Calling Malfunctions on Takeoff

[FlareArmed]

I am interested in gathering some information on what various operators policy is on calling malfunctions on takeoff, particularly for non-EICAS installations such as my current type, the B737NG.

For some background, the QRH has the following to say about abnormalities on the takeoff:

Rejected Takeoff

The decision to reject a takeoff rests solely with the Captain. The Captain must make the decision so stopping action can begin by V1. If the decision is to reject the takeoff, the Captain should clearly announce "Reject", commence the stopping action, and assume control of the airplane. If the First Officer is making the takeoff, the First Officer should not abandon control of the airplane until the Captain makes a positive input on the controls.

Prior to 80 knots, the takeoff should be rejected for system failures(s), unusual noise or vibration, tire failure, abnormally slow acceleration, engine failure, engine fire, unsafe takeoff configuration warning, predictive windshear, or if the airplane is unsafe to fly.

Above 80 kts, reject for engine failure, fire, predictive windshear warning, or if the airplane is unsafe or unable to fly

During the takeoff, the crew member recognizing the malfunction will call it clearly and precisely

Some questions:

1. How exactly do you call a system failure below 80 kts?

2. Do you call all malfunctions above 80 kts, or just the problems to reject for (some aircraft inhibit non-abort system failures above 80 kts)?

3. When a failure does occur, are key words used or is it left up to the individual?

4. Do any operators allow for the First Officer to make the reject decision?

[Centaurus]

One airline I worked with would use, for example, the words "Master Caution - door warning light" at any speed on take off - because it was felt that any event that caused a Master Caution light to come on should immediately be brought to the attention of the captain. What the captain did about it is another subject altogether.

Another example was if an engine overheat detection light illuminated at any time during take off or in flight. The person first seeing the light would cancel the Master Caution light and call "Master Caution - engine overheat light". The captain would then come into the act and decide what to do next.

On a slightly different slant on the subject, a problem that exists in some simulators is that if a fire warning was inserted by the instructor, the engine overheat light would illuminate first, followed several seconds later by the fire bell and fire warning light on the chosen engine. It left the crew with a tricky decision because no one wants to take an engine fire into the air because they have no idea of the severity of the fire.

Assuming the engine overheat light (and Master Caution) came on at 100 knots when there was ample opportunity to abort below V1, some might prefer to abort immediately.

Another operator might direct its crews to ignore any Master Caution above 80 knots and continue the take off. In fact that is what the Boeing 737 FCTM implies.

Some operators direct that there should be no call made for any malfunction which occurs between V1 and gear up selection. Presumably this is because the weakest link might get a fright and do the wrong thing.

Yet another operator might require the PNF to call positive rate of climb before the PF calls for gear up. The latest version of the Boeing 737 FCTM simply states that when the PF observes a positive rate of climb indication he calls "Gear UP", and continues rotation to take off pitch attitude. Nothing about the PNF coming into the act verbally - he just verifies the positive rate. Presumably if he sees that there is no postive rate of climb he simply doesn't retract the gear until it is safe.

Often seen in the simulator, especially if an engine failure has occurred and there is lots of noises and drama, the PNF gets distracted and forgets to call "positive rate" and the PF then forgets to call "Gear UP", because he it has been drilled into him that he must wait for the call by the PNF (who has forgotten!). The aircraft then staggers away clawing for speed and altitude because of a crew cock-up.

It seems to me that in the matter of a problem on take off, SOP's as originated by the operator are often so rigid, that the captain is left with has no discretionary powers. Blind rote actions are not necessarily a safe and reliable policy.

[BEagle]

We used to brief that only certain warnings would be the reason for calling an abort. Those could be called by either PF, PNF or FE at any speed up to V1. Thus the only call (other than the usual airspeed calls) would be 'ABORT'. No 'Oil Pressure No 3', 'Oh look, an orange light' or anything else.

Most failures would be known by 80 kts, but we didn't have any 'above or below 80 kt (or 100 kt)' criteria. Critical failure up to V1 = ABORT!!, critical failure above V1 = FULL POWER!!

The Captain would confirm the rejected take-off by closing the throttles fully and quickly. PF just braked and steered, PNF selected spoilers and full reverse. When the ac stopped, the Captain would then call "I have control" and put the parking brake on (even if he/she'd been PF) - this triggered the co-pilot to retract the spoilers and select flap to approach, in case an overwing immediate evacuation was needed. Then "Reason for abort?". That's when the 'Engine failure no 3' or whatever was advised, confirmed and appropriate immediate actions drills ordered. Subsequently the ac was taxiied clear if safe to do so and further actions completed as appropriate.

