I think you will find that my facts about the traps in VMC conditions in Antarctica actually lend weight to the argument that he should have not been there in the first place.
My recent comments here were purely intended to try and correct a recurrent misunderstanding and misrepresentation by some people trying to pin 100% of the blame on the Captain of the conditions faced by the crew and what they saw or didn't see and the conditions they were in.
In my opinion, Captain Collins may have been happy to stay in what was VMC as long as he did as he was not aware of the whiteout hazard, reinforced as out the right of the aircraft he could see the Dry Valleys.
It is my opinion again that he knew the initial descent was against SOP, but others had done it previously, it was likely VMC and so he made a calculated decision to descend and maintain flight under the cloud. In 20/20 hindsight after 25 years, we'd consider this a maverick cowboy manoeuvre but at the time likely tacitly approved by the company as is evidenced by others' previous violations.
Sadly, in making this fateful decision it is likely that he did not consider, amongst other things, external influences in the error chain (change of co-ordinates) and despite his own inexperience in the Antarctic had not been fully made aware of the dangers that lurk in VMC over snow.
Capt Collins needs to shoulder some of the blame. So does the company. So does the NZCAA. As to how to apportion blame? Well that's why we are still discussing this after 2.5 decades.....