that in the back of PF's mind was the idea to not overspeed the aircraft.
But that may have been somewhere more than the back of his mind: if the aural warning just would not stop, what he heard, and what he didn't hear, might be just as critical to understanding how that event played out as it did.
A pilot uses more than one sense. Under stress it is usually the sound (ears) that gets filtered out first and sight takes over. Sight can then become very tunnelled and all other things are shut out. PM is shouting at you WTF; then they are trying to give guidance about how to escape the problem: all to no avail as you do not hear them. Neither do you see all the other information that is screaming (visually) at you. You are focused on the PFD because that is what you have always done.
Time to pause and realise that the senses do not combine into common sense. Something must be wrong; it does not compute. High attitude at FL370 means an impossible over speed. The warning must be false. So what is correct? Difficult at 3000', but 37,000. That's a lot of time.
There was a B727 (Air Peru I think) that had a faulty static line at medium level. (not the B757 with blanked static ports during takeoff). The guys pushed & pulled believing the altimeter and ASI; but of course they were acting in the opposite sense. I'm not sure power/attitude entered the analysis. They were in an idle descent I think.
At soem point there needs to be a pause, back to basics, and then an analysis with all senses to discover what you can trust. In AF it's curious that the sound over-rode the visual.
I've seen RTO's in the sim, with the crew calling Mayday to ATC with the fire bell still ringing.
There were many human factors at play, plus training factors.
Last edited by RAT 5; 30th Sep 2016 at 07:16.