February 1963 the DRPC agreed again with the continuation of it. Suggestions were made by the MoD and the Admiralty that the number of TSR.2s could be reduced to 50 or 60 instead if 138, but the RAF and MoA rejected these. In June the estimates were up again, to 197--222 million.

In June 1963 an order was placed for eleven pre-production TSR.2s, to reinforce the development batch of 9 aircraft. Important was also a visit by an Australian delegation, because the RAAF wanted 24 strike aircraft. (The RAAF would later also select the F-111, and it would actually receive these aircraft.) The confidence was now growing, and in October the MoA gave a press release on the TSR.2. The reaction from the press was considered favourable by the MoA, but \"inevitably there was a tendency to dwell upon the cost.\" The RAF began making plans for the training of TSR.2 crews.

In December 1963 the TSR.2 program was debated in the House of Commons. The Times commented sarcastically that there were \"rumours of cancellation\", and official denials of this \"strenuous enough to spread panic through the arms industry\". There were also questions about the strategic role of the TSR.2, because of an earlier decision that the RAF would abandon this role to the RN and its Polaris missiles. In his reply the MoD stressed that the strategic role of the TSR.2 was only a bonus, not the reason for its existence.

next:

As far as the TSR.2 was concerned, 1964 was just more of the same: Rising costs, slipping time schedules, and disagreements between government officials and BAC. It was now obvious that the RAF, MoA and MoD had lost their confidence in the management of BAC. The TSR.2 had still not flown in July 1964, but cost estimates were now at 240 million, with an unit price of 2.3 to 2.8 million. It made its first light on 27 September.

In October 1964, a Labour government came in power. It wanted to reduce the defence budget to 2000 million a year by 1969/1970. And because TSR.2 was the most expensive development contract running, it was a logical target. The R&D costs were now estimated at 272 million, and the production costs for 158 aircraft at 469 million. This prompted yet another review of the TSR.2 program, and a number of foreign types were considered to replace it, including the TFX, later known as the F-111. This was, sadly, also a mismanaged project, and an Air Staff team sent to Washington reported that \"There is some reason to believe that there are difficulties about aerodynamics, weight growth and rising cost.\" Nevertheless, it was estimated that 158 TFX aircraft could be acquired for 332 million.

Several means of cutting the costs were also considered, and a proposal to negotiate an agreement on a fixed-price contract was approved in March 1965. Meanwhile, it was decided to update the specifications of the TSR.2 by taking into account the first flight test results.

On 15 January 1965, the Secretary of State for Defence expressed for te first time his view that the TSR.2 should be cancelled, along with the P.1154 and the HS681. The TFX would be cheaper, although it was admitted that costs might rise --- this aircraft was still in an early stage of development. At the end of January, it was decided to defer a decision until a closer comparison of the TFX and the TSR.2 had been made. The Prime Minister announced this decision on the House of Commons in early February. He estimated that this would cost the taxpayer 4 million per month.

At the end of March, the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee reviewed its position. BAC had refused to accept a fixed price contract, although it had been willing to accept a limited financial responsibility. The final decision was made in two Cabinet meetings on 1 April. An option for the F-111A was secured before announcing the cancellation, because the government did not want to be \"in the hands of the Americans\". The USA was willing to sell the F-111 at an unit price of 2.125 million pound for the first ten and 2.32 million for later aircraft. The UK did not yet have to commit itself to actually buying the F-111.

On 6 April 1965, the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, announced the cancellation of the TSR.2 in the House of Commons. The Secretary of State for Defence, Denis Healey, explained that the government had been very reluctant to do so, but that the cost of the TSR.2 program was becoming an \"intolerable burden\", because the total cost of 750 millions pounds amounted to 5 million per aircraft, assuming a production of 150 aircraft. Such an expenditure, he declared, could not be cost-effective. He added that even the best efforts of BAC and the government could not provide any \"assurance that the Government\'s ultimate financial responsibility would be limited\".

