tucumseh,
Perhaps the answer to your point is that the MAA is independent but those who work in and lead it are not.
I think I know what you're getting at, but the fact is that if the MAA is headed by senior officers whose career path is determined by the very people who are hostile to what the MAA is trying to achieve, then that degree of influence means there is no independence.
As Rigga says, they have chosen the path of least resistance. As there has been robust resistance to airworthiness since it was run down by (primarily) the RAF Chief Engineer in the early 90s, then it cannot possibly be addressing the failures.
The basic problem is, I believe, the MAA was established to clear the Haddon-Cave recommendations, thinking this would resolve "airworthiness". But H-C's report is fatally flawed, because he declined to publish the historical evidence detailing the depth and breadth of the problems. He blamed the wrong people, while protecting, in fact praising, those who were on record as disagreeing with the concept of airworthiness.
When asked to distil this down to one point, I always say this. H-C blamed Gp Capt Baber (Nimrod ITPL) for the poor management of the Safety Case task he let on BAeS. While partly true, he completely, and quite deliberately, missed the point that the regulations require continuous tasking on BAeS, and Baber should have inherited a valid Safety Case. The very fact he had to let a task on BAeS reveals long term systemic failures. That would have been Baber's defence; and MoD, the Provost Marshall, Thames Valley Police, the H&SE and CPS all played a blinder in conspiring to not bring charges. Thus protecting the guilty.
Allied to this, General Cowan was criticised for implementing 20% cuts over a 4 year period. A five year old can tell you that 28% per year, for 3 successive years (1991-94), is infinitely worse. Especially when it targets airworthiness, whereas Cowan's 5% p/a barely touched it. Why did H-C not mention this? (All the evidence was provided to him). Again, to protect the same guilty people.
The two are related because, when ordering the 28% cuts, the RAF Chief Engineer's department specifically directed that
Safety Cases should not be maintained.
The MAA should be acknowledging these facts and addressing them. But to do so would upset the cadre of retired VSOs, who very obviously still dictate matters to their successors; especially the Directorate of Air Staffs. Instead, by re-writing the regs they are implying they were wrong and the cause of the failures. Wrong. Demonstrably, if implemented they would have prevented (at least) Nimrod, Chinook, Tornado, Sea King and C130.
What is the tangible output of the process of "attaining airworthiness"? The Master Airworthiness Reference, the Release to Service, which reflects the Build Standard of the aircraft; and aircraft built and maintainable to that BS. The RTSs of all the above cases exhibit multiple failures to implement regs. The Chinook HC Mk2 RTS of Nov 1993 - June 1994 is typical. There are over 50 major non-compliances with mandated regs, any one of which should have prevented it being signed. So why did ACAS sign it? It is THE BIG QUESTION which has never been asked of him, in the same way Haddon-Cave avoided the big issues.