This was practised roughly twice per month for each and every pilot in the simulator, both as PF and as PNF. It has stood the test of time (nearly 30 years) and it works.

[Intruder]

Our standard briefing (744) goes something like:

Captain will make all Reject decisions.

Any Crewmember call out EICAS warning or caution when he sees it: below 80 knots, any warning or caution; between 80 knots and V1, engine failure, fire, or configuration warning. After V1, we'll take it flying and handle it airborne. At 500' and with the airplane under control, Pilot Flying call for autopilot, then handle communications and airplane. Pilot Not Flying [and First Observer] run the checklist after airplane is cleaned up.

[If the FO is Pilot Flying]: In case of rejected takeoff, Pilot Flying will maintain control of the airplane until and unless the Captain positively takes control ("I have the airplane." ... "You have the airplane.").

[alf5071h]

‘What and when to call’ is an interesting topic.
FlareArmed uses a fairly standard procedure - Above 80 kts, reject for engine failure, fire, predictive windshear warning, or if the airplane is unsafe or unable to fly, but this includes a human factors oversight. All of the parameters other than ‘the airplane is unsafe’ are self evident and do not require judgment, even when the 'airplane is unable to fly', it is self evident. The wording of procedures requires careful thought to minimize ambiguity and ease the crew decision making; procedures should avoid any call that depends on judgment. I recognize that many RTOs are judgment calls, but the decision is usually made after establishing the what the problem is (from the alerting call).

Centaurus, Beagle, and Intruder get closer to the root of the problem. Below 80 kts the handling pilot (head up) should be aware of a master caution, thus the information that he requires is whether the alert warrants a reject; not restating that there has been a master caution alert. In most modern aircraft with good a MWS design philosophy a master caution should always result in a reject; thus the next most valuable information are facts that may effect the RTO i.e. HYD failure (brakes/spoilers?), engine fire (which side). The call should give this information.

The difficult calls are for those factors that are not alerted by MWS and those requiring interpretation, particularly sounds, vibration, or smells.

The procedure for a call following a master caution above 80 kts, or even after lift off could follow a similar philosophy. The NFP passes information to the FP – sometimes the failure may affect handling or systems selection. Thus, whilst procedures are very powerful safety tools they depend on well thoughtout wording.
ALF

[Intruder]

Could anyone give some examples of “unable to fly” that would not be noticed before 80 kts?

Tire blowout at 90 knots.

[mustafagander]

Unsafe to fly
Things like multiple bird strike, abnormal control response, ASI major disagreement, collision with something etc. It really is impossible to define evrything which renders your a/c unable/unsafe to fly. That's one of the things captains are paid to decide.

[411A]

The less said, the better.

Verbal nonsense while rolling down the runway, can cause problems.

Engine failure, for example.
Needs to be confirmed by at least two perameters...which are often mis-read by new guys.

So, a simple 'engine failure' will do, not ...'ah, failure number three, I think...', or, heard on one sim detail, ...'oh cr@p, it just died."

Or, rolling down the runway at DEL one foggy night, the Flight Engineer starts yelling like a banshee...because one of the red EGT lights has illuminated. Sort of a 'aaahhhhhhhhh!!!!"

Looked thru the book, could not find this terminology anywhere...:\ :} :uhoh:

[BEagle]

Agree with you on this 411A!

We never called the actual cause for calling an abort - just the word "ABORT"!

Personally I think the Boeing ideas are too verbose - and as for handing over control before the ac has been stopped.....what a crazy notion!

[80/20]

After 80 knots - Unsafe to fly???

After 80 I am go minded and have programmed myself to abort if:
I hear the fire bell
The aircraft pulls unmistakably to the side (engine failure)
Wind shear warning

As far as unsafe to fly I can only think of two other causes:
Runway excursion (vehicle or plane on the takeoff roll)
One engine goes into reverse (this will pull to the side like an engine failure)

I would not abort for bird strikes, even multiple – only if the engine fails.

It is the Capt. that should make the RTO decision. If he/she is the first to notice a problem than he/she can just call RTO. The co-pilot should, in my opinion, give useful information, that is - various words describing the problems at slow speed. After 80 it should be restricted to engine failure or runway excursions unless it is an extremely urgent problem.

