ExEng...Thank you for your post. I have read the Trident report and have it here.
IMHO...I feel the Somatogravic illusion kills by rendering all the flightdeck incapable of action and it requires a number of steps into its jaws.
I agree with Ironbutt that the way to avoid taking these steps is to stick closely to Sop.
However this assumes the Sop and training are correct??
If not the sops provide and assist the first step closer to a Somatogravic illusion and accident.
In the Trident case I suggest dumping the droops and getting the stick push and the auto pilot disconecting, all in IMC, accelerating,then not, climbing rapidly then not, were sufficient to render four of Britains most highly trained low vis pilots, well used to instrument scan incapable of redeploying the droops, or comprehending what they had actually done, what was happening and simply reversing their last actions i.e. redploy the droops, reconnect the autopilot,and reset the stick push override.
Had a stick push ever killed a Trident crew?
I feel something sinister overtook this entire highly trained crew, and it also overtook the 3 Gulf Air A320 pilots on GF072.
I do not accept (yet) "They F....d up" or "They never should have been hired" as a worthy or concluding tribute to these seven pilots.
There were three A320 pilots on the Gf072 flight deck and a series of events I feel also took them well into the Somatogravic jaws.
They were all,(like all of the Trident crew) rendered incapable of proper flap action, autopilot engagement, or manual instrument flying when overtaken by this illusion.
On a positive note I hope Gulf Air will now discourage high speed below ten requests in the speed restricted airspaces.
Will go back to the 1974 company sops regarding the acceptence of night nonprecision approaches around the Gulf which were introduced after two similar fatal accidents on the RW12 Vor Bah.
Hold a seminar for their pilots on the "Black Hole" effect and the "Somatogravic" illusion on aircrew and aircraft operation.
Brief Atc on the dangers of multiple,high speed, instructions and questioning crews at low altitude during approaches and go arounds and immediatly on main gear touchdown on landings, especially in bad weather or at night.
Introduce a Star arrival from Saudi airspace to intercept the Rw 12 Vor final.
Or better still put an ILs onto RW12 as suggested by an Australian flight safety
proffesional.
Put an ILs on RW16 at Doha which is also a trap in low vis.
All of the above IMHO will be helpful to any remaining Gulf Air pilots.