nseu
as I understand it nseu the bus uses similar philosophy for position at least.
as for air data/aoa, not certain, its been a while since I delved.
I am quite sure a fault in one should flag a failure in another if not by the box itself.
Flying along fat dumb and happy, a/p engaged (one) its onside adiru is the source.alternate adiru is selectable manually.IR or air data can be turned off also.
Even so,it just seems odd such a flt profile can be allowed given its in crz phase at speed regardless of the monitoring and available redundancies.
If there are not software changes to limit the authority of systems in such an event I'd be amazed not to mention more authoritative monitoring of aoa and air data to further limit flt ctl movement at speed.
my redundancy comment was meant as fully independent systems operating in parallel ie on coupled approach.