ATSB Report Camden Duchess fatal accident

[Menen]

The report is on the ATSB website. Much could have been learned from this accident, but the report seemed more concerned with regulatory side issues and detailed discussion of previous accidents rather than the nitty gritty of who pulled what on whom.

The instructor was a well known highly experienced ATO who had conducted many instrument rating tests involving simulated engine failures at take off.

Yet the ATSB report said nothing about his usual method of simulating an engine failure on multi-engine aircraft during lift off or shortly afterwards. There must have been many pilots who had personally experienced his method of engine failure simulation. That being so, then why was this not brought out in the report? Fears of litigation maybe?

In essence, all we know from the ATSB report was that something happened at lift off to cause the aircraft to fly back into the ground on a night take off. And also that other aircraft have crashed under similar circumstances. So what's new?

The instructor's method of engine failure simulation may well have been the real answer to why the aircraft crashed. Anecdotal evidence existed that before simulating an engine failure at take off, this particular instructor would often place a map between the throttles and the mixture controls before cutting an engine. One wonders his motive for this?

Often there is no firm evidence of what specific actions took place in the cockpit immediately before a crash. This should not prevent the ATSB from at least discussing the most plausible explanations that may have precipitated the final outcome.

Instead ATSB spend nearly two years carefully drafting a report which tells the industry nothing that was not known before, but does say that it is not a good thing to pull an engine on take off in a multi-engine aeroplane unless you have first checked all clear left - ahead - and right for a safe area to crash if there is a stuff up. An interesting discussion point on its own? How?

[Tinstaafl]

So the student can't use lever position cues to work out which engine isn't working.

[Hudson]

Tinstaffl. Of course. The mixture control is the culprit.

[Bula]

Mixture with engine failure just airborne.... right. It should be an interesting read. Maybe it would be pure speculation to say he did do that during that flight..

saying that, the other "student" pilot (not so student) would have something to say aswell but its not uncommon in situations like these to not remember what happened... especially when you wouldn't want to.

ooohhh well.... let us all learn, let us learn

[kimwestt]

Surprise, surprise, there was more than just anecdotal evidence in the possession of the ATSB as to the why's and hows. Once again the opportunity of the industry learning something that would probably save lives has been denied us. I do know, as I had a "discussion" with the man in question a matter of days before.

[john_tullamarine]

Maybe most other pilots are far more skilful than I am ... I was always too busy flying the thing to find time to look at the disposition of levers ..and the map trick always strikes me as a silly and unnecessary potential for confusion ?

Determining the failed engine by flying the AH/DG, advancing all throttles, correcting the yaw delta, and closing to confirm, takes but a second or two ... and is done quite reliably and repeatably in a simple twin ...

Having said that, and having done a couple of renewals with the fellow concerned in years long gone by .. I can't recall his using a map or similar to cover the quadrant ? Perhaps this was a technique he adopted in more recent years ?

[Icarus2001]

I personally use a chart or something similar to cover the mixture controls during simulated engine failures. I also know plenty of other Multi-engine Instructors (& ATOs) who do the same.

To those that have asked, many pilots during twin or IFR training use the adage " a sneaky peak is worth a hundred scans", therefore visually masking the mixture controls prevents "cheating". And no most people probably would not even bother to look as they realise their life and the lives of their passengers are at stake, by being able to correctly identify and confirm the failed engine.

Whether he covered the mixture controls or not is hardly the point. He knew which engine he had failed and he was PIC so should "bloggs" get it wrong at the "confirm left" stage then there should be no issue.

I always do a runway abort with initial twin students and if the strip is suitable possibly a below Vyse failure (immediately after becoming airborne) hoping the student closes both throttles as they have briefed that they will do. Surprising how often they decide to go below the go speed.

John Where is the potential for confusion by covering the mixture controls? I find it has the added benefit that the student knows it is not a "real one" and also my hand is close to the action in case the student trys to do something silly, like close the other mixture control!

[Hudson]

Icarus old chap. Your opinons and practices don't match your your Pprune profile in which you describe yourself as "Aviation Professional".

[john_tullamarine]

Icarus 2001,

I respect your views but we must agree to disagree.

Coming mainly from a larger aircraft IFR background and being able to load the pilot up a bit in the simulator, I have long left worrying about pilots "having a sneaky look".

In any case, it should be fairly obvious to the GA I/F instructor/examiner if the student or pilot under renewal test is "cheating". By choosing the time of the simulated failure and keeping a reasonably high workload involved . .. if the pilot drops his/her scan then other things will fall in a heap and it all becomes a bit obvious to blind Freddy. The more experienced pilot wouldn't waste his/her time scanning the throttle quadrant when it is easier and quicker to do it right first time.

I don't have any knowledge of what Les did or did not do on this occasion and I have flown with him enough over the years to respect his overall ability .. even if I might disagree on some specifics. But, I agree, that isn't the point in question.

In general we could take the view that, in any situation where there is room for the student to do something silly (for whatever reason), and the instructor/examiner hasn't left enough fat in the scenario to recover from something out of left field .... the situation ..... sooner or later .... is going to turn to custard and bite you on the exposed bits ....

I suggest that failing engines during the takeoff flare at low speeds is just such a scenario. I am reminded of an airline for whom I did some contract sim training work a few years ago ... during recurrent training exercises, I introduced a similar exercise during spare time just for interest value .... it was far more interesting to see that some of the pilots got it very wrong first time round .... in the aircraft (presuming that the aircraft and sim were similar in response) there wouldn't have been a second time to try it again ... this sort of thing always provides a sobering point for debriefing discussions ...

