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ORAC
16th Dec 2005, 07:11
Defence Industrial Strategy (http://www.mod.uk/issues/industry/) Shades of Duncan Sandy....

"Dr Reid said that the need for manned fighter aircraft was likely to end in 30 years, to be replaced by unmanned craft".

Reference future FJ after Typhoon/JSF:
"Current plans do not envisage the UK needing to design and build a future generation of manned fast jet aircraft beyond these types......... Until now traditional thinking has linked the phases of design and development inevitably with manufacture. This model now needs to change. The focus must be on through-life capability management and what is required to sustain this critical capability in the likely absence of large-scale manufacture"......

"The world market for the large and training aircraft is not presently a concern, and there is no sovereign requirement to sustain an indigenous capability in these areas. We will continue to need, however, the systems engineering and design skill and access to Intellectual Property Rights for the integration of new mission systems, avionics and defensive aids into these platforms"......

MOD to work with BAe to move from a manufacturing capability to providing a through-life capability through "platform capability contracts".

OSD dates:

FJ: GR7 2010s, GR4 2020s, Typhoon 2030s, JSF 2040s. Replacements of GR4 onwards expected to be UAVs, with, "the possibility that we shall want to replace elements of the Typhoon and JSF fleets with manned aircraft".

Transport/large ac:
C-130K 2008, C-130J 2030s, C-17 2030s, FSTA ISD "early next decade"!, OSD TBD, A400M ISD early next decade, OSD 2050s, MR4A ISD early next decade OSD 2030s, Nimrod R1 2025, E3D 2030s, Astor Late 2030s.

Helos:
Merlin OSD 2030s, some Gazelles to be retained, Future Lynx for BRH & SCMR, ISD mid 2010s, Chinook configuration to be rationalised, decision on whether to proceed on work on 8 Mk3s to be taken next year. LACP decisions on replacement/sustaining Puma, SK etc TBD.

SAR Helos: "It is planned to begin to replace this capability with a single contract that retains a proportion of military aircrews to enable operational readiness of Combat SAR crews in the middle of the next decade".

mystic_meg
16th Dec 2005, 07:39
C-130K 2008
to be replaced by:
A400M ISD early next decade

...interesting!
Capability gap, anyone?

Compressorstall
16th Dec 2005, 07:46
to enable operational readiness of Combat SAR crews in the middle of the next decade

Is this a teency-weency slip of the FOC for JPR then?

BEagle
16th Dec 2005, 08:26
So, does "The world market for the large and training aircraft is not presently a concern, and there is no sovereign requirement to sustain an indigenous capability in these areas" mean that the UK is going to relinquish the RAF's own training and large aircraft programmes and simply rent time from people who can afford their own 'indigenous capabilities'?

Can you imagine any Frenchman saying such a thing?

southside
16th Dec 2005, 08:38
Of course. Isn't that what UKMFTS is all about?

BEagle
16th Dec 2005, 08:55
No it isn't.

MFTS has nothing to do with large aircraft, for one thing.

Bit late in the week for you to be at work isn't it, sailor boy? If indeed that's what you are and not the polymorphic troll many think you to be.

southside
16th Dec 2005, 09:01
Goodness me. What provoked that sort of attack? I asked a simple question regarding the future of Military Flying training only to be bombarded with a tirade of foul mouthed abuse.

So, the question remains.


Is there a sovereign requirement to sustain an indigenous capability in flying training?

charliegolf
16th Dec 2005, 09:07
Would someone end my dimwit misery by decoding FSTA please. By the various contexts, I assume it to be tankers and transport capability. Close?

CG

Si Clik
16th Dec 2005, 09:11
A mighty tome this which effectively is a Defence Review.

I would advise reading the section relevant to your expertise and experience rather than focus on the headlines.

The helicopter section certainly gives key programme decisions on Merlin CSP, BRH and SCMR which have not previously been announced.