Healey continued to say that Britain could no longer afford to produce combat aircraft for its own armed forces only. He went one important step further when he announced the governments intention to reduce the number of strike aircraft that would be bought for the RAF. \"It might even be possible to reshape our defences in such a way as to dispense with this type of aircraft altogether.\" When questioned about this remarkable statement, Healey admitted that this was very unlikely. It would only occur if Britain would decide to retire its forces from the Middle East and Asia. He mentioned that the government did indeed intend to buy a new strike aircraft, the General Dynamics F-111A, and that this could be done for less than half the price of the TSR.2 program.

To that date, BAC had received 125 million for the development of the TSR.2, and about 70 million had still to be paid.

Design
The TSR.2 was intended to cruise at Mach 2.05 at an altitude of 36000ft (10100m), and to achieve supersonic speeds at treetop height. This had to be combined with a long range and a good take-off and landing performance. These requirements called for powerful engines, a large fuel load, and a small wing.

The most remarkable characteristic of the TSR.2 was its enormous length. >From front to tail the fuselage contained a small radar, the cockpit, an avionics bay, a large fuel tank, the jet intakes and another fuel tank, the bomb bay, and the large engines with two more fuel tanks. The fuselage was crammed with fuel, and even the engines were almost completely surrounded by fuselage fuel tanks 3 and 4. About 80% of the fuel was in the fuselage, the rest was integral wing tanks. The internal fuel capacity was 5588 imp. gallons (25425 litre). The small wing was of delta planform with cropped wingtips. Instead of giving the entire wing anhedral, the wingtips were turned sharply downwards. Almost the entire wing was an integral fuel tank. Two pylons could be fitted under each wing, to carry missiles, bombs, or even more fuel --- the ferry tanks contained 2400 imp gallons, 10920 litre.

A small, highly loaded wing gives the smoothest ride at very low altitude, but to achieve the requested good take-off and landing performance, the entire wing trailing surface had to be fitted with blown flaps. They could be turned down to 50 degrees for landing, the take-off setting was 35 degrees. There were no ailerons, and the TSR.2 relied on differential operational of the tailplanes for roll control.

The tailfin and tailplanes had no fixed parts, but the elevators were split in two sections. Four airbrakes were fitted on the aft fuselage, in the narrow gap between the wing trailing edge and the tailfins.

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Engines
The engine intakes were of half-circular type, with movable shock cones. There were auxiliary intake doors behind the lips of the main intakes.

The Olympus 22R Mk.320 engines were twin-spool axial-flow engines, with variable afterburners and water injection. They were designed for sustained cruise at Mach 2+, a feature which would be used later in the Concorde, which was also powered by the Olympus --- at least the money for the engine development was not wasted.

The development of the Olympus 22R engine was not without problems. That there was a serious problem was demonstrated in December 1962, when a Vulcan testbed exploded during ground running. The event was traced back to a resonant vibration of the turbine, excited by the coolant air flow for the turbine blades. In July 1964 the shaft of an Olympus engine failed during ground testing, requiring more modifications. And after the engines had been installed in the first TSR.2, the vibration problems were back.

Crew Accommodation
The two crew members sat far forward in the fuselage, on Martin Baker Mk.8A ejection seats. The location of the cockpit was chosen to reduce the vibrations during low-level flights as much as possible.

The view from the front cockpit was very good, without any glare even in bright sunlight conditions. Only during the initial climb had the seat to be raised. The navigator only had a view on the outside world by two small windows in the side of the hood. Directly in front of him was nothing but a large electronics panel. The most serious complaint about the cockpit design was related to the very unreliable and temperamental air conditioning.

Equipment
The Autonetics Verdan computer system was an American product, developed for the A-5 Vigilante carrier-based jet bomber --- an aircraft which had many similarities with the TSR.2. It combined data from the nose radar, the Doppler navigation radar, and an inertial navigation system. The TSR.2 was also fitted with a radar altitude meter and systems to keep the TSR.2 automatically at an altitude of 90m. The system was designed for blind attacks with an error of less than 100ft (30m).

