rdr: you mentioned the sun in their eyes after a long flight. Look at the time of the mishap, and the direction of the runway: west.
Could there be a respect issue with the FO telling the Captain to go around, thereby delaying the call until it was too late?
If so, there's a possible culture issue, organizational at the least, and not based upon the shape of anyone's eyes. That considered, if it's two rated captains in the same airline, then why was the "A/S off by five knots" call not made sooner? That speaks to a different organizational and cultural issue.
Five knots slow, half-dot low. Standard callouts everywhere I've ever worked. Could've saved them. This approach got messed up long before the 7 seconds before impact call-out.
Scan: inside, outside, inside, outside, rinse and repeat ...
On one occasion I elected to fly a visual approach to 31L in JFK instead of going to 31R, this saved a lot of taxi time after landing). I was called to the office to explain why I flew a visual approach and did not use the ILS! FOQA data was designed to be used as a trend indicator, however Korean used it for punitive measures so it is not surprising that local pilots would take whatever measures were required to avoid exceeding the laid down parameters.
cdogg: Read the bolded part I extracted from one of the posts earlier. That addresses a matter of culture, not "race." I suggest that you learn how to read for comprehension, doctor.
What you describe in the safety arena in your own profession, and its improvement, is also a
cultural shift. There is a culture in your profession and in each organization in that profession.
Safety culture in a given organization does not exist in a vacuum. The larger "host" culture will influence it. It has taken "the West" three generations of learning, and many lessons have been written in blood, regarding safety culture, organizational culture, and cockpit gradient. That is in part due to our host culture being one wherein the background conditions are there for change to take place, however clumsily. Your own profession is a fine example. If the base culture does not embrace that form of change, it is harder for the sub elements to do so. (Though as Gladwell points out, not impossible). But in the Korean Air case, there was considerable
external motivation to change.