Karel_ x
5.4.4.1.
In the time of descend by the GS the instructions and information about following the correct flight trajectory are sending continuously with pauses between messages to give the crew a chance for communication.
The ATC commands and information can be received without confirmation after passing initial point of GP.
The crew confirms instruction of clearance (ban) for descent and landing .
Thank you for the translation... Example of a RSP + CAP by ATC The call out 8km, 6km, 3,km, 2km, 500m.
From Dukof on June 16,
The whole theory that ATCO is responding to heights called to him by crew is a very poor conclusion from CVR. Indeed, it indicates the complete opposite. ATCO calls "on course and glideslope" at 8km, at 6km, and at 4km, without any height being in the transcript beforehand. So what is he basing it on? Hence it's absolutely no reason to believe this was any different for the remaining two "on course and glideslope" calls at 3km and 2km.
The radar equipment was there, as shown on images. I can't understand why anyone would believe it was not working. Only because one person supposedly made a comment that it was not? Highly unlikely in my opinion.
It is however very interesting to observe that the 4km, 3km and 2km, "on course and glideslope" was given 400-600m too early. Which I explained in this post.
The call-out heights by ATC fit the Russian Federal regulations for the RSP + CAP approach.
The radar:
The approach plate for Smolensk RSP + CAP 100x1000:
From FlightGlobal "Crashed Polish Tu-154 struck trees below runway elevation" By David Kaminski-Morrow
"...Five days before the accident the airport was declared ready to receive both the Tu-154 and the Yakovlev Yak-40 used by the Polish presidential air wing, down to a minimums of 100m (330ft) height and 1,000m visibility."