[LEM]

Being in a hurry now, I'd only like to ask intruder more details about " Tire blowout at 90 knots."...

Does that make the airplane unable to fly?


Looking forward to come back on this excellent thread.

[80/20]

Tire blowing at 90 kts?
It is recommended to continue if you have a high speed tire problem.
Leave the gear down and come back and land with the entire runway available to stop is generally better than to try to stop with a poor RTO braking condition at high speed.

[alf5071h]

The tire burst itself, before or after 80 kts should not cause the aircraft to be unflyable. The problems in this scenario are the detection of a particular failure and the risks associated with that failure.

Detecting a tire burst has been notoriously difficult; some errors in detection have resulted in accidents due to late aborts (after V1). An unusual sound or vibration without confirmation is just unusual, the aircraft will still fly. A bang could be a tire or an engine; if it is a serious engine malfunction then alerts will be given. If it's just a bang then it’s not a bomb, statistically at least. It is unlikely (in my experience) that the crew will hear a tire blowing. Vibration is equally fraught with ambiguity; an engine could vibrate as much as an unbalance wheel, although (in my experience) the wheel / tire is more disconcerting. In one event during landing the vibration in the cabin from a blown tire dropped the O2 masks and popped the bins open.

The safety of our industry is largely based on statistics of risk. Where crews do not have these numbers to hand then both the knowledge of the basis of the risk and the balance of that risk by certification is important. A blow out before 80 kts, if confirmed beyond reasonable doubt, may warrant a stop, the event being less safe than continuing the takeoff. A tire blowout after 80 kts or the subsequent gear retraction after takeoff is not a significant risk, not enough to stop for i.e. the risk of stopping in this case is higher due to the unknowns about the braking capability as opposed to the lower risk of flying – ‘go-minded after 80 kts’

However there are many other statistically higher risks that need prompt RTO action and require both clear communications and understanding for the correct decision to be taken. Well defined procedures and clear calls are very necessary in time constrained events, but take care not to overstate the risk of apparently hazardous circumstances.
ALF

[GearDown&Locked]

Can a lightning striking the a/c during TO be considered as a reason to abort ?

[80/20]

GearDown&Locked wrote:
Can a lightning striking the a/c during TO be considered as a reason to abort ?

I would not do high speed RTO for a lightning strike, but probably before 80 kts ...

[NigelOnDraft]

The aircraft pulls unmistakably to the side (engine failure)Dodgy - "bang and a swing" could be Eng Fail or Tyre(s) - and with Tyre problems, Hi Speed Abort is very inadvisable.

The best person to assess an Eng Fail is the PNF - he should be watching the indications. (S)FO can call stop with us in certain circs - one of which is the Eng Fail case. To assess an Eng Fail requires 2 indications, one of which must be "internal" i.e. indication.

NoD

[Intruder]

Being in a hurry now, I'd only like to ask intruder more details about " Tire blowout at 90 knots."... Does that make the airplane unable to fly?

It may make the airplane unsafe to fly, depending on the circumstances. I am NOT saying that you should "always" abort with a blown tire.

On a 747, blowing 1 tire may not be felt at all. If you notice a tire blowing, it may well be more than 1. In a heavy airplane (we take off near MGTOW often) and near the runway limit, a couple blown tires may affect your ability to get airborne before the end. There is also a significant chance of structural damage to flaps and landing gear, so ability to safely retract gear and flaps is compromised.

OTOH, once above 100 Kt or so, the ability to stop is questionable, since the blown tires significantly reduce braking ability. A high-speed abort with less than 16 brakes will almost guarantee 16 blown tires after you're stopped.

Indeed, it's a lot to consider when accelerating through 90 Kt -- you have to make the decision NOW, and stick by it!

[80/20]

Agree with NigelOnDraft about questioning why the aircraft is pulling to the side before giving "the engine failure diagnosis”.

We all know how little time we have to make good RTO decisions. My strategy is to be as prepared as possible by narrowing down the causes why I might consider a high speed RTO as I wrote earlier on this thread.

[80/20]

I would like to share some facts about tire problems and RTOs:
A DC-9 departed Portland in a crosswind, wet runway, and at balanced field maximum weight. Near 100 kts during the takeoff roll, the captain felt something strange and heard a noise similar to a deflated tire thump. Because he was not sure if a tire had blown or failed in another manner, he elected to continue takeoff.

