To: BIT
I developed a computerized FMEA for Agusta for use on the A 129 and modified it for use on the EH 101. I worked for Agusta on a consulting basis for almost three years and then performed the same service for six months for the firm that built the hydraulic system. We used the same system on this contract as well.
Our counterparts at Westland constructed a similar system but after their system was fully developed we found out that the two systems were incompatible due to different programming structure and different mainframe computers. A system was to be constructed to allow the computers at Agusta and Westland to talk to each other but while I was on the program this system was not fully developed nor was it tested to my knowledge.
I attended a meeting at EHI offices in London where Agusta and Westland were presenting their respective R&M programs and assigning the respective workloads. Both Westland and Agusta were committing themselves to a level of effort that would be impossible to accomplish. Westland at that time was reducing the size of their product assurance department and Agusta only had five R&M engineers besides myself working the EH 101 program. These five engineers were in training and required constant guidance from myself. Besides, they had limited English skills.
I sat through the meeting and finally I couldn’t take any more. I tore into both companies for committing to such a heavy workload with inadequate staffing. In the process of this lambasting the Agusta manager took offense. When we returned to Italy, the manager told the five R&M engineers to not talk to me nor, could they ask any questions. Shortly after that, he told the men to remove the catastrophic failures. During the next thirty days I sat and read magazines, went out on the flight line and watched helicopters being built. After this enforced situation I went to work for the director of Agusta with the responsibility to integrate the engineering department with the product support department. Six months of concerted effort and it never happened. To my knowledge the two departments are still not speaking to each other and that was over 12 years ago.
The document required for certification are separate from those documents that establish the reliability and maintainability requirements and the safety requirements are still another document. In the certification process the helicopter is tested against the requirements of
Advisory Circular 29-2A (Certification of transport category rotorcraft) or, the JAR equivalent.
This document is performance oriented and has no relationship to safety, reliability or maintainability. If the FMEA is prepared against a military contract, the client has access to all of the documentation. On a civil contract the client can request access to the FMEA but he must come to the manufacturers facility to see the documents. This is also true for the documentation used in the safety analysis.
The latest rotor brake problem was determined by Royal Navy investigators to have been caused by a maintenance error. This would not normally be addressed in the FMEA unless it could be seen as a possibility. The first two failures were addressed in the FMEA but later removed. These failures resulted in a loss of life.