"Where is the potential for confusion by covering the mixture controls?" The training setup doesn't match the real world ... does that difference create a potential problem in the case of a real world failure ? In my view it does ... for no real benefit. If you chose a different point of view, then I accept that.

The history of training accidents suggests that it is a bit silly to kill more people by training for an event ... than are killed in the real world situation ..... the use of high fidelity full flight simulators provides the opportunity to play and refine skills .... without the risks associated with doing it for make-believe real.

I agree with Menen's philosophies .... why stick one's neck out playing with low level failures for questionable benefit. While there are arguments for and against, it seems to me that most of the training needs can be addressed by playing at a reasonable altitude.

My standard brief for GA renewals was along the lines of "pull an engine below X ft agl and I will assume that it is a real failure and close both throttles" ... no examiner ever called my bluff, Les included. Because my airline placed considerable emphasis on simulator practice and I did a fair bit of personal sim practice over and above minimum licence and training requirements .... I wasn't concerned about my ability to fly the aeroplane during a simulated failure ... I just wasn't prepared to risk my neck doing something which, in my view, was unnecessary.

[I Fly]

I'd like to know where there is a high fidelity full flight simulator for a Duchess, tell me and in future I'll spend my money there. Why has no one mentioned that in Australia engine failures at night below 1500' are illegal. Most Ops Manuals would have a minimum height below which you don't use the mixture but the throttle. Above that height I do use something to cover the mixtures. I do not want to get into the student's subconscious mind "it's always the mixture or it's always the throttle". I have operated Duchesses in and out of Camden for many years and have always found them capable to outperform that hill.
When a pilot sits in the runup bay and goes through the safety drill, s/he needs to know precisely what the aircraft can do and can't do. If you don't, how are you going to make a realistic decision? But do it in daytime with someone who does know.

[Icarus2001]

John I agree with most of what you say. However I still believe covering the mixture controls is worthwhile. I think the crux of the issue is instructors/ATOs crossing the line of their ability to recover if "bloggs" gets it wrong. I only got to fly with Les once and I concur that the outcome is surprising.

Hudson your personal attack has added very little to an important thread about an issue which is poorly taught and understood and has killed more than once. What do you actually think about the issue being discussed, rather than what you think you know about me?

I am always happy to learn and modify what I do based on new ideas or another persons viewpoint which is valid. However what can I get from your post Hudson?

[Hudson]

Icarus. No offence meant - it was meant to be a humorous quip.

There is however a fine line between risking life and limb of your student to prove that engine failures can be dangerous - and genuinely believing that by doing so, you will make them a safer pilot.

Having said that, I must say that cutting a mixture a few seconds after getting airborne with the intention that the student should close both throttles and bunt over to land on the remaining length of runway, is arguably one of the most dangerous practices that I have ever read about.

One thing is for sure, and that is the lawyers (and CASA)would have your guts for garters if you bent the aircraft and student in the process of showing your student how good you are. Only cowboys and the irresponsible would put lives at risk for the purposes of simulating realism. This, my lad, is not another humorous quip...

[Icarus2001]

Hudson yes I did take offence, as I consider myself at the other end of the spectrum to the cowboy, young & bold pilots.However I accept the limitations of the medium and the lack of a humour button on the posts.:O

I agree entirely that the line is very fine. I never intentionally go up to it as I wish to be the oldest pilot in Australia, perhaps not the best. Let me explain further. The standard GA light twin brief as you probably know includes something along the lines of " if I have an engine failure below X I will close both throttles and land straight ahead". This is often spoken as a mantra, losing it's effectiveness, and it is surprising how often pilots suffering an engine failure on the runway do not do as they have briefed for and close both throttles. As I said I always do an engine failure on the runway to prove this point to the student and also to show them how quickly the aircraft will head for the green bits! Most of the schools I have worked for show this as part of their training syllabus.

You will note that as for a below Vyse failure immediately after becoming airborne I said "if the strip is suitable I will possibly do..." Suitable for me is around 2000 metres of bitumen. I do not undertake this procedure lightly or very often. In fact I have probably done it three times in twelve years of multi-engine training. Usually a failure early in the ground roll is sufficient to make the point to the student that they should be ready for an engine failure on every take-off and that they have to move very quickly. I am talking about a simulated failure at around 10 feet off the ground. Incidentally I am talking here about Duchess, Seminole type aircraft. I also agree with you that it is probably the most dangerous sequence of training that I do, (hence three times only) and that includes plently of aerobatics training!

Hudson do you use phrases like "my lad" and "old chap" in your spoken communication? I find it very patronising, you assume I am younger than you? You may like to peruse this document...

http://www.casa.gov.au/download/CAAPs/ops/5_23.pdf

I think I fly raises a valid question. Simulated engine failures at night are not permitted below 1500'. (AIP ENR 80.3.1)

[Bula]

I have a question for the twin training guys...

If you dont think that it is important to cover the mixtures for the failure, why use the mixture below 1000' when the throttle could be just as effective?

Also regarding the AIP for engine failure at night below 1500' AGL i thought this comment and the use of the word "guidance" was very intersting in the ATSB report.

Asymmetric flight at night was not precluded by regulation. However, guidance provided to pilots contained in the Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) stated that simulated asymmetric flight at night must not be conducted below 1,500 ft AGL. Civil Aviation Advisory Publication (CAAP) 5.23-1 (0) provided guidance on a syllabus of training, which included night asymmetric circuits.