The takeoff continued uneventfully. After landing, it was discovered that a tire had come apart and deflated.
Later studies revealed that this incident could have had other consequences had the captain attempted an RTO from high speed. Given the conditions of the runway, and the fact that the tire was deflated, the airplane could have been very difficult to stop on the available runway.

An industry study found that from 1964 through mid-1976, 171 RTOS resulted in accidents or incidents. Of the 171 RTOs, 149 were initiated, either wholly or in part, because of failures or malfunctions involving tires, wheels or brakes. Tire failures were a factor in 124 of the 149.

[LEM]

GearDown&Locked,


Apollo 12 got struck by lighnting during launch, but they didn't abort their mission to the Moon!

[alexban]

Hy LEM
They (APPOLO 12)would'rejected,if they could've shutdown the engines,or eject.:)
Or maybe ,not enaugh rwy available to reject safely. (Not so big TORA for a rocket ,I guess) :E
Maybe the lighting strike won't make you abort,but maybe the CB over the field (that created the lighting) or the 'windshear ahead ' will make you decide to reject (or even better,delay takeoff) .:ugh:
Brgds Alex

[Centaurus]

I have always had grave reservations about who, other than the captain, can call an abort. Far better to make an appropriate call concerning the perceived problem, rather than putting one's total trust in the chap that decides an abort is warranted. As most people accept, it is the captain who should always make that critical call and subsequent actions to go or stop.

Some operators blithely state in their Operations Manual that any crew can call an abort. I wonder if they have ever had a long hard look at that statement to examine the potential for a complete stuff up at high speed?

Some years back I was talking to an old ex RAF flight engineer on Handley Page Hastings I think. When I met him he was now on the B727. He stated that in his squadron the flight engineer could call an abort (if he thought it was warranted, of course) and that it was mandatory for the captain to stop immediately an abort was called by the F/E.

This sounded dangerous to me especially as I think in the Hastings the F/E was seated sideways behind the two pilots faced sideways and did not have an immediate view through the front windows to see what runway was left in front.

On one occasion the F/E saw a flickering engine gauge and called "Abort" shortly before lift off. The startled captain immediately aborted the take off but managed to stop before running off the end. The captain then turned to the F/E and asked why he had called an abort. Just imagine nowadays a blind abort by a captain purely on a crew call without any idea of the problem. Yet the potential is there in some airline SOP's.

In this case the captain apparently chided the F/E for what he (the captain), saw as a wrong decision to call abort. The aircraft was then back-tracked for another take off, with my drinking friend the RAF F/E, smarting under the captain's remark.

Half way into the next take off run, the F/E hollered "ABORT" in a loud voice and true to RAF SOP the captain stood on the brakes and came to a smoking brake stop. Again he had no idea why the F/E had called the abort, so he turned slowly around in his seat and said what's the bloody problem now.

The F/E said that there was no engine or airframe problem captain, but that you violated SOP's by not taxiing right to the end of the runway before you started the take off run.

Now that might have been a slightly exaggerated tale of derring do by the F/E, but it had me worried. Sure, it was 25 years ago when he was a F/E on a Hastings , but now he was on the 727 and he firmly believed that as a crew member, he could call an abort and the captain would obey and sort things out after the event.

I am also surprised to read in this thread that the captain and first officer can "share" a rejected take off. I think the example given was the captain who was guarding the throttles simply closed the throttles as a sign that an abort was on, while the first officer (or PNF, whatever) selected speed brakes and applied reverse thrust. I don't recall who did the brakes.

What fantastic Torville and Dean synchronisation in a split second, that must have been demanded of the captain and first officer - or should I say the PNF and PF.

Talk about a recipe for potential confusion, I would have thought. Or is this just another example of the warm and fuzzy application of perceived CRM?

Thre is no doubt in my mind that the captain should always be the one to decide on, then initiate the abort, with all handling of brakes, speed brakes and reverse by the captain- particularly on a slippery runway abort where a cross wind might require judicious juggling of reverse thrust if the aircraft starts to weather-cock due wind and reverse thrust vectors.

[NigelOnDraft]

I have always had grave reservations about who, other than the captain, can call an abort.Fine - I'm sure we can just leave the (S)FO at home then... How can you, as Captain and PF, make as informed a decision as the PNF, who is spending most of the takeoff run studying the Engine (and other) Insts? How can you, as Captain, as PNF, assess a Handling Problem?

