Falklands Conflict '82 [Archive]

Jackonicko

29th May 2005, 17:21

The BARG book can still be found second hand, and is absolutely definitive, though not (I'd say) of much use for direct first hand accounts. I saw one last time I was in Keegan's bookshop in Reading.

There are two good books of first hand accounts. One is 'Falklands, Witness of Battles' by Salvador Mafe Huertas :ok: and Jesus Romero Briasco. The other is 'Air War South Atlantic' by Jeff Ethell :mad: and Alfie-Baby Price :E . Both include many accounts by aircrew from both sides.

Both Huertas and Dr Alfred Price PhD :rolleyes: also produced large numbers of articles based on their researches for the book, some of which were also based on first hand accounts. The magazine Wings of Fame (now absorbed into International Air Power Review) included articles on Skyhawk and Dagger ops with some first hand accounts.

The old part works 'Warplane' and 'Take Off' also included some articles about the Falklands - I remember reading one two- or three-parter that was based on new interviews with Paul Barton, and which had a ribbon diagram showing his 'kill'.

I've never seen any first hand accounts by any of the Punta Arenas det, however :{ - either Canberra PR9 :cool: or Hercules :} aircrew. Perhaps a fellow PPRuNer can help? ;)

WE Branch Fanatic

29th May 2005, 19:17

Maybe you should also consider reading books that take more of an overall view of the conflict, there is a very good one by Martyn Middlebrook. I have the second edition which has the title Task Force, I do not know what the current edition is called. However, there is more information in the public domain now than here was back then.

Sharkey Ward's book (yes I have a copy) is indeed controversial - but my take on some of what he said was....

Some Sea Harrier Pilots lacked the expertise in using AI radar - perhaps due to the rundown of fixed wing naval aviation in the 60s/70s. Since Blue Fox wasn't fully functional until they were on their way South - hence a steep learning curve, particularly for those who hadn't used AI radar before.

Due to the FAA run down, the task group commander (Woodward) and many of his staff lacked the skills and experience to use fighter aircraft as a weapon system, perhaps because exercises involving full scale task group situations had not take place. Cold War NATO scenarios yes, but out of area stuff?

Both of these problems are likely to happen again, thanks to losing the Sea Jet (http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?s=&threadid=98152). Do we never learn?

As for his hostility to the RAF (and others) maybe it is frustration at the above and the way the Fleet Air Arm got screwed (both before and after the conflict) around by both politicians and senior officers. Nor did they get the recognition they deserved.

Anyway, back to the topic....other books worth considering are Amphibious Assault Falklands by Mike Clapp, and Through Fire And Water by Mark Higgit, the story of HMS Ardent, a forgotten victim of 1982, lost to multiple air attacks.

Also Google or similar should find some interesting articles.

Jackonicko

29th May 2005, 19:50

"Nor did they get the recognition they deserved."

If you think that the Navy (and especially the SHar force) didn't get the credit it deserved, you must have been inside since '82. The magnificent contribution has been acknowledged and celebrated again and again, while the contribution of the light blue aviators has been persistently down-played.

As to Ward, his self aggrandising book is almost stomach turning. The bloke plainly did a quite brilliant job as a squadron boss, but he demeans himself with his arrogance and boasting, and plainly resents giving any real credit to even the rival SHar squadron in Corporate, let alone to anyone else.

Which is why he's such a ..........

'controversial'

figure, I guess.

Art Field

29th May 2005, 20:34

Thankyou Jackonicko.
A few words in praise of the Victor crews that launched night after night to refuel themselves and then onward to the Vulcans, Nimrods and Hercs. Having been told that the fleet would never be required to night receive fuel they all converted in double quick time, went out in large formations into the dark and murky South Atlantic night sky and completed complex refuel plans on a scale never seen before. The pressure was very high and built up as the campaign progressed. In spite of very limited back up facilities there were remarkably few failures and some courageous acts. Although greatly respected by those closely involved they gained little praise from the wider world.

Zoom

29th May 2005, 21:29

My particular hero was the one Chinook that survived the sinking of the Atlantic Conveyor. This aircraft flew endlessly carting men and materiels from ship to shore, barely stopping to swop crews and carrying more than all of the RN Sea Kings put together. I would like to see some numbers, if anyone knows any (that can be released).

The Real Slim Shady

29th May 2005, 23:19

I wrote a quite intriguing paper during the conflict.

Read by Royalty.

Actioned by many, including Royalty.

Yep, I spent the war organising a Royal visit to one of HM flying units.

But currency on the V bomber wasn't in short supply:-(

henry crun

30th May 2005, 02:23

For the humourous side of that war try
"Don't Cry For Me Sergeant Major" by R. McGownan & J. Hands.

Magoodotcom

30th May 2005, 07:47

I find one of Sharkey's statements to be remarkable. On page 248, he says...

"It would have taken much more than a lone Vulcan raid to upset Buenos Aires, and it was rumoured around the fleet that if things went badly for us then the city would indeed be attacked. Maggie would send a Polaris missile without a warhead - and if the Argentines didn't toe the line after that, she would send one with a warhead."

:bored: :oh:

Surely the Falklands conflict would never have degenerated to the point where the UK would have nuked a major Argie city, unless of course the RN has/had conventionally armed Polaris!? Even then, it would have been a major escalation way out of proportion to the original raison d'etre for Operation Corporate! or am I missing something?

Magoo

BEagle

30th May 2005, 08:16

I suspect that the "....rumour around the fleet" was Ward's own.

Total bolleaux even to think that the UK would use a strategic nuclear missile against Argentina.

Never trust a beardy!

Zoom

30th May 2005, 11:47

Agree with BEagle there. I was recently talking to an ex-RM/pongo/SAS/secret agent (depending on how much wine he had drunk), who claimed that the whole war was a set-up job to win Maggie votes. More bolleaux, I'm afraid. As we all know, the only person who would do anything like that resides in No 10 now rather than then. But that, as they say, is another thread.