[Toodogs]

"I think I fly raises a valid question. Simulated engine failures at night are not permitted below 1500'. (AIP ENR 80.3.1)"

The whole bloody point!!!

One Metro at Tamworth springs to mind...

[Icarus2001]

80.3 Circuit Training Operations at Night

80.3.1 Aircraft engaged in training operations at night in the circuit area must not, when below 1,500FT AGL, carry out any manoeuvres which involve:
a. the simulation of an engine failure;or
b. flight in a simulated one engine inoperative condition;or
c. the intentional shut down of a serviceable engine.

Asymmetric flight at night was not precluded by regulation. However, guidance provided to pilots contained in the Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) stated that simulated asymmetric flight at night must not be conducted below 1,500 ft AGL. Civil Aviation Advisory Publication (CAAP) 5.23-1 (0) provided guidance on a syllabus of training, which included night asymmetric circuits.

Pretty strong guidance! Okay so when CASA prosecutes it is for an offence against the ACT or the CAR. Surely the wording of the AIP carries legislative weight. Creampuff?

[Hudson]

Icarus. You may have a point re the patronising bit - so I will try and be more concise.
Most multi-engine light twin instructors will agree that cutting an engine at low speeds and close to the ground is risky. How risky is a matter of personal opinion.

It is interesting to note that the British CAA are against simulated engine failures by cutting the mixture of fuel at any altitude (AIC/1999 dated 6th May 1999.

In addition the NTSB in 1976, issued an urgent warning on simulated engine-out manoeuvres which was published following a fatal accident where the instructor and student were killed after a mixture control was used to shut down an engine. An interesting paragraph included in the NTSB warning, could well apply to your own stated reasons for such a practice on take off.

It stated that "Many flight instructors down through the years used the technique of abruptly cutting an engine with a multi-engine candidate to test his emotional reaction and judgement with this extreme technique."

Finally the Piper Seminole Information Manual at Section 10, entitled Training Tips, states that "experience has shown that the training advantage gained by pulling the mixture control or turning off the fuel to simulate engine failure at low altitude is not worth the risk assumed - therefore it is recommended that instead of using either of these procedures to simulate loss of power at low altitude, the throttle be retarded slowly to idle position".

If you feel so strongly about using the mixture as a good training policy then it might be safer to do this above circuit altitude where there is more time to recover from stuff-ups by either yourself or the hapless student. If the purpose of the map between the throttles and mixture trick is to give practice at identification then why not practice this above 2000 ft until the pilot is competent at correct and speedy identification.

Having now demonstrated his competence you can then use the throttle method at lower altitudes which is demonstrably a safer technique. But as I said earlier the policy of bunting over to land straight ahead is really beyond the pale for any sensible instructor.

All this reminds me of that wonderful pithy saying coined by some
wise aviator of yesteryear:

"A superior pilot is one who stays out of trouble by using his superior judgement to avoid situations that might require the use of his superior skills". A lesson there for you perhaps, Icarus?

[Jet_A_Knight]

TRAP: If it is done, successfully, enough times, the 'perceived' risk is lessend.

[Hudson]

Jet-A-Knight. Precisely!

[barleyhi]

Anyone of the Multi instructors here actually read Pub 45 re night asymmetrics???

"Asymmetric operations shall not be carried out at night."

Full Stop. No Argument........Essendon, Tamworth, Camden........History repeating itself!!

[Creampuff]

Icarus2001

And there you were thinking that the AIP contained rules!

You'd be amazed at how much of AIP is somebody's bright but legally invalid idea.

A direction in the AIP is binding if, and only to the extent that, it is the product of a valid exercise of a power to make the particular direction.

The problem is that you don't know which bits of AIP are valid and which bits are invalid. However, unless you are on notice that a particular bit of AIP is invalid, I suggest it is reasonable (and indeed prudent) for you to presume that all of AIP is valid.

You would have a defence of honest and reasonable mistake of fact if, for example, you did a right hand circuit at an aerodrome because ERSA said it was right hand circuits at that aerodrome, when in fact the 'requirement' in ERSA was someone's 'bright idea' instead of the result of a direction given by a delegate of CASA's power under reg 166.

Conversely, if someone is prosecuted for failing to comply with a 'direction' in AIP, it will be up to the prosecution to show that the 'direction' was a valid exercise of some power to make that particular direction. If, for example, you did a left hand circuit when ERSA said it was right hand circuits at a particular aerodrome, the prosecution would have to prove that a delegate of CASA's power under reg 166 had given a valid direction in relation to that aerodrome.



Reg 92 deals with aerodromes. It confers on CASA the power to issue directions relating to the safety of air navigation, in relation to an aerodrome. If CASA has given a direction under reg 92 to the effect set out in AIP 80.3, and if reg 92 is wide enough to support such a direction, and if that direction remains in force, a failure to comply with that direction would be an offence under reg 92(3).

If an operation is being conducted under the authority of an AOC and the company ops manual prohibits the activity mentioned in AIP 80.3, failure to comply with the ops manual would be a breach or reg 215(9).

That's a lot of "ifs".

Reg 166 deals with operations on and in the vicinity of aerodromes. It's very difficult to construe reg 166 as conferring power other than with respect to circuit directions.

Reg 249 covers pax-carrying emergency practice, and does not confer a direction-making power on CASA.

Beyond that, it's hard to identify the source of the power to give a direction in terms of AIP 80.3.

It seems that the ATSB has come to the view that AIP 80.3 is a 'bright idea' rather than a legally valid direction – a very, very untidy state of affairs. If it's only 'guidance', the AIP should say so in words of one syllable.

