First, when the autopilot disengaged there should have been an explicit message that it did so because of air speed indication anomalies.
The speed/mach flag was shown on the PFD.
How many clues are required?
This tragedy wasn't caused by the UAS but by the reaction upon.
Second, clearly the stall warning should continue regardless of airspeed except in specific circumstances ie if you are airborn at significant altitude there really is no reason for the stall warning to be discontinued...
Said it before but will say it again, there was no input from ADIRU to the SW logic inside FWC.
The ADIRU output design needs to be considered not the SW logic,
as AIB did with offering the BUSS option. (AoA input available to SW logic supplied through IR output)
AF (Pilot organisation) didn't opt for the BUSS enhancement,
Why?
The BEA is absolutely on the right track with the Human Factors workgroup, 'all' visual and audible clues have been
missed without any sign of
CRM or
TEM.