As for STOVL: a full-time operational STOVL base costs the same as a CTOL base. The Marines did not want cheaper facilities; they wanted to be free of facilities altogether.
Which was pretty much my point from the beginning. Navy aircraft spend about half their time ashore where they don't need launch bars, arresting hooks, folding wings, etc etc. A US Navy master jet base costs about as much as a USAF jet base. That was NOT my point. My point was that facilities constraints often drive weapons system design and also weapon system procurement decisions. The buyer often CANNOT alter his facilities constraints, whether it is due to cost or to physics or to politics or to something else. CATOBAR aircraft are designed and built differently than CTOL aircraft due to differing facilities constraints. STOVL aircraft are designed and built differently because they have still more different facilities constraints. The notion that weapon system designers and weapon system buyers can
always build or alter facilities to cater to the weapon system is simply false. More often it is the other way around. Engineers routinely design weapon systems to fit facilities constraints and buyers routinely make purchase decisions based on facilities constraints.
And all this relates directly to the USAF tanker competition which took into account much, MUCH more than simply how much fuel can be offloaded at X range.
KC-46 has essentially equal fuel offload capability.
KC-46 has essentially equal boom performance (
after an expensive redesign.)
KC-46 has a significant disadvantage in passenger carrying ability
KC-46 has a significant advantage in home basing costs.
KC-46 has a significant advantage in MOG when deployed.
KC-46 has a significant advantage in ferry range
KC-46 has a much more flexible mission suite (which includes its cargo door, cargo floor, and level loading attitude on the ground) which gives it a significant advantage in cargo carrying and medevac ability and lessens A330's passenger carrying advantage.)
When ALL the factors that the user (USAF) listed and prioritized are considered, KC-46 won. Of course it helped that the factors listed and prioritized favored the KC-46. And yes, some of that was due to politics. And my employer, Northrop Grumman, read USAF's list and priorities (not to mention the political winds) and came to the conclusion that they could not win with an A330 based offer. So they pulled out. And Airbus chose to go it alone, despite the very slim likelihood of a win. Perhaps Airbus's strategy was NOT to win, but to hold Being's feet to the fire and force them to make expensive changes to their offer AND to low-ball their bid and make Boeing's win a Pyrrhic victory. Which makes strategic business sense since Airbus and Boeing compete directly.