“the occurence of stall warning in the cases studied by BEA does not seem to match the higher threshold after loss of IAS.”
Chris and HN39,
I think I understand how you see this, and I would like to risk an explanation.
The following quote from the BEA :
If none of the three Mach values is valid, a Mach value close to zero is used. For example, it is of the order of 10° at Mach 0.3 and of 4° at Mach 0.8
should, imo, be considered as follow :
If none of the three Mach values is valid, a Mach value close to zero is used. For example, it would be of the order of 10°
if the Mach was really at 0.3 and of 4°
if the Mach was really at 0.8
A Mach 0.3 value can not be taken into account since none of the 3 Mach values is considered valid.
Do I make sense here ... ?
Originally Posted by DozyWannabe
... so disconnecting A/THR by moving the levers would be counter-intuitive. A/THR disconnect is achieved by pressing the red buttons on the side of the thrust lever handle.
Moving the thrust levers
before pushing one of the red buttons is usually a vital part of the standard A/THR disconnection procedure !
The other standard A/THR disconnection procedure is to simply set all thrust levers to IDLE detent.
But to answer
Shadoko question, moving the thrust levers cannot disconnect the AP.
Originally Posted by DozyWannabe
The computers will do exactly as the pilot asks of them and will not intervene unless the pilot is trying to do something dangerous
QF72 proves you wrong.
It won't make you an Airbus hater to admit it once for all.