GarageYears
Once IN THE STALL many of the systems necessary to understand the situation are compromised.
Solution = avoid STALLING
Mmmm.
Seems a naive viewpoint to me... it's this kind of thinking that has actually caused such an alarmingly poor crew response in this situation! (i.e. no need for the native skills to fly the plane in these conditions because '
you' won't allow it to ever get there)
I personally believe the instumentation is extremely poorly conceived... position error should be minimised 'by physical design' not using PE corrections (e.g. probes far fwd away from pressure field around wing or fuse, as in test fl;ight a/c). AoA instruments to be much more robust and reliable, balanced to work down to a few knots.
Thus IAS not dependent on a/c AoA and AoA not so dependent upon speed (after all, does it not occur to EASA engineers that AoA (primarily for stall avoidance and warning) is most likely needed to be reliable at some (fluctuating) but arguably very low airspeeds
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And as before, pretty well every post of mine will point to the sidestick culture.. so many downsides and the more we look at this (admittedly strange& hopefully rare) accident the more one can't imagine it ever happening with a fully visible and centred control device... whatever that may be.