The pilot and CRM aspects are quite clear to me.
Deeper questions relating to how the automation mileau (visually, culturally, psychological) has interacted with the pilot to produce the accident MUST be explicitly addressed , item by item, in the final accident report.I still feel there is insufficient respect for the power of sensory disorientation, for example. There is no mention of the likelihood of it in BEA report, even though the PF made clearly disoriented command inputs that are classic for a somatogravic illusion.
What is it about the alarm system that leads top of the line pilots to ignore or not belive it?
Is the altitude indicator tape, VSI and Artificial Horizon hard to INSTANTLY comprehend when one most needs to ? Did the dangerous autotrim full aft despite high nose attitude contribute?How much did the reversed/paradoxical stall actives and inactives further confuse at the last possible moment for saving the flight?Is this a an engineering concept unsuited to LOC management, or is it a human intereface problem?Why is it so important in the design concept that control inputs NOT be visibly dual/ linked?
The accident is a fascinating case of everything that could go wrong did go wrong.....many layered aspects.