[Jet_A_Knight]

It never fails to amaze how this little 'gem' from CAAP 5.23-1(0) Syllabus Of Training - Multi Engine Aircraft made it through:

Flight # F8 - Night Asymmetric Circuits

With a nice little pointer :" Note: The conditions of AIP OPS – 77 apply."

Still builds an expectency of legitimacy of the excercise.

I mean, why bother putting that in the CAAP???:confused:

[Icarus2001]

Hudson If you feel so strongly about using the mixture as a good training policy then it might be safer to do this above circuit altitude where there is more time to recover from stuff-ups by either yourself or the hapless student.
once again you patronise me. Of course almost all of the simulated failures are done at a "safe" altitude. You need to read the requirements for the CIR Renewal test to see that two engine failures at 8000' does not meet the requirements!

I note that the topic has now changed to using the mixture control to simulate an engine failure. I am simply following the standard practise in regard to this. Ring any CASA field office on 131 757 and ask what technique the local FOIs use for simulating an engine failure. Moving the mixture control to ICO is almost universally used by ATOs for the pupose of simulating an engine failure.

You quote from selected sources. I can quote some selected sources back at you if you like? Aircraft manufacturers write many things to protect their legal position. For example does a new C172R really need 13 fuel drain points?

I have had a read through some of your posts in an attempt to understand your point of view. It seems you have plenty of heavy metal time, am I correct? Much of what we do in GA is scorned by the RPT end of town. For example we fly single engine aircraft at night on moonless nights over tiger country. This is fully endorsed by CASA but strangely most CASA FOIs refuse to fly at night in singles. I have friends in the airlines who consider anything below 5700 Kg an ultralight.

We also fly aircraft with unreliable 1950s technology fuel gauges, some that have fuel tanks that are impossible to dip because of their design. We manage this risk in various ways. Coming from your world of guaranteed performance and triple redundancy this would be frightening no doubt but until the regulator actually does something to enhance safety in this country like requiring reliable gauges and fuel flow computers in say, all twins, we live with it.

Most of the engine failures I give pilots are conducted above LSALT or MSA but "the system" requires engine failures lower down. For example inside the OM on an ILS. Do you consider a simulated engine failure at 800' on the ILS to be folly also?

Creampuff Thanks for your input. Clear as mud isn't it. I deal with CASA on an almost weekly basis where what they want me to do and what they can legally compel me to do are very different.

So if the industry does not know which AIP "rules" (guidance) are backed by an instrument or other legal "direction" should we just obey the AIP assuming we are then protected?

barleyhi Interestingly I heard an RFDS aircraft advise the tower that they were going to go assymetric the other evening, about half an hour after last light. I wonder what their Operations Manual says?

[Creampuff]

Icarus2001

You are 'protected' to the extent that it is reasonable for you to assume that the AIP is valid, and the 'protection' would be in the form of allowing you to set up a defence of honest and reasonable mistake of fact in the event that a provision of AIP with which you complied was found to be invalid.

In almost all circumstances it will be reasonable for you to assume AIP is valid, because you will not have any knowledge of or means to determine whether and if so which parts are not valid, and you will have specific obligations to comply with various parts of AIP and therefore no reasonable alternative but to comply. In rare cases there may be a patent error in AIP, or you may be on reasonable notice of an error in AIP, in which case it may not be reasonable for you to comply with the erroneous requirement.

AIP 80.3 raises some very tricky issues, because it seems (from the ATSB's statement) that we're not talking about a failure to comply with a valid direction, but a failure to comply with 'guidance'.

If AIP 80.3 is not the product of a valid exercise of a power to make a direction in those terms (to which conclusion the ATSB appears to have come), what effect does it have?

If you 'comply' with it, you're evidently not breaking any rules, because you'll simply be doing what you would be otherwise be entitled to do: doing circuits at night without practising engine emergencies. If you don't 'comply' with it, you're still not breaking any rules, because (we've assumed) it's not a valid direction.

However, AIP 80.3 may still be relevant in determining whether the duty of care which is undoubtedly owed by the participants in the activity to each other and to innocent third parties, has been breached. The fact that an activity is carried out in compliance with, or without breaching any, regulatory requirements, does not preclude a finding that the activity was nonetheless carried out negligently. Whatever other effects AIP 80.3 may have, it has the effect of putting people on reasonable notice that there are particular and special risks that arise in the specific activities to which it applies, and there are consequent effects upon what must reasonably be done by participants in those activities in order to discharge their duty of care. (A simple analogy would be driving at the speed limit on a road that had roadworks and warning signs about gravel and the consequent sliding risks. The fact that the road rules did not prohibit you from driving at that speed would be no answer to a claim in negligence against you when you slid on gravel into on coming traffic.)

There's no way I'd be doing anything contrary to AIP 80.3, unless I had confirmation, in writing from CASA, to the effect that it is merely 'guidance' rather than a direction, and even then, only in the context of a very clear understanding of the special risks and consequent steps I needed to take to ensure I discharged my duty of care to those put at risk by the activity.

[NAMPS]

I think that simulated engine failures in situations described in the JWW accident report and NEJ accident report (Tamair Metro) should be authority enough to show that it is unsafe to perform that exercises at night below circuit height - especially in the case of a light training twin with marginal single engine climb performance.

In both of those accidents the aircraft had take-off power being delivered on one engine, this has the obvious effect of a large yaw force that requires a quick response to correct.

