CX Spin Doctors in overtime

[Captain White]

Seen the latest CX sponsored spin doctoring in the SCMP last week which outdoes the Tony Blair team by miles :yuk:

1. CX pressurises after tail strike
:ok: Good one - FCOM says don't do it

2. Crew continue to HKG
:confused: Better one - Airbus says return to departure a/d

3. Captain ignores input of Cabin Crew
:O Love the CRM and respect for Cabin Crew

What a shining example of professionalism to hold up to the world of aviation !! Makes the concept of Air Safety and CRM look
lacking at CX wouldn't you say !!!

:E Keep up the good work lads and lasses !!!!

[BusyB]

Some of us are more professional than others! And that includes Cap White.

[Traffic]

And they say White men can't jump...to stupid conclusions.

What a load of bollocks.

Read the report and crawl back into your hole. In fact, this report should be compulsory reading for anyone who is involved in aviation.

1. A/C was pressurised before anyone on the flight deck was aware there may have been a strike.

2. They continued to HK after they were convinced by all the facts and by ops in HK that their assessment, that there was strong likelihood of a strike, was wrong.

3. On the contrary. The captain did NOT ignore their input. He actually went back and interviewed them all at length. His original assessment was very much based on their input. The body of evidence from Auckland and HK caused him to overrule his original assessment.

It could happen to anyone.

I would imagine that reading the report would be waste of time for you but if you would like to see it PM me.

[Schrodingers Cat]

um..............

.......continued to HK after they were convinced by all the facts and by ops in HK that their assessment, that there was strong likelihood of a strike, was wrong

But surely the FACTS were that there WAS a tailstrike and that their assessment, that there was a tailstrike, was CORRECT?

The question that is not answered in the report is this:

Is there a weakness in the CX training that would predispose a Captain to accept the advice of a non pilot desk clerk in Operations several thousand miles away rather than his own assessment of the situation.........
:ooh: :suspect: :ooh:

[jtr]

the "non pilot desk clerk in Operations several thousand miles" was actually the deputy fleet manager, or some such similar position (i.e. a management pilot)

The crux of the issue is, they continued knowing there was a possibility of a tailstrike. If there is any doubt...

[rtforu]

And I'm sure that if any one of you very very clever chaps were placed in the exact same position you would no doubt make all the right decisions.

It's so comforting to know that there are such smart people out there flying aeroplanes, doing everything right every time. Oh, and what a fine display of character, getting onto an anonymous internet forum and pointing out the many shortcomings of other professional aviators.

Well done!

[Schrodingers Cat]

rtforu, it is part of being a professional to not just accept that 'everyone makes a mistake' but to attempt to seek answers so that IT WON'T HAPPEN AGAIN! If this concept is beyond you I suggest that you publish YOUR name on this 'anonymous internet forum' so that one of your aviation colleagues can complete your education, which is obviously sadly remiss in several important aspects.......:*

[Flying Bagel]

In speaking to the pilots who were on the flight deck, as well as reading the report, I do concur that this was an unfortunate incident that, as said, could have happened to anyone.

Was it right to go back to Hong Kong? CRM is an important issue, but when the only conclusive evidence is that of a junior flight attendent hearing an odd noise is quite daunting to say the least.

They had gone through several avenues in order to make sure their decision was the right one. Possibility of a tailstrike? Sure. In hindsight, I would have gone back myself, but hindsight, afterall, is 20/20. And in this situation, I highly doubt any amount of training would have produced a clear and conclusive answer in how to respond to such a scenario (just by looking at the amount of differing opinion in regards to this incident says it all, among veteran and junior line pilots alike).

Let's be fair here, as fellow aviators, it is a given right to discuss issues at hand to enhance safety in the future. But let's try to refrain from judicious slander and other sorts of statements that do nothing but to rile up other readers of this forum.

[Traffic]

The reason I say this is a 'must read' report is precisely because it could have happened to anyone.

I am sure that the captain would, in hindsight, have stuck with his original decision. But hindsight is just that, yesterdays news and today's fish wrapper.

