The ICAO document doesn't replace existing NAA documents such as FAA Part 60 or EASA JAR-FSTD. I'm sure the goal of harmonised simulator design standards is a fine one, but the industry has come close to this before but diverged again. It also throws a few curve balls into the process.
Confusingly it introduces a new set of device types without clearly identifying what they are (Types I-VII). From what I can see Type VII is a full flight simulator, so the document ignores the existence of Levels A thru D devices. It also sets some criteria which are in excess of existing (for example minimum lateral visual FOV is put at 200 degrees when many operators are struggling to meet the existing 180 degree standard set out in JAR-FSTD). That is 50 degrees more than most existing simulators. How much training in simulators requires such a FOV anyway?
So the simulator world isn't going to change overnight.
As has been stated above, unusual attitude and jet upset training requires data which doesn't exist at present. Incomplete data could well result in negative training. Even stall behaviour is not adequately presented in current airliner aero models, nor does it have to be.
UA and jet upset scenarios have been programmed into simulators for decades, but risk negative training due to lack of data and the unrealistic way such upsets must be introduced. An early set of UA scenarios I recall simply put the simulator in a particular condition, frozen, then required the crew to recover when freeze was released. Some ramp in the attitude and the crew are requested to be hands off during this process. You can subtly induce a UA by failing attitude indications, but if the failure is identified the UA is never reached and so no recovery is taught.
Tee Emm
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From what I read the aircraft was not in an unusual attitude. It simply hit wake turbulence and it is drawing a long bow to claim that American Airlines actually taught the pilot concerned to apply full rudder to and fro.
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411A is correct. The NTSB report on this accident certainly mentions the AA unusual attitude training as a possible contributor. It wasn't an unusual attitude of course, but it appears that the F/O may have learned to use the rudder to pick up the wing at high AOA and applied this technique to regaining wings level in the wake turbulence, when a wheel input would have been more appropriate.