2016-24-51
As a PAX I'm surprised that an operator would "miss" a HUMS threshold exceedance on the TRPCS, especially in light of the previously issued AD # 2016-24-51, dated November 18, 2016.
I appreciate that the aircraft can only be designed and operated within budget constraints, but a TR failure on an approach to a helideck is not very conducive to the drivers or SLF. What price do the operators really place on safety...
The fact that this failure mode appears to have surfaced several times before, and with it being such a critical part of the machine's airworthiness, would have IMO warranted a much more higher profile and proactive maintenance and inspection regime, including HUMS threshold monitoring.
We have been relying on this type to get to work since 2006 over here in Newfoundland, we had CGR491 on March 12, 2009 which could have been avoided if the failure mode from Broome in July 2008 had been correctly diagnosed and an AD for immediate stud change out applied. I sincerely hope that lessons are learned here this time round, as somebody earlier had said this was a large hole in the Swiss cheese.