Maple 01

30th May 2005, 13:42

Oh sure Zoom GWII and Kosovo were sure-fire vote winners:rolleyes: I'd go back to your Daily Mail if I were you

However, Goose Green fought for political aims? More than a few that were there seem to think so.

wf1

30th May 2005, 20:11

livng in tents , ever moving runway the royal engineers put straight every night after endless sorties , its still got to be better than mpa 1435 flt tonkas

Ian Corrigible

30th May 2005, 20:18

"Military Intelligence Blunders" by Col. John Hughes-Watson offers a concise perspective on the road to the war, including the role of the DIS, JIC and FCO in mis-calling Galtieri's intentions.

I/C

The Rocket

30th May 2005, 21:24

wf1

livng in tents , ever moving runway the royal engineers put straight every night after endless sorties , its still got to be better than mpa 1435 flt tonkas

What?:confused:

BEagle

30th May 2005, 21:27

Phandet, Base Aerea Puerto Belgrano, Islas Malvinas...... Circa late 1982?

pr00ne

30th May 2005, 22:34

WE BF,

FAA run down? Ark Royal and squadrons decommissioned in November 1978, the FAA got its first SHARs in June 1979. Op Corporate was mid 1982.

Nor did they get the recognition they deserved???????????????????????

Where the hell were you in 1982 and for the next decade? I cannot see how you could possibly have given them MORE recognition, from their rather polished and flamboyant arrival as a 6 ship formation at Farnborough they continued to hog the limelight for years. Quite rightly so in my opinion as the aviators of BOTH hues of blue deserved all the recognition going.

BEagle,

Oh dear! Your not going to like this one little bit but I now think we have a grand total of 4 areas of agreement;
“Never trust a beardy!”

Never a truer word spoken, both as a generalisation and in PARTICULAR to that individual…………………..

Zoom,

Yeah right! Invading Iraq was a sure fire vote winner for Blair wasn’t it? Really made him popular and gave him an easy ride.
Now I happen to have disagreed about going into Iraq, did then and still do now, but Blair did it because he thought it the right thing to do. Love him or hate him you have to admire him for taking that really difficult call that he knew would cost him popularity and be a tie round the neck of his party as long as he remained in power. It was a call in the same vein as Thatcher, much as I loathe and detest her she had the guts to make the call in 1982.

WE Branch Fanatic

30th May 2005, 23:14

By FAA run down I was talkng about the way the fixed wing element of the FAA was progressively wound down in the 60s and 70s. Also the first Shars may have been delivered in 1979 or 1980 but that doesn't mean they were fully operational - ie with radar, as such I can easily understand why there were problems in using radar.

My understanding is that air defence skills are very perishable and need constant practice, wiithout Blue Fox fitted and working etc etc etc.

As for recognition most of the people you talk to hold these days seem to think that a)the RAF won the air war and b)the Army won the ground, and c)the Navy weren't involved. BTW I was only five in 1982.

Like This - Do That

31st May 2005, 01:40

Off topic a little, but .....

"BTW I was only five in 1982." WE BF

That made me laugh. I was giving a lecture to OCDTs in 1996 and Goose Green was mentioned. I was astounded to hear that none of them had heard of 'H' Jones and the circumstances leading to his postumous VC. They in turn were astounded to hear that the Bn CO charged a gun pit with an SMG. The penny dropped when I realised that the OCDTs were about your age and probably hadn't paid much attention at the time .....

Lower Hangar

31st May 2005, 11:31

Reference the original thread my favourite anecdote would be the RAF Flt lt. ( who had just arrived from Conveyor that day) saying late one night in the Hermes 800/899 briefing room ( night ops just finished 4/6 ship night bombing on Port Stanley ) " I take my hat off to the FAA ...how can you do 52 sorties in 1 day with only 14 a/c beats me ".....these were his actual words . Next day he got shot down on a GR3 strike somewhere over West Falklands....but he go out OK (Flt lt Thomas ????)..memories beginning to go .....we had 1 U/S out of 14 at the end of that day and it was waiting for NAVHARS bits from UK. I relate this because back in Bucc days on the old Ark a good day for 14 Buccs ( 809) was 4 over 4 in the morning, 4 over 4 in the afternoon and then 4 for night flying.....ie 12 sorties on a good day of Roosy Roads.

Pilgrim101

31st May 2005, 11:52

We should've challenged the Argentinians to a game of Polo for the Islands. ;)

As for nuking them, I believe the "informal" lines of communication with Buenos Aires at the time would have avoided such an attack, which would have caused billions of dollars worth of improvement to the City !

Such comms links certainly saved their "Viencento de Mayo" (sp?) Aircraft Carrier from grave embarrassment since it turned back to Comodorio Rivadavia with "engine trouble" rather than risk raising the Jolly Roger on Conqueror twice on return to Faslane.

Such a gentlemanly approach ? :E

MMEMatty

31st May 2005, 13:11

Bending slightly away from topic, but i've always wondered:

For those who had experience of both (Perhaps Lower Hangar?), would the old style UK carrier battle group (with Phantoms / Buccaneers) have performed better or worse than the through dck cruisers (Sea Harriers) in the Falklands?

Matty

airborne_artist

31st May 2005, 13:39

My father was Deputy Director of Ops for rest of the World (ie not Russia/NATO) in the MoD in 1982. His previous job was Captain of Endurance, so he was in the right place at the right time.

He died about two years ago, but I have his two shorthand notebooks that he used during the war.

I'm trying to work out what to do with them at the moment - thinking that they should be in the Kings College collection, but if you or others would like to see them we may be able to work something out.

Navaleye

31st May 2005, 13:45

If its airgroup was fully functional then yes. Much longer ranged aircraft, faster, more weapons, long range weapons at that and AEW. If we still has the old Ark they would not have done it IMHO.

Lower Hangar: Was that Geoff Glover by any chance?

steamchicken

31st May 2005, 14:55

Middlebrook did two histories of the Falklands - as well as Operation Corporate, the British-side one, he also did an Arg-side history, The Fight for the "Malvinas" - The Argentine Forces in the Falklands War, which is good too (but hard to find).

