I agree with you that the airspeed was well above 60 kts and that the AOA signals were in reality valid. My point is that if the vane manufacturers had declared their equipment to be reliable only above 60 kts then AI had no choice but to use that value in their logic.
>And I question that 60kt validity limit.
Only the vane manufacturers could tell you why 60 kts real airspeed was the limit.
>Why CAS measurements should invalidate AoA values and shut down the stall warning ?
Because nobody is going to certify a system that continues to work normally even though it knows (or is being told) that its input data is wrong - in old computer terms garbage in, garbage out. The fact that there is a cross linking between the CAS/EAS relationship and very high AOAs complicates matters
That being said, there is a simple change in the logic which would eliminate the problem - the stall warning, having been activated by a valid AOA signal should remain latched until is receives a valid signal that AOA has reduced to below the stall trigger value