The nose radar had limited search capability, only over sea or flat terrain, and an air-to-air capacity suitable to assist in the connection with tanker aircraft. It was intended primarily for navigation and bomb aiming.

For the reconnaissance radar, a pallet could be installed in the bomb bay. This contained a side-looking radar, cameras, and a line scanner.



Landing Gear
The TSR.2 stood high above the ground, and a not too tall person could walk under it. It had a backward retracting nose leg with twin wheels. The mainwheel had two wheel in tandem, and retracted into the fuselage. During tests, there were several occurrences of heavy vibrations upon touchdown, and modifications to the landing gear were planned.

A tail parachute was fitted and routinely used during the test flights.

Prototypes
The original contract called for 9 prototypes. This was later extended by the order of 11 pre-production aircraft.

The first TSR.2 was rolled out at Weybridge (Vickers) on 4 March 1964, but the first flight was repeatedly delayed. It was found that the engines required modification because they did not fit into the TSR.2, a sign of the poor communications between BAC and Bristol Sidddeley. After relocation of the engine accessories they were installed, but during ground tests there were serious vibrations. A palliative was implemented, and the TSR.2 was cleared for its first flight, but with an engine power limitation. Afterwards, test pilot Roland Beamont commented: \"It is clear that the current engine ratings leave the aircraft critically short of thrust, and this situation is likely to dictate the rate of flight development.\" New engines would have to be fitted, and this caused again a delay of months.

There was pressure to have the TSR.2 ready to fly at Farnborough\'s SBAC show in September. But the first flight of XR219 was finally made on 27 September, with Roland P. Beamont at the controls and D. J. Bowen in the navigator\'s seat. For this flight, the undercarriage was left extended and the engine intake configuration fixed. Beamont found that the TSR.2 was pleasant to fly, without any major deficiencies. The behaviour was very close to that predicted by design studies and a simulator.

The second flight was not made until the end of December, because the engines had to be replaced. The undercarriage was also troublesome, and not until the tenth flight was a successful undercarriage retraction achieved. This was on 6 February 1965. Supersonic speed was achieved on the 14th flight, on 22 February, when XR219 achieved supersonic speed at \"Max. Dry Intermediate\" power. The full performance envelope could not be investigated during this flight, because of an error in the No.2 engine (port) which prevented the selection of afterburning. Nevertheless Beamont flew the aircraft to Mach 1.12, with only the No.1 engine at 1/3 afterburner. The XR219 remained completely controllable, with only a small trim change required.

The TSR.2 was directionally very stable, stable in pitch, and somewhat unstable laterally at subsonic speeds. Supersonic flight was reached with only mild buffet between Mach 0.93 and Mach 1, and no trim change was needed. At supersonics speeds it became laterally stable, and behaved flawlessly.

While everything was fine on the aerodynamics side, there were numerous teething troubles with other elements of the TSR.2. The undercarriage continued to cause problems, with serious (1.5g) oscillations on touch-down. The cabin air conditioning failed to operate in any reasonable way. The engines were a source of constant problems.

After the cancellation on 6 April 1965, the three TSR.2s built were immediately grounded. They were never to fly again.



Aftermath
In January 1968 the UK cancelled its option on the F-111. At that time the favourite aircraft of McNamara was in serious trouble. It fell below the specifications, was seriously delayed and had become even more expensive than the TSR.2. Although the USN abandoned its F-111B carrier-borne fighter version as totally unsuitable, the F-111 was not cancelled. Later the F-111 would prove that it was an effective strike aircraft.

It was decided to buy the F-4 Phantom for the tactical attack role, and the Buccaneer as long-range strike aircraft. This was a remarkable reversal of fortunes. A single Buccaneer, XK487, had been used as a testbed for the TSR.2\'s radar in 1963, and had attracted new interest from the RAF because of its excellent performance at low altitudes. In 1969 the RAF received the first example of the aircraft it had rejected twelve years earlier. In July 1970 No.12 squadron became the first operational Buccanneer unit of the RAF. The land-based version of the Buccaneer was the S.2A. The S.2B was a modified version, which had a bulging bomb bay door with an additional fuel tank, and provision for the Martel missile.