Especially interesting is the background to the Argentine mythology about the "Invincible Raid". The two surviving A4s, the ones Avenger didn't shoot down, returned to base and a heroes' welcome, before much later being shown a picture of 'Vince and asked if they'd hit her - not the best debrief technique ever...

Navaleye

31st May 2005, 15:10

It was Exeter that took the A4s with two excellent long range, low level potshots with Sea Darts.

Hoobie Schnaps

31st May 2005, 15:17

Many thanks for the pointers so far. In terms of the books recommended I have pretty much read them all (although one or two from a while ago). As for the good officer Ward - I had to stop reading his book as I got fed up with the constant moaning about every body else and the view that he was clearly the best operator that had ever existed. A great shame really as he had the potential to set the FAA in a fantastic light and, from my perspective, he missed that opportunity and has done a disservice to his colleagues.

I read an account recently of the first Milan fired in anger by the British Army, fired at an A4 Skyhawk by a certain Private Worrall of 2 Para - sadly he missed but insisted that it was only due to some exceptional flying by the A4 pilot!

As for the Chinook that served so well - I had the honour of meeting one of the pilots in the early 90's - when he was a UAS instructor prior to leaving the RAF. I think that his name was Greg Potter (although all memories from UAS days are a little hazy - so I am not 100% sure of the name). Needless to say, his anecdotes of '82 and other things he had been involved in were exceptionally interesting - in addition he was a thoroughly good bloke.

As for Goose Green, my view is that the attack by a couple of GR3's in the afternoon of the 28 May (2 para had managed to position themselves around the settlement although the Argentinians had just reinforced with a Coy strength detachment) was one of the major prompts in the Argentine Cdr's decision to jack the fight in. The GR3's destroyed a significant AAA site in spectacular style. The shooting down of the Pucara and Aeromacchi (sp?) earlier that day would have also helped I am sure.

Regards

HS

steamchicken

31st May 2005, 15:23

I stand corrected, NE

ORAC

31st May 2005, 15:25

For the view of it from the Argentine conscripts point of view read Los Chicos de la Guerra (the boys of the war) by Daniel Kon. London : New English Library, 1983.

You´ll end up pitying the conscripts and despising their officers.

Widger

31st May 2005, 16:08

WEBF

You sprog!! Would never have guessed it if you hadn't let it slip.

Hoobie,

Totally agree, Sharky ruined what could have been a great historical account with his rantings. Whilst I echoe some of his sentiments, I agree that his "Chip Shop" detracted from a fine read.

Met some quite extraordinary people in my career.

Chinese Laundryman that was sunk 3 times in the Andrew and then HMG refused him a Passport in the Hong Kong Debacle.

FC, mentioned in Sandy Woodward's book at cocking up the intercept, was a newly qualified Freddie, and just about his first live intercept. After Woodward said "He'll never control again" was sent to another ship to get him away from the Admiral. That other ship was Coventry, I believe!

DISTAFF on ICSC, who at short notice gave us a very full account of his time in Sheffield's Ops room when the Exocet hit.

Nothing but admiration for the lot of them. I just hope that we do not forget the lessons that they learnt at the expense of many friends and colleagues.

Navaleye

31st May 2005, 18:38

DISTAFF on ICSC, who at short notice gave us a very full account of his time in Sheffield's Ops room when the Exocet hit.

That wouldn't have been the AWO then. :mad:

Solid Rust Twotter

31st May 2005, 19:00

Milan normally used for engaging ground targets. Pvt Worral sounds like a pretty sharp bloke to even give the A4 driver something to sweat about with the beast.

Used to speak to the MV England on VHF from an unnamed island in the general area after hostilities ceased and she was used to ferry troops, civilian personnel and supplies to the islands.

Lower Hangar

1st Jun 2005, 05:23

NavalEye

Yes....you've jogged the grey matter...it was Geoff Glover...seemed a nice young chap for a light blue ...but I only saw him the once...next day he was gone!!

Here's another anecdote:

On the day Conveyor was sunk, the only Chinook (BN) was airborne ( air test ?) and therefore was diverted to Hermes. Flyco squawked me on deck ( Duty Air Engineer) and said in his impeccably haughty tones " Engineer on Deck ...could you get the Chinook folded (!!) as its bu******ring up my #1 and #2 spots for SK's". Needless to say we had absolutely no Chinook tools on Hermes and have you seen a Chinook blade compared with SK or Wessex !!!! 2 days later BN transited inshore accompanied by a Lynx ( something to do with radio fits) where I gather it did sterling service throughout the conflct. I wonder where BN is now ??

Gainesy

1st Jun 2005, 06:14

LH,
I understand that its still in service, based at Odiham. There was a thread on the aircraft a few weeks back.

teeteringhead

1st Jun 2005, 08:21

Best dit from '82 I know of concerns the then OC 18 (Chinook) Sqn.

When berths were being allocated for the trip south, he thought QE2 would be more agreeable than "some container ship" (Conveyor). So OC goes to QE2, 2 i/c goes to Conveyor...

However, OC discovers he is sharing a smally cabin with 5 other SO1s in triple bunks, and doing his own dhobi. Whereas, 2 i/c turns out to be senior crab on Conveyor, and gets own cabin and service of Chinese laundryman. Peeved OC sees solution and cross-decks his dirty dhobi to 2 i/c for attention of laundryman (I swear I'm not making this up!)

You can guess the next bit - 2 i/c goes swimming when Conveyor goes down, along with assorted Chinooks and Harriers - not to mention at least one of JK's guitars! And of course, lots of OC 18's dhobi.

Sunsequent insurance claim by OC 18 is rebuffed along following lines:

"Reference your kit insurance claim. We have received many claims from people alleging kit was lost on the Atlantic Conveyor, so we obtained from MoD a passenger manifest for the vessel. You are not on the manifest; if you persist with this apparently fraudulent claim, we will be forced to pass details to the police."

Laugh - we almost paid our Mess Bills on time.......;)

Arkroyal

1st Jun 2005, 09:14

A lot of my tropical uniform went down on the conveyer too. I had gone SAR just as the invasion took place, and reckoned I'd have no need of it (silly me) so lent it to 'pigpen'.