He was, however, talked out of it for the following, very human reasons:

- Relatively new commander and therefore more readily talked out of believing he had a strike, which would, in isolation, be a CLM .
- Probably, (although not referred to in the report) was not told by the F/O, that the oleos were 50% below mimima ( and over-ruled by the ground engineer/s in Auckland). This info, if relayed to him at the time, would have allayed his fears of it being a CLM.
- The commercial pressure that casts a shadow over all operational decisions.

It all ended safely and I think some valuable lessons were learned.

[badbadballz]

Anyone know how to get a copy of the report without subscribing to the SCMP? Tried using Google but to no avail.

[shortly]

Overall this has been a very interesting post. It is a pity that some contributors (aka Pussy), are more interested in mud slinging at the Company and the Captain than really reviewing the affair and determining a resolution that teaches us all. The report - available on the CX website - is thorough, professional and a good job. The company's response was appropriate given the facts on view. The 'young' captain is a more than competent aviator with a good attitude to flying, the company and his fellow aviators, whatever their culture. Every flight is an opportunity to learn. I find it interesting that pilots - who should know better - are stating what they would have done, go on, turn back etc. Mate you weren't there. This sort of response is of course a throwback to when all pilots were solution oriented. Ie lets have a solution even though I really don't understand the problem - if there was one. The training system at CX stresses that you don't seek answers from your ops when you contact them, no, you advise them of the problem and what you wish to do. If there are circumstances outside your control then you may be given contrary advice, or you may be given the green light. Ah I wish I was as much without guilt as some of the other contributors here.

[Captain White]

:ok:
Well answered and I respect the opinions of you all that
he made the decision on the spot with the available information

BUT ..........

The personal abuse was unnecessary and the aim is to make us think EH ??

FCOM is unambiguous but we are all human !!!

:p

[Schrodingers Cat]

We are having this discussion now because things turned out alright, there WAS a tailstrike, but everybody got back OK. It appears that the CREW, who were obviously on the spot, accepted the advice of a company manager many thousands of miles away over the advice of the FCOM, and the evidence of a crew member.

Why was this? What evidence did the manager have that meant he could categorically say that it was SAFE to proceed? Now that he has been proved categorically in error, what re-training is he undergoing? How was his advice and input more valid than the cc who, despite her relative inexperience, sits down the back during every take off and KNOWS what it sounds like? Were the CRM procedures followed? Was the problem solving model introduced? If so why wasn't the state of the oleo pressures brought up? How can procedures be strengthened so this doesn't happen again, both in Company procedures AND CRM training of both flight and cabin crew? i.e. how can we make the operation SAFER?

God forbid, but what would we be discussing now if things had NOT turned out alright? This is NOT scaremongering, the topic was opened to the public by the company the moment the report appeared in the SCMP, this is legitimate questioning of the Company response and procedures to this incident in an open forum. Just thank God we don't work for Emirates (if you've been following the Rumors thread....)

Has this happened before (pressurization after a tailstrike)?

[Traffic]

Cat

The Rev would know if it has happened before at CX but I fear he is away crocodile hunting in the Northern Territory.

Not analagous but one of the 1011's (think it was one of the ex-Court Line jobs) lost a rear pressure bulkhead many years ago out of HK . The late Tug Wilson hightailed it back to Kai Tak pronto. Lucky it was a 1011 which is built like a brick outhouse down the back otherwise there could have been a real mess a la JAL.

[Basil]

CX ops have an unfortunate propensity to argue with the captain on the spot (who probably knows best) against his chosen course of action. Dunno why they're like that - moment of glory syndrome or sumfink! :*

[Schrodingers Cat]

no, I didn't mean the Tribomb....... wasn't there a -400 about ten years ago on its way to AKL.......?

[backin5]

In regard to this scenario (and I am not saying that I would have reacted any differently), I heard that the crew were made up of 3 ex-cadet pilots. Just wondering if that had anything to do with the level of assertiveness of the F/O to point out the oleo problem, and maybe to add input to an already inconclusive situation?

[Schrodingers Cat]

Backin 5........ suggest you sign up for the Irish mine detection course rather than pursue this line of inquiry.....:ooh: