While we're waiting for the New Year, a certain Government response and the suspect outcome of the TASRR maybe it is worth a pre-New Year cogitation or two...
From the last Senate Estimates hearing (18/11/13) NX has added some additional written QONs that I'm sure plenty on here would all appreciate the answers for..
:
144
ATSB 04
XENOPHON
Pel-Air
I note that the Canadian TSB has been commissioned to undertake an independent review of the ATSB’s reporting processes.
a. Who commissioned the review?
b. Why was the TSB chosen, and who made that choice?
c. What is the process for the review?
Suspicious bugger our Senator X...
However if we give Beaker the benefit of the doubt and remain on the assumption that his intentions are honourable for calling on the Canuck's, then in true IOS tradition let's continue to aid the TSBC with their unbiased, fully independent review..
Okay a couple of recent bureau research investigations and reports could certainly be helpful to the TSBC review.
First cab off the rank, with much chest beating from Beaker in the media (
Media release) and on his personal blog (
Night-flight warning), is the bureau research report
Visual flight at night accidents: What you can’t see can still hurt you
It never hurts to remind aviators of the inherent risks of flying at night but is the report actually telling us anything new (i.e. that we didn't already know) and has the bureau planned further proactive initiatives to address this significant safety issue or are they merely going through the motions??
The TSBC comparison: I had to go back a fair bit (1990) to find a partly similar research report to compare but here it is:
REPORT OF A SAFETY STUDY ON VFR FLIGHT INTO ADVERSE WEATHER
Now I know the reports are not directly comparable but the TSBC report does have this to say about the risks of NVFR which reads similar to the ATsBeaker report (remember TSBC/CASB report was 1990):
3.0 NIGHT VISUAL FLIGHT
Accidents occurring in other than daylight conditions comprised a disproportionately large number of VFR-into-IMC accidents. Approximately 10% of all Canadian accidents occur during the hours of darkness, which parallels estimates of the general level of night flying activity (also 10%). However, VFR-into-IMC accidents occurring during the hours of darkness accounted for almost 30% of the total study accidents. Analysis pointed to three issues: night VFR weather minima; the conditions for obtaining and maintaining a night endorsement; and weather briefings.
3.1 VFR Weather Minima
The consequences of flying in reduced visibilities are exacerbated when operating at night, in light conditions which do not permit sufficient warning for the pilot to see and avoid worsening weather conditions. Inadvertent entry into IMC when the actual conditions can not be seen can be minimized by reducing the possibility of occurrence.
Other countries employ weather minima to reduce the probability of aircraft encountering adverse weather, even during daylight conditions. For instance, in the United States VFR weather minima were recently introduced which prohibit daytime recreational pilots from flight in visibility of less than three statute miles. This measure reduces the risk of bad- weather encounters, and is even more effective for flights at night when bad weather is not so easily detected.
The high proportion of fatal night accidents attributable to adverse weather is in part the consequence of pilots initiating flight in weather conditions which are legally acceptable, but which deteriorate. The first indication to the night-flying pilot can be the inadvertent entry into IMC. The Board believes that, to reduce this risk, VFR flight at night should be restricted to more favourable weather conditions. Accordingly, the Board recommends that:
The Department of Transport increase VFR weather minima for night flight so as to reduce the risk of inadvertent flight into poor enroute weather conditions.
TSB-A90-71
3.2 Night Endorsement
The night endorsement qualifies the private pilot to fly during the hours of official darkness. To obtain this endorsement, the pilot undergoes a minimum of ten hours training in basic instrument flight manoeuvres. The intent is to prepare the pilot for inadvertent entry into IMC and to familiarize the pilot with aircraft control in conditions in which there is no apparent horizon. Five of the instrument training hours can be acquired in a simulator. No evaluation of competency is required prior to endorsement, nor are there re-certification requirements for the continued exercise of privileges of the endorsement.