He managed to be airborne in a Wessie at the fateful time.

If all the stuff reputed to have gone down with her was actually on boerd, she'd have probably sunk under her own weight anyway.

I was loafing around near Fitzroy whilst the grubbers tried to fix one of the donks on a Wessex. A dot was approaching at fast walking pace, occasionally stumbling in the peat.

As it got closer it turned in to a ruddy face pongo officer who shouted from the limit of earshot. 'Right, get that thing started up, I'm commandeering it'

When he was close enought to speak to without any ungentlemanly raising of my voice, I said 'Sorry, old chap, but it's going nowhere. It's only got one engine'

He spun around, marched back towards the settlement yelling 'And I suppose the other one went down on the f***ing Atlantic Conveyor, like everything else in this effing war!'

He must have been pissed off a while later when I took off and returned the thing to Port San Carlos. On one engine, negative grubbers, who didn't seem too keen on going single engined.

Widger

1st Jun 2005, 09:18

Navaleye,

No he was an FC at the time. From his account, he was controlling an FRS1 when the missile hit. The SHaR pilot was calling for Bogey Dope, and he calmly told him that the guy sat next to him had just lost half his face, give him a moment to sort himself out. He then carried on controlling until he had no choice but to evacuate.

He also recounted how the crew battled to get the Command System up and running and indeed amongst all the flames and smoke they did get a call from the Computer Room that the system was back up. That was the last he heard from them.

It was quite a moving tale and ceratinly made us all stop and think. Like I said before, I hope for the sake of all those who died that we do not throw it all away with stupid, shortsighted decisions from beancounters.

Navaleye

1st Jun 2005, 10:07

I think we are getting the two confused. Not helped at all by my spelling his name wrong. Lower Hangar: Is this the gentlemen you were referring to?

http://i5.photobucket.com/albums/y184/Navaleye/jeffglover.bmp

Pilgrim101

1st Jun 2005, 11:10

I seem to recall that Geoff Glover was shot down by a Blowpipe fired by a Correntinos Indian no less and was introduced to him when they fished him out ?

engineer(retard)

1st Jun 2005, 11:23

A Royal Navy task force was sent to the Falkland Islands to defend them from Argentine attack five years before the war there, archive papers have shown.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4597581.stm

Regards

Retard

vecvechookattack

1st Jun 2005, 11:28

Just shows you how times and political/tactical deployments have changed. How on earth can you have a "secret" exclusion zone or a secret task force? But there again when you look at the Government at the time and wonder what Harold Wilson was doing chasing spies amongst the daffodils in St Mary's then there is little wonder is there? and even in 1977 the legality of sending British troops abroad was in question.

November4

1st Jun 2005, 12:05

Britain's Small Wars (http://www.britains-smallwars.com/Falklands/index.html) site has some interesting stories from both sides.

Scud-U-Like

1st Jun 2005, 13:06

Moving slightly off-topic, it appears that, for all its faults, Jim Callaghan's Labour government read the warning signs and ensured the RN defended the Falklands properly. How ironic that, for all their flag waving and jingoism, the Tory government under Maggie, allowed the Falklands to be invaded.

How Britain averted a Falklands invasion in 1977 (http://www.guardian.co.uk/military/story/0,11816,1496465,00.html)

airborne_artist

1st Jun 2005, 13:08

The prequel is being discussed on Jetblast (http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?s=&postid=1917497#post1917497)

From The Guardian:

"Details of how a Royal Navy mini-task force was secretly despatched to the Falklands to defend the islands from Argentinian attack are revealed in documents made public for the first time today.

The tiny flotilla, led by the nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarine HMS Dreadnought and accompanied by two frigates and two support vessels, was credited with deterring a full scale invasion in 1977."

The story goes that the frigates spent most of their time on that mission about 1000 miles to the N, as the weather was so atrocious. Pre-satellite surveillance, so no-one could argue! Heard that from sources close enough to be believable.

ORAC

1st Jun 2005, 13:23

Scud,

One would not want to imply that Labour governments are more likely to act in a pre-emptive manner of course........

Scud-U-Like

1st Jun 2005, 13:33

Thanks, aa, will check-out jetblast.

Of course, Callaghan was ex-RN, so he might have been a little more in touch with the problem than his successor.

Pierre Argh

1st Jun 2005, 13:47

Another good book to consider (other than "Falklands Air War"... which is close to definitive but still contains the odd mistake) is David Brown's "The Royal Navy and the Falklands War" (Guild Publishing London, 1987)... less a catalogue of aircraft registrations and name lists than the BARG volume and a bloody interesting read.

As to some of the other comments above... I recall the Polaris option being mentioned in the press at the time. It seems unlikely now, (and hopefully one Maggie never dwelled upon?) but remember this was midst of the cold war when such reaction was, perhaps, considered the inevitable outcome of prolonged conflict. Maggie was confident we would prevail, but at the start there were many less sure.

As to the part played by the RAF... while one cannot deny they were there, but unlike more recent conflicts, this one was undoubtedly sorted out by the two senior services. The part played by the RAF was (to their obvious embarasement) minor.

The Black Buck raids on Stanley were a brave missions, but little more than attempts by the RAF to prove they could participate... and one might even venture back-up their dubious claim (of the 1960's that provoked the scrapping the plans to replace Ark Royal and conventional carrier aviation) that there was no place for Naval Aviation as they could provide air cover for the fleet world-wide.

Were the raids effective? Onboard HMS Invincible, shortly after the conflict, one verse of a popular Wardoom song says it all...

"We are the Vulcan Bombers,
No F*****G use are we,
We flew down from Ascension,
To drop bombs in the sea,
But if you e'er ask of it
We'll shout with all our might,
Per Ardua Ad Astra
Sod you Jack, I'm alright!"

