SayItIsntSo
"1. From the GFS base to Cheung Chau is effectively just down the road…it is a case of out through the pass a touch left and it is straight ahead…there was not a hell of a lot more that they needed to do, and I am sure that this route had been done by this pilot many times before."
Actually, there WAS a hell of a lot more this poor crew needed to do that night, namely, stop dwelling on this ridiculous performance pledge that was obviously foremost in their minds.
What they WEREN'T doing, unfortunately, was looking right at Tung Chung Pass and seeing it for what it was, which was totally obscured in cloud. They had no business even considering attempting to navigate that pass that night and yet in spite of the obvious visual reality they faced, still elected to press on.
You state you are sure this pilot had flown this route many times before. You're probably quite right in that assessment. So why then, on that night and in what were very obvious poor weather conditions, did the pilot elect to press on? What pressure was he feeling or subjected to that would literally drive him and a fellow crewman to their deaths???
I'm not trying to make light of this, rather, understand why the accident report really did nothing to address, in any amount of detail, the organisational aspect relating to this accident. If you ask me, the accident report is just a little too tidy and confined in its scope.
JW
Last edited by Joker's Wild; 14th Jun 2006 at 13:42.