Twenty-four studied accidents which occurred at night resulted from a loss of aircraft control, often after the apparent onset of vertigo. To understand the circumstances of such occurrences, the training, experience and skills of the accident pilots were examined. The accident pilots had seldom obtained additional instrument training after acquiring the minimum experience for night endorsement. Since instrument flying skills are perishable and require regular practice to maintain even a modicum of proficiency, the criteria for obtaining and maintaining a night endorsement apparently do not adequately reflect the skills required to cope with inadvertent entry into adverse weather. There is a higher probability of these circumstances occurring at night.
At present there is no method of ensuring that a minimum level of skill in flying on instruments has been achieved prior to receiving a night endorsement; an evaluation of a pilot's skills under the type of vertigo-inducing conditions encountered in adverse weather at night appears to be warranted. Furthermore, at present there is no method of ensuring that a minimum level of proficiency has been retained after the issue of a night endorsement; therefore, some form of recurrency training and/or testing also appears to be warranted. Such training and testing should focus on the instrument flying skills required for the safe conduct of night visual flight, skills which are considerably less complex than those required, for instance, to conduct a complete instrument approach.
In view of the disproportionate frequency of VFR-into-IMC accidents which occurred at night, the Board recommends that:
The Department of Transport revise conditions for the issue and maintenance of a night endorsement by:
- including a practical evaluation of the pilot's skill prior to issue of the endorsement; and
- verifying continued proficiency on a recurrent basis.TSB-A90-72
3.3 Night Weather Briefing In light conditions in which hazardous weather conditions can not be detected until they have been encountered, it is essential that pilots have appropriate information before initiating flight. Seventeen accidents that occurred in other-than-daylight conditions involved pilots who did not use available weather briefing facilities.
Weather information can be obtained by phone, by remotely-located computer terminals, or in-person at a weather office. There are no regulations specifically requiring a weather briefing before VFR flight; yet the probability of inadvertent entry into IMC at night could be reduced if pilots had appropriate information upon which to base their decision to initiate or defer a flight. This applies to all night flights, both private and commercial, but the Board is particularly concerned about the safety of the air transportation system used by fare-paying travellers. The Board believes that the Department of Transport should encourage private pilots to obtain a weather briefing prior to conducting a flight at night, but that the requirement for operations conducted by commercial pilots should be more stringent. Therefore, the Board recommends that:
The Department of Transport require that, prior to initiating night flight under VFR from locations for which weather briefing facilities exist, pilots engaged in commercial passenger-carrying operations obtain a weather briefing.
TSB-A90-73
Point of difference: This TSBC report from 1990 led to a significant educational
Safety Promotion initiative from Transport Canada and the promulgation by TSBC of no less than 27
Safety Recommendations. The ATsBeaker report has yet to see any initiative from CAsA but did lead to two wet lettuce SRs being issued that ironically strongly reflect previous (yet to be addressed) SRs from 2003-4.
Okay next ATsBeaker vs TSBC research report comparison: Back in October the bureau released their report into LOSA:
Loss of separation between aircraft in Australian airspace, January 2008 to June 2012
A TSBC research report (again back in 1990):
REPORT ON A SPECIAL INVESTIGATION INTO AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLSERVICES IN CANADA Quote from the executive summary:
..."
Following a series of losses of separation between aircraft at Lester B. Pearson International Airport in Toronto in late 1988, the Canadian Aviation Safety Board decided to conduct a special investigation of the safety aspects of the current air traffic control situation in Canada..."
Point of difference(like chalk and cheese these two): The TSBC report led to the promulgation of 48 SRs which, according to the documented evidence, have all been proactively adopted and acted on by Transport Canada since. The ATsBeaker report led to 3 SRs, which again can only best be described as wet lettuce attempts to address some fundamental safety risk issues within the ATC system.
Well there you have it, a couple of comparable research reports with similar subject matters. Those of you with the interest and the time to read can be the judge of who has the better more proactive methodology/approach in compiling research reports....hmm perhaps pass on your thoughts to the TSBC..