Thank goodness for the "Through-deck Cruisers", the fact that the UK hadn't yet dispatched the aged Hermes to the Indian Navy, and for the Ships Taken-up From Trade (STUFT). Without them to get true airpower to the scene and the Army & Royal Marines ashore, the world map might now feature "Ilas Malvinas"

PS. Another good book for dits is "Fly Navy: The View From The Cockpit 1945-2000". Edited by Charles Manning, (published by Leo Cooper 2000) it is a collection of stories, and chapter five is virtually all about the Falklands.

Archimedes

1st Jun 2005, 14:16

Pierre,

there's enough public domain evidence out there in the form of quotations to suggest that Admirals Leach and Woodward (and by inference the late Admiral Lewin) did not view the Blackbuck raids in quite the same way.

MRAF Sir Michael Beetham, the CAS of the day was asked (I assume by Mrs T or Sec State) if a Vulcan raid could close the runway for the duration. He said that he would want to send 25 and preferably 50 aircraft to achieve this giv the nav kit, etc in the Vulcan. With one aircraft, a single bomb might hit the runway and deny it for a time to FJ.

However, it was felt that using a strategic bomber would send a useful message to the Argentine government, so the raids were launched. The Argentines withdrew their fighters north after the raid to protect Buenos Aries.

This all emerged at a seminar at the Staff College three years ago [Chatham House rule did *not* apply]. Most memorable part of a very memorable day for an air power type was when Adms Woodward and Leach (plus MRAF Beetham) expressed the view that the raids made a very important contribution to the war - possibly the first attempt to gain 'strategic effect'. Adm Woodward was particularly vociferous in expressing this point of view, although the published record does not convey the 'gently thump table for emphasis' in his words.

It was interesting to witness the dmolition of the notion that the Strat Effect argument was invented after the war by the RAF to hide their embarassment.

WE Branch Fanatic

1st Jun 2005, 14:30

Would that count as an early example of effects based warfare? And did the Arg Mirage's get moved because of because they were getting splashed? Does anyone know for sure?

The 1977 deployment proves the utility of naval forces - apart from sending a message, the force had an SSN, two frigates, an RFA tanker and an RFA stores ship, and carried several Sea Kings aboard the RFA, and the firepower (particularly the SSN would have posed a real threat to any invasion force). Would the (post Hoon) RN be capable of this sort of deployment?

steamchicken

1st Jun 2005, 15:15

Certainly it could, WEBF. No-one has suggested we're losing the SSNs, and it was the Dread that was the key element in that deployment.

It's also a good example of just how fantastic submarines are as a tool of policy: putting it in the South Atlantic meant the Argentines could never know where it was, but they had to believe it was somewhere nearby - a really effective countermobility asset. And they can move - quickly by sea standards - and operate with practically no logistic support..

It's an interesting question whether the withdrawal of the Mirage IIIs was brought about by losses in the few air-air missions they went on, or by the "revealed Vulcan threat" to Buenos Aires.

BEagle

1st Jun 2005, 15:22

Shame then, that the lesson of the value of strategic bombing wasn't properly acknowledged and we lost that capability.

A few Vulcans, suitably updated, could have been very useful self-designating LGB bombers in GW1. One a/c with perhaps with 12 LGBs - instead of 2 VC10Ks, 3 Tornados and a Buccaneer?

Dropping from a 'significant' altitude as well!

Navaleye

1st Jun 2005, 18:46

I was on a ship in April last year that had a USN SSN sitting right underneath us for the entire trip.

Archimedes

1st Jun 2005, 19:06

BEagle,

One of my colleagues at the Learning Centre discovered some evidence (via an interview with someone who preferred not to be named in the book) that the idea of retaining at least one and possibly two squadrons of updated Vulcans for long range bombing, possibly with mods to permit carriage of ALCM was put forward but the Treasury demured, muttering something about long-term costings.... ISTR seeing a pic dating around 1982 of a Vulcan with three PW2 in the forward bomb-bay.

WEBF - Admirals Leach and Woodward seemed fairly convinced that it was the Vulcan raids that led to the removal of the Mirage - as was the Argentine Air Force officer in the audience (although as he pointed out, he had only just joined the service, so he may have got the wrong impression).

caspertheghost

1st Jun 2005, 19:08

Pierre Argh.
The RAF had already 'proved they could participate' by operating Harriers from your boats for some time during the conflict.

pr00ne

1st Jun 2005, 19:36

WEBF,

That sort of deployment is precisely WHY the RN has got the SSN and Frigate/destroyer numbers it has, of course they could do it now!

I think you willl find that the Argentine Mirage 111 was withdrawn to cover the theoretical threat to the mainland by the Junta, certainly effects based warfare though we wouldn't have called it that then.

BEagle,

Warning, FIFTH point of agreement!

The Vulcan has to be an example of a capability that would have proved useful in almost every campaign/deployment made by the UK military in the last 15 years, running on 2 squadrons would surely have been worthwhile.

Navaleye

1st Jun 2005, 19:43

Pr00ne. Sorry you lack any credibility. BEages, yes, we should have retained the Vulcan. Rumour has it that the MR4A will have longe range Storm Shadow capability. Comments invited from all. I'm off for a few days :p

BEagle

1st Jun 2005, 20:01

Perhaps if the Airships had thought beyond WE177 strikes on the Russkis, we might still have the Vulcan. When I did my captaincy board, the AOC asked me whay I said that I wanted a F4 cross-over rather than a Vulcan captaincy. We had a good chat, he concluded, "Yes, that's the same view as I hear from Town. I happen to think they're wrong, perhaps we'll find out one day".

He was right, it seems. But he was nice enough to give me a top recommendation for Vulcan captaincy, should I change my mind. Unfortunately I didn't, so did the 500 hr pre-VC10K Phantom course!

If only we could have gutted the Vulcan of all those old black dustbins (Calc 2 & 3 ?) etc and given it a glass cockpit, twin GPS/LINS and B-1B level nav attack systems.....

Had the chance to taxy the old beast a few weeks ago. Wonderful! I gather that 558 will be getting a twin GPS fit when it flies again next year. Beats the heck out of Doppler, GPI and sun gun!