Si

endplay
16th Dec 2005, 09:21
Capability holiday surely?

BEagle
16th Dec 2005, 10:23
Hmm - was a bit rude to southside, I guess. Sorry!

charliegolf - FSTA explained:

The Future Large Aircraft (FLA) was originally supposed to replace all the RAF’s large a/c. That proved unfeasible, so the tanker/transport requirement became Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft (FSTA) and another fight arose between A400M and C130J as the Future Transport Aircraft (FTA). FSTA then became a Private Finance Initiative (PFI) project; the preferred platform became the A330 Multi-Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) rather than the B767 offered by the rival TTSC. Meanwhile, A400M which had been the FLA was given the go-ahead to be the FTA; however, to fill the gap, a Short Term Strategic Airlifter, STSA, was needed and that became a fight between the An124 and the C-17. The RAF decided upon leased C-17s as STSA to fill the gap before FTA became reality; however, the C-17s will now be bought and the STSA will become another FTA, but not the sole FTA as that will still be the A400M. Which, of course had once been FLA and rejected as FSTA. Nevertheless, the Common Standard Aircraft (CSA) A400M does have a requirement to have an AAR role, but not as a strategic tanker as that will be the job of the FSTA, presumably the A330 MRTT – which also has immense AT capability as well as its AAR capability but is seemingly not considered to be a FTA even though it would be.... Although there is, of course, the A310 MRTT in service with other countries but not offered by any of the FSTA bidders even though it had been studied under an earlier project by MoD Department of Future Systems (DFS) as it then was when a Multi Role Tanker Transport rather than a Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft was being considered.

So:

C-17 which was the STSA but wasn't an FSTA will be an FTA.
A400M which was FLA, then rejected as FSTA will become the 'official' FTA.
A330 MRTT will probably be the FSTA under PFI but not a FTA .


But WTF is currently going on with FSTA I have no idea.

Except that the price seems to keep going up...

charliegolf
16th Dec 2005, 10:49
BEagle

Thanks for that. But phew!

CG

ORAC
16th Dec 2005, 10:50
Just This Once.......

Start of anyway.....

Page 85, para B4.10: "....C130K came into service in 1968 and the current fleet, which comprises 25 aircraft, is planned to be phased out from 2008. 25 of the newer C-130J are currently in service, with an assumed OSD early in the 2030s".

What surprises me is the fact they intend to keep C-130J, A400M and C-17. I thought the idea had been to rationalise the AT fleet and standardise on two types, my presumption being that the Js would, at some stage, be replaced by A400Ms. Some of the trade rags had even mooted the possibility of the Js being offered for lease/sale to the Canucks for their proposed new buy. Obviously not.

BEagle
16th Dec 2005, 11:16
Wasn't FTA Tranche 2 the subject of the A400M v C130J struggle after the original C130J acquisition decision?

If the C-17s are being purchased, the ex-FLA A400M as FTA Tranche 2 is clearly being augmented by the C-17 legacy STSA.

How short was the 'Short Term' strategic airlifter supposed to be around for? Wasn't it always supposed to be replaced by the FTA - A400M?

Toxteth O'Grady
16th Dec 2005, 11:31
Beags

I think your last post should be on this thread!! (http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?s=&threadid=200614) ;)

:}


:cool:

TOG

SirPeterHardingsLovechild
16th Dec 2005, 16:19
Page 85, para B4.10: "....C130K came into service in 1968 and the current fleet, which comprises 25 aircraft, is planned to be phased out from 2008.

'...from...'

One little, ambiguous, non-committal word.

And a large group of people are none the wiser.

Thanks for that. :mad:

BEagle
16th Dec 2005, 16:33
From the DPA website, which was reviewed this month:

"CURRENT REQUIREMENT/FLEET STATUS

The current AAR & AT capability is provided by the RAF's operational fleets of VC10 and TriStar aircraft. All VC10s can operate in the air refuelling role, with some also able to operate in the air transport role. The Tristar fleet comprises some air transport and some dual-role aircraft. The current fleet is reaching the end of its useful life. Current plans involve its replacement during the first half of the decade."