Of course, a simulated engine failure during, say, a turn from an outbound leg to an inbound leg on an NDB approach or at the outer marker of an ILS is completely different, due to the active engine only delivering approach power. The yaw force is much less and therefore there is a greater margin of safety (although the effects of an engine failure during this phase of flight can be insidious).

I would be interested to read the accident report regarding CTT, what factors were contributory.

For those interested, here is the link to the ATSB report of the NEJ accident: http://www.atsb.gov.au/aviation/pdf/vh-nej.pdf (http://)

[swh]

Creampuff,

Good posts ..... Thanks

:ok:

[I Fly]

Creampuff, I suggest you talk to the ATSB. I talked to the person that wrote the report. He/she states that the bit about the AIP being only 'guidance' is NOT his / her opinion, it IS THE INTERPRETATION GIVEN BY CASA. I thought that when we got the CAAPs, all the advise was to be written there on coloured paper. White paper was to contain the law and nothing but the law. Perhaps the CASA legal eagles write the law so they know where the loopholes are that the rest of us is blissfully ignorant and just complies anyway.
I understand that the pre-flight safety briefing spelled out that NO simulated engine failures will be carried out below 500'. In that case the pilot flying should (MUST) have assumed it to be a REAL engine failure (bits of paper or not) AND FLOWN ACCORDING TO HIS PRE TAKE-OFF SAFETY BRIEF. If they had done a full stop landing, returned to the run-up bay, and done a FULL AND PROPER pre take -off brief, they might still be alive.
Shortcuts only shortcut your life.
IF there was a real engine failure at 12' and IF the pilots had operated the aircraft correctly, (the BE67 at Camden, only 2 up, not full tanks,) the aircraft HAS the performance to fly away. Have a look at the accelerate go distance, in those conditions, in the POH. NOTE: The accelerate go distance is based on 71 kts. I doubt they were as slow as that at 12', therefore the accelerate go distance is less.

[Creampuff]

I'm not surprised ATSB checked with CASA.

That means that CASA takes the view that AIP 80.3 is not the subject of a legally valid direction.

The fact that it remains in the AIP in its misleading mandatory terms, or has not been made mandatory by a valid supporting direction with consistent complementary guidance material, is, I am afraid, typical of the two and half ringed political circus that passes as your aviation regulators.

[Hudson]

I Fly. The fact that a safety brief was given which stated that no simulated engine failures would be given below 500 ft doesn't mean a thing. One would be very naive to then assume that a real engine failure has occurred if the instructor had pulled an engine below 500 ft - in this case just on lift-off. The PF would have seen the instructor pulling the engine (by whatever means) as there would be hands all over the mixture controls. Clearly in this case the instructor pressed his luck once too far as he had been known to get away with this sort of thing for ages -albeit with a couple of close shaves.

The assertion that a full stop landing followed by a run-up and nice little take off brief would have prevented the accident from happening is hopeful speculation and exceedingly unlikely given the most probable method of simulating the engine failure.

While the Duchess may have had the performance to climb away with the gear retracted and the prop feathered this does no take into account the rising terrain on the projected take off flight path from that runway at Camden.

[CurtissJenny]

And I seem to recall that a DH Dove crashed under similar circumstances, ie an engine pulled on t/o going up the hill at Camden in 1954.
Aircraft was a write off. DCA test officers on board as was another pilot, the name Dalton, comes to mind. Daylight hours.

Do we learn with age & experience ?

[I Fly]

Hudson the point I was trying to make. If they had done a 'proper safety brief'. With that aircraft, that load, those pilots, that airport, that time of day(night) - the go - no go discission would have been at least 85kts with gear in transit (if not a height as well). So IF a real engine failure had occurred BEFORE that point, both throttles would have been closed and landed straight ahead (possibly still on the runway, had they started the take-off roll from the beginning of the runway). NO SIMULATED ENGINE FAILURE SHOULD BE DONE BEFORE THAT POINT unless you are well within your accelerate stop distance available. Pub. 45 also states not to do engine failures 10 kts either side of Vmca. So it's simulated engine failures below 55 kts and still on the ground, or simulated engine failures AFTER the pilot said "we are in the go mode".
CurtissJenny I don't think we can compare this to the accident in 1954. Aircraft then had NO requirement for performing on one engine.

[Naughty S]

Why use the throttle?? Its because the piston being a large hunk of alloy stays warm and the cylinder cools very quickly (just check CHT) and therefore the cylinder shrinks onto piston and simulated emergency now becomes the real thing .

:mad:

I also cover the mixtures as in accordance with the ops manual and also Lycoming/Contonental have issued guidelines on the subject.

Engine failures below 300' if I really want to prove a point I will do so with throttle only but this is very rare. EFATO below 500' in daytime is dangerous enough people.

It was only recently practising Vmca at 3500' that a student said to me "I havent got any more rudder" and rolled full aileron and took the Baron after almost half a rotation and 1000' till I recovered (first 500' was just adrenalin) Multi training is dangerous enough without testing the limits of the flight envelope

[4dogs]

Ah, Creampuff,

I have missed your precise and well constructed passages....

I have always argued about the validity of AIP 80.3, simply because of its generality. As you have pointed out, it is indeed the product of someone's good idea on one hand and lack of regulatory knowledge on the other.

I believe that your approach (duty of care) is most appropriate, simply because it does not prohibit something that is capable of being risk-managed in certain aircraft types to a better risk profile than some other practices currently accepted. Practice failures in CAO 20.7.1B compliance-capable aircraft and many multi-engine helicopters spring immediately to mind.

