Capability Gap

[BEagle]

From Sky News:

'CAPABILITY GAP' FEARS


The Armed Forces are facing a significant "capability gap" because old equipment is being phased out before the planned replacements are fully operational.

The Commons Defence Committee said that across the three services, aircraft warships and armoured vehicles are being withdrawn over the next three years.

But much of the new equipment is not due to enter operational service until after 2010.

Some of the replacements, such as the Royal Navy's two new aircraft carriers and the Joint Strike Fighter which is supposed to equip them, have already run into development difficulties. Others, such as the Army's Future Rapid Effects System family of armoured vehicles, are dependent on the unproven technologies.

The MPs are also "concerned" about plans to cut four infantry battalions from the Army, even though they acknowledged it would free up resources to allow some 3,000 new posts to be created in essential support services.

The committee said: "We believe that that vision takes a somewhat narrow perspective on the range of demands which our Armed Forces might be expected to meet in the future. Furthermore it may take another decade before the capabilities to deliver those requirements are in place. In the meantime equipment withdrawals and personnel reductions may leave gaps in capability."

[Gainesy]

WTF is a Rapid Effects System in English?:yuk:

[mbga9pgf]

IDentifying centres of gravity for a campaign and being able to apply pressure to the Centre of gravity before the enemy can respond to your manouvre. OODA loop stuff.

Some Labour toad is trying to squirm his way on BBC2 at the moment.

[Razor61]

The Future Rapid Effect System (FRES) is the UK programme to provide the British Army with a family of medium-weight, network-enabled, air-deployable armoured vehicles to meet up to 16 battlespace roles.

The key drivers for FRES are the need for:

- An armoured Rapid Effect land capability;
- Wide operational utility;
- Maximum interoperability with other parts of deployed forces, other components and allies; and
- Addressing the obsolescence of existing fleets.

These drivers are closely aligned to the Army’s strategic development themes of Agile Forces, Effects-based Operations and Directed Logistics

General characteristics / technical performance

The key design features of FRES include:

- A ‘System of System’ architecture, drawing closely on developments in Digitisation and CBM/ISTAR, designed to ensure optimal situational awareness, operational tempo and force cohesion throughout the battlespace.

- Air portable, to achieve Rapid Effect.

- A balanced, modular and integrated survivability package.

- Commonality of sub systems and components to improve supportability; reduce the logistic footprint; enable through-life capability sustainment; and reduce cost of ownership.
An incremental approach to both capability acquisition and approvals, in particular to the insertion of technologies as they mature, via an Integrated Technology Acquisition Programme (ITAP).

Costs, ISD and Major Milestones

The full Programme cost is yet to be established.

The ISD has yet to be firmly set and will only be endorsed at Main Gate, but the planning assumption is for the early variants of FRES to be introduced around the end of the decade.

The Total Fleet Requirement will be determined by studies planned for the initial Assessment Phase.

Commercial Aspects

A Systems House (SH), independent of product or manufacturing capability and appointed via competition, will lead the initial Assessment Phase. The planning assumption is that the SH Contract will be in place in late 2004. The broad aims of the Assessment Phase are: to further define the FRES capability required within the developing medium force and network enabled operational concepts and thus develop a series of affordable options for meeting the FRES requirement; to develop optimum procurement and support strategies for future phases in order to present a robust case at Main Gate; and to manage technology and supplier risk to acceptable levels.

It is too early in the project to determine the strategy for future phases, however a range of alternative options will be explored during the initial Assessment Phase in order to arrive at the optimum strategy for later phases. Industrial issues related to FRES are being assessed in line with the Defence Industrial Policy, and in association with Other Government Departments, in order to determine how these issues may influence the project. The detailed development of acquisition options will be made against the background of wider industrial factors.

International Collaboration

The IPT is exploring areas of common interest for co-operative activities, and sharing information on work carried out to date. During the initial Assessment Phase, studies will be undertaken to see if international co-operation or collaboration offers a potential solution for FRES.

