Some of the conclusions in the report are just outrageous.
The crew not taking into account the stall warning, which could have been due to:
>> A failure to identify the aural warning, due to low exposure time in training to stall phenomena, stall warnings and buffet,
WHAT! What nonsense is this???
>> The absence of any visual information to confirm the approach-to-stall after the loss of the limit speeds,
What happened to PREVENTING a stall???? Already they should be applying the unreliable airspeed procedure/maintaining a safe pitch attitude with plenty of power, at least until they figure out what is going on.
>> Flight Director indications that may led the crew to believe that their actions were appropriate, even though they were not,
The Airbus is a flying computer. Computers lie. Therefore you revert to RAW DATA and read past the FD bars, or whatever else.
OK... there is a STALL warning...... then the FD bars are still considered valid data? How about checking the airspeed indications first?
>> The appearance at the beginning of the event of transient warnings that could be considered as spurious,
I left this until last. I agree spurious alerts are not good, but the question should be WHY IS IT GOING OFF? Stall relates to airspeed, so back round the merry-go-round we go....
As for the comments in the report regarding high pitch attitude (>16 degrees at FL370!) and FD bars agreeing............
WHERE IS COMMON SENSE?
Yes, yes... hindsight, arm-chair analysis, etc...