The other problem for the regulator is finding an appropriate regulation under which to ban the practice, if that is what is required in the public interest. My quick scan of CAR(88) didn't pop up too many options that I thought appropriate - do you have any ideas about what piece of existing legislation might support a proper direction?

Stay Alive,

[Menen]

Curtis Jenny. The Dove accident was fatal - I think one or two DCA Examiners of Airmen were killed. That was a practice engine failure at rotation and the prop was feathered I think. I never flew the Dove but like the Duchess I think it was quite flyable providing the gear was up and prop feathered. In the case of the Dove I believe the mixture is cut to ICO and then the prop feather button pushed. Same as DC3. But until that prop is feathered the aircraft is going nowhere fast.

Also on January 1st 1950 around midnight a Lockheed Hudson VH-SMK crashed at Camden under similar circumstances to the Duchess, except that it may have been a real engine failure but this was not proven. It cleared nearby trees but stalled flat into the rising ground a few hundred yards beyond the end and 100 yards to one side of the extended centre line of runway 06. It caught fire and both pilots were killed.

Again a similar fatal accident at Port Lincoln about 20 years ago in a Chieftain. The instructor was known to pull the mixture to simulate engine failure at night and in this case he failed to put the mixture back to rich an set the throttle for zero thrust. The aircraft impacted gently rising ground - no visible horizon - and both pilots were killed. Mixture cuts and cowboy instructors have been proved to be a sometimes fatal combination.

[Creampuff]

4dogs – you’re too kind.

If I wanted to be hairy-chested about it, I’d probably:

- give it a go under 92, and let someone have a go at challenging its validity;

- use 215(3) to direct all AOC holders to put a prohibition, to the effect set out in AIP 80.3, in all Ops Manuals;

- use 5.11 and 5.16 to impose conditions, to the effect set out in AIP 80.3, on all licences and ratings

All of these could build in exceptions for specifically qualified people in specified circumstances.

(There was a time when a range of posters on this forum would say - do as they do under the FARs.)

[Cloud Cutter]

I don't know any instructors who use anything but the mixture (or in some circumstances the fuel selector) to simulate an engine failure. This is a perfectly safe practice if it's done under suitable conditions (I use 300' min, day VMC only).

This is how it's done by testing officers in NZ also. Mixture controls are usually sheilded from view, mainly to stop the student using anything other than rudder pressure to identify the dead donky, but also to let the student know that it is a simulated engine failure and not the real thing (they are briefed as such).

[Centaurus]

Ah - so they have cowboys in New Zealand as well as sheep.....

[Cloud Cutter]

No, I fail to see how simulating with the mixture is any different to the throttle. Speaking of cowboys, intentionally failing an engine on or just after rotation should (IMHO) not be done in ANY aircraft, that's what simulators are for. No there aren't any duchess sims, but as this type of aircraft (group C) is not required to be able to continue a takeoff after engine failure below 50 feet, there is no need to try.

It's quite simple: EF below blue line/with gear down/below 50 ft = rejected takeoff.

[Icarus2001]

So Centaurus & Hudson, using the mixture controls to simulate an engine failure makes one a cowboy? Then I must be one along with most CASA FOIs and all the ATO's that have done my renewals for the last 14 years!

I would really like to know how much light twin training time you guys have in the last ten years.

[QSK?]

Naughty S:It was only recently practising Vmca at 3500' that a student said to me "I havent got any more rudder" and rolled full aileron and took the Baron after almost half a rotation and 1000' till I recovered (first 500' was just adrenalin) Multi training is dangerous enough without testing the limits of the flight envelopeWhen demonstrating the effects of Vmca to a student, put your foot under the relevant rudder so that the student can see the aerodynamic effect of approaching Vmca but can't go below Vmca and put the aircraft into an uncontrollable stall. The pain in your foot will be significantly less than hitting the ground at Mach 1.0 in a nose down attitude.

[Centaurus]

Right on - Icarus..

[Bula]

ok then.. let me ask you this question. Would you simluate an engine failure after takeoff in a single engine aircraft with the use of the mixture?


No. didn't think so.... I dont know but realistically if a ATO or otherwise did that to me at an alititude that was not safe I would be punching the mixture back up and say were going home. The cockpit it not the place the "talk" about such things.

The risk is not worth the experience.

[Capt Fathom]

Having spent a consireable amount of time in GA, I have never had a Examiner/ATO/Check Pilot fail an engine by any other method other than moving the mixture control to cutoff.
Having said that, it has been a few years since I have done an endorsement/IR renewal. Has there been a change of thinking?

[Hudson]

Because people have have been given mixture cuts to simulate engine failure after take off for years and years and some have been killed as a result does not mean it was a safe practice. In fact it is plain idiotic. There is strong rumour of expensive legal action looming over the Duchess accident at Camden where the survivor was terribly burnt.

[Menen]

There is an article on asymmetric training practices in the latest edition of Flight Safety Australia just out. It is interesting to note CASA make a footnote at the end of the article which states:

"Note: CASA does not recommend propeller feathering or fuel starvation by mixture cut or fuel valve closure in asymmetric flight training operations at low level or in poor visibility.

[Chimbu chuckles]

It's not. imho, how you fail the engine but where and under what circumstances...also how switched on is the trainee.

I have given endorsement training in Islanders, Aerostars, C402/404 and Falcon 200 jets...I'm endorsed (and expereinced) on about 8 other piston/turbine twins and 4 other jets....including one renewal on the BE76. Nice little plane.

