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I don't know of any GA twin which is authorized to spin.

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14. APPROVED MANEUVERS
The aircraft is certified in normal category in accordance with EASA CS-23 regulation.
Non aerobatic operations include:
 Any manoeuvre pertaining to “normal” flight
 Stalls (except whip stalls)
 Lazy eights
 Turns in which the angle of bank is not more than 60°
 Chandelle

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Acrobatic manoeuvres, including spins and turns with angle of bank of more than 60°, are not approved for such a category. In addition, stall with one engine inoperative is forbidden.

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The spin recovery has not been demonstrated during certification process being not required for this aircraft category. Should an unintentional spin occur, the classic recovery ma- noeuvre is deemed as being the best action to undertake.

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you are probably a test pilot for that flight

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I've not been able to find any information on stall-spin Tecnam twin accidents.

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Findings as to causes and contributing factors

These are findings related to the unsafe acts, unsafe conditions, or safety deficiencies that are associated with the safety significant events that played a role in causing and/or contributing to the occurrence.

1. For unknown reasons, the aircraft entered a spin from a stall exercise.

2. The instructor and trainee recovered the aircraft from the spin, but insufficient altitude remained to recover from the ensuing dive.


Findings as to risk

These findings are not causal or contributory to the occurrence. They identify a risk that was found during the investigation that has the potential to degrade safety. They may describe a condition that is systemic in nature that applies to an audience beyond those involved in the immediate occurrence.

1. If flight training units do not emphasize that the most important reaction to a stall or approach to stall is a reduction in the angle of attack, a loss of aircraft control may occur.

2. If organizational safety processes do not identify and mitigate non-standard practices, manoeuvres that are outside of the aircraft limitations defined in the aircraft flight manual may be conducted, increasing the risk of aircraft accidents.

3. If full-stall demonstrations are required as part of a multi-engine rating test, there is an increased risk that, due to unknown spin characteristics, pilots may not be able to regain aircraft control if the stall progresses into a spin.

Other findings

These findings are not causal or contributory to the occurrence and are not systemic in nature. They identify an element or contain a message that has the potential to enhance safety. They can resolve an issue of controversy or provide a data point for future safety studies or analyses.

1. It could not be determined whether the instructor or the trainee involved in the occurrence had been exposed to the non-standard practice in use for stall-recovery training or whether the instructor had used it on the accident flight or on previous flights.

2. Given that the aircraft was almost entirely destroyed by the crash and subsequent post-impact fire, it could not be determined whether any pre-impact system failure or malfunction contributed to the accident; however, the components that were examined showed no signs of malfunction.

3. The information contained in Advisory Circular 700-031, Prevention and Recovery from Aeroplane Stalls, was not incorporated into TP 11575, Instructor Guide—Multi-Engine Class Rating.

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The most exciting outcome was a 1500' altitude loss with inversion and a maximum descent rate of 12,500 fpm

It seems this excursion was not shared.

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... during the approach to landing with the course 314 in the area of ​​the third taxiway tilted, fell and completely burned down.

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