In BA: The (S)FO can call STOP, as PNF, for a specified list of items (e.g. the Eng Fail above)
The (S)FO has a slightly extended list as PF (blocked Runway - Handling problem)
The Division of duties (PF/PNF) means that for each reason to STOP, only one person is usually in a good position to call STOP (e.g. PNF for an indicated problem, PF for a handling problem)
We all know STOP is only to be called below V1. Even if called erroneously (as decided by the Mgmt later), the STOP should still be safe.
Captain only has an overall discretionThre is no doubt in my mind that the captain should always be the one to decide on, then initiate the abort, with all handling of brakes, speed brakes and reverse by the captain- particularly on a slippery runway abort where a cross wind might require judicious juggling of reverse thrust if the aircraft starts to weather-cock due wind and reverse thrust vectorsAgain - wrong IMHO. If the (S)FO is PH, surely he should initiate the abort? To expect the Captain to call STOP, and then take over the PF duties in an instant, and have the (S)FO immediately take up PNF duties takes up valuable time when you do not have it.

If your (S)FO is not up to calling STOP in clearly defined circumstances, and initiating an RTO, then the 2 crew concept in your airline is true Man & Dog.

And before you say "sounds confusing", the BA SOP, and the list of who can call STOP, and what for, and the drills for initiating the STOP, and when/if the Captain will take control is rehearsed before each Departure (LH) / 1st daily dperture (SH). And practiced X times each Sim...

I am not saying the BA system is perfect, but reading some of the opinions here, a lot better than others!

NoD

[*Lancer*]

On top of those examples... Incapacitation is the biggest reason an F/O can initiate an abort!!

As an S/O I would probably also answer the cabin interphone on takeoff... if something is considered serious enough to get called up in what is continuously stressed as a 'no-contact' period, then I want to know what it is! The others no doubt would too, and I'd tell them with something simple, like FIRE, or HIJACK. Or if there is no 1-word explanation and we're 3 knots below V1: STOP!

But that's all close to the realm of immediately life-threatening, where SOPs take second seat to saving everyone's life (including your own).

[411A]

Lancer,

When most crew members get a bit more experience, they generally find that to answer the interphone in the middle of the takeoff run as really not all that useful.:ooh:

[Menen]

NoD. I don't know what type of aircraft that you operate, but if it is a B737 series, have a glance at page 3.19 of the Boeing 737 FCTM.

Among other things it states: "The PNF should closely monitor essential instruments throughout the takeoff roll and immediately announce abnormalities such as Engine Failure or Engine Fire, or any adverse condition significantly affecting the safety of flight.

The decision to reject the take off is the responsibility of the captain. If the captain is the PNF, he should initiate the RTO and announce the abnormality simultaneously".

Best of luck to your BA procedure, but I notice that there is no reference in the Boeing FCTM to sharing the decision to abort.

I would say that throughout the years of designing aeroplanes large and small, Boeing has done a great deal of research on the subject of abort processes - and along with many other operators has decided that in the best interests of flight safety, crew other than the captain are not in a position to decide an abort and execute it. Incapacitation excluded, of course.


If your sensibilities and pride are offended by the Boeing policy then perhaps you could arrange for some measured abort tests incorporating your ideas, then forward them to your CAA and the aircraft manufacturer to their consideration.

Who knows - you could even be the catalyst for changing 70 years of hard won experience of the role of the captain of the ship...

[NigelOnDraft]

Menen...

That maybe what the Boeing FCTM says. However, I have never had anything to do with 737s, and the BA Manuals differ anyway. That is the privilege of the Operator (BA in this case) and Authority (JAA/CAA) to approve.

I am not saying which is best, or really care. All that matters is that whatever procedure is used is known and practiced by that airline.

In my previous airline, only the Captain could call and initiate a "STOP". 4 engine type. When an Outboard Engine failed, the Captain would call STOP, take control, and the PF would therefore release the controls. Result - if (as called above the Torville and Dean syncronisation!) was not perfect, the aircraft would be off the side of the runway? Hardly ideal...

I could add that manuals such as the Boeing and Airbus FCTM are designed, shall we say, for the lowest common denominator. BA have decided that the level of training and ability of theirs (S)FOs is sufficient to allow them to call STOP in clearly defined circumstances, particularly when they are in a better posiiton to determine the failure.
then perhaps you could arrange for some measured abort tests incorporating your ideas2 scenarios:[list=1]
Capt = PF. Eng Fail near V1. PNF watching Eng Insts, sees Failure, calls "STOP". PF initiates RTO...
Capt = PF. Eng Fail near V1. PNF watching Eng Insts, sees Failure, calls "Engine Failure". PF either calls STOP immediately in response (hardly made a decision), or searches for some sign that this call is correct, and then calls STOP. PF initiates RTO...
[/list=1]I know which one of these will use less distance.

