Originally Posted by MrOptimistic
Interesting reading but the strong inference must remain that the 3 crew at no time seriously considered that they were stalled and at no time applied appropriate inputs to attempt to address a stall. Can't see how yoke/aoa gauges are relevant. Perhaps they would have made a difference, we can never know, but they should not have been needed in any case. Dialogue articulating the pull-up inputs is clear enough on the transcripts so can't think anyone was seriously misunderstood for any appreciable period.
Had the situation finally been appreciated and the subsequent recovery hindered through lost time or absence of some instrument, OK. But it never got to that point.
Thank You. In all of the techno babble, "sim-geek", bovine scat, the fact remains that the crew saw something that convinced them to ignore a stall warning. Either they were incrediblly stupid, or incrediblly confused by what they saw, felt and heard. No amount of FBW, SS, automation, defense changes the fact that three qualified aviators flew the bird into the ocean. What I find disturbing is that the airplane (AB) was designed to prevent such an event, but failed.