My former colleague recently received this from the expat captain involved in the near death incident:
In the attached ‘Flight Safety Bulletin’ of 11.02.2011, (see below) is it possible that General Manager (Flight Safety), Captain xxxxx, might have been referring to the flight of July 13, 2010 that I nearly died on… with more than 250 others?!!!
It is curious how he actually published something more than 7 months later and then references the ‘occasional’ stick shaker (mine was way past stick shaker and into a fully developed stall) as though such an event should almost be considered as a transient normal phase of flight or an inherent acceptable risk of aviation. Any stick shaker event under normal flight conditions (no Non-Normals present) is a reason to lose your license. I have only experienced stick shaker one time in my 36 years of flying…… which was one time too many….. and it was at Air India. Had I not sprung out of the jump seat to make sure the throttles were pushed to maximum thrust and the autopilot disengaged, and the bank and angle of attack lessened, Air India would have been minus one B-777. The aircraft recovered at less than 1000 feet above the ground. I assumed command shortly after the recovery and when the Indian captain had left the cockpit I proceeded to lecture both First Officers on the incident. They had no idea what had just happened nor how close they were to death. We were in a 30 degree bank at the time of stick shaker (and subsequently entered a fully developed stall buffet shortly thereafter until the bank angle and angle of attack was reduced). If that bottom wing had stalled, you would have had to dig us out of the 120 degree pitch and roll crater that would have certainly ensued.
In case you are curious, here is the India crew’s coordinated universal answer to the incident. This was the official email. (3 Indians – 1 expat. I refused to write a report without seeing the flight data. It was never shown to me and I was never called in)
After t/o, on r/w 29 (TOGA power), climbed on r/w hdg to 1700' and then turned left on a hdg of 190 deg climbing to 2600' as per the clearance. Autopilot was engaged at 1000 feet. As the thrust reduction altitude was flaps 1, the speed crossed flaps 15 and in no time rested near flaps 1 speed. To arrest the fast increasing speed, I had to momentarily disconnect autothrottle and slightly bring back thrust levers to arrest the speed and prevent it getting into VMO. In the meanwhile we were changed over to radar frequency, which gave us climb to FL70, which was executed by the FO. The a/c started to climb which led to drop in the speed that was arrested on time by pushing the thrust levers to full forward, disengaging autopilot and reducing body angle to gain speed. Thereafter the AP and the AT was engaged and normal flight resumed.
Acceleration height 1000 feet
Thrust reduction: flaps 1
TOGA power
END.
Without going into too much detail, this Indian dissertation bore little resemblance to the truth. First, seldom do you see an Indian captain fly up to 1000’ feet before connecting the autopilot! It didn’t happen this time either. He connected the autopilot at 200+ feet, he was very fast on airspeed and the autopilot captured the low altitude hold-down immediately. The throttles came to idle and he didn’t know why they were doing that so he disconnected them and forgot about it as he turned the corner…… while the F/O (100 hour Ab Initio) initiated a climb (instead of the captain who should have been the one to make any MCP inputs because the autopilot was still engaged at that time). The only reason he mentioned the flaps in his email report is because he thought that the airplane would tell on him for that and not the stall. He got fast on speed after the recovery because he was still at maximum power and didn’t know what to do next without the autothrottles. We oversped the flaps big time!!! But we were alive. If it weren’t so serious, the errors made would have made for a great aviation comedy. In fact it was a total ‘goat rope’ but with potentially grave consequences.
As a result the crew got ‘retraining’ consisting of signing the book in the black mould dungeon (aka Air India Training Centre) and supposedly got a simulator ride….and we all know how thorough those are! I submitted a U.S. NASA report via the ASRS system for the collection of data and did not get involved in the ‘Indian truth’.
I decided to take a ‘sabbatical’ because they weren’t paying me (they finally paid me 8 months late) and because the Indian captain involved has threatened me if I return to India.
They are still out there pretending to be pilots when they cannot fly safely without the autopilot. Beware.
Air India Flight Safety Bulletin. 11.02.2011
SUBJECT: FLIGHT DECK AUTOMATION
INTRODUCTION TO FSB:
During the investigation of a few incidents, where in momentary stick shaker was
experienced by the Pilots, and during Flight Data Recorder monitoring, it has been
observed that possible mismanagement of Flight Deck automation lead to such excursion.
Even in complex and highly automated aircraft, automation has its limits. In a dynamic situation, the pilots can lose situational awareness of the automation mode and may not understand the interaction between the automation and the phase of flight or pilot input. During training, pilots are taught to use that level of automation that best supports the operation of aircraft/phase of flight. Although the concept is correct, in a rapidly developing scenario, the pilot may not correctly understand what the automation is doing at that particular instant.
REASON FOR ISSUE:
Maximum numbers of incidents have occurred in the B777. The B777 has very high
thrust engines and at times the energy state is far in excess of that required. For e.g. The maximum take off weight in an ultra long haul flight is typically between 340 to 350 tons however, at times, especially on shorter flights, the take-off weight could be as low as 210 tons to 220 tons. In such cases, the maximum permitted reduction in thrust by way of assumed temperature would still leave a large quantum of excess thrust for the take-off and climb, resulting in a very high rate of climb and rapid acceleration. Low visibility and some other weather conditions may not permit use of Reduced Thrust by way of Assumed Temperature. On the other hand, at every high take-off weight, the performance is comparatively sluggish.
During Flight Data Recorder analysis it was observed that the stick shaker incidents
occurred mainly due to one or a combination of the following:
1. Manual flying with excess bank during flap retraction at heavy weights.
2. Early flap retraction without permitting the aircraft to accelerate at the expected rate.
3. The pilot may have induced or precipitated the event by improperly manipulating the automation/disengaging automation partially, e.g. Auto Pilot engaged but Auto Throttle disengaged etc.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
A thorough understanding of the auto flight system is essential. Although it is difficult
to define every possible scenario, pilots should visualize various possibilities and
mentally revise how they would tackle them. I.e. In a particular situation what should be the sequence of de-selecting auto flight systems, taking over manual flight control if required, and the sequence of reselecting auto-flight systems. Examples of reducing the level of automation are as given below but are not restricted to those given:
i) Controlling the speed by speed intervention in VNAV.
ii) Using Altitude Hold when required to level out at short notice during
climb/descent
iii) Using Heading Hold during turn when required to stop turn in place of using
Heading Select and then selecting the required Heading
iv) Changing from VNAV to Flt. Level Change
v) Changing from LNAV to HDG Select.
Examples of sequentially deselecting Auto Flight Systems are:
i) Auto Pilot disengaged with Auto Throttle engaged
ii) Both Auto Pilot and Auto Throttle disengaged but using flight Director.
iii) Both Auto Throttle and Auto Pilot disengaged and deselecting Flight Director.
Studying incidents which have occurred in the industry and learning from them,
discussing with experienced Training Captains, would help pilots to come up with the
best strategy to adopt when faced with various scenarios. Any exceedances should be recorded in the Flight Report Book and necessary reports be raised to facilitate early technical inspection. The exceedances will be detected later through the DFDR; however the aircraft may have flown without the necessary technical inspection in the interim period. Therefore, immediate reporting is mandatory.
(Issued/Signed)
CAPT. XXXXX
GENERAL MANAGER-INCHARGE (FLIGHT SAFETY)