The only potential hazard with the BA way is unnecessary, even hazardous, STOP calls being made. This does not appear in practice, so I am, for one, happy with the BA way. But as I say, it does not mean it is the "best", or only way. You seem set that the Boeing way is the "only" way...?

NoD

[*Lancer*]

411A, why not? There are enough unannunciated, severe problems for it to be worth doing under certain circumstances. I'm not talking about the PNF answering it... just the person in the back sitting there waiting for something to happen. I don't think I could just sit there looking at a 'pilot priority' if we're accelerating through 60 knots.

[Menen]

Nigelon draft.

"The level of training and ability of British Airways S/FO's is sufficient to alow them to call STOP etc etc."

You win, Nigel old boy - I give up. I am at loss for words to describe this absolute gem of wisdom.

[411A]

Problem is *Lancer*, many times the crew in back are not in a position to 'decide' anything, such is their recruitment and training with many airlines.
I'm sure you get the picture.:\

[NigelOnDraft]

Menen...

If you're going to quote me, please do not re-arrange the quote, leave bits out, and alter the meaning entirely!

My post makes it clear that BA determine their (S)FOs are able to call STOP in clearly defined circumstances, their Operating Authority (CAA, now JAA) are quite happy to approve that decision, and IMHO, it works well in practice.

So please can you say why a fully Licensed Pilot on that type, as P1, is unable to judge e.g. an Engine Failure and call STOP? Especially the one whose main task during the TO run is to scan the Engine Instruments... It is my option, of course, as Captain, to deny them that ability, but not only would it be highly irregular, I have never had the slightest reason to doubt any (S)FO I have flown with in this regard. And nor did any Captain during my time as (S)FO...

Any other opinions out there?

NoD

[GlueBall]

We keep the go/no-go decision simple: For every takeoff only the captain's hand stays on the throttles until at (or just before) Vee One, whereupon the hand is removed and any event will be treated as an inflight problem... and only after reaching 1500 feet AGL, or obstacle clearance altitude, whichever is higher. When the captain's hand comes off the throttles it's an automatic and instinctive GO decision, even if it's 10 knots before Vee One!

[Silvertop]

Hi All,
Having operated both systems i.e. Boeing and a B.A. stylee, I belive that as long as the operating proceedure is approved by the "feds", and most importantly, the training is very good, then the guy in the right hand seat is just as able to evaluate the criteria in his or her remit for stopping as the guy in the left seat.

I know that when I changed from the B.A. to Boeing, I felt pretty under- utilised until I moved into the left seat, where I have now developed independently pointing eyeballs (can't spell chamelion!).

There are pro's and con's both ways, but I suppose that as long as the training is good, then they both work and stand the test of critisism.

cheers

[gunshy67]

Well, well, well. Such prose and self recommendation from our BA Nigel brother.

While the theory may seem fine and the approval of the Regulator is used as a pacifier, the reality in practice can be very different to the anticapted outcome.

And who says the regulator has the expertise to make such decisions when they are not the exposed ones and in fact may be wrong. That is not to say they are but.........they are not the repository if all avaion expertise in my view.

Gluepot has got it right and there are good reasons for his comments.

Apart from the practicalities (talk about that later).......who is responsible for the "safety of the aircraft and pax? The captain!

Who gets strung up if the call by the learned and highly skilled support person (F/E or PNF) calls a bad call. And don't think it can't happen no matter what the company says.

Wait until you are in the witness box in a private legal battle and see who your friends are then.

And are we really sugesting a contiuned take-off at 80 knots plus? Finer if you don't have a balanced field but how about the effects of using clearway and screen height.

And if the procedure is fine for the abort, do we use the support person to COMMAND an action over which the captain has not real control. Perhaps an emergency descent....or even an engine fire AT 1,000 FT AGL after takeoff.

..................."Fire No1" says the support person...... "SHUTDOWN NOW"......... and forget the extended second segment climb.

The difficulty in an these scenarios is that there are so many. And to write procedure after procedure......many different............in an attempt to cover all these scenarios is well nigh impossible.