Errm, so that's in 2 weeks' time, I guess? Or does the 'first half of the decade' mean something else in DPA-speak?

Perhaps they meant 'first half of the next decade'?

mystic_meg
16th Dec 2005, 17:16
Beagle: Nail - Hit - Head!
replacement during the first half of the decade

Exactly! Nobody specified which decade, did they??:p

6Z3
16th Dec 2005, 17:31
Going back to the (Flying Training) future for a moment. As the MoD reviews the UKMFTS Conceptual Systems Design proposals submitted by the 3 Consortia ahead of the selection of a prefered partner next year, does this document point to a general cooling of the SofS's resolve to commit MoD to a 25 year UKMFTS Project.

propulike
16th Dec 2005, 21:53
Not wanting to split hairs, but the C130K started to be drawn down in 2000 when 25-odd frames were flown back to USA (Georgetown I think it was) as part of the Buy-Back deal for a replacement - the J.

DEL Mode
17th Dec 2005, 07:04
I think you are missing the point.

The Defence Industrial Strategy is laying out what is considered to be the "Crown Jewels" of the UK Defence industry.

By stating that Training and Large airraft are easily available the government are saying that these can be purchased from a number of sources in the world, and therefore UK Industry will not receive special protection.

The document also sets out, again to industry, what is likely to happen and when, some of which can only occur if UK Industry has not gone to the wall.

It is also an indication to UK manned fst jet producers that their is no longer a need for manned fast jets in the future, therefore if you were BAE Systems or Martin Baker you need to think about your transition plan.

BEagle
17th Dec 2005, 07:59
THe UK hasn't built a training aeroplane for the RAF since the Bulldog/Hawk/Jetstream era nearly 30 years ago.

The last new 'large' British aeroplane the RAF had (excluding recycled 1949 designed Comets) were a few corgi-carrying BAe146s about 20 years ago, although the RAF could have had a couple of dozen Airbus A310 MRTTs by now if it had taken up BAe's offer which was on the table about 10 years or more ago, instead of the PFI rentaplane nonsense which continues to delay FSTA.

So, nothing new really.

Except that are we talking indigenous military requirements for large aircraft and trainers, or indigenous design, development and production capabilities?

Is the dour Doc saying that the UK won't need its own large aircraft and trainers, and will rent the capability from others, or is he saying that there's no need to develop our own aircraft?

pr00ne
17th Dec 2005, 11:54
Beagle,

The paper is all about what elements of the UK defence industrial base the Government considers it is in our national interest to ring fence, safeguard from foreign competition and therefore preserve, it is NOT a list of what the UK is or isn’t gong to do in the future.

Just because the Gov’t does not consider that we need to preserve a purely national capability in the manufacture of large aircraft or training aircraft it doesn’t mean that the UK per se is not going to do these things in the future.

No-one is saying that there is no need to develop our own trainers or large aircraft, just that there is no need to artificially preserve the existence of such capability. That does not mean that that capability will vanish.

jindabyne
17th Dec 2005, 12:50
That does not mean that that capability will vanish

And if you really believe that, prOOne, pray enlighten us with your interpretation.

tucumseh
17th Dec 2005, 12:54
Having been led to believe it would be a more robust “strategy”, it feels like all style, no substance. BAeS and AWHL seem to be happy, seeing it as a firm commitment to British industry, which is no bad thing, but the fine detail will be interesting. Will we see, for example, a “No Software Code, No Contract” policy? Or a return to “No UK Support Facilities, No Contract” (employed on invariably successful projects)? And so on. The MoD unions describe it thus;

DIS marks the embedding of End-to-End and contracting for availability. Our fear is that it will mean an accelerated and deeper move to contract out 'provider' functions (and make the 'decider' functions smaller and smaller?) This possibility had been lost on Lord Drayson (who is responsible for the DIS) until the MOD unions explained it to him in the last couple of weeks. He now understands the point, but does not accept that it will be a consequence of the DIS.

