AZR - you cannot simply dismiss the downwind takeoff, the overweight, and especially the missing spacer as irrelevant to the crash. They were all factors, and if any one (never mind all) had been absent it might have changed the outcome. Especally the spacer (it wasn't designed by the manufacturer to be there just as added ballast!).
The overfilling of the tanks so that there was insufficient air space to allow some compression and therefore obviate the hydraulic overpressure is a crucial factor.
If the FE had not shut down No.2, they'd therefore have a lot more power and less drag as they'd have got the gear up. That might have enabled them to attempt some sort of landing (Perhaps at Le Bourget) before the wing burned through. Or the fire might have got them first. We'll never know.
Either way the inexplicable FE's action raises questions in one's mind about AF's operation of this complex and demanding airliner.
The post return-to-flight near loss of another Concorde (Halifax NS) and AF's decision shortly after that to ground their fleet reinforces that question.
I am confident, having spoken extensively to BA crews who express similar views to the above, that no such situation existed in that airline.