So..........what is the solution. Accept the fact that the captain is the responsible pilot. He can get information from the tea lady if he likes...............but he makes the decision..........he executes the manoeuvre and then there is no fancy "I'll do this and you'll do that and by the way, if I forget you do this too".

And there is real handover required (although there is a defacto one) when the Captain is PNF. Gluepot said it right. Captain has his hand on the thrust levers until V1 and then on the wheel.

Simple.

If there is abort he slams the thrust levers shut, jumps on the brakes.......or (RTO is on) and grabs reverse in about 1second and if not automatic deployment, graps the spoiler handle.

There is one airline (almost the largest in the world) who call V1 at 5 knots before so that the real V1 is the one that is actioned. And thsi arile also considers a bias to go at 100 knots plus.

But that is only a bias and the final dession is with the captain.

One last thing.............and I can see the arrows being sharpened now................how about the abort on a real long runway above V1.........like what happened in the UK a few years back. Now that's for another time I suspect.

Happy flights

[Menen]

Gunshy67.
Interesting points you make regarding the perceived expertese of the Regulator's men. To this day, flying operations inspectors in Australia - and I am sure the same for UK - get precious little hands-on actual flying on the jet transport they are responsible for.

Even their annual simulator practice is less than the average airline pilot receives. Most of the time the larger the airline, the less importance is given to the opinions of a flight inspector. To trumpet that a procedure must be good if the flight inspector says it is, means SFA in the real world.

I am not dead sure of this, but I wager that during certification flight testing of transport types, the test pilot personally carries out all the handling required to initiate and complete a rejected take off.

I have not heard of this task being shared between the test pilot and his co-pilot - apart from monitoring duties by the co-pilot. Indeed, if the task was shared (as espoused by Nigel D), then the resulting FCTM would make it clear which specific handling of brakes and levers would be carried out by the PF and PNF (pilot monitoring).

Surely therefore, doesn't this tell you a story? That the most efficient and reliable method of executing a rejected take off is that the captain decides, initiates and executes the complete procedure with his own two hands and feet. To have the captain blindly initiating an abort purely on the basis of someone else on the flight deck yelling"STOP" is surely an abrogation of command responsibility. As Gunshy 67 attested, a court would rip the commander to pieces for accepting a subordinate's command to abort and if something went tragically wrong.

Despite Nigel D's assertion that his co-pilots are superbly trained - and I have no doubt that their training is excellent - co-pilots have been known to call the wrong call or make the wrong decision (haven't we all?)

[411A]

Worked for two airlines that had prior and present (seconded) BA co-pilots, and they all seemed superbly trained...if just slightly full of themselves, but hey, why not, BA has a pretty good record, overall.

They suggested in their 'new' company that the First Officer had the duty...actually the right, to call STOP at anytime, and the Captain should obey, period.

Oddly, the 'new' management didn't agree, and these guys were
told to keep their opinions to themselves, as in...our company way, or the highway.

So, they clammed up and did as they were told.
Having said this, they were pretty good stick and rudder guys/gals.
Also, very good technical knowledge about the equipment.

OTOH, the very best seconded First Officers that I have ever flown with came from...oddly enough QF, many years ago.

[BigHairyBum]

For something major self preservation would cause me to shout stop no matter which seat I was sat on.

Slower than 80 kts there`s more time to think.

Sound familiar?

;)

[Jetset320]

Everyone keeps mentioning 80 knots like it's some industry wide magic figure. I remember this figure from my Boeing days, but on Airbus the 'cut-off' figure is 100 knots. It seems to me that for commonality's sake, the industry should use one cut-off figure, one standard.

Somebody mentioned that they (would) shout "Abort". Again, for commonality, this was replaced by "Stop", on both fleets, long ago. "Overshoot" replaced by "Go-Around" etc.

[Centaurus]

Question. Aircraft is belting down the runway and 20 knots below V1 on the wet runway the ever alert 500 hour first officer sees a flickering oil pressure gauge and because he is momentarily transfixed with doubt whether or not to bring it to the attention of the captain who is PF, decides to take what he judges as the safest action and that is when in doubt call STOP, STOP, STOP...

So he shouts out loud STOP, STOP, STOP.

The captain is instantly nonplussed. The first officer is obviously serious and the captain must decide either to give him the benefit of the doubt and STOPx3 - or, not having a clue what the first officer is on about, says ****** that - I am continuing the take off and sort out the "problem" in the air.

Who is right? And if you were the captain what would you do? Obey the first officers command? Or ignore it?