Storage
XR222 is in the Imperial War Museum at Duxford

XR220 is on display at Cosford in Wolverhampton

XR219, XR221 and XR223 are reportedly at the shooting range of Shoeburyness.

XR224, XR225, XR226 and XR227 were scrapped. The nose of one is at the Brooklands museum in Weybridge.

Statistics
Here four aircraft are compared: The TSR.2, the Buccaneer S.2 that effectively replaced it, the General Dynamics F-111A that was once selected to replace it, and the North American A-5 Vigilante. The mention of the latter may be a surprise in this context. But this carrier-borne attack aircraft resembled the TSR.2 in many ways, and actually preceded it by seven years. It had the same all-moving tail surfaces, the long fuselage, the blown flaps, the inertial navigation system, the twin engines and the internal bomb bay. It failed as an attack aircraft because of a complicated and ineffective bomb bay design. The data listed here are for the reconnaissance version, which carried more fuel.

Type BAC TSR.2 Blackburn Buccaneer S.2 G.D. F-111A North American RA-5C Vigilante
Engines Bristol Siddeley Olympus Mk.320 Rolls-Royce RB168 Spey Mk.101 P&W TF30-P-3 General Electric J79-GE-10
Thrust 13865kg 5105kg 8380k 8127kg
Dry Thrust 8880kg
5435kg

Wing Span 11.28m 13.41m 19.20m / 9.74m 16.17m
Length 27.13m 19.33m 22.37m 23.35m
Height 7.32m 4.97m 5.22m 5.91
Wing Area 65m2 47.82m2 48.77m2 70.0m2
Empty Weight 20334kg 13608kg 20920kg 17024kg
Max. Weight 34500kg 28123kg 44780kg 36133kg
Fuel 25404l
19090l 13633l
Load internal 6 * 454kg 4 * 454kg 2 * 340kg

Load external 2722kg 5443kg


Max. Speed 2185km/h
2337km/h at 16290m 2229km/h at 12190m
Low Level Speed 1352km/h 1040km/h 1470km/h

Ceiling
+12190m 17900m 14750m
Action rad. 1850km
2140km 2414km
Range
3700km


Max. Range 6860km
5090km

respect and regards

http://www.pilotfriend.com/general_interest/potty%20aircraft/TSR2.htm

another great link

http://www.thunder-and-lightnings.co.uk/tsr2/history.html

[L J R]

anything to add, anything, Bueller?, Bueller?

[jimgriff]

http://www.ejectorseats.co.uk/mk8lhs.jpg

IMHO the Mk 8 seat was one of the best looking seats ever designed and made by Martin Baker. It had some radical design innovations for the age (main chute in headbox etc) and even today the latest Mk 16 is using some of it's design in the form of the twin ejection rails/tubes (see second pic). Mind you the 16 has twin guns and the 8 had the "traditional" 80' per second gun installed between the twin tubes.
The drogue gun was installed in the top of the port tube.
http://www.ejectorseats.co.uk/Mk8rear.jpg

From what I can gather very few of the Mk 8A seats were made.
Testing and design took up some 15 seats and there are only some 8 examples left in the world. Two of these are in 220 and a third next to as shown in pics.
Seatstar has one in it's collection and MBA have one. Farnborough (Quinetic) had one until a few years ago, but this seems to "have gone missing during a move of buildings". Anyone know where it might be?

[wub]

http://www.pbase.com/glenns/image/31580180.jpg
http://www.pbase.com/glenns/image/31580182.jpg

[TEEEJ]

Northernmonkey wrote:

"The TSR2 wasn't a million miles away in Looks to the septics Vigilante. (through my failing eyes)"

Sukhoi in the Soviet era came up with the T6. They abandoned the layout and went with swing wing. The swing wing development became known as the FENCER.

http://www.aeronautics.ru/sukhoi/su-24_fencer/su-24-023-t6-1.jpg