Public/Private Partnerships

No current plans for Public/Private Partnerships

Crown Copyright 2004 - www.mod.uk

[Roland Pulfrew]

And once you have accepted a "capability gap" does anyone seriously believe that this, or any, governement will pay to fill the gap? The scrutineers in the centre would just trot out the well used line "Well you have survived this long without that capability why do we need to replace it now!":(

[airborne_artist]

WTF is a Rapid Effects System in English?

It's a "family" of fighting vehicles - what we used to call tanks, APCs, SPGs etc.

William Hill currently offering odds of 10-1 against that it will be late, 20-1 against that it won't work out of the box, and 30-1 against that the training system will be even later, so > half of them will be stored in a shed until the trainers catch up.

[C130 Techie]

I`m off to the bookies with a fiver. Its a dead cert.

[Huron Topp]

The MPs are also "concerned" about plans to cut four infantry battalions from the Army, even though they acknowledged it would free up resources to allow some 3,000 new posts to be created in essential support services.

If no-one at the pointy end is left, who are they supposed to support?

[totalwar]

You don't need to fill a capability gap. Just remove the capability and then you don't have a gap. Peasy

[BEagle]

So this FRES is a sort of little tank with a clever wireless or few then?

No doubt Leutnant Gruber will love it?

[airborne_artist]

in particular to the insertion of technologies as they mature

... sounds very uncomfortable ...

[umbung]

No no no they've all got it wrong... there is no capability gap....
it's a CREDIBILITY gap!

[Bag Man]

3,000 more support posts. Will they be civilian by any chance? What happened to the front line?

[airborne_artist]

Just remove the capability and then you don't have a gap. Peasy

Better still, just remove the requirement to be capable - the gap never even exists then.

[mbga9pgf]

Anyone else see a repeat of Circa 1935?

[rafloo]

what happened in 1935 apart from my Grandad being born?

[soddim]

This is more risky than 1935 - in those days it was possible to expand rapidly and to build new weapons systems quickly. Any move to expand now would require at least 5 years lead time before anything came off a production line and the training time required to operate modern kit would be lengthy.

Look after Uncle Sam - he's our only hope.

[Stan Bydike]

I must admit that I prefer the term:

"Capabilty Holiday"

:}

[WE Branch Fanatic]

Also see this. (http://telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2005/03/17/nmod17.xml&sSheet=/news/2005/03/17/ixnewstop.html)

And from the Gaurdian:

Britain cannot sustain its army deployments abroad, MPs warn

Richard Norton-Taylor
Thursday March 17, 2005
The Guardian

The intensity with which the British army is deployed on operations is unsustainable, a cross-party committee of MPs says in a report published today.

The government has undervalued the continuing need to deploy significant numbers of "boots on the ground", while cuts in manpower and equipment programmes will lead to capability gaps, the Commons defence committee warns.

"Many frontline units in the army have for some years been experiencing an operational and training cycle whose intensity is unsustainable over the longer term," it says.

It also says the MoD has underestimated the role the armed forces may have to play in defence of the "homeland" - Britain - as a result of the threat from international terrorism. The MoD's emphasis is on an "expeditionary strategy" under which the threat from international terrorism is "dealt with at source".

Pressure on the defence budget, meanwhile, has led to the early scrapping of surface ships, submarines, and fast jets including Jaguars and Sea Harriers. The MPs point out that many of the key capabilities identified by the MoD, including two aircraft carriers, the planes to be based on them, submarines, destroyers, and helicopters, will not be available until the end of the decade or after.

Some of the programmes have already been delayed. They include the Eurofighter, or Typhoon as it is now called, and the aircraft carriers programme now estimated to cost £12bn, which includes the cost of the planes to be based on them. However, potential manufacturers of the carriers say £4bn is a more realistic cost for the two carriers than the £3bn the MoD estimates.

Weight problems have already delayed the Joint Strike Fighter programme and the carriers - HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales - will be at sea for two years without them.

The MoD has also delayed a decision in a planned £3bn helicopter programme badly needed by the RAF and army. "We are concerned that recognition of their operational value does not seem to be matched by the priority or urgency which MoD gives to their future procurement plans," the committee says.

It backs the army's controversial programme of regimental mergers, with some famous, single-battalion regiments - the Black Watch, for example - amalgamated into larger units.

