Questo, non più molto recente, aggiornamento può aiutare nella discussione:
"The airline said the investigation has been completed, the report appointed no blame and released no safety recommendation or requirements to Ryanair.
Spain's CIAIAC released their report in their bulletin 02/2012, page 212 and following, concluding:
The incident resulted from the crew of the Ryanair B737’s misjudging of the distances as it passed behind the B767, which was stopped at the G3 position of the runway 25L holding point.
Assigning position G3 to an aircraft with a long fuselage, such as a B767-300, and the position of said aircraft, relatively far away from the holding point marking, contributed to the incident.
The deficiencies in the communications between the cabin and flight crews on the B737 resulted in the collision going unnoticed and in both aircraft continuing with their flights without an assessment of the damage produced.
The CIAIAC reported the American Airlines Boeing 767-300 was positioned on holding point G3 (the most western holding point) about 16 meters short of the hold short line stating: "From the pilot’s point of view, the main concern is not to interfere with aircraft circulating on the runway at any time. A pilot will therefore give priority to this consideration over any potential problems involving tailing aircraft, and will keep the holding point marking well in sight and ahead of the nose of the airplane, barring any instruction to the contrary from ATC."
The CIAIAC reported neither of the Boeing 767-300 crew got aware of the contact between the aircraft, especially they did not notice any movement that would by typical for a collision. When the B738 crew refused to continue to taxi before the B763 had moved, they moved about 10 feet forward.
The CIAIAC reported the B738 captain had asked the first officer to verify separation to the Boeing 767-300 as they were passing along. She steered the aircraft about half a meter to the left of the taxiway center line to ensure separation. The first officer indicated there was no concern as the wingtip passed the tail cone of the 767 however he asked to stop immediately when the wing tip approached the end of the left hand horizontal stabilizer. The captain rose out of her seat to assess the situation and was surprised about the short distance, the first officer assured however the aircraft had not made contact. Shortly thereafter the intercom rang (single chime only, company policy requiring three chimes in case of a serious problem) and the flight attendant said "for your information" leaving the captain under the impression only one passenger had reported contact between the aircraft - she continued to say in the interview that had she been aware of multiple passengers observing the collision she would have reacted differently.
After returning the Barcelona both flight crew believed the contact must have happened before stopping.
The CIAIAC released one safety recommendation to Spain's AENA to reassess the taxi limitations on taxiway K and holding points G.
The CIAIAC also released one safety recommendation to Ryanair to "reassess those aspects of its training program involving flight and cabin crew communications and address the deficiencies noted, if any. Special emphasis should be placed on the benefits to safety that stem from the effective transmission of information from the passenger cabin to the flight deck."