TwoDeadDogs

1st Jun 2005, 20:03

Hello all
I have a cousin who served as a steward on one of the STUFT ships. He was just after rolling into his bunk and nodding off after a duty, one time, when the Air Raid warning went. He had previously been told to bunk down in the centre of the ship, rather than in his cabin, which was at one side of the ship. He ignored this and put the head down under the cabin's porthole. He was jolted awake by a violent banging under his bunk, just in time to see a Skyhawk pulling up to go over the ship. The noise was the sound of cannon shells going through the ship. Some of the shells had punched clean through the entire hull. There were also strikes from unguided rockets on the upper structures of the ship. He stated that a large crack appeared in the ship's side, that was hastily patched over and not fully repaired until they got back to the UK. I don't know what the name of the vessel was or from which Company it was hired, but I suggest that the guys on them were very "unsung".
regards
TDD

November4

1st Jun 2005, 20:57

Off topic but..... Someone on E-bay is selling a Falklands Medal (http://cgi.ebay.co.uk/ws/eBayISAPI.dll?ViewItem&category=90694&item=6535203497&rd=1) and it is over £500 with a buy now price of £625

pr00ne

1st Jun 2005, 21:00

Navaleye,

Credibility?

What???

soddim

1st Jun 2005, 21:24

A little known fact is that a Vulcan dropped 2 LGBs within 10 feet of the centre of a target in Luce Bay from 16,000 feet during the war. This was done to prove the capability to deliver the weapon using co-operative or ground designation but it was not used in-theatre.

The RAF Harriers did use LGBs in theatre towards the end of the war against targets designated by FAC laser and these attacks were very successful. Interesting to note that the LGB guidance kits and the instructions for use were air-dropped alongside HM ships in the South Atlantic - a lot of people did stirling work under great pressure to achieve those results.

Also interesting to note that the only RAF fatality (as far as I know) during the war was to a FAC with the SAS cross-decking in a Sea King. RIP Garth Hawkins, you were a great chap.

Navaleye

2nd Jun 2005, 04:32

TwoDeadDogs,

Ha, I bet that was a Type 21! Avenger or Alacrity.

Lower Hangar

2nd Jun 2005, 05:40

NavalEye

Yes thats the guy I recall seeing that night in Hermes.

ORAC

2nd Jun 2005, 05:43

They may have been stuffed, but I doubt they were STUFT..... :rolleyes:

Jackonicko

2nd Jun 2005, 09:33

If m'learned friend will allow:

The Beatles - a popular beat combo from the North West, much admired by the nation's youth.

STUFT - Ships Taken Up From Trade.

scroggs

2nd Jun 2005, 10:21

Off topic but..... Someone on E-bay is selling a Falklands Medal and it is over £500 with a buy now price of £625

Bugger - lost mine years ago. Could have got a few beers for that amount of dosh! ;)

TwoDeadDogs

2nd Jun 2005, 11:16

Hi all
He was on one of the civvie ships, Taken Up From Trade for the duration.He said that the ship had a couple of machine-guns fitted on the upper works as defences, manned by RN bods.
regards
TDD

MarkD

3rd Jun 2005, 01:39

Pr00ne:

The Vulcan has to be an example of a capability that would have proved useful in almost every campaign/deployment made by the UK military in the last 15 years, running on 2 squadrons would surely have been worthwhile.

Even since EIS on Tomahawk on the SSNs (Kosovo, fired from Splendid in 1999, as well as outings in Afghanistan and Iraq 2)?

Let's face it, the notion of a TLAM zeroing in on your Presidential Palace would surely concentrate the mind of your average tinpot more soundly than an extreme range assignment like Black Buck.

Speaking of Bob Mugabe... is 1100km range far enough to get him? :D

zomerkoning

3rd Jun 2005, 09:21

My Uncle was one of the RAF guys that flew harriers of the Atlantic Conveyor and onto HMS Hermes adn flew a bunch of combat mission during the conflict.

I do remember him telling me about the people who where rounded up by the MoD to fly the sea harriers, as most of the Navy guys didn't have any experience or training with or Air to Air or Air to Ground (I can't remember which one). Some where from the MoD, some RAF, some Fleet air arm all transfered to Yeovilton for a crash course in carrier landings and then sent of to the Falklands...

He doesn't talk about the conflict much (as I've seen with most people who have been in combat), either you where there, you witnessed it and did the job and hoped you'd get home alive or you weren't and don't really know what you're talking about..

If you are really doing a lot of research I could ask him if he wants to answer some of your questions by e-mail. Send me a e-mail and I'll pass it on....

pr00ne

3rd Jun 2005, 10:49

MarkD,

I wouldn’t have advocated retention of the Vulcan as a TLAM replacement, or even supplement, but rather as a more efficient and longer ranged LGB delivery platform that also has the ability to drop a much large quantity of weapons, maybe the same as an entire Jaguar squadron?

teeteringhead

3rd Jun 2005, 10:54

I do remember him telling me about the people who were rounded up by the MoD to fly .... and don't get me started on the 72 Sqn vs 847 Sqn saga..............:(

firmrashhaze

3rd Jun 2005, 19:00

Hoobs,

Its a bit vague in the old grey matter but there is a book and accompanying video which I think is called "mentions in Dispatches" and covers various accounts of action from Op Corporate. One of those is Flt Lt Morgan discussing his kills including the Puma loaded with ammo which he encouraged into the side of a hill. His apparent reaction was one of disappointment as he was hoping to give it a thorough hosing down with Aden 30mm!

On the more humbling side is a dit from an ex Pongo turned NAAFI manager who found himself in the middle of a scrap and being one of the few people on board who knew how to use the Jimpy - gave lots of support (of the goffa/nutty and emotional variety) to the ship's company but never agreed that he was brave - that commendation he gave to one of the PWO's from his ship who was last seen firing a Sterling at an inbound A4 just before the ship took a hit - think it might have been Ardent.

Very definitely worth scratching around for.

OldBonaMate

3rd Jun 2005, 19:47

Pierre Argh

I don't doubt your experiences of the conflict but your claims about RAF participation are way off the mark. One thing which is seldom mentioned in publications about the air war in the Falklands is that there were a significant number of light blue pilots flying SHARs throughout the campaign. Why? you may ask. The answer is simple enough, there weren't anywhere near enough dark blue SHAR pilots!