It accepts the changes would mean that each battalion would be based in a fixed location, rather than facing regular moves, which would bring important benefits in terms of family life, career development and unit deployability.

However, the MPs criticised the refusal of the defence secretary, Geoff Hoon, to publish the minutes of the Army Board meetings which agreed the changes.

"A more open approach, which might have demonstrated that the Army Board had arrived at its recommendations on the basis of sound and objective arguments, would have reaped significant benefits in terms of support from serving and retired members of the army for the proposals overall," the committee says.

Disputes over the names of the new regiments, it adds, "seem to have been fomented by the perceived lack of transparency in the Army Board's deliberations and decision-making process".

The MPs also say accommodation for the armed forces is "too frequently of a poor standard".

[Lafyar Cokov]

Isn't it 'In between capabilities at the moment'???

[Archimedes]

Not according to the Public Accounts Cttee: 'alarming shortages' (although the story seems very familiar) BBC story (with dodgy dates about JHC) (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4360089.stm)

[BEagle]

Referring to the Chinook Mk 3 scandal, the chairman of the all-party Public Accounts Committee said:
"It is simply disgraceful that the MoD has spent a quarter of a billion pounds of taxpayers' money on the botched procurement"

Here is the full text from BBC News:

Troops 'face helicopter shortage'

The armed forces face an "alarming" shortage of battlefield helicopters, a Commons committee has warned.

The Public Accounts Committee said the gap between the number of helicopters needed and those available to the MoD is between 20% and 38%. The shortage was exacerbated by the MoD's £259m purchase of eight Chinook helicopters, which remain grounded.

The report also said shortfalls in other protection equipment could increase risks for service people.

The MPs branded the Chinook affair "one of the worst examples of equipment procurement that the committee has seen."
The committee also warned of shortfalls in helicopter protection equipment, nuclear, biological and chemical protection for aircrew, and communications capacity.

Risks 'increased'

It said these problems could increase risks faced by the Royal Air Force, Army and Royal Navy, including overstretching available equipment and pilots. The committee said as yet the equipment shortfall had not impacted on the successful conduct of operations - but had "adversely impacted" training in the UK.

The MPs noted that the MoD intended to spend £3bn over the next 10 years to enhance and replace the capability provided by the helicopter fleet. But it added: "The Department did not, however, expect to eliminate the shortfall in battlefield support helicopter lift in its entirety."

The committee said the shortfall problem had been exacerbated by the Chinook saga, which began in July 1995. The Chinook helicopters were grounded because they could be a risk to fly in cloudy weather because the software which enabled them to do this could not be properly tested. The report said "Only 45 of 100 'essential elements' set out in the department's requirement were actually specified in the contract.

"The department was unable to say who was responsible for the flawed procurement of the Chinook Mark 3. No-one seems accountable when things go wrong, " it stated.

As of April 2004, the MoD had an overall fleet of 357 battlefield helicopters to support land, amphibious and Special Forces' operations.

'Spare parts'

The committee made a series of recommendations including that the MoD should consider creating a single organisation which would deem whether a helicopter is airworthy and fit to enter service.

Currently that is a responsibility of the individual services.
Committee chairman Edward Leigh, Tory MP for Gainsborough, said of the report: "It is simply disgraceful that the MoD has spent a quarter of a billion pounds of taxpayers' money on the botched procurement of eight Chinook helicopters that cannot be flown because the MoD can't determine if they're safe. The MoD urgently needs to work out whether the helicopters can be made fit for operations and how much this would cost the public purse, or whether there is any other good use for the helicopters aside from breaking them up for spares."

The report welcomed the 1991 move which saw the battlefield helicopters of the Royal Navy, Army, and RAF brought under a single Joint Helicopter Command (JHC).

[Razor61]

On Westcountry News this evening a news piece about the 'shambles' of Helicopter availability to the Armed Forces.

In the news it said the Land forces were 20-40% down on helicopter availability from the RAF, Army and Royal Marines.

Navy were 70% down in specialist helicopters at sea.

Also a news item about the Chinook farce.