I have never...and I repeat NEVER had a trainee frighten me significantly....I have been somewhat bemused as a trainee F/O bored out over the Palm Oil plantations at V2+30/35/40 etc :ugh:

Use of the mixture control is not only valid but, in some aircraft, preferrable from an engine longevity point of view...C404s come to mind with their GTIO engines.

The problem is that many, if not most, people who give multi instruction, and many ATOs, have only that as their total aeronautical multi experience...oh and a few hours IFR charter if they a 'real' expereinced.

There are enough 'generic' twin sims out there so as to be able to simulate EFATO...to death so to speak, without having to take inordinate risks in the real thing...it's practicing bleeding.

The only 'twin' I have ever done 'V1' cuts in was the Falcon and at, even relatively heavy, training weights it went uphill at 2000'/min at V2+10 :ok:

Everything else was not below 300' and NEVER at night.

Don't expect too much quality guidance from CASA...remember the average CASA employee is almost unemployable.

On the occasions when I was to be exposed to EFATO in light twins my briefing was delivered in a tone of voice and looking straight into the eyes of the examiner in such a way as to leave him/her in NO doubt as to how the excercise/real failure would be coped with...if the event happened during the phase of flight I had dictated was to be 'real ones only' then that's exactly how they would be carried out...if the result was a damaged aircraft then I would walk away and leave :mad::mad::mad::mad::mad::mad::mad::mad: to explain why.

Several real ones over the years, including one just airborne in a C402 with the gear in transit and tall timber looming (in low cloud and tropical downpour) have been the crucible in which my attitudes to multi engine training have been formed...and in excess of 10000 multi hours/7000+ in command and multitudinous simulated engine failures in aeroplanes and proper simulators.

When CASA clearly mandates zero tolerance for practice EFATO in other than sims then things will improve...not before.

Several people in this thread have used terms like 'accelerate stop/accelerate go' with respect to light twin training in general or the duchess in particular....I don't care what graphs have been incorparated into ever thickening AFMs by arsecovering lawyers these are inappropriate terms to be used in other than FAR25 certified aircraft....there has been way too much "well that's what they do in the airlines' (spouted by people who have nevr been in an airline) creep into GA training in recent years. GA and the big end of town are completely different mindsets.

rant mode off:ok:

[Centaurus]

Chimbu Chuckles. What a fascinating mind-boggling career you have had in the check pilot world. Do tell us more about your death defying exploits in the world of jets and close shaves. Your adoring audience is waiting in breathless anticipation for the next chapter in your life as a world class expert in the field of engine failure advice. Come on, Chimbu - be a devil and tell us some more stories...

[7gcbc]

hey Centaurus,

some of us listen, some of us learn, some don't.

Two people died in horrible circumstances in that crash, one whom had 10K hours + decades of experience [perhaps his downfall, perhaps not, not my call], and his "student" who happened to be also a ATPL line pilot, so we're not talking about novices here ?

maybe the checkout pilot was off,mybe there was a gust, maybe there was..blah..blah.......whatever.

I listen to Chimbu, he's kinda right when you consider all the options......?

So why are you gunning ? Intellectual vanity perhaps?

[Chimbu chuckles]

Centaurus unfortunately the written word doesn't convey intention sometimes..I in no way was having a play with myself. This is a bulletin board where people of varying backgrounds give opinion based on their experience.

It has never occurred to me to read into your various posts and or stories of your career in Lincolns etc anything other han helpfull (hopefully) advice and or entertainment.

My point is only that with proper training and experience of the trainers and proper standards set then the vast majority of the fatalities that occurr in this area of our profession could be avoided.

I feel lucky indeed that I was, from a very early stage in my career, within a system that did lots of good quality training and whose trainers were very expereinced individuals.

Talair was a supplemental airline where we were required to pass 6 monthly checks/IR renewals to a fairly high standard...whether we were in a Baron , BN2, C402 or a Twin Otter/Bandit..all of which were flown single pilot as was the fashion of the day. Even the piston twins required a ground course several days long with a VERY experienced training captain....I'm talking guys with well over 10-12000hrs multi command in PNG....and then 5 hrs endo + 10 hrs minimum ICUS.

I am aware, off the top of my head, of only two assy fatals in the history of Talair and one as absolutely unavoidable no matter the skills of the pilot due to terrain. That's 38 years of company history with god knows how many 100s of young pilots operating 100s of thousands of hours of piston twin time on upwards of 15-20 sectors a day all loaded to the gunnels, at least, 95% of the time. That's not to say we didn't have many engine failures..we did...just they were not generally followed by a fatal crash...despite the well known additional factors that being in PNG added.

Lets juxtapose that with my limited experience of the same situation in Oz. The total time spent on ground courses for PN68/B58/C441 type ratings does not add up to 2 days...my 'endorsement' on the BE76 comprised of the "the fuel goes here, the oil goes there and you know the rest!" + 1 hour or so encompassing 1 engine failure and a couple of IF approaches. In the trainers defence this was not long ago and I wasn't a 19 yr old with 180 hrs TT.

The groundcourse for the C550 lasted 1 day and the highlight was being told "if you lose an engine on takeoff don't select full power on the other because you'll lose control and roll upsidedown" The CASA approved ATO would not accept or did not understand the certification process of FAR25 and the relationships between Vmca and V2.

Horror stories abound of stupidly dangerous practices in light piston twin assy training and CASA does very little if anything....in my personal experience of CASA as a CP they were not interested in stopping one individual I was aquainted with from instructing and flying IFR Charter in a high performance piston twin when he clearly had some of the lowest standards I have ever witnessed first hand....I sacked him.

