Originally Posted by Akrotiri bad boy
I was very close to that F700 when Flt Lt
signed for 4 sparrows, 4 'winders, and 1000 in the can. I was closer still to the scorch marks when Flt Lt
brought back just 3 'winders.
As for the excuses, it wasn't aircrew's finest moment when it came to pointing the finger. Could it just possibly have been that old sloppy link between seat and stick that failed?
There were other factors involved. Far from flying regularly with live weapons at the end of a generation exercise wiser heads recognised that the F4's weapons system wasn't exactly safe. Therefore after aircraft generation with confirmed serviceable Sparrow and Sidewinder systems the exercise stopped while live weapons were downloaded and acquisition Sidewinders and sim plugs fitted. On the fateful day the Station Commander for whatever reason skipped the downloads and launched the wing live.
The crew involved manned up late. They had both recently moved off base to local hirings and the recall plan did not reflect this. Another crew on local leave stood in while they were found. They scrambled soon after taking over and concentrated on coping with new unfamiliar Supplan Mike departure and arrival procedures. Beside the pulled cct breaker in the rear cockpit, armed aircraft were supposed to have the armmament master switch in the front cockpit immobilised with orange dayglo tape. It's 24 years ago but I'm pretty certain that the tape wasn't there. This is understandable as our armourers did not expect the jets to be launched live. They then met the Jaguar pair at Borkun (the largest POL in N Germany) at 1000' QNH and shot down No 2.
There was an interesting sequel. On the next generation exercise the CO decided to launch us again with live weapons to prove that we could operate safely. However there was a slight variation on the theme. Instead of mounting the usual autonomous LL CAPs. we were to survival scramble on vertical dispersal and carry out ML PIs under GCI control with the controllers chanting 'Check switches safe' at about 15 second intervals. These instructions were passed on telebrief to all HASs before the mass scramble. Unfortunately one crew were sunning themselves outside their HAS because an EOD exercise was going on inside. They manned up about a minute before the scramble and got airborne blissfully unaware of the plan. The R/T on Clutch was bedlam as everyone vied for handoffs to GCI, so spotting a VFR area below, the unbriefed crew stopped their climb and told Clutch that they were off to low level. Three aircraft behind them assumed that our heroes knew something that they didn't and followed them. The four then set up the usual LL CAP and spent a pleasant hour or so chasing sundry 2TAF aircraft around the N German plain. Apparently the CO was not best pleased at this apparent flouting of his cunning plan as he could see his smooth inexorable climb to ACM possibly checked. Of course it wasn't.
Some years later I met the Jaguar leader who became a good friend despite my, to him, dubious background. He told me that as they approached Borkun, Clutch reported a fast mover in their 12 o'clock so they widened to look for it. On roll out he looked back for his No 2 in time to see his tail fall off. He immediately shouted at him to eject which undoubtedly helped 2's decision making process as he was low and slightly confused to put it mildly. Incidentally that Jaguar pair eventually shared 3 ejections between them.
This sorry tale has a relatively happy ending. I fully second the remarks about what a good bloke and operator the pilot was. I too flew with him on the OCU as a student and later on the squadron. He left the service for a short while and then rejoined. He did in fact get his scraper and some time later was commended for an outstanding contribution to aircraft operations.