Engines
The MoD did not hold a Safety Case for the Mk10 seat. If they didn't hold that, they should never have issued an RTS for the aircraft. As Tuc has said elsewhere, it's highly probable that Martin Baker had a perfectly good 'Safety Statement' for the seat, to get it past their own internal safety management system.
However, that document may not have been kept up to date, or supplied to the MoD, as the funds to support that activity were slashed in 1993. So, somewhere between the Mk10 entering service and 2011, the MoD ceased to have a Safety Case for the seat.
Q from civvy.
Is this (RTS) a grandfather rights thing?
I presume MK10's were introduced and released to service prior to much of the in depth data/history systems 'we' use today. (NB I'm aware that like civvies the airframe doesn't leave the ground until its matched its own weight in paper documentation)
So if the airframe and systems/equipment were fit for RTS under a 1980's? system, have or were they subsequently re-assessed under contemporary standards? and I realise that timelines sort of a moving target.
If a mod is done to a system, eg seat cushion change, is the whole seat re-assessed or is it just the cushions and their immediate fixings?
So if an airframe is assessed in e.g. 1989, and there are no historical incidents or accidents that point to a problem area, (eg seats, in every event they've previously worked as expected), can these form a hole in the cheese if there is no regular update or overview to ensure legacy equipment is still fit for purpose.
If HSE are pursuing MB, I feel it follows that HSE feel the
company has a specific case to answer regarding its product or product support, rather than how the end user operated it. Even allowing the possibility that the end users procedures/application were found also to be at fault.