All of this is true, but the same unions have allowed this situation to develop over many years. What they do not say is that their acquiescence to past insanities has left MoD, in particular DPA and DECs, unable to fulfil its “decider” or “Intelligent Customer” functions in many areas, as most of the experience has been lost and what remains is undervalued by management (e.g. the DPA XB).

In practice, we see Industry increasingly contracted to make the decisions. However, there are certain major contractors who delight in accepting poorly written contracts (see above lack of experience) and deliver what it says knowing that it is not what the Customer wants. They then point to the contract and sit back waiting for an amendment, funded by MoD; often being paid twice to do the same job. A DIS is fine, but what about having a complementary internal MoD strategy?


And then to aircraft, and we get this corker;

A package of work known as the Chinook Mk2/2A coherence
programme has been launched to establish a single configuration
baseline for the Chinook fleet and is expected to be completed early in
the next decade. This work will enable a reduction in the overall cost
of supporting a fleet with disparate equipment standards due to the
fitting of a large number of partially integrated equipments in support
of operations. It is also an essential precursor for the integration of the
Bowman communications system and will enable a future Chinook
capability sustainment programme, should it be decided to extend
the life of the platform. This work is expected to complete around the
turn of the decade.


Single configuration baseline? That infers configuration control as mandated policy, but for 15 years it’s been largely unfunded and ruled a dispensable item if money is to be saved. (And remember, it’s essential to maintaining safety). Very costly to resurrect. Are they doing this on other aircraft types or equipments?

Partially integrated equipments? No doubt a legacy of the widespread practice of buy it, fit it, walk away without ensuring it works. And in doing so not bothering with configuration control or tech pubs (see above). But at least DIS has at last recognised the problem. But will MoD see it through when the true cost becomes apparent? Again, what about other aircraft types?

Essential precursor for integration of BOWMAN? I know the work they mean and I’m enormously pleased at this positive step, after 11 or so years of complete denial. However, I’d like to see the technical detail, because fitting a BOWMAN radio is the least of the problem; but I suspect this will their limit due to lack of understanding. But again, what about other aircraft types? I suppose the saving grace is that BOWMAN has slipped over the years (decades) so someone will spin this as timely planning.

Put together, this is very close to an admission that the MoD is not entirely comfortable with the safety management processes employed on Chinook in the past. At best, it’s a clear admission of a fragmented, incoherent approach to managing the fleet. It obviously refers to a plethora of UORs embodied as SEMs which, in my experience, breed safety and quality problems as they are seldom funded, designed, built, tested, integrated, trialled or evaluated properly; and almost never appear in the MAR build standard or the Safety Case. And partially integrating equipments is known to cause certain types of problems, including spurious data errors and intermittent faults. I’ve seen all this mooted somewhere before. Brian Dixon, are you reading this?

engineer(retard)
18th Dec 2005, 08:42
Tuc

We've probably had this discussion before, but the cost has been well known for some time, and has been unaffordable. The major problem is that the SEMs do not appear on the Boeing drawing set and a fully funded mod such as BOWMAN will not work because the aircraft is very different. The BOWMAN design for the aircraft has been ready for some time.

regards

reatrd

tucumseh
18th Dec 2005, 12:08
Thanks Eng, my points precisely.

If SEMs aren’t in the Boeing drawing set (and therefore not cover mod’d or superseded) then the chances increase that, contrary to mandated safety procedures, they haven’t been appraised by Boeing and don’t figure in the build standard or the associated safety case. It is this casual acceptance that the actual build standard of most tail numbers is not fully traceable to that presented for MAR, or to the safety case, which I abhor. Some here may think it engineering faff and nonsense, but as we both know it’s different when your name is on the paper and it’s you the BOI comes after.

All the best