I think I have more than enough experience within various systems to have an opinion. If my first post came across arrogant or boastfull I appologise...it was not my intention.

One poster above relates the story of VMCA at altitude...I had a long discourse with one 'experienced' multi instructor once who didn't understand the dangers of demonstrating Vmca at a 'safe altitude' ...never occurred to him and he had apparently never been told that Vmca decreases with altitude in a normally aspirated piston twin, as with turbine twins, risking the real possibility of an assy stall/spin.

How many assy crashes will it take Centaurus?

edit.

I have just reread my post and fail to see what got up your nose??

I can assure you the close calls I have had left my knees shaking and heart going like mad...if not for the good advice and excellent training I recieved from 300TT to the present, with the few exceptions listed above, I would be DEAD.

These sorts of threads are among the most valuable on PPrune...if I can help one pilot survive long enough to be labelled an experienced cynic then I'm a very happy chappy.

[Creampuff]

Centaurus

I must say that, from my perspective, your response to CC's post was more than a little churlish. His considerable experience, and yours, should not be treated so disparagingly.

What fascinates me about the subject matter of this thread (upon which, I can assure you, I have very little experience) is that it is typical of so many in aviation: diametrically opposed opinions, notwithstanding decades of experience using the same equipment, in the same conditions.

This schizophrenia gets worked into the 'rules': don't practice low level assy at night; here's some guidance on practising low level assy at night; don't pull the mixture to simulate an engine failure; do pull the mixture to simulate an engine failure; never run your engine LOP; always run your engine LOP.

Perpetually fascinating….

[Centaurus]

Chimbu and Creampuff. Good replies both. I think the original purpose of the opening post by Menen has been lost in the slanging match which inevitably happens between pilots who should know better - and that includes moi.

Having a cheap shot at CASA pilots as Chimbu did, however, does rather drop the standard of these discussions, more is the pity.
With very few exceptions the FOI's that I have come into contact with have been sound level headed airmen. It is unwise to generalise in such matters.

The Camden Duchess accident had to happen eventually. I sometimes wonder if ATSB tend to tip-toe around such messy prangs for fear of criticism by lawyers in a Coroner's Inquiry. My impression of the ATSB report on Camden was it was carefully worded to avoid offence to anyone involved one way or another.

At least the author of the article in the latest FSA has opened up the subject in no uncertain manner.

Anyone that still insists that low level engine failure simulation by mixture cut is safe as houses providing the instructor is experienced and knows his aircraft, is either overconfident of his own ability or has rocks in his head.

[Chimbu chuckles]

Centaurus

I never mentioned FOIs in my post I said employees:D

Every personal experience I have had with CASA has been a negative one....sure there are some ood guys working there...I can think of three I know...the idiots and Lawyers outnumber them.

To mixture cuts.

I would certainly agree that we are products of our own training/trainers. I can't think of anyone who didn't do mixture cuts during my own training...there must have been one or two but my overwhelming memory is people cutting the mixture. To my mind there is no reason the engine won't run again instantly when re-instating the mixture...the spark and air is unchanged all that's needed is fuel....I have never experienced an engine not restarting instantly upon selecting mixture back to where it was before the simulated failure. Even in cases where the prop was feathered as part of the training excercise (at altitude) putting it back to fine and waiting while it builds up some revs then mixture back to an appropriate setting (not necesarily full rich) has, in my expereince, always resulted in the engine running normally very soon after.

I have had it explained to me by engineers why, in the 404, it was better to fail on the mixture...even internal pressures on crankshaft, not detuning counterweights etc. You obviously don't agree...I'm always ready to learn something new so please give us reasons.

What's your definition of low level? I came to believe simulated failure below 200-300' were not worth the risks associated, in piston twins, I did do them with the nose wheel just off the runway in the Falcon (no sims for DA200s). Note I came to the above conclusion not because of personal bad experiences but due to reading of other peoples misfortune. I never, EVER failed engines at night...not in anything. As far as I'm concerned they're like assy go arounds (in piston twins) at low level...you just don't do them...an ex RAAF examiner who was checking me for C&T approvals for the C404 wanted me to do one from very short finals..."Nope sorry...won't be doing that!!" He contended the aeroplane was more than capable..empty it was but my contention was no matter who taxied out in front I'd find somewhere to land....to my mind it was a dangerous excercise for no appreciable return...how many go arounds do we do from short finals in general...I can't remember doing one ever.

The technology is availble to have really good sims that represent FAR23 certificated aircraft...Chesty has them at Cooly, most excellent trainer I ever expereinced in Oz! It's people like him and Centaurus who should be doing assy training...not grade 3s who just need the twin time for their QF application.

CASA is twenty years behind the times, as it always has been in my memory. We have the technolgy and there are plenty of people with real experience to teach multi training. What we need CASA to do is make multi training approvals much harder to get (ie impossible without significant real multi experience). They need also to be much harder to keep...significant 6 monthly refresher training for starters.

Chuck.

[Naughty S]

QSK?

All I was simply trying to state was that I nearly got caught out practising manoeuvres even at altitude and recovered without any problems, thats what training is all about.

If you try and become a test pilot at low level you will get bitten hard one day. I use a similar technique as you describe but sometimes S@#t happens and you can get hurt if there is not sufficient altitude to recover or not fast enough.

I did also state that the aileron was the culprit not the rudder.

:E

[QSK?]

Sorry Naughty S, I didn't mean to be critical or patronising - just thought I'd pass on a helpful hint.

Cheers mate.