As regards the 'limited' RAF participation, which of the other 2 services can even come close to matching the record and total lift accomplished by Chinook BN after Conveyor went down? Also which Service provided mail drops to the task force on numerous occasions?

Unfortunately, and for obvious reasons, the participation of RAF SHAR pilots is much played down by the Senior Service. With types like 'Sharkie' to contend with along with his version of history, is anyone in the least surprised?

Drygeezer

3rd Jun 2005, 21:06

You ain't seen me right, the ISK lot are chasing my bus, keep running doggy!

scroggs

3rd Jun 2005, 21:56

As regards the 'limited' RAF participation, which of the other 2 services can even come close to matching the record and total lift accomplished by Chinook BN after Conveyor went down? Also which Service provided mail drops to the task force on numerous occasions?

While I don't want to get into any verbal punch-ups with anyone, my own (RAF) memories of that period involve two or three years of 100+ flying-hour months in support of South Atlantic Ops, C130 guys being recalled from all kinds of ground and support jobs to come back and fly Albert, engineers working their arses off to support a daily aircraft serviceability rate that way, way exceeded the declaration to NATO at the time, and many other examples of how much the Falklands war dominated the Herc fleet's life - and not just for the period of the conflict. Indeed, I never managed to divorce myself fully from the S. Atl until I left the RAF in 1998 - I even met [one of the various] Mrs Scroggs down there!

Albert wasn't the only RAF fleet that was heavily in demand by various agencies during that war - and please bear in mind that many essential operational tasks were not necessarily within a few hundred miles of the islands themselves. Also remember that, for all three services, there was an overriding responsibility to maintain the NATO face to the USSR throughout the conflict, and heavy commitments in N Ireland, which could not be delegated elsewhere. Thus the overall workload on all services was proportionally far higher than the scale of the conflict might otherwise have justified.

Arkroyal

4th Jun 2005, 10:49

teeteringhead:.... and don't get me started on the 72 Sqn vs 847 Sqn saga.............. Oh.... go on.

What saga?

teeteringhead

4th Jun 2005, 16:45

OK Arkroyal , here goes.

First the caveats. This is now twenty-odd years ago, and as they say, the older you get the more clearly you remember things that never happened! It's based on my (and others') memory and, perhaps more importantly, perception of what went on. It's obviously a crab-eyes view, but I must insist that absolutely no criticism is implied or intended of any of those, of whatever colour of uniform, who actually went. There is criticism, implied and intended, of very senior officers, but I think I'm going to be as rude to Air Marshals as I will be to Admirals!

Next the background. 72 Sqn had been operating in NI on detachments since 1969. In late 1981 the long-overdue decision was made to move them permanently to EGAA. It was a big squadron, 24 ac (Wessex 2s) IIRC. Also in NI were detachments from 845 NAS, flying the fairly similar Wessex 5. Fine bunch of blokes, even the occasional chap, could even drink a bit for WAFUs.....

So, spring 1981 and the Taskforce sails. On the SH side, some Chinooks were going, while 33 Sqn (Puma) were working up with 5 Bde (?), intended to be the "follow on force". Didn't quite work out that way, seemed it might not be as easy as some had thought.

The rest of 845 had gone south, telling the crews in NI "tough titty, stay where you are on permanent detachment in NI 'til we get back." Chums on 845 (NI) not too happy - but not for long. Crews called to go south, RN tells RAF "You can keep the Wessi fives and the maintainers!"

Meanwhile, it looked as if 5 Bde would be a bit more involved than just in garrison duties and, oh Lordy Lordy, Puma can't do shipboard ops cos of narrow track undercarriage (I mean - they even fall over on land).

RAF (some of it) takes decision to swap 72 with 33 - so Wessex would go south (commonality of types - shipboard capability etc etc) while Puma would take over NI. Over Whitsun weekend, the squadrons swapped - quite an operation in itself, with a seamless takeover of NI tasking by 33. Changeover overseen from a great height (literally and figuratively) in a Chinook by a certain White Tornado Odiham Staish...

72 assemble at Benson before embarking on Atlantic Causeway , maintainers do fantastic job servicing all frames etc etc. Then, CO 72 summoned to Northwood - from where the war was being run, to be told by the Air Commander (AOC 18 Gp) that 72 weren't going, as the RN had formed a new Sqn (847) to take their place and that commonality of type ruled. Air Commander apparently thought (or had been led to believe) that 72 was another Puma Sqn........

So 847 went - with aircraft out of store, many/most without VHF/FM radios to talk to the troops, crews off ground tours/exchange tours who were uncurrent etc etc. Coordination so pisspoor that crews and aircraft arrived separately, indeed the aforementioned Dave Morgan, an ex 72 man, had to fly some of the aircraft ashore. Even the RN exchange guy on 72 was 'phoned up personally by a two-and-a-half and told "I don't care if you are on a Bessbrook in the morning, get yer ass to VL to join 847"

I could go on but I'll get to the point. I've spent many years in the SH business, and the point of that business IMHO is to give the guy on the ground THE BEST SUPPORT AVAILABLE (shouting intended). Quite simply, they didn't get it in '82. And the perception (see first para) was that this rag tag and bobtail squadron (847) was dragged together in preference over a fully worked up combat ready squadron, purely so that an RN sqn could take the place of an RAF one.

Alternative history is dangerous ground, but maybe, just maybe, the Welsh Gurads could have been sat in the back of 72's Wessex instead of waiting a long long time in Galahad.........

But then - Causeway might have gone the same way as Conveyor !!

And the fate of the Wessex 5s at Aldergrove is another good dit! Apologies once again if the above is all bolleaux, but I think it ain't. It is most certainly the view of many who were there, and not only crabs.......

charliegolf

4th Jun 2005, 18:51

Teeters

Even given that cruel jibe about starships, I recall everything you write, as it happened.

The whole farce lurched from one apparent cock-up to another.

