Dear tilt,
Check the POH on page ii and you will see that the certification signoff for the R22 and by definition the R44 was granted by the Manager, Flight Test Branch of the Transport Airplane Directorate which is based in Seattle. I ask you, what the hell do these people know about helicopters? The helicopter certification branch is in Fort Worth, Texas. Most certification Authorities have a lot of tallented people that are technically qualified to do their jobs. On the other hand they have a lot of technical dim bulbs that are not qualified for their positions but governments being what they are these people stay on. First of all, Frank Robinson was the DER for some time during certification. This is against FAA regs and both the FAA and NTSB were aware of it. Could it be that he, being the great persuader, convinced the FAA that all of the tests were done and in doing so proved to the FAA that his design was certifiable. Nobody knows and nobody is talking. All of the players have a vested interest in keeping quiet. The FAA can't admit that there are problems in the design as to do so they would have to admit to making a major error in granting certification. And Robinson Helicopters certainly not going to admit anything. This in legal terms is called conflict of interest and would make the participants legally culpable.
Now I want to give you a practical illustration of the calibre of the technical capabilities of members of the CAA, DGCA and the LBA. The following took place in the eighties. The following was a post I made on the Tech Log thread
I was visiting the IASA web site and read several articles dealing with the incompetence of FAA personnel and how they didn’t let that incompetence stop them from forcing an airline out of business. I had an experience with similar incompetence when I worked on the Airbus program. As senior RMS engineer for a German company that was the lead contractor on the flap / slat drive system design I had to attend a design review meeting at the home facility of our English design partner.
The purpose of the meeting was to make a final determination about the run of the hydraulic lines that powered the wing tip brakes. Another part of the design review was to determine if it was necessary to incorporate anti flail guards on the slat drive system. The Integration contractor from Germany and the English wing designer were in favor of running the lines along the front spar as this would simplify the tubing run and it would be cheaper. To prove their design philosophy they had the English partner of the German firm conduct a test.
The test consisted of an electrical drive motor connected to a Hook’s joint that was attached to a short section of the slat drive shaft. This short shaft was supported by a live center to allow shaft rotation and the live center could also be disconnected to allow the shaft to fall as if it suffered a mechanical disconnect. They filmed the entire test and presented it to the meeting attendees. In attendance were representatives of the CAA, the LBA and the DGCA.
In the film, the shaft was brought up to design speed of about 1400 RPM. When the shaft was disconnected the shaft fell to an angle of about 20 to 30 degrees off of the drive line center. The shaft continued to rotate and it did not flail. They showed several tests filmed from different angles and each time the shaft fell and continued to rotate with out flailing. With that the certification authorities along with the wing designer and the integration contractor stated that it was not necessary to provide anti flail guards and that the hydraulic lines could be routed along the front spar. Case closed. Or, was it.
After the presentation I asked my English counterpart to step out side. I asked him if he thought there was something wrong with the test and he agreed with me that the shaft should have started to flail after dropping several degrees off drive center due to lock –up of the hooks joint.
We went back into the meeting room and every one was congratulating each other. We asked the test engineer to come outside with us. In the hall, we asked him about the test and why the Hooks joint didn’t lock up. He stated that he didn’t use a Hooks joint because the German design firm would not provide one due to a shortage and that they were behind in their delivery schedule to the integration contractor. We asked him what he had used in place of the Hooks joint and he told us that he had used a shaft and coupling from (If I remember correctly) a BAC 111 which used constant velocity joints. If my counterpart and I were not in that meeting the A310 would have the hydraulic lines routed along the front spar and there would be no anti flail guards. If in that configuration a shaft had separated the A310 would lose all three hydraulic systems which would make the aircraft a bit difficult to control.
The test was rerun using the correct Hooks joint and shaft resulting in the lines being run in front of the front spar and behind the rear spar and anti flail devices were incorporated.
The integration contractor and the wing designer in their zeal to be proven correct didn’t catch it and the certification authorities didn’t have a clue.
There is one person that could shed a great deal of light on this subject but to do so would jeopardize his position. That person is Tim Tucker who performed all of the flight testing for certification.
This is how it works the other way:
I was aware of several severe design deficiencies on the A310 wing and I made these facts known to my supervisors. It was their contention that if they were to bring the problems up to Airbus they (the German firm) would have to absorb the cost of the change. I jacked it up one level to the Integration contractor. They said the same thing. I then went to the top which was BAe
who designed the wing. They told me that they were sympathetic to my problem but they couldn't help me. It should be noted that problems that effect reliability, maintainability or safety must immediately be brought to the attention of Airbus Industrie. It was never done. When the A310 was certified in the United States the FAA took the word of the JAA and only performed a few tests to verify operating costs and block times. Later I notified the FAA about the problems and when they contacted the DGCA they stated that the problems were solved. I contacted a good friend and he told me that the design was not changed. I again notified the FAA and this time they acted. As a result the VP and the program manager at the German firm were fired. The design however was never changed. I aasume because of a cost benefit analysis performed by the FAA and the using airlines.
The whole process sucks and people like you are flying in aircraft certificated by people like them. Your only salvation is people like me.
------------------
The Cat
[This message has been edited by Lu Zuckerman (edited 22 October 2000).]