[LEM]

Two cases: if the Captain realizes why the FO has called STOP he may reply CONTINUE or GO.

If he doesn't realize the reason, he better listen to the FO, who, don't forget, can also exercise his emergency authority.

FO are not monkeys, and sometimes much brighter than the Captain!

At the end of the fair, there will never be an absolute truth, as usual, and people capable of improvising, with good common sense, have got some more chanches to get it right, IMHO.

[Menen]

Lem.

Please explain this emergency authority thingie that the first officer has up his sleeve? I don't recall seeing this term in any legislation.

[gunshy67]

Menen et al,

Wow. Emergency Authority? The only time I know when the F/O might have emergency authority is when the F/O needs to conduct the "Dead Captain Drill"

Thankfully not often.

What rubbish we are exposed to. How about some common sense and acknowledge that the Trans Cockpit Authority Gradient slopes left to right....................but with it comes clear legislated responsibility.

Get real!

[LLuke]

Lot of fuss about nothing. Obviously most important thing is that the right decision is taken as fast as possible.

FWIW; in our company, for a/c type I fly (B73):
-Once take-off thrust is set and roll commenced, aborting for just an amber master-caution light is not recommended.
-After passing 80 kts, aborting take off should be restricted to engine fire/failure and control problems affecting safe a/c handling
-Either pilot may call stop, PF aborts take-off.
-Only until V1 the 'STOP' call can be given.
-Outside previously mentioned guidelines only captain may decide to abort.

Guess there will always be scenarios that won't fit inside the procedures mentioned in this topic, but that keeps the job interesting.

[Menen]

Lluke. You say that its' a lot of fuss about nothing. Don't you believe it chum - it is a deadly serious subject. You say that in your company, either pilot can call STOP and the PF aborts. From that I assume that if the first officer is PNF and calls STOP, the captain does as he is commanded and throws out the anchor. The word STOP is a command - not an idle comment.

Sounds like a recipe for potential disaster to me. What if the call STOP was made when the take off was runway critical and it was purely the first officer's personal opinion that something was unsafe - and the captain aborted on the call and over-ran the runway causing casualties.

Think about it from a lawyer's point of view representing the casualties. As per Gunshy 67 post, who would wear the blame? The first officer or the captain? The captain's entire responsibility is enshrined in legislation.

Furthermore - are you saying that if the captain is PF and calls STOP, the responsibility for handling of the abort is the first officers - and not the captain?

[LLuke]

Forgot to mention in my previous post we also use V1 as decision speed. Don't abort after V1 although also here one can be in the situation that it is the only possibility.

"What if..."

The FO calls stop, the Captain fails to see why (oil fluctuations??) and continues. Doesn't make that Captain necessarily popular for his decision. Maybe the FO called stop for another reason? Maybe by the time the FO explained why he called stop things get a bit late.

Aborting for an erroneous call from FO (or captain) below 80 kts isn't fatal. Above 80 kts both pilots can identify an engine fire/failure/jammed stabilizer. It is not that difficult.

Fortunately life isn't always black or white. There may be time for describing/challenging situations in plain language. ("Hee, is that a car on the RWY?") Captain is clearly the highest authority and responsible by law for everything & everybody. Also responsible for mistakes from others. If this responsibility is too much one wonders. They don't get their appreciated salaries for solving x-word puzzles in the newspapers, do they?

[Menen]

Interesting paragraphs explaining the Boeing philosophy from the FCT 737 (TM) page 2.42 under the sub paragraph entitled Rejected Takeoff Maneuver

....The pilot not flying should closely monitor essential instruments throughout the takeoff roll and immediately announce abnormalities, such as "Engine Fire," Engine Failure," or any adverse condition significantly affecting safety of flight. The decision to reject the take off is the responsibility of the captain, and must be made prior to V1 speed.

If the decision is made to reject, the Captain must, without delay ;
Rapidly and simultaneously retard the thrust levers to idle and apply maximum braking, or verify proper operation of RTO autobrakes.
Immediately extend the speedbrakes and initiate reverse thrust consistent with the conditions.
Maintain maximum braking and reverse thrust as required, transitioning to the normal landing roll procedure after determining that stopping on the remaining runway is assured.

During the rejected takeoff, the First Officer calls "60 knots" during deceleration.

There are additional notes on the rejected takeoff manoeuvre, but the main points are that it is the captain who decides on the abort (not the first officer calling STOP). And it is the captain who handles every part of the physical process throughout the reject manoeuvre.