Over a short period of days I was told to:

crew a single Puma to sail on the Canberra- I was duty crew, and told to pack a bag;

go play with 5 Bde on Sennybridge;

go be 72 Sqn for a while.

In the event I ended up doing my normal rotation at Addergrove as the one and only Starship crewman. Saw out the war there.

Sort of- 'Hello left hand, this is right hand. Have you met?'

CG

steamchicken

5th Jun 2005, 12:08

the helicopter loads had been made up in bundles weighing 3,000 lbs, presumably for RAF Pumas as they were too heavy for our Wessex and uneconomically light for the Sea Kings Says Mike Clapp of 5 Bde.

Presumably that cockup was due to somebody assuming 33 Sqn's Pumas would be the SH?

Arkroyal

5th Jun 2005, 15:26

Thanks teeteringhead, very interesting to hear the story from the 72 angle.

I've no doubt that inter-service rivalry played some part in the saga, but the final nail must have been the airheaded airship who thgought 72 operated Pumas.

I'd been dined out by 845 on the eve of the Argentine invasion and packed off to Lee - on - the - Solent for SAR, and so thought I'd be taking an early bath too. So 847 went - with aircraft out of store, many/most without VHF/FM radios to talk to the troops, crews off ground tours/exchange tours who were uncurrent etc etc.847 was formed from what was available, and I, like Norman, got the phone call to 'get my arse in XS491 and deliver self and it to 847 in the morning' '84 who?' I asked. But that's another story (and song) The work up was not too big a problem as we had a long trek south, and a depth of experience, with very few first tourists.
Coordination so pisspoor that crews and aircraft arrived separately, indeed the aforementioned Dave Morgan, an ex 72 man, had to fly some of the aircraft ashore. Not quite true. Causeway was being converted in Devonport for helo ops, and as an ex container ship, simply did not have the accomodation for the personnel required for the 14 aircraft the squadron embarked.

RFA Engadine was the only wessex sized deck available with ample berths, and was chosen to carry the other 4 wessiea and 14 crews. Not ideal, but all that was left. Engadine left whilst Causeway was still unfinished, but the timings went totally awry when the old girl broke a piston near Gib and had to wait for spares to be flown out. (I can't confirm this, but it seems the spares arrived in Gib, where a well meaning blunty, working on Engadine's planned timetable, duly sent them on to Ascension.......and back) Further delays through tropical waters when Engadines top speed slowed to a pathetic 12.5 kts due to overheating. Upshot was Causeway and helos arriving some time ahead of most of the crews. (Did Moggy fly any ashore? I doubt it). THis sorry state of affairs would equally have affected 72 Sqn, unless this fully worked up and combat ready squadron had some secret plan to fly the bloody things there some other way.

In the event, the crews arrived on June 9th. Too late, I'll agree. Once ashore, the troops received the best support they could have.

Would 72 have been so keen on finishing off the war, and then sticking around as garrison squadron until mid September, as 847 did? I doubt it.
He said tou're 847
A Commando Squadron true
And as the words had left his lips
We all whispered - 84 who?

Arclite01

5th Jun 2005, 15:29

Just started reading this thread.

BEagles early comments really are food for thought.

I'm sure if the US can keep the B52 in service for close on 100 years (by the time it goes out in 2048) the idea of keeping the Vulcan in service as a versatile platform for laser guided munitions delivery was really quite a cost effective option.

LTC or not...............

'The Victor might have been an even better one - discuss'

Arc:D

Conan the Librarian

5th Jun 2005, 16:14

Wasn't the Vulcan trialled (with FI in mind) with LGBs? Sure I have a picture somewhere, but if memory serves me well, it could only carry three of the then current LGB due weapon (more likely control surface - was it Paveway 1/2?) dimensions.

How many JDAMS would a Vulcan carry I wonder? I would love to hear the old girl again and wish she was in service, but how useful a platform would she have been if the above is true?

regards to all,

Conan

teeteringhead

6th Jun 2005, 08:50

but the final nail must have been the airheaded airship .. absolutely Ark Royal , couldn't agree more. Fortunately we'd got properly Joint (well, ...ish) by the next lot (GW1). Thanks very much too for the dark blue view - I know from Norman (RIP) that 847 did the business when they got there (and btw ... crab SH are STILL in FI !)

Problem in '82 was largely the lack of proper (crab) staff support for the Air Commander - let's face it I didn't (don't!) know much about Nimrods either......

As to Moggy flying some of the Wessi ashore, that came from his own lips .... but he always did talk a good debrief!:ok:

I guess there were just as many dark blue and brown cockups as well...

Do you still drink as much port as you used to (Rotterdam Rules!) ... that's if you are who I think you are .....

Strictly Jungly

6th Jun 2005, 10:43

Sailed down on HERMES and came home in her too, with a variety of locations in the interim. An outstanding ship!

Many many memories to choose from, however, happened to drop onto CANBERRA where one of the lounges was filled with survivors of the ARDENT. I was fortunate to witness a stirring speech from their CO. At the time I thought "he'll go far!" and he did!

Chinook - worked round the clock and even lifted one of ours off a hill side after an unfortunate accident. ( I still have the photo DL)

HMS EXETER - Saw one Sea Dart launch with satifactory impact, however, the other was a rogue that detonated in the surrounding hillside!

Teal Inlet - LSL unloading. Chinese crew members all ashore to minimise risk during air raids, taking shelter in corrugated metal sheep pen. As Argies are passing, a nameless person launches large sod of earth onto roof of aforementioned building. In almost cartoon fashion building collapses under forces of evacuating chogies as they imagine direct hit. Fear turns to anger (naturally) as they espy perpertrator (easily identified as he is convulsed in laughter). Said orientals then chase perp towards the inlet during air raid. I guess you had to be there.

Woodward's and Thompson's books I enjoyed, I haven't plucked up the courage to read Sharky's book.

Irrrespective of the inter service rivalry, I personally thought the raid on Stanley (irrespective of operational impact) was an amazing logistical feat. Having subsequently worked with RAF FW in the CVS - they are a fine bunch (well the ones that don't mind being there!).

SJ